By the middle of 1942 the geographical focus of the resistance in Yugoslavia, its political orientation, and the distribution of occupation spheres had changed drastically from the previous summer and fall. Rebel activity had all but ceased in Serbia and Montenegro and now was confined to Independent Croatia, especially western Bosnia; instead of representing a hasty and strained alliance of all anti-Axis elements, the resistance was now predominantly a Partisan effort. The occupation system created by the treaties of May 1941 had broken down due to competition over zones of influence, disputes over policies towards the civilian populations, and some notable failures to deal with the anarchy and civil war in Croatia. In the western half of former Yugoslavia, the Italians had extended their occupation zone dramatically, mainly in opposition to the Croatian Ustaši, and gave several indications of pursuing a basically pro-Serb policy. This had the effect of hastening the falling out between the non-Communist Serb nationalists and the Partisans; the result of such divisions was usually to pit former Yugoslav officers and local Serb notables against the Communist party leaders. As a result of these changes, the parent Chetnik movement, dominated by Mihailović and his fellow officers and based in Serbia, became a weak underground
organization; in Independent Croatia and Montenegro, Italian policies and the initiative of officers and civilian intermediaries had conspired to create a whole web of armed movements, which were anti-Partisan collaborationist, usually at odds with the Ustaši government and the non-Serb civilian populations and at least potential allies of a revived Mihailović movement.

After the end of 1941, General Mihailović, unlike Tito, had no sizeable armed following under his immediate command but had to organize somehow the confusing assortment of bands commanded by the Montenegrin officers and the local chiefs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This involved the difficult tasks of imposing some form of military organization capable of coordinating the activities of the various Serb groups and establishing a common adherence of unit leaders to Mihailović’s personal authority and long-range goals. As early as the beginning of 1942, when he made his first efforts to lay the groundwork for the organization of the Montenegrin Chetniks, he stressed his preference for the command of active and reserve officers rather than local civilian notables and prescribed that each detachment (odred) consist of three bands or companies (četa); mobile fighting units would include only men under the age of thirty; older recruits would train themselves for sabotage warfare and take care of local police functions.¹ These instructions were, almost needless to say, somewhat unrealistic since the Montenegrin officers had not yet put together a well-organized movement and most of the formations in Italian-occupied Croatia were led by civilians.

As regards immediate strategic guidelines, Mihailović’s staff was at first hampered by their ignorance of the situation in western Yugoslavia and was thoroughly inconsistent. In his important instructions to the Montenegrins Lašić and Djurišić of December 1941, Mihailović closed with an exhortation to “attack, kill and sabotage the occupation troops with the slogan ‘Death to the Occupiers’” ² but in January urged them to avoid clashes with the Germans, Italians, and Partisans. In February Mihailović supported and sanctioned Stanišić’s move toward active anti-Partisan collaboration, but by this time the Partisans were on the verge of complete collapse in Montenegro and Mihailović was almost certainly

¹ Command of Chetnik Detachments of Yugoslavian Army/Mountain Staff (Mihailović), “Instructions for Carrying out Mobilization,” 7 January 1942, Dokumenti o Izdajstvu Draže Mihailovića, no. 9. Another order, dated 5 February 1942, which also deals with measures to be taken for the organization of the Chetnik formations in Montenegro, is cited by Dušan Živković, Boka Kotorška i Paštrovči u Narodnooslobodilačkoj Borbi (Belgrade: Vojno Delo, 1964).

² As indicated previously, this document can be found in the collection of evidence used during the Chetnik trials after the war (Dokumenti o Izdajstvu Draže Mihailovića), in the Zbornik series, and in the Italian microfilmed documents. R. Missione Militare Italiana in Croazia to Comando Supremo, “Disposizioni emanate dal capo cetenico, Generale Draze Mihailović,” 16 July 1942, T-821, roll 347, frame 822.
following events rather than initiating them. According to Chetnik sources, he was not successful in establishing direct ties with Djukanović and Jevdjević until late spring, and when he wrote them in late April, he refused to give precise orders for their next course of action because he lacked contacts with their formations and, therefore, adequate information on the confusing events in the western provinces. 8

Until the middle of 1942, Mihailović was a general without a fighting organization in Serbia and still lacked control over developments in the rest of Yugoslavia. Nonetheless, the Chetnik staff thought they could rebuild the movement by co-opting the collaborationist formations and, with Allied recognition and support, were certain of Germany’s ultimate defeat and the reconstruction of Yugoslavia along Serb nationalist lines. The postwar goals of the Chetniks, as Mihailović saw them in December 1941, bore no relation to what the weak officers’ movement could hope to accomplish in the immediate future and went far beyond a restoration of the political status quo ante bellum. In his orders to Lašić and Djurišić, he outlined an ambitious set of aims which combined his expected anti-Communist and pro-monarchic orientation with plans for territorial adjustments and domestic reconstruction inspired by both Greater Yugoslavia and the most extreme sort of Greater Serb passions. Reminding the Montenegrins that he was relying for final victory on the aid of “the great democracies, England, America, Russia and China,” he established as the Chetnik long-range program:

1. the struggle for the freedom of all our people under the scepter of his Majesty King Peter II;
2. the creation within a Greater Yugoslavia of a Greater Serbia, ethnically pure, which will include Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Syrmia, Banat, and Bačka;
3. the struggle for the annexation to our state of all Slavic territories ruled by the Italians and Germans (Trieste, Gorizia, Istria, Carniola);
4. the removal from the state territory of all minorities and a-national elements;
5. the creation of a common frontier between Serbia and Slovenia and Serbia and Montenegro by removing from the Sandžak all the Muslims and from Bosnia-Herzegovina the Muslims and Croats;
6. the punishment of all the Ustaši and those Muslims who have in these tragic days pitilessly destroyed our people;
7. the punishment of everyone guilty for the April catastrophe;
8. the colonization of those areas purged of minorities and a-national elements with Montenegrins. 1

Mihailović and his staff assumed that the Axis Powers would lose the war, but, before that happened, the officers had to eliminate or at least reduce drastically the influence of the Partisan resistance and take all measures necessary to protect the Serbs, especially those in Independent Croatia, from the ravages of Axis and Ustaši reprisals. Collaboration with the Italians served both of these ends, yet there was always the danger that the Serb nationalist formations would gradually be reduced to the level of police formations attached to the occupation forces, that the tactic of collaboration would lead to a weakening of the Chetnik political position in London, or even that the Italians would soon drop out of the war, thus isolating the Chetniks. In any event, Mihailović’s long-range program, not to mention the events in Serbia of 1941, placed an immediate priority on a Partisan defeat; moreover, the spontaneously formed and often civilian-led Serb nationalist bands in western Yugoslavia were already bound to an anti-Communist line, and even those Chetniks who were enthusiastic about resisting the Ustaši often had to cooperate, at least formally with the occupation powers’ anti-Partisan measures.

Mihailović, then, had to establish his own authority over collaborationist bands without frightening the Germans and Italians and, so that their cooperation with the occupation order would be temporary, had to bring about the rapid collapse of Tito’s Partisan republic in western Bosnia. The Chetnik officers felt compelled to collaborate, but only selectively and on their own terms, and they were just as determined to prepare to turn against the Axis at the right moment. This effort would perhaps take place in the event of an Italian exit from the war or a Partisan collapse, for the Germans would then be in a position to wage an unobstructed struggle against the officers; it would certainly take place if the Allies launched an amphibious operation in the Balkans. In the meantime, Mihailović and his staff officers had to take drastic measures to coordinate and direct the activities of the several armed formations so that collaboration served their ends and so that they would be in a position to transform the Chetniks suddenly into a resistance force as soon as they felt events justified a general uprising.

These efforts began to show results by midsummer of 1942. In April Radmilo Grdjić, a close collaborator with Jevdjević and intermediary with Roatta, visited Trifunović in Split and General Djukanović in Cetinje and won their agreement to place their formations under Mihailović’s control. Chetnik headquarters, however, had practically no ties with the formation leaders themselves, except probably Đurišić, and, a few months later, Mihailović decided to do more than rely on couriers and letters, and prepared for a personal encounter with the Herzegovinian leaders.
The immediate aim of these contacts was to bring about a working alliance between the Herzegovinian civilian spokesmen and the Montenegrin officers. Mihailović, whose ties with the Montenegrins were closer, must have had some role in arranging a meeting between Trifunović and Colonel Stanisić in mid-July at Gačko, Herzegovina; he certainly sent a permanent personal delegate, Petar Baćović, for the purpose of maintaining continuous contact with Jevdjević and Trifunović. About a week after the meeting with Stanisić, Mihailović himself slipped over the Montenegrin border and presided over a two-day conference at Avtovac, Herzegovina, with Jevdjević and Trifunović.

Although the only source for this meeting is an account of what the Herzegovinian leaders told the Italians about it, it is possible by examining this and other evidence to situate Mihailović's actions in an intelligible pattern of Chetnik strategy. His encounter with Jevdjević and Trifunović and his subsequent approval of their collaborationist policies make it clear that he was fully aware of and in agreement with the temporary arrangements with the Italian command in Yugoslavia. There is no reason to believe that Mihailović had altered in any serious way the postwar aims of the Chetnik movement as given to Lašić and Djurišić in December 1941. On 23 July, in fact, the second day of the Mihailović conference, Jevdjević and Trifunović left for nearby Trebinje, conferred with Radmilo Grđić and another of the Chetnik political agents, Milan Šantić, and established as their ultimate goals and immediate strategy: (1) the creation of Greater Serbia; (2) the destruction of the Partisans; (3) the removal of the Catholics and Muslims; (4) nonrecognition of Croatia; (5) no collaboration with the Germans; and (6) tempo-

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7 The source for this meeting is a German translation of an Italian intelligence report to the Foreign Office in Rome: Vittorio Castellani (representative of Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Second Army headquarters) to Königliche Ministerium Aus. Angeleg, “Treffen des serbischen Führer mit Draža Mihailović und seine Erklärung,” 23 August 1942, T-821, roll 252, frames 297–300.
8 This, of course, is stoutly denied in all the pro-Chetnik literature, most of it written right after the war and primarily designed to rehabilitate Mihailović after his trial. Often the argument is that Mihailović was vaguely aware of the collaboration of his supporters but was unable to prevent it since he had no control over them. In other instances the denials are even more extreme. For example, John Plamenatz, The Case of General Mihailović (Gloucester: John Bellows, 1944), writes that “though Mihailović was in occasional contact with the Serbs in Dalmatia, there is no evidence that he urged them to get arms from the Italians to fight the Partisans,” (p. 18) and that “Mihailović, however, never sought Italian help against the Partisans, neither directly nor through subordinates, nor did he advise anyone else to do so” (p. 19).
Mihailović's immediate strategy was based on a selective and tactical sort of collaboration, a refusal to attempt arrangements with the Germans, and, most important, a determination to carry on parallel civil wars against both the Partisans and the Chetniks' national enemies. The officer leadership, as Serb nationalists, not only encouraged the recurrent outrages committed by the armed formations against the Croats and Muslims as a part of general policy and in a spirit of revenge for everything the Serb civilians had suffered but also were convinced in the middle of 1942 that they were about to be faced with a new wave of Ustaši violence. Jevdjević and Trifunović, in a rather startling admission to the Italians, related that Mihailović was considering evacuating the Serb civilians from Herzegovina to Montenegro and moving Montenegrin Chetniks north to meet the Ustaši. The basic reason for this strategy was that the Serb nationalists and Mihailović had by then discovered that the Italian anti-Ustaši policies in Yugoslavia were being revised and that the Second Army had already agreed to restore a large part of occupied Croatia to Zagreb's control. The Italian decision, confirmed by an agreement signed with the Croatian government on 19 June, to withdraw practically all the Second Army occupation troops from the third zone was part of a general retreat from their earlier attempts to establish predominant influence in Independent Croatia and reflected Rome's growing concern over the mounting disorders in Slovenia and Dalmatia.

The meeting between Mihailović and the Herzegovinian Chetnik leaders came shortly after the announcement of the shift in occupation zones, which the officers understandably thought would work to their disadvantage by contracting the area in which they enjoyed Italian toleration. Moreover, underestimating the disintegration of the Croatian armed and police forces, the Chetniks, as indicated by Mihailović's frantic pro-

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9 The source for this meeting is a report by the German consulate in Sarajevo. The program outlined above agrees with Mihailović's earlier instructions and has to be taken seriously because the Germans at Sarajevo had established ties with Jevdjević in May and could have gotten this information through collaborationist Chetniks, like the group led by Savo Derekonja, in the vicinity of the Bosnian capital. Deutsche Konsulat in Sarajevo to Deutsche Gesandtschaft in Zagreb, "Milan Santić vor Cetnici-Führern in Trebinje," 20 August 1942, T-501, roll 265, frame 1026.


11 A little over a month after the Italian evacuation, Croatian authorities were already asking Roatta to send help to their hard-pressed forces at Livno, which the Partisans...
posals at Avtovac, braced themselves for clashes with the returning Ustaši and attempted to shore up their arrangements with the Italians by pressing for a major joint anti-Partisan drive in western Bosnia.

Further events in the summer confirmed the Chetniks' suspicions that Italian cooperation and support against the Ustaši was ending and that it had to be exploited immediately against the Partisans. Mihailović rejected an offer made jointly by Jevđjević and the Italians to arrange a meeting between himself and Second Army officers, permitted one of his closest collaborators, Major Ostojačić, to launch a counterattack against Ustaši troops at Foča in August, and instructed his chief agent in Bosnia, a Chetnik from Serbia, Captain Račić, to prepare the Bosnian Chetniks for military operations. In short, while the Italians were trying to mend fences with Zagreb and were even agreeing to rearm Croatian anti-Partisan formations, Mihailović's subordinates, especially Ostojačić and Račić, appeared bent on pursuing a basically anti-Ustaši course.

The prospects of a continued Italian withdrawal to the Adriatic and a revival of Ustaši activities in the Serb parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina had the added effect of hastening Mihailović's adoption of a tactically collaborationist line. Faced with a confrontation with both the Partisans and the Ustaši in Independent Croatia and convinced that effective Italian support would not last long, the officers tried to salvage what they could with the Second Army and to fulfill one of their basic aims by proposing a grand joint operation against Tito's Partisan republic in western Bosnia. Mihailović probably conveyed this plan to his associates at the Avtovac conference; soon after, both Bacović and Trifunović were besieging. Commissariato Generale Militare/Capo di Stato Maggiore to Comando 2. Armata, “N. 76 del 31 luglio 1942,” 31 July 1942, T-821, roll 64, frame 221.


In September Račić was sending instructions to various Chetnik groups in Bosnia with such openly Greater Serb phrases as “Who will rule Bosnia: the Communists or the Serbs?”

Present-day Yugoslav historians like Plenča (Dušan Plenča, Medjunarodni Odnosi Jugoslavije u Toku Drugog Svjetskog Rata [Yugoslavia's international relations during World War II] [Belgrade: Institut Drustvenih Nauka, 1962], p. 130) and Kaćavenda (“Kriza Četničkog Pokreta,” p. 281), employing evidence presented at Mihailović's trial in 1946, assert that the general told Trifunović, Jevđjević, and Bacović at Avtovac to begin negotiations with the Italians immediately for a combined operation, using Chetnik units from Montenegro, Herzegovina, Dalmatia, and the Lika against the Partisans in western Bosnia. The only Italian source on this meeting makes no specific mention of Mihailović's plan for an anti-Partisan operation, although it is
brought up the project at the headquarters of the Italian Sixth and Eighteenth Army Corps.

The Italians, who were trying to patch up relations with Zagreb to ensure adequate Croatian troop strength in the evacuated areas, found themselves in a delicate position and even refused for a while to sanction the proposal.\textsuperscript{18} By the end of August, though, Mihailović was issuing directives to his units, many of which were operating in Croatian sovereign territory, to prepare for an anti-Partisan action in Bosanska Krajina in conjunction with Italian and Ustaši troops.\textsuperscript{19} Trifunović soon took the Chetnik scheme to Roatta’s headquarters at Sussak, where he argued for a large-scale combined anti-Partisan operation in northern Dalmatia and the Lika.\textsuperscript{20} On 9 and 10 September Trifunović was continuing to press the matter with the Italians, arguing that the first snowfalls would begin in the mountainous western Bosnian area in the second half of October. According to Chetnik plans, roughly 7,500 “militiamen” would join the Italians in the operation; the largest contingents would be 3,000 troops under the command of the Bosnian Drenović and, most significant, another 3,000 men from Herzegovina.\textsuperscript{21}

Roatta evidently appeared receptive to the Chetnik project, for Trifunović wrote to Mihailović on 20 September that “not only our own troops but also Italian units will undertake a single operation of very wide proportions against the Partisans in the Jajce-Glamoc-Livno-Duvno-Gornji Vukuf sector.”\textsuperscript{22} Roatta, in fact, flew to Rome on 13 September, where Comando Supremo cautiously approved the plan but only on the rather unlikely condition that Zagreb be consulted and that Croatian troops participate in the operation.\textsuperscript{23} A week later, when Roatta visited Pavelić, the whole project seemed about to collapse. The \textit{poglavnik} rejected absolutely the use of Chetnik formations in areas populated by Croats

\textsuperscript{18} This is clear from letters from Baćović to Trifunović of 6 August and Trifunović to Mihailović, sent some time in August, cited in an excellent article by Miso Leković, “Planovi Draže Mihailovića za Uništenje Partizanske Države u zapadnoj Bosni u drugoj polovini 1942 godine” (Draža Mihailović’s plans to destroy the Partisan state in western Bosnia in the second half of 1942), \textit{Jugoslovenski Istorizki Časopis} 1 (1966): 84.

\textsuperscript{19} The order went out on 28 August 1942. Plenča, \textit{Medjunarodni Odnosi Jugoslavije}, p. 131.

\textsuperscript{20} Leković, “Planovi Draže Mihailovića,” p. 86.


\textsuperscript{22} Leković, “Planovi Draže Mihailovića,” p. 86.

\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 87.
and Muslims.\textsuperscript{21} In Zagreb, the Second Army commander not only refused to back the Chetnik strategy strongly but also confided to Croatian officials that he was seriously concerned about the recent behavior of the Serb armed groups.\textsuperscript{22}

Mihailović’s first major effort to employ a collaborationist strategy with the Italians was a failure almost from the start. Officials at Second Army headquarters were alarmed by their recent discovery of Jevđjević’s and Trifunović’s ties with Mihailović, tended to assume that all Serb armed bands were being organized by the officers,\textsuperscript{26} and had serious reservations regarding the Chetniks’ long-haul political program. Mihailović’s intermediaries did little to allay these suspicions; Trifunović, in fact, after pledging that the Chetniks would willingly fight alongside both Catholic and Muslim anti-Partisan militia forces, appealed for Italian support for a Chetnik-inspired postwar reconstruction of Yugoslavia in which Serbia would be enlarged to include Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro.\textsuperscript{27}

At this point, Mihailović probably had little if any control over many of the Serb armed formations and was in no position to turn suddenly against the Axis. The occupation authorities, however, were more impressed by his recent contacts with the chief Serb spokesmen and tended to overestimate dramatically his influence with the non-Communist formations. The Chetnik officer-delegates had, in fact, only just begun to put together an organization in western Yugoslavia, were attempting to pursue a strategy which was at the same time anti-Ustaši and anti-Partisan, and proposed to the Italians the use of only about one-third of the Serb nationalist units in the anti-rebel drive.

By the latter part of September, Second Army headquarters, after a month of negotiations with the officers’ spokesmen concerning an anti-Partisan action, was basically interested in sounding out Jevđjević and Trifunović for the purpose of ascertaining the exact nature of their relations with Mihailović, the long-range goals of the movement, and the precise strength of their formations. On 21 September, in a conference with two Chetnik deputies, Roatta himself reaffirmed the Italian decision to avoid any kind of support or toleration of the Chetniks’ postwar political aims and stressed that the Serb formations were to fight for “exclusively anti-Communist ends” and must shun “any sort of political activity of an anti-Croat nature.” Trying to smooth over their tense rela-

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p. 88.
\textsuperscript{22} Kasche to Aus. Amt./Pol. IV, “Telegramm N. 2637 vom 19.9. 1942,” 19 September 1942, T-120, roll 208, frame 245/161299.
\textsuperscript{26} See, for example, the Italians’ unrealistic estimate of Chetnik strength in eastern Bosnia and the Sandžak in Comando 2. Armata to Comando Supremo, “Milizie cetniche,” 26 September 1942, T-821, roll 31, frame 364.
tions with the Italians, Jevdjević and Trifunović insisted that Mihailović was "the effective leader only in Serbia and Macedonia" and agreed that their formations be employed only in areas populated predominantly by Serbs.

The Chetnik negotiators refused, however, to back down completely. They promised to cooperate with Croat and Muslim anti-Partisan formations and to submit to the Italians' overall command, but they demanded that Serb units operating outside the Italian zone take orders from Trifunović and their own unit leaders, and, in spite of Roatta's warnings about their Greater Serb political designs, they declared again that "the aim of the Chetnik forces is to save the Serb people and to create the means which, at the end of the war, can materialize the boundaries of the Serbian nation." 28

The Chetnik leaders, in fact, gave little indication that they were willing to accept the status of auxiliary police formations under Italian command. On 22 September, shortly after Trifunović and Jevdjević had dismissed Mihailović as only a "moral" head of the armed formations in western Yugoslavia, they were forced to admit to the Italians that they had held another meeting with the general on 16 September near Nevesinje.29 Trifunović suddenly charged the Italians with doubting his loyalty and insisted that cooperation between the Chetniks and the Second Army would be possible only if Roatta tolerated the continuation of propaganda "in the Serb nationalist spirit" and permitted "the greatest possible autonomy of action as far as their internal affairs are concerned."

While Mihailović's negotiators persisted in demanding the freedom to develop a Serb nationalist program, the armed formations continued to terrorize Croat and Muslim civilians. In August and September various Serb bands fanned out from the Nevesinje area throughout Herzegovina and into parts of Dalmatia, where they often wreaked vengeance on Croat peasants.30 In this area, which included most of Herzegovina and had recently been evacuated by the Italians, none of the contending occupying powers or rebel groups had effective control. The situation was becoming increasingly anarchic, local bands were taking matters

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into their hands, and the Axis occupation authorities, for understandable reasons, tended to suspect the worst of the Chetnik officers. At the end of September Pavelić refused again to sanction a combined anti-Partisan drive in which Chetniks would take part, and Roatta acquiesced. At the same time, Trifunović wrote to Mihailović that the Italians were becoming very suspicious of the ties between the Serb representatives and the officers and that Second Army headquarters was determined to prohibit “anti-Croat manifestations as well as our public propaganda for the creation of a free, national state.” Mihailović’s organization had to deal now with increasing “meddling of the Italian Army in the Chetniks’ internal affairs.”

The Germans, whose main concern was the safety of the bauxite mines in Herzegovina, finally intervened to encourage the Italians to launch the action, but the proposed operation, whose goals were the Livno-Prozor area north of Mostar, fell far short of what Mihailović had hoped. In early October final preparations for a combined anti-Partisan operation in western Bosnia called for a two-pronged thrust: the German 714th and 718th divisions and Croat units would operate from the north, and the Italian “Messina” division and about three thousand Herzegovinian Chetniks would drive from the Neretva River toward Prozor.

The Germans and, therefore, Pavelić tolerated this limited participation of Serb formations only in order to induce the Italians to make a greater contribution. Almost immediately after the operation began, individual Chetnik bands, acting contrary to Italian directives and perhaps also to Mihailović’s orders, used the opportunity to seize Ustaši functionaries, kill over five hundred Croat and Muslim civilians, and launch a campaign of Serb nationalist revenge.

Chetnik officers and civilian unit leaders indulged in a flurry of wildly anti-Croat and anti-Ustaši political activities. In Dubrovnik a group of former Yugoslav officers were reported to have created an underground organization dedicated to the destruction of the Ustaši state. In other instances, the Serb leaders were more open about their long-range goals. Djujić, whose formations in the mountains of western Herzegovina were making sporadic raids into Croatia, stated categorically that he would strike against the Ustaši state once the war was over. The Ustaši, on their part, were not slow to respond, launching a campaign in Herzegovina aimed at exterminating Serbs and collaborating with the Croats.

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32 Ibid., p. 91.
Bosnia were operating near Tito's Partisan republic, gave a speech to his followers in which he declared that “we Chetniks have to be in good relations with the Croats for the time being in order to get a large number of arms and munitions, but when the proper time comes we will settle accounts with them.” At Mostar, a letter signed by Jevđe­vić, setting forth a Chetnik program of establishing a postwar Greater Serbia and urging that all Serbs maintain a hostile attitude toward Pavelić’s régime, was widely circulated.

By the end of October it became clear that the Chetnik intermediaries were making certain promises to the Italians while encouraging the rank and file of the armed formations to do just the opposite. The evidence suggests strongly that in these parts of Yugoslavia, formally attached to Croatia and occupied successively by Ustaši and Italians, the Chetnik groups were motivated far more by intense hatred for the Croats and Muslims than by anti-Partisan sentiments. Mihailović, although primarily interested in destroying Tito’s movement as soon as possible, evidently did little to restrain the prevailing mood of national revenge. His own appointees, like Petar Baćović, a former reserve officer and lawyer and then commander of the Chetniks in Herzegovina and eastern Bosnia, openly announced plans to destroy whole Muslim villages.

Over the short term the officers and the Serb bands succeeded in waging an anarchic civil war and escaping major reprisals. Pavelić and the German representatives in Zagreb, Kasche and Glaise von Horstenau, dispatched a stream of complaints to Rome and Berlin but had to be satisfied with Roatta’s vague promises to reduce his support for the Chetnik formations. In actual fact, most of Herzegovina was in a state of total chaos and, until someone with the troops and inclination intervened, was prey to an array of ravaging armed groups. Pavelić spoke of reprisals against the Serb formations but encountered Italian resistance and could not carry them out. Hitler could not afford to shape his Balkan policy according to Kasche’s recommendations, and

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39 Zanussi, Guerra e catastrofe, p. 268.
Ribbentrop once more had to point out to the German minister that "now as before the Italo-German alliance is the basis of our foreign policy and that under no circumstances must we let ourselves be dragged into a conflict with the Italians on account of Croatian interests." Roatta, despite all his misgivings regarding the political activities of the Chetnik leaders, favored pulling the Italian units back to the Adriatic and avoiding the drain of major anti-Partisan operations. By the fall of 1942, when the prospects of an Axis victory in North Africa appeared unlikely, Second Army headquarters was thinking more and more in terms of the final defense of the Italian peninsula and was less interested than ever in hunting Communist guerrillas or taking drastic action against Mihailović.

The Chetniks survived the fall basically unmolested not because they were strong and well organized but because their numerous opponents either could not or would not act. Not only were their successes essentially negative, but their overall strategy was a complete failure. Militarily they depended more than ever on the Italians, and the major drive from Herzegovina against Tito's stronghold in western Bosnia never materialized. The “Messina” division, for example, which took Prozor and Livno from the Partisans, was quickly withdrawn to the coast and the Chetniks had to pull back with them. Italian generals began to lose whatever illusions they had about the discipline, organization, and combat-effectiveness of the Serb formations. More important, in the western Bosnian sector, where the Chetnik leaders Djujić and Drenović had hoped to join forces, the Partisans not only were holding on but seemed to be gaining the upper hand.

In short, Mihailović's hurried strategy of stopping Tito and asserting Chetnik strength in the Serb parts of the Ustaši state failed to achieve either objective. By the late fall of 1942, the Chetniks had little military strength outside of Herzegovina and Montenegro, where Italian toleration, more than anything else, accounted for their temporary ascendancy. In Herzegovina, where Mihailović's agents and spokesmen were most active, the Chetniks' savage reprisals against the Croat and Muslim
civilian communities forfeited whatever chances they might have had of expanding their popular base and did little to improve their image in the eyes of their Italian sponsors.

To the extent that Mihailović was pursuing any overall strategy in 1942, it was to wage a series of simultaneous parallel wars. In western Yugoslavia, he attempted to capitalize on Italian support by challenging the Ustaši and to knock Tito out—before the expected Allied Balkan landing, he hoped. In order to maintain the confidence of the British, which his tacit cooperation with the Italians was bound to strain, he also decided to employ his underground organization in Serbia in a sabotage campaign against German railway movements. This form of anti-German resistance was the least risky, since the Chetniks no longer had a significant armed movement in Serbia, and it served to demonstrate to the Allies that the Chetniks had the means to create diversions in the German rear in the event of an amphibious operation in the Balkans.

Until well into the summer of 1942 the remainder of the Chetnik organization in Serbia was so weak and inactive that the German authorities even rejected Nedić’s requests that the “illegal” formations be disarmed immediately. The Chetniks refrained from armed clashes with either the Germans or Nedić’s forces and preferred infiltrating the Quisling administration; the Germans refused to consider any anti-rebel drives before September, had few battle-worthy troops in rump Serbia, and feared that military operations would fail anyway, since Mihailović’s agents would surely get advance word of German plans.

In May Mihailović took the first step which finally upset this uneasy truce. He requested from the British Middle East Command heavy explosives for the purpose of destroying the German supply lines running south to the Aegean for Rommel’s troops in North Africa.

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46 According to Topalović (Pokreti Narodnog Otpora, p. 95), who was one of Mihailović's closest collaborators and the chief political organizer of the St. Sava Day Congress at Ba, Serbia, in January 1944, the Chetniks killed perhaps as many as forty thousand Muslims during the war, mainly in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the Sandžak. Partisan sources suggest that a good deal of their early support in Herzegovina was Muslim. In June 1942 Vlado Šegrt told Dedijer that “about 80 percent of the Mostar Muslims stood with them and that practically all the Partisan terrorist activities were the work of Muslim schoolboys. Vladimir Dedijer, Dnevnik, (Belgrade: Državni Izdavački Zavod Jugoslavije, 1945–46), entry for 18 June 1942.


available evidence, he did not order his subordinates to begin the sabotage campaign until early August, when the directives were issued to small Chetnik bands in southern Serbia. The sabotage campaign was apparently a shortlived gesture, for neither Mihailović nor the exiled Yugoslav government, remembering the events in Serbia of 1941, wanted to expose the civilian population to German reprisals or to jeopardize the tenuously reconstructed Chetnik organization of infiltrators and double agents. Sometime in September Mihailović even turned down a request from General Alexander to expand Chetnik attacks on German rail movements. The head of the émigré government, Slobodan Jovanović, wrote to the British ambassador, Sir George Randall, that “attacks on the lines of communication, if successful, would without doubt elicit an action of the Axis troops against General Mihailović." 

Chetnik sabotage actions in Serbia fell short of British expectations, and they also determined the Germans to settle accounts once and for all with Mihailović's organization. In late September they began to round up Chetnik officers, weed out Mihailović's agents in the Nedić administration, and break up the sabotage groups. The first of Mihailović's chief organizers in Serbia to fall into German hands was Major Gordić; at the end of the first week of October the number of arrested Chetnik officers had risen to twenty-one. The Germans soon succeeded in rounding up Mihailović's entire sabotage organization in Belgrade, composed for the most part of civil servants and railroad employees. This reaction caught the Serb Chetniks off guard and showed how vulnerable their slowly rebuilt organization of infiltrators really was. Throughout the rest of the fall the occupation forces arrested stray bands of “unreliable” Chetniks, seized Mihailović’s small munitions depots, and proceeded to dissolve most of the “legal” armed formations.


Toward the end of 1942, the Germans, who were preparing for a major anti-rebel operation in western Yugoslavia in January, became determined to prop up the Nedić régime by crushing the Mihailović movement politically. Their basic strategy was to disarm the armed bands in the rural areas, whether legalized or not, and to eliminate the center of the Chetnik organization in Serbia through a campaign of mass terror against the officer double agents and the pro-Mihailović civil servants in Belgrade. During the month of December from about ten to a few dozen Chetnik officers and agents were arrested daily and, in most instances, executed immediately; at the same time, General Bader's police succeeded in destroying at least temporarily Mihailović's intelligence network within the Nedić administration and broke off his radio ties with Belgrade. The German reprisals, although carried out in a hasty and haphazard manner, did succeed in nullifying most of the Chetniks' reorganization work in Serbia since the end of 1941.

These developments in Serbia were very significant: the officers had counted on preserving a well-developed organization in the capital ready to seize power in the event of a German defeat. In a more immediate sense, though, it marked an important change in the occupation policies of the Axis Powers, not only in rump Serbia, but everywhere in former Yugoslavia. Mihailović's recourse to acts of sabotage in August and September, the expansion of the Partisan movement deep in Croatian territory, and the rapidly deteriorating military situation in North Africa from late October on all led the Germans to favor extraordinary measures for dealing with resistance movements in the Balkans. Fearing that an Allied invasion of southeastern Europe would help Mihailović more than Tito, the Germans tended to overestimate the Chetniks'
potential for resistance activity and made no significant distinction between the two movements.\textsuperscript{58} Significantly enough, the Armed Forces Command South-East attached a supplement to Hitler’s “no prisoners” policy that the policy also applied to “anyone who declares himself for Mihailović or is in his service.”\textsuperscript{59}

Outside of Serbia, where Italian policies had acted as a protective umbrella for the Chetnik revival, the Germans prepared for a settling of accounts with Tito and Mihailović. In fact, they were filling a vacuum created by the progressive disintegration of the political and military authority of Zagreb and the steady withdrawal of Roatta’s Second Army units to the Adriatic coast. By late fall the Ustaši hierarchy was falling apart, armed forces head Slavko Kvaternik launched an abortive coup, and desertion from the regular, or Domobran, army units to the Partisans was assuming serious proportions.\textsuperscript{60} General Löhr, the armed forces commander southeast, had recommended that a German officer be attached to every Croat regiment to ensure discipline and, in his conference of 17 September with Hitler, thought it necessary to ask what the Germans should do in the event of the collapse of the Ustaši government.

Immediately after the Allied invasion of northwestern Africa, Roatta ordered a study to determine the minimum number of troops necessary for the Italians to maintain a firm hold on the Adriatic while sending as many units as possible back to Italy.\textsuperscript{61} In mid-November, Cavallero gave his approval to a plan for Roatta’s army to cede from two to seven divisions for the defense of the mother country; meanwhile, Second Army units were evacuating practically all their garrisons in the second zone. Second Army headquarters had less and less to offer the Chetniks but dared not provoke disturbances in their rear. Roatta therefore met Jevdjević in November and even agreed to authorize and legalize three thousand more Chetniks; moreover, he recognized virtually all of eastern Herzegovina as the Chetnik zone.\textsuperscript{62}

In addition, the Italians, in part because they lacked confidence in many of the Chetnik leaders and in part because they opposed German methods of dealing with the officers, made a number of efforts to tighten their control over the Serb anti-Partisan formations. Roatta tried to get Jevdjević to agree to confine the activities of his Herzegovinian detachments to a specific “sphere”; on 12 November the Italian commander told

\textsuperscript{58} In April 1942 Roatta had won Bader’s agreement to the policy of treating captured Chetniks in the eastern Bosnian operation as prisoners of war rather than as rebels.

\textsuperscript{59} Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Südost/1a, “N. 2868/42 vom 28.10. 1942,” 28 October 1942, T-311, roll 197, frame 84, which is a supplement to OKW/WFSt., “N. 003830/42 vom 18.10.1942,” 18 October 1942, T-311, roll 197, frames 81–82.

\textsuperscript{60} KTB/OKW, vol. 2, entry for 17 September 1942 (Aufzeichnungen Greiners).

\textsuperscript{61} Zanussi, Guerra e catastrofe, pp. 281–82.

a group of Chetnik delegates that they would have to accept the presence of an Italian liaison officer at all their formations of regiment strength or more and that they must agree not to harm Muslim and Croat civilians. On 15 November Jevdjević arrived in Mostar where he had to support formally the Italian decision to begin arming Muslim anti-Partisans.

The immediate result of these changes, especially the further contraction of the Italian occupation sphere, was to enlarge the military vacuum in western Yugoslavia. In some areas, for example, around Bos Grahovo and Višegrad, the Chetniks now had exclusive rights of occupation in sectors they had formerly patrolled along with the Italians. In reality, though, the officers had little room for maneuver and probably even less time. The Chetnik leaders realized that, over the short term, the Italians were their only major source of supplies and protection against German policies. It is significant that in December several formation leaders went out of their way to convince the Italians to reconsider or delay their evacuation from the second zone. In Montenegro, where the officers did not have to contend with Ustaši or Partisans, they depended completely on Pirzio-Biroli’s administration for their monthly dole of funds to support their troops.

In a more general sense, Mihailović, his chief officer-delegates, and the leading civilian spokesmen for the Chetnik cause were all being placed on the defensive. Jevdjević and Trifunović found relations with the Italians increasingly difficult and were compelled to make promises which they could never enforce among the Chetnik rank and file. At the end of the year Serb bands were still threatening nearby Croat garrisons and starting fights with Ustaši troops at Mostar. There was apparently little the civilian intermediaries could do to affect the behavior of the

63 Plenča, Medjunarodni Odnosi Jugoslavije, pp. 145–46. The author's source is a report from a delegate of the Chetnik command, Captain Ivanisević, to Mihailović of 19 November 1942.


67 For instance, Krsto Popović to command of “Perugia” division, 19 August 1942, Zbornik, vol. 3, bk. 4, no. 222; Zarija Vuković (Second Chetnik Battalion) to commander of Zeta Flying Detachment, 29 October 1942, Dokumenti o Isdajstvu Draže Mihailovića, no. 54; command of National Liberation Army of Montenegro and Herzegovina to Supreme National Committee (Cetinje), 11 November 1942, ibid., no. 55.

68 Supreme Staff of Bosnian Chetnik Detachments (Luka Radić) to commander of Ustaši division at Banja Luka, 7 December 1942, cited by Topolović, Pokreti Narodnog Otpora, p. 99; report of Third Domobran “Zbor” of November 1942, Zbornik, vol. 4, bk. 8, no. 234.
Armed units. Second Army headquarters even reported that one of Jevdjević’s collaborators from Mostar had conceded that he was “incapable of putting the brakes on his men because they are pervaded by a profound race hatred and dominated by desire for revenge.”

Jevdjević, because he was the chief negotiator with the Italians, came under strong attack when Roatta decided to arm Muslim and Croat anti-Partisan formations and insisted that the Chetniks curtail their political activities. Several Chetniks refused to carry out these commitments to Roatta, and in November two Chetniks came to Mostar in an attempt to assassinate him; another major civilian leader, Petar Samardžić, began to oppose him openly. Mihailović himself became increasingly suspicious of the Italians and warned one of his subordinates that “the Italians are trying everywhere to come into contact with our people so they can use them for their own ends.” In November he also ordered one of his delegates, Major Djurić, not to negotiate with the Italians concerning the situation in Kosovo-Metohija because Roatta’s officers had given indications of a willingness to sponsor Albanian Muslim armed formations.

None of this meant, however, that Mihailović and his collaborators, military and civilian, were moving toward a break with the Italians. If anything, recent events demonstrate that collaboration had become something of a necessary evil. As Italian influence in Yugoslav occupation politics diminished and relations between Chetnik spokesmen and Second Army officers became more difficult, Mihailović’s men tried a new way of bargaining, but in their view there was almost no immediate alternative to some form of cooperation with the Italians. The general had long since agreed to give tacit support to the collaboration of the Montenegrin officers and firmly rejected the requests of the British liaison staff that he begin sabotage operations against the Italians.

Mihailović was finding himself in an increasingly difficult position vis-à-vis the Italians and his own nominal followers. In Herzegovina and Montenegro, the Chetnik strongholds, he opposed acts of resistance against the Italians, dealt with them for money and arms through Jevdjević, Djurišić, and the National Committee at Cetinje, and even proposed a major anti-Partisan drive to be carried out in conjunction with Second

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Army units. At the same time, he avoided personal contacts with Italian officers,\(^7\) resisted Roatta's efforts to restrain the activities of the Chetniks, and contributed to undermining Jevdjević's position with the Italians by encouraging his followers, especially Major Ostojić and Captain Djurišić, to wage a campaign of terror against the Muslim population along the border of Montenegro and the Sandžak.\(^7\) According to Mihailović, the Chetniks would begin operations against the Axis in the event of an Italian capitulation or a German invasion of Montenegro; in the meantime, they used their relatively secure position in Montenegro to carry on the civil war, especially against the exposed villages of the Muslim Sandžak.\(^6\)

Outside the Chetniks' sphere Mihailović and the officers faced mounting difficulties. In several parts of Bosnia local Serb armed detachments had established treaties in the spring of 1942 with the Ustaši and the Germans; Chetnik headquarters in Montenegro had virtually no influence there, and Mihailović's schemes were challenged by both the Germans and the local Serb leaders. The Germans, although avoiding any immediate reprisals, left little doubt as to the eventual direction of their policies; General Lüters, named German general in Croatia on 16 November, began the new course when he directed the Croat military authorities to re-examine and dissolve the local treaties.\(^7\) In mid-December Lüters went one step further and announced that the German command did not recognize any of the treaties concluded between Zagreb and the Bosnian Serbs.\(^8\) Collaborationist civilian Chetniks like Jevdjević, who had tried unsuccessfully in September to intervene with the Germans on behalf of the Bosnian Serb formations, had even less influence now.\(^9\)

Mihailović's efforts, beginning in the spring and summer of 1942, to use the numerous Serb armed bands in Croatian territory to rebuild the Chetnik movement had met insurmountable obstacles. By the end of

\(^7\) See, for instance, Ostojić to Djurišić, 10 November 1942, included among the intercepted messages in Comando 2. Armata, "Premessa," 24 February 1943, T-821, roll 31, frame 376.

\(^8\) Ostojić reported that the Chetniks had just completely destroyed twenty-one Muslim villages and killed about thirteen hundred people.


\(^7\) Jevdjević had offered to instruct a Bosnian Chetnik force of about twelve thousand to behave loyally toward the Germans and protect the Sarajevo-Višegrad railway line. Glaise von Horstenu was firmly opposed. Deutsche General in Agram/Ia, "N. 05584/42 vom 9.9.1942," 9 September 1942, T-501, roll 265, frame 1018.
1942 most of the widely dispersed Serb formations in Bosnia, probably numbering over ten thousand followers, were either firmly tied to the unreliable agreements with the Ustaši or were beyond the reach of Mihailović's officer-emissaries. Repeated attempts, directed from Chetnik headquarters in Montenegro, to co-opt the bands and remove the local leaders probably hurt more than helped Mihailović's cause.

Several Bosnian Serb chiefs had established contact with Mihailović in late August and early September through the Chetnik delegate Captain Dragoslav Račić. Jevdjević's efforts to organize them on a temporarily collaborationist basis by negotiating with the occupation authorities got nowhere. According to the Bosnian Serb leaders, most of Mihailović's delegates were killed or returned to Serbia; the remainder, like Račić, created considerable dissension when they attempted to subordinate the armed groups to the control of Mihailović's staff. At a conference of Bosnian Chetnik Detachments at Kulašim of 1 December 1942, one of the local heads, Stevan Botić, whom Račić had tried to purge in July, spoke out against the "intrigues" of the officers and accused Mihailović of withholding recognition of the local Bosnian leaders because he was "surrounded by Serbs and Montenegrins" who did not understand the situation in Bosnia. While Mihailović's delegates insisted on the inadequacy of the Bosnian organization, several of the local original unit leaders demanded that the basically native and civilian organization be preserved. Finally, the conference passed a resolution that the Chetnik officers would come as "collaborators, not as tutors."

By the end of 1942, then, the Serb detachments in Bosnia had settled into a pattern of uneasy and in part necessary collaboration. Their major function was to buy the toleration of the Ustaši and Germans by accepting "police" duties and to protect the native Serb population by remaining strong enough to bargain for local spheres of influence. Several probably felt a moral bond and sympathy with Mihailović; few were willing or able to declare themselves openly as his followers. In Serbia there was virtually no independent military organization, and events showed that those who sought protection and future opportunities by attaching themselves to the Nedić administration could survive only if they refrained from all anti-German activity.

In the second half of 1942 Mihailović was not doing enough to satisfy the British and had scored no noteworthy successes against Tito or

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80 Rade Radić to Mihailović, 1 December 1942, Dokumenti o Izdajstvu Draže Mihailovića, no. 118.
81 Minutes of Inter-Detachment Conference of Bosnian Chetnik Units at Kulašim, 1 December 1942, ibid., no. 119.
82 Hudson was fully aware of the officers' cooperation with the Italians, thought Mihailović was essentially an opportunist, and even wondered whether the Chetniks
Pavelić. Most important, he had lost most of his organization in Serbia, failed to develop one in Bosnia, and had only about twenty thousand "troops" in Herzegovina and Montenegro, over whom he had no direct authority. These formations were as dependent on the Italians as their leaders were loyal to Mihailović. Collaboration meant a lease on life to the Chetnik officers—arms, supplies, and relative, if decreasing, freedom of action in their spheres; it also meant that the leaders had to play a constant double game and that their troops' activities were confined for the most part to the shrinking Italian zone and the immediately adjacent areas.

The main Chetnik contingents were trapped by rivalries within the occupation system and by the concessions they had made to the Italians. Their activities were restricted to Herzegovina and Montenegro, and they devoted most of their energy not to preparing for anti-Axis resistance or collaborating against the Partisans but to prolonging the struggle in the nearby ethnic borderlands against their national, largely civilian, enemies. In these areas, mainly the Croat and Muslim parts of Herzegovina and the eastern limits of Montenegro, the officers' policies compromised their relations with their Italian sponsors, considerably narrowed their potential base of support, and, in a more general sense, kept alive a civil war initiated by Axis policies and Ustaši excesses.

The mood of national and religious hatred and urge for revenge was a logical outcome of the events of 1941. Moreover, nothing that Mihailović or his collaborators could have done would have completely restrained the Serb bands. Until well into 1943, the entire Yugoslav resistance, both Chetnik and Partisan, was overwhelmingly Serb and represented in a very basic way the armed response of the Serbs, especially in the western half of the country, to the tragedy of 1941. The crucial difference is that the Partisan leaders, for the most part young and free of confining ethnic loyalties, suffered numerous failures in their efforts to win over Croats and Muslims, but the Chetnik officers, virtually all Serbs and


83 Note Deakin's remark that, as late as the summer of 1943, the overwhelming majority of Partisans were Serbs. Ibid., p. 106.

84 Throughout the first half of the war, for example, the evidence from Partisan sources suggests that they had more than their share of problems trying to win over support from the Yugoslav Muslims. A Partisan document from Herzegovina of October 1941 explained that "for the time being, cooperation with the Muslims would be impossible." Staff of Herzegovinian National-Liberation Partisan Detachments, 2 October 1941, Zbornik, vol. 4, bk. 2, no. 4. In May 1942, when the main Partisan forces were forced to flee Foča, a report to Tito admitted that "the Muslims of Foča greeted the Italians enthusiastically." Chief of Supreme Staff of Yugoslav National-Liberation Partisan Detachments to Tito, 11 May 1942, ibid., vol. 2, bk. 4, no. 27. In the Kosovo-Metohija area the Partisans did poorly with the Albanian Muslims. A letter written by the secretary of the local Kosovo-Metohija C.P.Y. committee stated that "as far as


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schooled in a tradition which identified Serb military prowess and political hegemony with the Yugoslav idea, not only tolerated but took part in a campaign of revenge against non-Serb civilians who had nothing to do with the Partisans or the Ustaši.

The Chetnik officers rallied behind a Greater Serbian political program, attempted to put it into effect during the war, and apparently saw no contradiction between their Pan-Serb schemes and devotion to the Yugoslav idea. At the end of 1942 Chetnik conferences in Montenegro produced resolutions which spoke of a Balkan "Chetnik dictatorship" embracing "half of Albania, all of Bulgaria, half of Hungary, and Rumania up to the oil reserves." Even Mihailović, according to a German report, had discussed the possibility of establishing a Greater Yugoslavia which would extend to the Black Sea by bringing Bulgaria into a Yugoslav customs union.

Just as the Allies created an image of Mihailović and the Chetnik bands which bore little relation to reality, so the officers in Montenegro wildly exaggerated their political and military prospects. In all likelihood, they were far more impressed by the German defeats at Stalingrad and in North Africa than by their own reverses in Bosnia and Serbia. As for collaboration with the Italians, Mihailović could justify his actions by pointing to the strong probability that Italy would soon collapse militarily. When that occurred, the Chetniks would disown the Italians and defend Montenegro from a German invasion. Similarly, British pressure for sabotage operations struck Mihailović as unreasonable but must also have reaffirmed his already strong conviction that the Allies had big plans for the Balkans. Before that happened the Chetniks had to secure exclusive Allied support for the future, and that meant crushing Tito once and for all. In 1943 Mihailović finally had his opportunity to participate in the destruction of the Partisan movement.

the Albanians are concerned, there is no difference between the Serb Chetniks and the Serb Partisans." Secretary of Kosovo-Mitrovitsa Provincial Committee, (?) November 1941, *ibid.*, vol. 1, bk. 9, no. 3. As late as August 1942 the Partisan organizers had had practically no luck with the Kosovo Muslims; a provincial committee report related that the Albanian Muslims, who made up about 70 percent of the population, were still a narrow minority within the party. Deakin (*Embattled Mountain*, p. 52) explains that in June 1943 Partisans moving through eastern Bosnia had to avoid hostile Muslim villages.

Minutes of Chetnik Youth Organization Conference held at Sabović and presided over by Major Zaharije Ostojić and Captain Pavel Djurišić (30 November-2 December 1942), *Dokumenti o Izdajstvu Draže Mihailovića*, no. 4.
