CHAPTER 3

ONE-PARTY STATE POLITICS AND THE IMPACT OF DESEGREGATION

One-party factionalism was acutely vulnerable on the issue of race, the primeval fault that had divided the have-nots at crucial junctures in the southern past. In many nonsouthern states, New Deal voting alignments were more or less entrenched behind party identification, the political orientation of ethnic and religious minorities, and the organizational structures of labor unions and urban machines. In southern state politics, New Dealish politicians relied upon personal followings, factional loyalties, alliances with county leaders, a common-man style, and the individual voter's ability to recognize and support his own economic self-interest. The Brown v. Board of Education decision of 1954 struck directly at the Jim Crow system, and large numbers of southern whites reacted with the same defensiveness and hostility toward outside intervention with which they had responded to previous assaults on peculiar southern social institutions. The focus of southern politics began to shift from economic issues to matters of race.

To be sure, racial demagoguery was by no means a stranger to political conflict prior to the Brown decision. The Dixiecrats sprang to the defense of white supremacy in 1948, and Herman Talmadge won the Georgia governorship in a campaign that played upon white racial fears. In 1950 what was later to be christened the Social Issue\(^1\) was particularly salient. That year saw Congress deadlocked in a bitter debate over enactment of a permanent Fair Employment Practices Commission; Senator Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin become a household word as he pursued communists in and out of government; Richard M. Nixon win a U.S. Senate seat with a red baiting campaign in California; and Senator McCarthy claim credit for what Franklin Roosevelt had failed to do, namely, unseating Senator Millard E. Tydings of Maryland. In the South, former Secretary

\(^1\)The term was popularized by Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg, *The Real Majority* (New York: Coward-McAnn, 1970).
of State James F. Byrnes won election to the statehouse in South Carolina, which he used as a forum to vent his hostility toward Harry Truman, the Fair Deal, and desegregation; Herman Talmadge was reelected governor of Georgia; and incumbent Senators Claude Pepper of Florida and Frank P. Graham of North Carolina went down in defeats that Samuel Lubell described as "the most crushing setbacks Southern liberalism has suffered since the coming of Franklin Roosevelt."2

The campaigns that upset Pepper and Graham were remarkably similar. Florida Congressman George A. Smathers, characterized by one student of Florida politics as an attractive candidate with "political ambition and surprising flexibility in his political position,"3 and Willis Smith, the favorite of the establishment forces in North Carolina, both sought to capitalize on the incumbent senators' identification with socially and economically liberal causes. The challengers vigorously attempted to link their opponents to an overlapping trinity of communism, Trumanism, and racial integration, and in Florida, for good measure Smathers added labor bossism. Their campaigns achieved the desired results. It was not surprising that most of Florida's major newspapers opposed Pepper, nor that he ran poorly in upper-status white precincts. But Pepper also lost in rural areas, and his majorities in lower-status white neighborhoods, when they materialized, were by no means overwhelming. Pepper ran strongly in Jewish and black districts, but a substantial majority of Protestant white voters supported Smathers.4 In North Carolina Graham enjoyed support from Governor Kerr Scott and almost won a first-primary victory. In the runoff, however, the Smith camp launched a "White-People-Wake-Up" campaign that was labeled "a display of race bitterness such as this state had not witnessed for fifty years."5 Graham suffered heavy defections in the eastern lowlands, where his vote dropped by almost five percent. But despite the impact of these elections, they were relatively isolated. They pointed to the soft underbelly of southern liberalism; however, Pepper, who had cast Senate votes in favor of civil rights, and Graham, who was a member of President Truman's Commission on Civil Rights, occupied particularly exposed positions.

Not until the late 1950s did a politics of race become a regional phenomenon. The reaction to the Brown decision demonstrated the depth of southern white opposition to basic changes in racial practices. Black-belt whites organized the Citizens' Council movement to defend white suprem-

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acy and to spread the resistance to public-school desegregation. Spurred on by the Councils, important southern political leaders vowed resistance, and southern state legislators enacted more than 450 laws and resolutions designed to prevent, delay, or limit public-school desegregation and to suppress or handicap the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and other civil-rights groups. The Councils often behaved as local vigilante committees self-commissioned to enforce racial orthodoxy; governmental investigating committees searched for communists and found integrationists; and state governments laid plans to abolish the public schools rather than desegregate them. “Massive resistance” to the Brown decision became the dominant theme of southern state politics.6

The defense of white supremacy and southern traditions shifted the thrust of southern politics. The rural and lower-status whites who had provided much of the impetus for the populist-New Deal politics of the early 1950s were also the people most likely to feel threatened by black advancement and to express confidence in southern customs. The urban-suburban bourgeoisie, past mainstays of southern conservatisn, were apt to be somewhat more tolerant on racial matters or at least sufficiently devoted to business and industrial progress that they were soon to become frightened that the excesses of massive resistance, especially the threat of school closures, would be detrimental to economic progress. Blacks were the most liberal of all southerners, at least concerning issues of economics and race.7 During the post-World War II decade, blacks often allied with the economically liberal but socially conservative lower-status whites; as the segregation issue became increasingly pressing, blacks frequently found themselves in a coalition with affluent white “moderates” in opposition to white-supremacy extremism. These shifting issues and changing voter patterns disrupted and modified Democratic party factional alignments throughout the region.

The dynamics of the politics of massive resistance are well illustrated by voting tendencies in Arkansas. Orval E. Faubus won the governorship in 1954 by upsetting the vaguely conservative, largely nondescript incum-

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bent, Francis Cherry, who had defeated Sidney S. McMath two years previously. In Arkansas, a governor was virtually assured a second term, although not in a half-century had an incumbent been permitted a third term in office. Faubus was to overturn both traditions. Raised in an Ozark mountain county so isolated that the first paved thoroughfare was not constructed until the early 1950s, Faubus worked variously as a migrant fruit picker, a logger, and a schoolteacher, ultimately purchasing a small weekly newspaper in his home county of Madison. Faubus also dabbled in politics. He once ran for a state legislative seat and solved the problem of living in a Republican county in a Democratic state by calling himself a “Lincoln-style Democrat.” McMath introduced Faubus to state politics, appointing him to an administrative position. (McMath was later to say: “I brought Orval down out of the hills and every night I ask forgiveness.”)

With McMath’s support, Faubus sought the governor’s office in 1954. He ran sufficiently well in the mountains and in rural areas to force Cherry into a second primary. In the runoff Faubus won hardly more than a third of the votes cast in metropolitan counties, and he lost the larger towns, although by a narrower margin. But in a rural state with a substantial mountaineer population, Faubus was the rural and mountain candidate, and he won approximately 55 percent of the votes cast in the countryside, and the election. In Little Rock, the state’s largest city, Faubus fared poorly everywhere, but he did worse in prestige districts than in black and lower-status white neighborhoods. In upper-class Little Rock precincts, the “hillbilly” candidate failed to win as much as 10 percent of the votes in either the first or the second primary.

As governor, Faubus proved to be a capable politician, carefully balancing competing interests and strengthening his ties with county leaders. He catered to rural areas with increased state support for public education and higher old-age pensions, which he paid for by raising both income taxes and sales taxes. He propitiated business by granting various favors, including controversial rate increases for the Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Company, and by strengthening the Arkansas Industrial Development Commission, appointing Winthrop Rockefeller as its director and supporting its industry-hunting activities (until Rockefeller later became identified with the anti-Faubus forces, at which time the governor slashed the Commission’s budget). Faubus’s administration drastically reduced the number of welfare (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) recipients, which action hit poor blacks hardest, and supported segregation legislation.

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designed to forestall public-school desegregation; at the same time the
University of Arkansas began accepting black undergraduates, and a half­
dozen blacks were added to the state Democratic Central Committee.9

By the time of the 1956 primary elections, Faubus had covered all
flanks. His chief opponent in the gubernatorial contest was James D.
Johnson, past president of the Arkansas Citizens' Councils and an avid
segregationist. Despite Johnson's racist appeal, the rural counties and the
mountains stayed with Faubus; and the governor, now the moderate can­
didate, also won majorities in the cities, running best in black and higher­
income white neighborhoods. The precincts that had given more than 90
percent of their votes to the opposition in 1954 now gave almost 60 percent
to Faubus. In 1954 rather vaguely the economically progressive candidate,
Faubus fared best in the mountains and in rural areas, and he did relatively
better among blacks and lower-class whites than among middle- and upper­
status whites in the cities. In 1956, when the racial issue was paramount,
Faubus was, still as vaguely as he could manage, the moderate candidate;
while again running best in mountain and rural areas, his appeal was more
general, and in the cities it was to a coalition of blacks and affluent whites.

Then came the Little Rock desegregation crisis of 1957, from which
Faubus emerged as a hero among segregationists. After Little Rock Faubus
was unstoppable. He breezed past the opposition to win first-primary vic­
tories in the next four gubernatorial primaries. In 1958 two moderate can­
didates sought to capitalize on a temperate reaction to the racial hysteria in
Little Rock, and aiding the anti-Faubus effort were such diverse political
powers as former Governors Ben Laney, Sidney McMath, and Francis
Cherry, all of whom professed distaste for Faubus's actions in Little Rock
and feared, no doubt, that the governor was becoming too politically
dominant in Arkansas. Faubus largely ignored his opponents and cam­
paigned instead against the federal government, outside agitators, the
*Arkansas Gazette*, the NAACP, and a variety of other people, ideologies,
and organizations that had no particular relevance to the gubernatorial
primary election in Arkansas. Displaying a genuine knack for dema­
goguery, Faubus promised to call out the National Guard in Little Rock
again "if they push me."10 The silent vote for moderation failed to mate­
rialize, and Faubus won overwhelmingly.

In 1960 Attorney General Bruce Bennett was the best known of the
four candidates challenging Faubus. During the late 1950s, Bennett had kept
his name before the public by warring on the NAACP, communists, and
integrationists and had waited for Faubus to step down. That failing,
Bennett ran anyway, promising to restore segregation throughout the

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9*Arkansas Gazette*, June 16, 1955; March 16, 1957; July 1, 1958; April 7, September 17, 1959.

10As quoted in *Memphis Commercial Appeal*, July 5, 1958; and *Arkansas Gazette*, July 1, 5, 8, 26, 30, 1958.
Table 3.1
Triptile ranking of counties in support for Faubus, 1954–62

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Counties</th>
<th>Top 1/3</th>
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<td>Rural mountain</td>
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<td>1954 Runoff</td>
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The nine counties in Arkansas containing a city of more than 20,000 population (1960).

state. Again demonstrating the admirable flexibility of a latter-day Vicar of Bray, Faubus appealed to “all the people” and spoke of the accomplishments gained “by working together, not by fighting, not by yielding to the agitators of whatever race or creed.” Faubus won easily. In 1962 the governor faced threats from both right and left. Sidney McMath returned to the political fray to oppose his former protégé, and, on the right, Dale Alford, an extreme segregationist and former congressman, sought to keep alive his political cause. Together with three minor candidates, McMath and Alford held Faubus to his smallest majority since 1954, but the governor still won the first primary by a comfortable margin. By 1964 no major candidates were willing to oppose Faubus for the nomination.

The governor’s post-Little Rock opposition varied, but his voter support remained relatively consistent during the 1958–64 period. In both 1958 and 1960 Faubus won more than three-quarters of the ballots cast in lower- and lower-middle-class white precincts in Little Rock. This vote dropped off slightly in 1962, though Faubus still won majorities in both classes. The upper-status white neighborhoods, which had opposed him in 1954 and joined him in 1956, now staunchly rejoined the opposition. The sharp class cleavages provoked by Faubus’s candidacy were unusual in Little Rock and testified to the divisive impact of the race issue. The poor whites followed Faubus, and the affluent whites, concerned about adverse publicity and the closure of the public high schools in Little Rock during the 1958–59 school

year, opposed him. Blacks, not surprisingly, joined the affluent whites in an anti-Faubus coalition. In the countryside, the mountain counties that had originally formed the governor's voter base continued to support him, but, after the Little Rock crisis, they were figuratively elbowed aside by the stampede of lowland counties into the Faubus camp. Arkansas's most racially conscious whites, those of the plantation lowlands and the working-class districts of the cities, contributed heavily to Faubus's extended tenure in the governor's mansion.

Fig. 3.1. Percentage of the vote received by Faubus in Little Rock, 1954-62, by socioeconomic class and race

In Louisiana the political dynamics generated by the race issue disrupted customary factional alignments. The Long faction's concentration on economic issues had overridden the social and cultural differences between Catholics and Protestants and blacks and whites, but the re-emergence of a politics of race not only divided blacks from whites but also accentuated the differences between the French-Catholic culture of south Louisiana, where the practices of white supremacy found less support, and the southern traditionalism of north Louisiana. This sectional fissure had long existed within the anti-Long, reform faction. One wing of the anti-Long forces was Bourbon-oriented, socially conservative, and strong in north Louisiana, especially in the larger towns and Protestant plantation counties. The other wing, oriented toward good government and a good business atmosphere, was socially moderate and attracted some black support; it fared best in south Louisiana, especially in the suburban communities in the New Orleans area. This division was clear in the 1952 first-primary election, when Congressman Hale Boggs was the candidate of the progressive side of anti-Longism, and James McLemore and, perhaps to a lesser degree, Judge Robert Kennon led the Bourbon forces. In 1956 Mayor deLesseps Morrison was the progressive, good government, south Louisiana candidate; and Fred Preaus, who had Governor Kennon's endorsement, was the north Louisiana anti-Long contender. Both groups, however, shared a mutual distaste for buccaneering liberalism, and the necessity of uniting against the Longs held their intrafactional differences in abeyance.

But as social matters replaced economic concerns as the center of political contention, the Long forces found their north Louisiana following defecting on the race issue and their south Louisiana support disintegrating over the religious issue, and these same impulses sharpened divisions within the anti-Long faction. Seizing leadership of Louisiana's massive resistance movement was William E. Rainach, a little-known state senator from north Louisiana. Rainach became chairman of the Joint Legislative Committee to Maintain Segregation, which plotted segregationist strategy, concocted and drafted all manner of anti-integration legislation, carried out white-supremacy propaganda campaigns, investigated integrationists and communists, and encouraged purges of blacks from the voter registration rolls. Rainach was also president of the Citizens' Councils, and it was the Councils that utilized a provision in the Louisiana state constitution permitting citizens to challenge "illegally" registered voters on a variety of technical grounds to purge some 31,000 blacks from the registration lists. So long as Rainach and his associates were writing


segregationist statutes and searching for communists, Governor Earl Long avoided a direct confrontation. But disfranchising voters who normally supported the Longs was another matter. "If those colored people helped build this country, if they could fight in its Army, then I'm for giving them the vote," Long stated, and he added, "a candidate should go after every vote he can get." Such statements were anathema to Rainach, who insisted that the voter purges were making Louisiana "a shining example to the nation on how to thwart the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People." "I'm sick and tired of you yellin' nigger, nigger, nigger," Long snapped at Rainach. "People aren't with you; they're just scared of you." When the Louisiana legislature met in 1959, Rainach and his Committee to Maintain Segregation introduced legislation to facilitate voter purges, and Governor Long countered with legislation to protect registered voters. But the governor was under great strain, and in May 1959 he had his much-publicized breakdown.

Against this background Louisiana voter alignments shifted massively in the 1959–60 gubernatorial elections. Three anti-Long candidates led the first-primary balloting, and the two contenders from the Long camp trailed behind in the fourth and fifth positions. Mayor Morrison, himself a Catholic, ran strongly in the Catholic parishes of south Louisiana to lead in the first primary; Rainach, making his first statewide race, fared well in the north Louisiana black-belt parishes and in the Shreveport area and came in third. Finishing second and thus gaining a runoff spot with Morrison was former Governor Jimmie H. Davis, who wrote and sang country music and promised to "govern sincerely, honestly, impartially and with feeling." Davis claimed to be a "one-thousand percent" segregationist in the first primary; in the second primary he concluded an alliance with the Rainach forces and made defense of segregation the central theme of the campaign. Earl Long, who after recovering from his breakdown had run unsuccessfully for lieutenant governor, endorsed Davis, presumably concerned that Morrison might win control of the patronage in both New Orleans and the state government. Morrison campaigned as a segregationist, but, given his relatively enlightened record as New Orleans mayor and the racist onslaught from the Davis forces, there could be no doubt that he was the racial moderate in the runoff campaign.


15 As quoted by Robert Wagner, in New Orleans Times-Picayune, September 21, 1958.
19 As quoted by Robert Wagner, in New Orleans Times-Picayune, September 7, 1959.
For the first time in a generation, a Long candidate failed to appear in a gubernatorial runoff primary, and the election returns, as Perry H. Howard has observed, portrayed "a cleavage which pitted North against South, Protestant against Catholic, and rendered race the primary issue in the place of economic realities." 21 Morrison carried French-Catholic south Louisiana substantially, but Davis won every other parish in the state, most by whopping majorities. The sectional appeal of Davis in 1960 differed fundamentally from the statewide following attracted by Earl Long in the 1956 primary. Urban returns reflected the north-south split: Caddo Parish (Shreveport) in the far north gave Davis better than 70 percent of its votes, East Baton Rouge on the edge of the Catholic parishes granted him almost 55 percent, and Orleans Parish went for Morrison by almost 60 percent. Within the cities, the Long alliance of blacks and non-affluent whites collapsed. Morrison was clearly the candidate of a coalition of blacks and upper-income whites, while lower-income whites followed Davis.

A similar sectional split appeared in Florida. North Florida differed not basically from north Louisiana: it too was Protestant, old-stock southern, and its politics reflected a similar devotion to social and racial conservatism. And rural-small town citizens were particularly numerous in north Florida. South Florida, of course, had little in common with French-Catho-

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<td>Percentage of the Vote for Long in the 1956 Primary and for Davis in the 1959 Runoff, by Rural, Urban, and Metropolitan Counties</td>
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<sup>a</sup>Plaquemines Parish, bossed by Leander Perez, a Davis ally.

<sup>21</sup>Howard, Political Tendencies in Louisiana, p. 355.
Fig. 3.2. Percentage of the vote received by Morrison in the 1960 runoff in New Orleans, Baton Rouge, and Shreveport, by socioeconomic class and race

lic south Louisiana, except that neither seemed overtly devoted to lost-cause mythology or to white supremacy. Heavily metropolitan, south Florida contained substantial Jewish and Latin as well as black minorities, and economically it was particularly dependent on the good will of non-southern tourists and immigrants. While south Florida was not noted for political liberalism, its citizenry possessed a social toleration that was

foreign to the northern part of the state, and the racial issue contributed along with other factors to a growing divorce between rural-oriented, socially conservative north Florida and predominately metropolitan, socially heterogeneous south Florida. 23

Florida voters had rejected Claude Pepper, the state's preeminent New Dealer, in 1950, and they did so again in 1958, when Pepper challenged Senator Spessard Holland for his U.S. Senate seat. In neither election was there a major split between the northern and southern portions of the state. Pepper ran best in the cities by swamping the opposition in Jewish and black precincts and by winning significant if uneven support in lower-income Protestant neighborhoods. But he ran poorly in upper-income Protestant areas, and in a rapidly growing state with an ever proliferating suburbia, this inability to appeal to the affluent was fatal, at least for a candidate who was vulnerable in rural areas to charges of being soft on communism and integration, themes which both Smathers and Holland played upon freely. In his 1958 comeback effort, Pepper sought to win the voters who had entered the electorate since 1950, but when the ballots were in, Pepper had lost by a larger margin than before. 24

In the 1952 gubernatorial campaign, Dan McCarty was more successful, combining a winning coalition behind a program of progressive moderation, a program sufficiently progressive to win minority support, sufficiently "safe" to attract affluent voters, and generally urban-oriented in a state where the metropolitan counties cast a majority of the ballots in a gubernatorial primary. McCarty promised efficiency and economy in government, encouragement of business and industrial growth, and expanded financial aid to education, highway construction, and public services. McCarty's runoff opponent, Bradley Odham, ran a relatively non-descript campaign centering around such noncontroversial homilies as "I'll clean up your government or close it up—and get the dirty hands of the racketeers off your kids' government." 25 McCarty died just after assuming office, and since the Florida constitution at that time provided for no lieutenant governor, the statehouse passed to the president of the state senate, who in Florida's grossly malapportioned legislature was "Pork Chop Gang" favorite Charley E. Johns. A former railroad conductor representing a tiny north Florida district, Johns, as Hugh Douglas Price noted, "had distinguished himself in the senate by voting for the 1947 white primary bill and for legalized slot machines, but against expanded school construction and against unmasking the Ku Klux Klan." 26 Johns

24See Frank Trippett, in St. Petersburg Times, August 5, 1958.
25As quoted in Miami Herald, May 27, 1952.
26Price, The Negro and Southern Politics, p. 98. Also helpful on Florida politics are William C. Havard and Loren P. Beth, The Politics of Mis-Representation: Rural-Urban Conflict in the Florida Legislature (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1962); and
promptly fired many of McCarty's appointees and steered the government toward policies favored by rural conservatives.

In a special gubernatorial election two years later, LeRoy Collins, McCarty's senate floor leader and friend, sought revenge. Collins promised to return to McCarty's program and generally conducted an urban-oriented "media" campaign, by-passing county political elites to appeal directly to the voters. Johns relied heavily on winning the support of local leaders, and it is highly probable that Johns's organizational superiority rather than the issues accounted for his curious majorities in the black precincts in Jacksonville. Although Johns led in the first-primary balloting, Collins won the runoff and the election. Collins again sought the gubernatorial nomination in 1956, and this time his leading opponent was Sumter L. Lowry, a retired army general and a rabid segregationist. So aggressively did Lowry promote the racial issue that the moderate Collins shifted rightward to protect his exposed flank, notably after Look magazine insulted traditionalist white Floridians by picturing Florida in gray as a wavering state rather than in black as a state totally resistant to desegregation. Collins quickly convened a high-level strategy conference, after which a spokesman assured reporters: "I think what we've done here today will definitely put us in the black." Collins won a first-primary victory and, after the election, resumed his socially moderate policies.

Collins was constitutionally unable to succeed himself in 1960, and voters chose Doyle E. Carleton, Jr., and C. Farris Bryant as the runoff candidates from a large field of first-primary contenders. Governor Collins dismissed Bryant as an apostle of "reaction, retreat, and regret" and endorsed Carleton. A legislative supporter of the Collins administration, Carleton promised a continuation of "the same progressive service we have had the last six years." Bryant campaigned on a staunchly conservative program, promising governmental economy, avowing himself "a firm believer in segregation," and attacking the moderate Carleton as the candidate who "stands for moderate integration." Bryant won, and four years later Haydon Burns, mayor of Jacksonville, running on a platform very similar to that of Bryant, also emerged victorious. Burns's runoff opponent, whom he denounced as the "candidate of the NAACP," was Robert King Tebeau, A History of Florida, pp. 437ff. V. M. Newton, Jr., Crusade for Democracy (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1961), chap. 10, includes a devastating critique of the "Pork Chop Gang."

27See Steven Trumbell, in Miami Herald, May 26, 1954; and Havard and Beth, The Politics of Mis-Representation, pp. 27–29 passim.

28As quoted by John L. Boyles, in Miami Herald, March 25, 1956.

29As quoted in St. Petersburg Times, May 24, 1960.

30As quoted in ibid., May 23, 1960.

31As quoted in ibid., May 10, 1960.

High, mayor of Miami. High was more openly "liberal" on both social and economic issues than Collins or Carleton had been, but generally the 1964 runoff primary was a replay of the 1960 one.

These gubernatorial elections exhibited a certain continuity in the sense that Collins identified himself with McCarty, Carleton identified with Collins, and High was obviously in their tradition. All were moderate on racial matters, and all espoused generally progressive policies. Their opponents were for the most part conservative on economic issues and vigorously racist in social matters. The voter response in these elections revealed not only a general trend toward conservatism but a deepening split between the northern and southern halves of the state, with north Florida becoming increasingly solidified in opposition to the more progressive candidates. In the 1952 runoff McCarty won almost 55 percent of the ballots cast in north Florida, running somewhat better there than in the

Fig. 3.3. Percentage of the vote received by progressive candidates in north and south Florida, 1952–64
southern portion of the state. Two years later, Collins, in his runoff against Johns, won only 42 percent in the north and carried the election by harvesting 61.5 percent of the south Florida vote. Collins dropped to just over a third of the north country's votes in his 1956 first-primary victory, again winning more than 60 percent in the south. Carleton won less than 30 percent in the north in his 1960 runoff effort against Bryant, while his south Florida vote was only 53 percent, insufficient to swing the election. High fared even worse, winning 25 percent in the north and just barely over 50 percent in the south. Thus the north Florida tally for progressive gubernatorial candidates fell steadily from 1952, when McCarty won better than one out of every two votes, to 1964, when High received one of every four.

There was in these campaigns something of a rural-urban as well as a sectional cleavage. A Collins or Carleton ran better in metropolitan counties than in rural-small town areas. But the basic cleavage was sectional. Progressive candidates ran better in south Florida metropolitan counties than in south Florida rural counties, but they also fared better in south Florida rural areas than in north Florida metropolitan counties. Although Collins was a resident of Leon County on the Georgia border, south Florida adopted him as its own, and his two campaigns in the mid-1950s marked a high tide of progressivism in the south.

Insofar as Jacksonville is illustrative of voting trends in urban north Florida, the progressive decline resulted from a general collapse of support in the white community. In 1952 McCarty had been the coalition candidate in Jacksonville, winning overwhelmingly in black precincts, solidly in upper-status white neighborhoods, and trailing off to just above 40 percent in lower- and lower-middle-income white areas. Against Johns, Collins had done even better in white areas, sweeping affluent white districts with more than 60 percent and semi-affluent precincts by above 55 percent. He lost the lower-status whites, with about 45 percent of the vote, and black voters rejected him by a more substantial margin. But in 1956 blacks massively flocked to Collins, giving him 93 percent of their votes, while white support slipped sharply. Collins lost in every category of white voters, winning above 40 percent only among the affluent. Lower- and lower-middle-class whites allowed Collins less than 20 percent. Carleton did worse in the 1960 runoff, falling below a quarter of the vote in every white category. Like Collins, Carleton won huge majorities in black communities. This growing black-white polarization became almost complete in 1964, when High won just under 95 percent of black votes and lost more than 85 percent of the white votes.

33Since the consolidated vote in Escambia County (Pensacola, the only other metropolitan center in the north) and the counties containing larger towns followed the same general patterns from election to election as Duval County (Jacksonville), it is probable that somewhat similar patterns prevailed in urban north Florida generally.
Light-years from the voting patterns in Jacksonville were those in Dade County and Miami, where voters of all races, creeds, and colors tended to support the progressive candidate. McCarty in 1952 and Collins in 1954 and 1956 fared best in upper-status, predominately Protestant

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34 Dade County (Miami) could not be considered a typical south Florida metropolis, since such cities as Orlando, St. Petersburg, Tampa, and Miami are distinctively different. See Peirce, *The Megastates of America*, pp. 450–94.
precincts. As social issues became increasingly salient, Jewish and black voters cast ever mounting majorities for the progressive candidates. But in not a single instance did Collins in the 1954 runoff or the 1956 primary, Carleton in the 1960 runoff, or High in the 1964 runoff manage to lose more than 40 percent of the votes in any voter category. Not that Miami voters were by any means homogeneous; there was a considerable gap between the 60 percent majority that Carleton received in lower-status white neighborhoods and the 91 percent he collected in black precincts. An aggressive economic liberal, such as Claude Pepper in his 1950 and 1958 Senate races, sparked strong opposition from affluent whites; an aggressive racial liberal, such as state Representative John B. Orr, Jr., drew an unfriendly reception in lower-status white precincts. For relatively “safe” progressive candidates, however, Dade County regularly delivered impressive majorities.

The vigorous if sometimes chaotic rural liberalism so prevalent in Alabama during the 1940s and early 1950s also fell victim to the race issue. In the 1958 primaries, all major gubernatorial candidates disavowed association with “Folsomism,” a nebulous term that included maladministration and laxity in state government but especially a generous attitude toward race. Voters might forgive Governor Folsom for having a drink or two, but not with Adam Clayton Powell. Attorney General John Patterson and Circuit Judge George C. Wallace, a former Folsom protégé, emerged from the first primary as the runoff contenders. The central question in the runoff was the same as in the first primary: Which candidate could convince the voters that he was more avidly segregationist than his opponent? Patterson won hands down, leaving Wallace to ruminate, significantly as it turned out, “they out-niggered me that time, but they'll never do it again.”

In the runoff Wallace carried urban black precincts handily; but neither candidate projected a consistent class appeal.

The gubernatorial primaries four years later gave Alabama voters wider choices. The leading contenders were Wallace, state Senator Ryan DeGraffenried, and James Folsom. This time Wallace easily outdistanced competitors for the position on the extreme right of the racial issue, but on economic matters he talked in a populist vein. DeGraffenried campaigned as an economic conservative and was comparatively moderate on racial issues. Folsom was the liberal candidate, socially and economically. In his last term as governor, Folsom had battled the Citizens’ Councils and encouraged black voter registration. In 1962 he called for “Peace in the

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“Valley” and a termination of racial strife. Folsom might well have made the runoff had it not been for a disastrous statewide election-eve television appearance, in which Big Jim appeared to be fall-down drunk, attempting to introduce his family but forgetting some of their names. “How many votes that TV show cost Folsom,” observed a veteran Alabama journalist, “is beyond calculation.” At the polls Wallace cut heavily into Folsom’s rural and lower-class white following. Folsom led in the mountain counties, and he won heavily in urban black precincts, but Wallace’s racial appeal served him well in lower-status white districts and in rural areas, especially in the black belt. DeGraffenried ran well enough in metropolitan counties, where he was the favorite in affluent white neighborhoods, to nose past Folsom and make the runoff with Wallace.

In the second primary Wallace swept the lowland counties and ran well in the countryside generally. (Wallace, like Folsom before him, was the rural candidate, but the sources of their support, if overlapping, also differed. Wallace appealed most strongly to voters in the black belt, the area that had shown a decidedly limited enthusiasm for Folsom.) In the cities Wallace was the white common man’s candidate. DeGraffenried won the support of blacks and upper-status whites. This now familiar coalition carried metropolitan Alabama for DeGraffenried but not by large enough margins to overcome Wallace’s majorities in the hinterlands.

The same voting patterns—in which rural, lowland, lower-status whites were pitted against metropolitan, upland, blacks and higher-status whites—were customary in Georgia during the entire postwar period. The Talmadges and Griffins prospered in rural areas, ran best in rural counties in the southern half of the state, thrived in lower-status white precincts in the cities, lost the more affluent white precincts, and might as well have not been on the ballot at urban black polling places.

Georgia voters divided along similar lines over such issues as expanding and constitutionally formalizing the county-unit system and authorizing the substitution of a private-school system for the public schools in order to avoid desegregation. In 1950 and again in 1952 the Talmadge forces in the legislature submitted county-unit amendments to the electorate, and both times the voters turned them down. After the 1950 defeat, Talmadge and his associates went all out in support of the 1952 amendment, insisting that it was insurance against: “1. Mixed Schools and Colleges; 2. Boss Rule; 3. Organized Crime; 4. County Consolidation.” But to no avail. A major-

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37Bob Ingram, in Montgomery Advertiser, May 6, 1962.
ity of Georgia’s voters saw through such nonsense; and ratification of a constitutional amendment required a majority of the ballots, not a majority of the county-unit votes. The Talmadge camp was more successful in 1954, when voters ratified the private-school amendment. Voter response in these elections was generally consistent, as evidenced by the coefficients of correlation between the vote for Herman Talmadge in 1948 and 1950, for the county-unit amendments in 1950 and 1952, and for the segregation amendment in 1954 (see table 3.3).

The presence of nine candidates, three of them from the Talmadge camp, disrupted voting patterns somewhat in the 1954 gubernatorial primary, although the combined vote for the two leading Talmadge candidates, Lieutenant Governor Marvin Griffin and Commissioner of Agriculture Tom Linder, compare closely to past voting patterns. During the late 1950s political conflict subsided. Talmadge went to Washington as a U.S. senator, and Lieutenant Governor S. Ernest Vandiver, a close political friend of Senator Talmadge, won the 1958 gubernatorial primary overwhelmingly against weak opposition.

But the old cleavages reappeared in the 1962 gubernatorial campaign, when former Governor Marvin Griffin opposed state Senator Carl Sanders of Augusta. That same year the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a lower federal court decision declaring the county-unit system unconstitutional,40 and for the first time in the modern period, popular ballots decided the election—a factor no doubt important in accounting for the greatly increased turnout in metropolitan counties. Griffin had served as lieutenant governor under Talmadge in the early 1950s and had enjoyed Talmadge’s support in his successful gubernatorial effort in 1954. But Griffin proved something of an embarrassment to the Talmadge-oriented leadership in the state because of his heavy-handed administration, alleged corruption and malpractices on the part of his appointees, and generally what Atlanta journalist Charles Pou called “the ‘if-you-ain’t-for-stealing-you-ain’t-for-segregation’ modus operandi of Griffin’s administration.”41 Griffin and Vandiver became particularly acrimonious political enemies; indeed, when Griffin asked his former lieutenant governor what support he could expect in his 1962 campaign, Vandiver thundered “none whatsoever.”42 Griffin ran in 1962, as he had in previous races, as a “good ole boy” segregationist, but without support from the state’s top political leadership. Sanders conducted an urban-oriented campaign, avowing his belief in segregation but promising moderation and fairness. Sanders won overwhelmingly, sweeping the cities with whopping majorities in affluent white and in black districts and even winning a slight plurality in the countryside. Griffin ran best

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41 As cited in Sherrill, Gothic Politics in the Deep South, pp. 90.
42 As quoted in Atlanta Journal, February 16, 1960.
Table 3.3
Consistency in Voter Support for the Conservative Position in Georgia, 1946–62

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<tr>
<td>Talmadge, 1948</td>
<td>.96</td>
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<td>Talmadge, 1950</td>
<td>.85</td>
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<td>County-unit amendment, 1950</td>
<td>.96</td>
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<td>County-unit amendment, 1952</td>
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<td>Private-schools amendment, 1954</td>
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<tr>
<td>Griffin, 1962</td>
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Notes: The elections included are: Eugene Talmadge, 1946 gubernatorial primary; Herman Talmadge, 1948 special gubernatorial election and 1950 gubernatorial primary; for county-unit amendment, 1950 special election and 1952 general election; for private-schools amendment, 1954 general election; and Marvin Griffin, 1962 gubernatorial primary.

The units of analysis employed were south Georgia metropolitan, urban, and rural; Black-belt metropolitan and rural; Piedmont metropolitan, urban, and rural; and Mountain urban and rural (ten cases).
in the traditionally Talmadge strongholds. In the cities Griffin appealed to the lower- and lower-middle-status white voters, the same voter groups that had given relatively strong support to Herman Talmadge, the county-unit and segregation amendments, and Griffin himself in previous races.

The black-affluent white coalition that helped to give Sanders more than two-thirds of the votes in metropolitan counties reappeared in a variety of elections in Georgia and elsewhere. In Atlanta the affluent whites and the blacks opposed the private-school scheme and supported liberalizing local ordinances governing the sale of alcohol. Their votes kept Mayor Ivan Allen, Jr., in office and replaced the Fifth District’s antediluvian congressman, James C. Davis, by making Charles L. Weltner, a moderate Atlanta lawyer, the Democratic nominee for U.S. representative.

The racial issue provoked similar alignments in other southern cities. In Little Rock, blacks and upper-status whites ultimately elected a moderate school board that helped to resolve the desegregation crisis in that city. In Birmingham, blacks and higher-income whites retired Eugene “Bull” Connor from his position as police commissioner, first by outvoting the lower- and lower-middle-status whites to approve a new form of government that abolished Connor’s office and then by again outvoting the same groups to prevent Connor from becoming mayor. (Having been driven from office in Birmingham, Connor was now a martyr, and he promptly won the important office of president of the Alabama Public Service Commission in a statewide election in 1964.)

Voting patterns varied from state to state of course, but a central theme was the breakdown of the New Deal alliance, as the Faubuses, Davises, Wallaces, Bryants, Burnses, and Griffins siphoned off rural and lower-income white voters. Blacks reacted by supporting the moderation of upper-status suburbanites. In some states, such as Arkansas or Mississippi, this division took on the basic character of a rural-urban cleavage; in others, as in the case of Louisiana or Florida, it accentuated sectional differences. In most instances, voting patterns reflected all of these factors—race, class, sectional, and rural-urban division—which were so clearly etched in the election returns of Alabama or Georgia. In Mississippi and South Carolina, the pervading influence of the race issue transcended the sporadic primary-election conflict between black belt and hills.

Mississippi, Key speculated in *Southern Politics*, “only manifests in accentuated form the darker political strains that run throughout the South,” 43 and surely Ross R. Barnett was the ultimate caricature of the racist demagogues of the massive resistance period. But before Barnett, the conflict between the Mississippi River Valley black-belt counties and the predominately white northeastern hills and southeastern coastal areas

mapped the contours of state politics. During the postwar period the black-belt whites and their allies in the high-rent districts of Jackson, the state's only metropolis, supported an uncompromising conservatism that could have been matched by few other areas of the nation.

In 1947 the Delta gubernatorial candidate was Fielding L. Wright, who defeated the vaguely New Dealish Paul B. Johnson, Jr., and went on to become the Dixiecrat vice-presidential nominee. Wright was replaced in the statehouse by Hugh White, another black-belt favorite, who defeated Johnson by a relatively narrow margin. In 1954 James O. Eastland defended his Senate seat against the moderately progressive Carroll Gartin. Himself a Delta planter, Eastland won an impressive 71 percent in the black-belt counties, which was the same margin by which he carried the silk-stocking neighborhoods in Jackson. In 1960 Mississippi voters ratified a constitutional amendment placing right-to-work provisions in the state constitution, thus reinforcing the right-to-work law already in the Mississippi statute books. Only four of eighty-two counties voted against the amendment, but the majorities delivered by some of the Delta counties were truly impressive, though most could not live up to the 94.3 percent provided by Jackson's upper-income precincts. In a 1952 prohibition...
referendum, the black belt turned in a relatively sizable minority for the
wet position, but on few other matters could the area’s voting residents lay
claim to the liberal side of an issue. James Eastland insisted that “segrega-
tion lives in the minds and hearts of southerners. It is integral to southern
culture.”

Walter Sillers, perennial speaker of the Mississippi house of
representatives and a leading Delta spokesman, opposed progressive taxa-
tion for the support of public education on the grounds that, “after all, the
people who have the children should pay the tax, and you know the favored
few don’t have many children.”

What Key called “the delta mind” was
aptly expressed in a 1960 resolution passed by the Mississippi legislature
commending “the determined stand of the government of the Union of
South Africa in maintaining its firm segregation policy.”

Against this background the 1955 gubernatorial election marked some-
thing of a break with tradition. In the first primary Fielding Wright won a
plurality in the black-belt counties and a majority in the affluent and semi-
affluent precincts in Jackson, while Ross R. Barnett exhibited some appeal

44As quoted in U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1950, 9043.
to lower-status white voters. But neither made the runoff, which was fought out between Johnson and James P. Coleman. The black belt and, indeed, most of the northern and central portions of the state adopted Coleman in preference to the liberal-tinged Johnson, and the upper-income Jackson neighborhoods gave him two-thirds of their votes. But Coleman was by no means a typical Delta candidate; he brought to the governorship a refreshing concern for dignity, rationalized governmental procedure, and such things as honest elections and a higher budget for Mississippi's starved public schools. Whatever impetus Coleman might have provided toward a more responsible conservatism, however, was soon absorbed by racial hysteria.

Ross Barnett made his third assault on the statehouse in 1959. In the first primary he ran well enough in rural areas and, insofar as Jackson returns are representative, in lower-status white precincts to lead the balloting and enter the runoff. His runoff opponent, Carroll Gartin, was the coalition candidate, winning majorities in black and high-income white neighborhoods. But too few blacks voted, and Gartin's majorities in Jackson's prestige areas were too narrow to overcome the massive support Barnett received from the lower socioeconomic levels of whites. Barnett carried Jackson and the election. Despite his success in Jackson, however, Barnett was distinctly the candidate of the countryside; of Mississippi's seventy-one rural-small town counties, Barnett won majorities in sixty-one. Gartin's strength lay in the larger towns. Of the eleven counties containing a city of 20,000 or more, Gartin carried nine, losing only Hinds (Jackson) and Adams (Natchez) Counties.

Barnett promised little in his campaign other than absolute devotion to the policies of white supremacy and, reputedly, an unusually large number of patronage positions for his supporters. So preoccupied did Barnett become with finding jobs for worthy allies that when a reporter asked him about Quemoy and Matsu he allegedly answered: "They're good men, and I'm sure I can find a place for them in Fish and Game [Commission]." Barnett was never able to get the grasp of the governorship and always seemed a bit incredulous when things went wrong. After a prison trusty assigned to the governor escaped, Barnett philosophized memorably: "If you can't trust a trustee, who can you trust?" The first session of the Mississippi legislature to meet under Barnett's guidance distinguished itself primarily by lowering the income tax and raising legislative salaries; commending South Africa's racial policies, enacting a series of anti-sit-in and anti-civil-rights laws, and opening the state treasury to the Citizens' Councils; and submitting to the electorate constitutional amendments.

47Coleman's tenure is perceptively reviewed by Kenneth Toler, in Atlanta Journal and Constitution, January 3, 1960.
48As quoted in Sherrill, Gothic Politics in the Deep South, p. 184.
49Ibid., p. 3.
One-Party State Politics

guaranteeing right-to-work and erecting yet further barriers to voter registration.\textsuperscript{50} As time passed, the Barnett administration came under increasing criticism for inefficiency and corruption. But Barnett "stood in the school house door" in defense of segregation at the University of Mississippi, and so did his lieutenant governor, Paul Johnson, Jr.

Consequently, Johnson made continuation of the struggle against the federal government and its racial policies his principle campaign issue in his 1963 quest for the governorship. Once known as something of an economic liberal, Johnson followed the drift of Mississippi, and indeed southern, politics from economics to race. His leading opponent, as in 1955, was James P. Coleman, and the two once again met as runoff opponents. By this time the mood of the electorate had changed, however, and Johnson won a substantial victory. Coleman swept Jackson's black and upper- and upper-middle-class white precincts, but Johnson won in lower-status white neighborhoods and carried most of the state's rural counties. Johnson won more than 55 percent in only three of the eleven urban counties, but he did better than 55 percent in three-fourths of the rural-small town counties.

The darker political strains exemplified in Mississippi were a formidable force in Democratic factional politics in the upper-South states, splitting even the venerable Byrd organization in Virginia. Senator Harry Flood Byrd had coined the term "massive resistance," and the Byrd organization was instrumental in formulating a strategy of southern opposition to public-school desegregation. But when the defense of segregation became a matter of closing affected schools, Governor J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., chose to abandon massive resistance and to reopen on a desegregated basis the nine schools he had ordered closed during the fall of 1958. Senator Byrd and many of the organization stalwarts considered the governor's strategic retreat a sellout. "I stand now as I stood when I first urged massive resistance," the senator stated,\textsuperscript{51} and the division between the organization's hard-core segregationists, who stood with Byrd, and its more moderate members, who followed Almond, widened during the governor's final years in office.

Each faction entered candidates for the gubernatorial nomination in 1961. The organization regulars selected Attorney General Albertis S. Harrison to oppose Lieutenant Governor A. E. S. Stephens, who was closely associated with Almond's policies. Virginia voters for the first time since the 1940s were treated to the unseemly spectacle of a hotly contested Democratic primary election. The Byrd organization weathered the rebellion. Harrison won substantial majorities in nonmetropolitan areas,


especially in the southern and central parts of the state, to finish with 56.7 percent of the vote. Stephens carried the mountain counties and almost broke even in the metropolitan areas. In Richmond and Norfolk, Stephens massively carried the black precincts and lost the white ones, though he made a creditable showing in lower-status areas. Harrison held together the Byrd organization's basic following—the Southside whites, the urban upper class, and the rural-small town voters generally. Nevertheless the public bloodletting damaged the prestige of the organization’s aging leadership.

In North Carolina the racial issue catapulted I. Beverly Lake, a Columbia Ph.D. and former Wake Forest law professor, into a major force in state politics. Making his first statewide campaign in the 1960 gubernatorial primary, Lake relied heavily on the volunteer efforts of former students and on an aggressive defense of segregation. Lake ran sufficiently well in the lowland counties and in blue-collar districts in the cities to enter the runoff against Terry Sanford, former campaign manager for Kerr Scott. Horrified by Lake's virulent racism, Governor Luther H. Hodges and the establishment forces, who had divided their efforts between two contenders in the first primary, threw their support to Sanford. Opposed by virtually all the Democratic party regulars, Lake went under in the runoff with 44 percent of the vote. He carried the black belt and made a creditable showing everywhere except in the mountain counties. In the cities he projected a sharp class appeal, running well among lower-status whites. Sanford, who campaigned on a progressive platform, won almost unanimous support in black precincts and carried higher-income white precincts by handsome majorities.

Four years later Lake again sought the governor's office. This time, however, the establishment faction united behind Judge Dan K. Moore, while the more liberal Sanford forces supported Judge L. Richardson Preyer. Lake finished third, again demonstrating a strong appeal to voters in the eastern lowland counties and in lower-status white neighborhoods. Eliminated from the runoff campaign, Lake supported Moore, who apparently attracted the bulk of Lake's voter following. In the runoff, as in the primary, Preyer won massive majorities in black neighborhoods and lost generally in white neighborhoods. In North Carolina the race issue alone was not adequate for victory, but the impact of Lake on the state's politics testified to its disruptive potential.52

Similarly, in Tennessee hardly a campaign passed without some candidate accusing the opposition of integrationist leanings. Both Gore and Kefauver won renomination over segregationist opposition. In 1958 former Governor Prentice Cooper based his campaign to dislodge Gore on a

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<table>
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<th>Vote category</th>
<th>Charlotte</th>
<th>Greensboro</th>
<th>Raleigh</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage of vote received</td>
<td>Percentage of vote received</td>
<td>Percentage of vote received</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower-class white</td>
<td>44.8 (1,843)</td>
<td>53.9 (321)</td>
<td>51.9 (503)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower-middle-class white</td>
<td>29.6 (769)</td>
<td>54.6 (960)</td>
<td>47.0 (1,135)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper-middle-class white</td>
<td>23.9 (1,314)</td>
<td>39.8 (1,958)</td>
<td>41.0 (1,263)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper-class white</td>
<td>27.9 (3,105)</td>
<td>32.9 (3,096)</td>
<td>35.8 (3,943)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>.9 (1,704)</td>
<td>.3 (2,234)</td>
<td>1.7 (2,491)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County vote</td>
<td>34.2 (10,098)</td>
<td>40.8 (11,897)</td>
<td>41.7 (28,616)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) (N) denotes the number of votes upon which the percentages are based.

\(^b\) County-vote percentages are based on the total number of votes cast in the county.

Stringent defense of social conservatism; two years later Judge Andrew T. Taylor conducted a similar though more folksy, more effective campaign in his effort to unseat Kefauver. In neither case did the tactics prove effective. Both Cooper and Taylor won majorities in the rural-small town counties of the western Tennessee lowlands, but the incumbents swept the central and eastern parts of the state to claim impressive victories. In Nashville Gore and Kefauver carried precincts of all socioeconomic categories, running best in black and lower- and middle-income white areas. Beginning their Senate careers with substantially different voting bases, Kefauver and Gore were repeatedly challenged in the Democratic primaries by demonstrably more conservative, segregationist candidates. The sharp escalation in their ecological correlations clearly suggests the convergence of their voter constituencies and the polarization of politics in the era of desegregation:

- Kefauver in 1948 and Gore in 1952: \(-.57\)
- Gore in 1952 and Kefauver in 1954: \(-.10\)
- Kefauver in 1954 and Gore in 1958: \(.62\)
- Gore in 1958 and Kefauver in 1960: \(.85\)
- Kefauver in 1960 and Gore in 1964: \(.87\)

Racial and ideological division was less obvious in Tennessee's gubernatorial politics. Liberal candidates in Tennessee gubernatorial primaries...
consistently went under, but so too did the extreme segregationists. In 1952 Frank G. Clement defeated Governor Gordon Browning and two years later overwhelmed Browning’s comeback effort. As governor, Clement increased educational expenditures and state services, promoted industrial expansion, and followed a moderate policy on racial matters. Unable to succeed himself in 1958, Clement supported the successful campaign of Buford Ellington, his commissioner of agriculture and former campaign manager, who in turn supported Clement’s return to the governor’s office in 1962. The administration machine failed in 1964, when Clement sought to move from the governor’s office to the Senate seat vacated by Kefauver. Ross Bass, a progressive congressman who had voted for the 1964 civil rights bill, ran extremely well in the middle part of the state and combined black and lower-status white support to carry the cities and the election. Clement got revenge two years later, beating Bass in a rematch by a narrow margin. The administration forces continued in power, moreover, as Ellington returned to the governorship, defeating liberal John J. Hooker.

The Clement-Ellington administration forces fielded candidates in election after election and thus provided some structure for Tennessee politics, but they did not create a consistent identifiable voter following, and the ecological correlations suggest a surprisingly minimal relationship between their voter bases: Clement in 1954 and Ellington in 1958, .14; Ellington in 1958 and Clement in 1962, .11; Clement in 1962 and Ellington in 1966, .26. Like the Crump organization that it replaced, the administration faction relied on loose alliances with county leaders and the patronage and favors dispensed by the governor. In the cities white upper-income areas provided the basic support. In Nashville and in Memphis, both consistently did best in high-prestige neighborhoods.

New Deal voting alignments continued more or less to hold together in Texas. In 1958 Ralph Yarborough successfully defended the Senate seat he had won in the 1957 special election by defeating William A. Blakley of Dallas. An insurance man, banker, rancher, and lawyer, Blakley was regarded as wealthy even by Texas standards, and his ideological views corresponded to popular stereotypes of the outlook of the very rich in the Lone Star State. So reactionary were Blakley’s positions on the issues that moderate leaders, such as U.S. Speaker of the House of Representatives Sam Rayburn, and numerous right-of-center voters supported Yarborough, who won convincingly. As in previous races, Yarborough ran best in black and lower-status white precincts, and he carried eastern Texas by a hefty margin. But unlike in his previous elections, Yarborough made a creditable showing in higher-income neighborhoods and was the favorite of the south Texas machine counties.

Yarborough’s 1958 victory was a relatively isolated event, however. Texas liberalism had no other leader with a statewide following. In the 1960 gubernatorial primary, the only contenders were two conservatives,
Governor Price Daniel and challenger Jack Cox. When Lyndon B. Johnson resigned his Senate seat to become vice-president, the 1961 special election to fill the seat was a true free-for-all, with seventy-one candidates on the ballot and one write-in contestant, but the two major liberal candidates, Henry B. Gonzalez and Maury Maverick, Jr., together won only 20 percent of the votes, as William Blakley and Republican John Tower captured runoff slots.

Then, in 1962, both the conservatives and the liberals found new leadership. Don Yarborough, a Houston lawyer and no relation to Senator Yarborough, entered the gubernatorial primary as a New Frontier liberal. Yarborough had made only one previous campaign, a strong though unsuccessful effort for lieutenant governor in 1960, but he was an attractive candidate and a persuasive advocate of social and economic reform. Price Daniel was expected to be the strongest conservative contender but as the campaign got underway, that role passed to John B. Connally. In both the first and second primaries Connally’s campaigns were among the best financed and most effective in Texas history. His five-minute “Coffee with Connally” television spots between seven and eight o’clock each morning proved popular, and his “John Connally Victory Special” whistle-stop speaking tour was reminiscent of Harry Truman’s 1948 presidential campaign. Although making his first race, Connally was a veteran aide to Lyndon Johnson and during 1961 served as secretary of the navy. The hotly contested runoff between Connally and Yarborough resulted in a narrow Connally victory. Don Yarborough, like Ralph before him, carried east Texas and ran up heavy majorities in lower-status white precincts. Connally won in west Texas, and his financial and organizational resources appeared in the returns from the Mexican-American counties, which he took handily, and probably in the returns from black precincts, where he reaped a sizable share of the vote. Connally won a third of the black votes in Yarborough’s hometown of Houston, almost 45 percent in his own hometown of Fort Worth, and a majority in the black precincts of intermediate Waco. But Connally’s basic constituency was the upper-income whites; in Yarborough’s Houston, Connally won more than 80 percent of the ballots cast in affluent white districts, and he did almost as well in Fort Worth and Waco.

The 1962 race had been close; in a clear-cut contest pitting liberal versus conservative, the liberal had reaped almost half the votes cast, despite defections from minority voters. Then came the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in Dallas in 1963. Connally, who was riding

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55For a more detailed discussion of voting patterns in Houston, see Chandler Davidson, Biracial Politics: Conflict and Coalition in the Metropolitan South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972), pp. 52–105.
with Kennedy and who suffered wounds from the assassin’s bullets, immedi­ately became a living martyr. When Don Yarborough again challenged Connally in 1964, the Houston liberal polled less than a third of the ballots, as Connally, his arm still bandaged from his wounds, swept to a massive victory. In this instance the frontier tradition of violence, rather than the southern tradition of racism, undermined the liberal cause in Texas. None­theless, the New Deal voting alliance remained potentially intact, as Ralph Yarborough demonstrated in his reelection to the Senate in 1964. Yar­borough faced relatively weak primary opposition, thanks in some measure to arm-twisting on the part of President Lyndon Johnson, who wanted to prevent factional bloodletting in his home state.56 As he had against Blakley, Yarborough rolled up massive majorities in black and lower­income white precincts to cruise to a first-primary victory.

But over much of the region the racial issue slashed through the fabric of one-party politics. Voting patterns varied, of course, but in state after state the populist-New Deal alignments of the early postwar years broke apart, as rural and low-income whites shifted from support of economic reform to defense of social conservatism. Black voters increasingly joined with the economically conservative upper-income whites in opposition to racial extremism. These shifting voting alignments disrupted the factional competition that had served as an inadequate substitute for a two-party system. By this time, however, the days of the Solid Democratic South had passed. A surging southern Republicanism represented a new force in southern politics.