The Socialist Republic of Rumania

Fischer-Galati, Stephen

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Inter-camp Relations

The matter of international cooperation, and integration with members of the socialist camp, was spelled out in the lengthy statement of the Rumanian Workers’ Party. The fundamental principles contained in the statement, if fully implemented, would indeed have led—as in fact they did by March, 1968—to the “independent” communist Rumania of today. The statement’s basic thesis is the right of all communist and workers’ parties and of socialist states to “elaborate, choose, or change the forms and methods of socialist construction” in accordance with the “concrete historic conditions prevailing in their own countries. . . .” To secure these rights, it was further stipulated that “bearing in mind the diversity of the conditions of socialist construction, there are not nor can there be any unique patterns or recipes; no one can decide what is and what is not correct for other countries and parties. It is up to every Marxist-Leninist Party, it is a sovereign right to each socialist state, to elaborate, choose or change the forms and methods of socialist construction. The strict observance of the basic principles of the new-type relations among the socialist countries is the primary prerequisite of the
unity and cohesion of these countries and of the world socialist system performing its decisive role in the development of mankind." ¹

These principles were clearly aimed at protecting the country's and the Party's integrity against "interference in internal affairs" by the Soviet Union. Specific protective clauses were also included. The Romanians stated their unshakable allegiance to the principle of the unity of the socialist camp of equals, thus endorsing the Chinese views on the subject. They also restated their determination to develop "relations of cooperation with countries which have a different social-political system, on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence." For the Romanians, these principles were equated with the "development of trade, of economic relations based on mutual advantage, as well as the extension of technical and scientific links, of cultural exchanges..." that would improve the "international climate" and "strengthen peace throughout the world."

The most specific demands voiced by the Romanians were for the abolition of all military blocs (including the Warsaw Pact), the conclusion of a German peace treaty (with implied recognition of the political existence and legitimacy of West Germany), and the enlargement of the membership of COMECON to include all members of the socialist camp acting in accordance with the principles of equality of members and the "most flexible forms and methods of cooperation." Offensive as these views were to the Soviet Union, they naturally added to the existing friction between the dissident Romanians and Russia and the loyal members of the Soviet bloc. In fact, the statement was a declaration of war against Soviet domination of

the bloc inasmuch as the Kremlin had declared itself opposed to accepting the validity of even less specific conditions for Rumanian "independence."

The subsequent evolution of Rumanian relations with the Soviet Union, the members of the bloc, and the socialist camp, at both the Party and state levels, and with noncommunist states—in other words the evolution of Rumania's anti-integrationist policies—have reflected the Party's awareness of the impossibility of meaningful reconciliation of Russia's centralistic orientation and Rumania's political interests. The "Rumanian course" has also reflected the dilemmas and contradictions inherent in seeking ill-assorted crutches for support against Russian "imperialism" at home and abroad. The principle of the unity of the socialist camp—a euphemism for the maintenance of the split caused by the Sino-Soviet conflict—was even as early as 1964 in obvious contradiction to the policy of economic and political coexistence with the arch-enemy of the Chinese wing, the American "imperialists." And these contradictions were deepened by such subsequent actions as befriending West Germany and Israel, the sworn enemies of members of the Soviet bloc and of the Arab communist parties. In Rumania proper, the drive to secure acceptance of the Party's historic claims of fulfilling the independent traditions of the Rumanians unleashed the latent forces of nationalism, cultural in form but political in purpose. These contradictions have placed the Rumanian leaders in an ideologically indefensible and politically dangerous position, and have determined the unique character of communist Rumania and of her present relations with the members of the Communist party states.²

² A brief analytical statement is contained in Fischer-Galati, The New Rumania, pp. 104 ff.
The direct political conflict—inherent in the struggle for independence from Soviet domination—has been with the Russian Communist Party and state. The Rumanians' uncompromising position, in its original formulation of April, 1964, was held until the death of Gheorghiu-Dej in March, 1965. However, even during that period of comparative moderation, the Rumanian regime pursued policies designed to consolidate its independence on bases different from those stated in 1964. Most significant was the gradual rekindling of nationalism—with an anti-Russian character—focusing on the Bessarabian question. It is uncertain whether the Rumanians' territorial revisionism—made public in December, 1964—was a deliberate reassertion of Rumania's independence at a time when the Brezhnev and Kosygin partnership replaced Khrushchev, or a response to a continuing Soviet pressure to force Rumania back into line. The Russian methods of coercion through economic pressure, reopening of the Transylvanian question, and insistence on reasserting Soviet supremacy in the camp were at work in the fall of 1964. In any event, to the Rumanian leadership, the formal reopening of the Bessarabian issue was designed to gain the support of the Rumanian people for anti-Russian activities unrelated to "proletarian internationalism." The appeal to nationalism grew stronger in 1965 when blatantly nationalist theses were expounded in official reinterpretation of Rumanian history and Russo-Rumanian relations. The Russians were once again historical "villains," and their contribution to the "liberation" of Rumania in August, 1944, was minimized. The Rumanian communist

3 Most striking was the publication of Marx's critical notes on tsarist imperialism by A. Otetea and S. Schwann in December, 1964. Karl Marx, *Insemnari despre romani* ("Notes Concerning the Rumanians") (Bucharest, 1964).
leaders were now the primary architects of the "armed uprising," executed with the "assistance" of the Soviet armed forces. The Rumanians' defiance of Russia—or defense against Russian pressures—had become even more pronounced by July, 1965, when the April, 1964, formulas were revised in the direction of greater independence at both the state and Party levels. The Party shed the compromise appellation of "Rumanian Workers' Party" in favor of "Rumanian Communist Party," to correspond to the self-declared elevation of Rumania from the status of People's Democracy to Socialist Republic. The equalization in rank of both the Party and the state to that of the most "advanced" members of the Soviet bloc—the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia—was offensive enough to Russia, but the preference for "Socialist Republic of Romania" (emphasized by the readoption of the historical Latin-derived spelling which had been abandoned in 1954) rather than the "Rumanian Socialist Republic," added insult to injury. Since the summer of 1965, the Rumanian leadership has grown increasingly bolder in deepening its independence from Moscow. The territorial claims to Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, though somewhat soft-pedaled through restatement of the inviolability of the frontiers drawn in Europe by the peace settlements of World War II, have not actually been renounced. The demands for liquidation of the Warsaw Pact, concurrently with NATO, assumed more strident tones after the unequivocal spelling out of that anti-Russian position by Nicolae Ceausescu in May, 1966. The Rumanians' rejection of their military partners' views on nonproliferation of atomic weapons in March, 1968, is only the latest evidence of
Ceausescu's determination not to allow the Russians to obtain any legal means for coercion of weaker socialist states by virtue of superior military power.

In its most spectacular form, however, the Rumanians' independent course has manifested itself in the constant opposition to the restoration of Soviet hegemony in the socialist camp. The Rumanians have opposed all Russian attempts to restore the unity of the camp through action by an international communist conference. They dramatized this determination by walking out of the February, 1968, meeting of communist parties held in Budapest, when the assembled parties were veering in the direction of supporting Soviet positions vis-à-vis the Chinese and other dissidents. The walk-out was also an expression of Rumanian resistance to Russian reaction against Rumanian policies unrelated to the international communist movement. The Rumanian Party's decision to maintain friendly relations with the Communist Party of Israel, and of the Rumanian state with the state of Israel during and after the Arab-Israeli war of June, 1967—motivated by economic and political factors other than those of the Soviet Union and the Russian Party—clashed directly with that of the members of the Soviet bloc and the Arab parties and states. The denunciation of Rumania's "treasonable" policies toward Israel, made by the Syrian delegation at Budapest—clearly with Russia's consent, if not at Moscow's behest—was the ostensible reason for the Rumanians' exodus from that meeting. The Syrian and Russian moves in Budapest underline the depth of the Russo-Rumanian conflict, and the extent of Russia's displeasure with Rumanian's independent course.5

The Rumanian doctrine of the supremacy of the national interest is insufferable to the Kremlin. The Russians have repeatedly expressed their irritation over Rumanian actions, justified in terms of national as against international communist interests. Rumania's establishing normal diplomatic relations with West Germany in 1967, over the protests of East Germany and without Moscow's consent, was an act of overt defiance. Almost as offensive was her refusal to join the Soviet bloc in condemning Israel, and the subsequent expansion of the scope of Israeli-Rumanian economic and cultural relations. Rumania's rapprochement with West Germany and her independent attitude toward Israel were caused primarily by her desire to secure markets and capital for the country's economic development, in order to lessen her economic dependence on the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc. Nevertheless, none of Rumania's actions—at the Party or state levels—have affected vital Russian national interests sufficiently to warrant more forcible Russian "interference in Rumanian affairs." It is most unlikely that the Rumanian leadership would risk a direct confrontation with Moscow and thus, at least on the surface, "friendly, comradely relations" are maintained between the two countries. In reality, of course, the conflict is acute, and the opposing positions are at present irreconcilable. This situation has constantly affected, if not determined, the nature of the relations between Rumania and the Rumanian Party and other members of the bloc and socialist camp.

The most direct impact was on relations with Hungary. It has been assumed that until 1964 Rumania's relations with Hungary, at the state and Party levels, have been correct if not necessarily cordial. The chauvinist manifestations displayed by part of the Magyar
population of Transylvania—most notably university students—during the revolt of 1956 were officially condemned by Budapest. Nevertheless, the Rumanian regime took steps to curtail the cultural autonomy of the Hungarians in Transylvania after the revolt, ostensibly because these manifestations were reflections of "bourgeois" ideological influences which had to be eradicated. With the degeneration of Russo-Rumanian relations, and particularly after the reopening of territorial questions in 1964, the process of making Transylvania more "Rumanian" gained momentum. The Rumanian action was motivated in part by the need to gain mass support for causes identified with the Rumanian historic tradition (among which anti-Magyar sentiment occupied a paramount place), but mostly because of the Russian encouragement of Hungarian irredentism and the accompanying threat of redrawing Transylvania's frontiers on the basis of ethnic-territorial factors.

Whether the Russian pressure exerted on dissident Rumania through reopening of the Transylvanian question was a reflection of official Hungarian revisionism or an independent political action of the Kremlin in which Budapest tacitly concurred is uncertain. In any case the Russian action and Rumanian reaction, or counteraction, has once again focused attention on territorial and nationality questions in Rumanian-Hungarian relations, to the detriment of the further development of economic and cultural ties. Perhaps, paradoxically, the Hungarians did not share the Russian, Czechoslovak, and East German anti-Rumanian positions in COMECON and are still cooperative with the Rumanians in economic affairs. But cultural exchanges have declined and, in general, relations between the two countries have become formal and some-
what rigid. At the Party level, the Hungarians have adhered more closely to the Russian ideological positions than they have to Russia's political and economic line at the state level. The Hungarian Party has favored the convening of conferences designed to reestablish Russia's domination of the camp and has sided with Russia in all ideological disputes with the Rumanians. Most striking was the Hungarian criticism of the Rumanian walkout at the Budapest conference, and the wholehearted support given to Moscow's call for another, formal conference of all communist parties to implement the Kremlin's demands for ideological conformity so opposed to the Rumanians. Evidently, relations between Hungary and Rumania are likely to be more strained than before, with as yet unpredictable consequences for the unity of the bloc and the camp.

Rumania's relations with Bulgaria are ambiguous also. Since 1957 the Rumanians have been seeking close ties with a view to implementing the Stoica Plan for Balkan federation. As Russo-Rumanian relations deteriorated, Rumania's courting of Bulgaria became more intensive. Ceausescu, in particular, has tried, mostly unsuccessfully, to reduce Bulgaria's subservience to Russia and to encourage manifestations of independence at least to the extent of accepting the Stoica Plan and strengthening regional autonomy. The Bulgarians' evinced interest in participating in the Rumanian scheme for creating a "zone of peace" in the Balkans, and the related outward manifestations of "fraternal solidarity" have not satisfied Bucharest. Sofia's continuing subservience to Moscow in political and ideological matters, as evidenced by total endorsement of all Russian schemes and proposals no matter how opposed to Rumanian positions, has proven the futility of Rumanian efforts to convert the Bulgarians
to a more flexible—if not necessarily Rumanian—line.

Rumania's ties with East Germany are less ambiguous—in fact, they verge on hostility—as do her ties with Poland, which reflect Bucharest's rapprochement with Bonn. The East Germans have been the primary supporters of Russian positions on economic integration under COMECON, both before and after the Rumanian denunciation of those policies in March, 1963, and they have expressed profound displeasure over all aspects of Rumanian foreign relations. The East German attitude is derived primarily from its total dependence on Moscow for political survival; however, in no small measure the East Germans regard the Rumanians as upstarts and traditional inferiors, at both the state and Party levels. The Rumanian reaction to Ulbricht's positions has been equally negative, with the result that only the most perfunctory bilateral relations are maintained between the two parties and states.

More significant is the deterioration of Rumania's relations with Poland, which had been closer, traditionally, than those between Rumania and East Germany. In 1956 the Rumanians were flirting with Gomulka when Polish assertions of independence coincided with Rumanian views on the relationship among members of the bloc and camp, at the same time opposing the internal liberalization policies of the Poles as anti-Stalinist. Gradually, as Gomulka's liberalism and independent policies waned, with corresponding realignment with Russian positions, and the Rumanians became closer to the Poles of 1956, friction began to develop. The Poles now regard the Rumanians as a destructive force sabotaging integration and the common interests of the Soviet bloc and socialist camp. Gomulka is totally identified with Moscow on matters
related to Germany, China, and Rumania; and Ceausescu is apparently more contemptuous than resentful toward Gomulka's attitudes. In any event, relations between the two countries and parties are static and rigid with no immediate likelihood of improvement.

Similar rigidity had been characteristic of Rumanian-Czechoslovak relations until the removal of Novotny from power in January, 1968. Novotny's dependence on Moscow and his support of all Russian positions in international affairs was as offensive to the Rumanians as the scarcely hidden Czechoslovak contempt for Rumania's demands for economic equality with the more advanced socialist nations and its ostentatious assumption of the title Socialist Republic, which was, until 1965, the distinguishing mark of Czechoslovakia with respect to the "underdeveloped" members of the Soviet bloc. The assumption of power by the "reformist" group headed by Alexander Dubcek brought about closer relations between Czechoslovakia and Rumania. As early as February, 1968, the Rumanian power elite paid homage to Dubcek and to the Czechoslovak independent course in a state visit to Prague. And during the confrontation between the Czechoslovak and the Russian and "conservative" allied parties of Poland, East Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria in July, 1968, the Rumanians sided openly with the Czechs. After the threat of Soviet military intervention appeared to have subsided in early August, the Rumanian power elite returned to Czechoslovakia to conclude a far-reaching treaty of friendship and mutual assistance with Czechoslovakia and to reiterate its support for the right of all nations to work out their own policies, without interference, on the basis of "objective historical conditions." And even after the Soviet invasion
of Czechoslovakia on August 20–21, Rumania vociferously reiterated its support for Czechoslovakia’s right to political self-determination.

It has been suggested that prior to the invasion Rumania’s stand—which coincided with that of Yugoslavia—was partly motivated by a common desire to strengthen the political and economic bonds among the “dissidents” in Eastern Europe. In fact, the historic antecedents of the interwar Little Entente came to the minds of political analysts of Eastern Europe. In any event, for Rumania, as well as for Czechoslovakia and even for Yugoslavia, the rapprochement of the summer of 1968 was also designed to reduce their isolation from the rest of the Soviet bloc and provide a common front against pressures exerted by the conservative members of the East European party states. This was particularly true of Rumania, which has not been consulted on any important issues affecting the bloc since the meeting of the Warsaw Pact in March, 1968, and has been, in effect, ostracized from the bloc as a sign of Moscow’s growing displeasure with Ceausescu’s independence. Indeed, Rumania has become essentially isolated from all members of the Soviet bloc except Czechoslovakia, none of which are subscribing to Bucharest’s views on the relations among members of the bloc when such views are contrary to those of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the Rumanian independent course has not brought about the disintegration of the bloc or, for that matter, of political, cultural, and economic organizations in which only members of the bloc are represented. Rumania is still a member of COMECON.

6 The essence of Rumania’s position vis-à-vis Czechoslovakia and the Czechoslovak crisis is contained in the “Declaration of the Grand National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Rumania Regarding the Fundamental Principles of Rumania’s Foreign Policy,” published in Scinteia, August 23, 1968.
and of the Warsaw Pact, although the Rumanian actions have weakened the cohesion of these organizations. In that respect, Rumania's position is entirely different from that of ex-members of the Soviet bloc, Albania and Yugoslavia, whose own independent course has resulted in their abandonment of collective commitments and programs.

Rumania's decision to retain her commitments to the bloc are consonant with her national interests. The Rumanian economy is still heavily dependent on relations with members of the bloc, most notably the Soviet Union. The Soviet-Rumanian trade protocol for 1968 envisages a volume of 770 million rubles, or slightly over 25 per cent of the total Rumanian foreign trade for that year. Even if the proportion of Russo-Rumanian trade has dropped increasingly in recent years (7.3 per cent in the share of Rumania's total 1966 foreign trade, 17.4 per cent in 1963, and about 25.6 per cent in 1958), Rumanian trade with Russia is essential for the attainment of Rumania's economic goals. The comparable decline in Rumanian trade relations with the other members of COMECON has been less significant because it was more than compensated for by the constant increase of trade with Western Europe. Her geographic position also precludes the pursuit of policies that could be regarded as fully incompatible with the national interests of the Soviet Union and other members of the bloc. Thus, withdrawal from COMECON or the Warsaw Pact, or energetic pressing of demands for revision of the post-war frontiers of the member nations of the bloc are unlikely to occur. The Rumanian dilemma, caused by realistic economic and geopolitical considerations, is

7 Important statistical information may be found in *East Europe*, Vol. 17, no. 9 (September, 1968), pp. 51–52.
also translated in her championing of the principles of
the unity of the socialist camp and her unique relations
with members of the camp, as different from the bloc.
Theoretically, the bloc is subordinated to the camp;
practically, the camp of equals constitutes a protective
defense against pressures by a bloc of satellites.

It is for such pragmatic reasons that the Rumanians
have maintained correct, often even friendly, relations
with the communist nation states not belonging to the
Soviet bloc. The specific character of the relations has
been determined by differing “national” requirements,
invariably political but occasionally reflecting broader
economic interests of the state. These considerations
account for the diversity of relations with communist
states at opposite poles of the communist ideological
and political spectra. Of greatest significance for this
study are Rumania’s relations with China and the
neutrals of the communist left and right, North Korea
and North Vietnam and Yugoslavia, respectively.

Rumania’s relations with China most accurately re­
fect the dilemmas, paradoxes, and complexities of her
independent course.8 The mutual utilization, by China
and Rumania, of common opposition to Soviet cen­
tralism and internationalism for furthering their own
independent, nationalist courses lost much of its effec­
tiveness in 1965 when the Rumanians veered to the
right and the Chinese to the left. Chou En-lai’s visit to
Rumania that year showed Ceausescu and his close
associates that the Chinese demanded total adherence
to their line as the price of active support of Rumania’s
“deviationism.” Mao’s “cultural revolution” further
alienated China from Rumania, both doctrinally and
in terms of possibilities for effective joint pressure

8 Details in Fischer-Galati, Rumania and the Sino-Soviet Con­
flict, pp. 261 ff.
against Moscow. The rather extensive trade that had been developing between the two countries in the late fifties and early sixties was cut back from approximately 5 per cent of Rumania’s total trade in 1959 to only half that percentage in 1968. Nevertheless, the Chinese have avoided any and all polemics toward the Rumanians and have supported Bucharest’s positions on the unity of the camp. However, the Chinese are no longer actively supporting Rumanian deviationism; nor are they using the Rumanians as spokesmen for anti-Soviet positions. Rather, it is the Rumanians who cling to China, at least to the extent to which Rumanian interests coincide with Peking’s. The Rumanians’ insistence on avoidance of condemnation of the Chinese party at the Budapest conference of February, 1968, was a Rumanian initiative; the coincidence between the Rumanian and Chinese positions on atomic controls stems from similarity of national interests rather than advance coordination of common policies.

The gradual loss of leverage—evident at least since the summer of 1967—has forced the Rumanians to adjust their relations with several members of the camp. If the Chinese position is still regarded as sufficiently strong to oppose Moscow’s quest for hegemony within the camp, it has had to be reinforced, certainly since the summer of 1967, through the re-establishment of Rumania’s position as a neutral and potential leader of a third force in the international communist movement. The third-force concept first emerged in 1963 but was shelved during the early stages of the Vietnamese war when the unity of the camp against imperialist aggression had to be proclaimed. It remained in mothballs until 1967, when the “cultural revolution” had shattered all possibility of maintaining even pro forma

unity, and in effect resulted in growing polycentrism in what was believed to be an essentially monolithic Chinese bloc. The differences between the Chinese and Russian views on formulas for settlement of the Vietnamese war helped Rumania's position of independence from Moscow as long as Hanoi's views veered toward Peking's. However, even in 1965 and 1966, the Rumanians exploited their independence and "friendship" with China for soundings of Peking's and Hanoi's inclinations for a compromise solution. In 1967, the last of their soundings fully revealed the weakness of their bargaining power as "friends" of China and the need to revert to the position of third force in the camp. Peking's blunt rejection of Rumanian efforts to persuade the Chinese to agree to a compromise formula for re-establishing peace in Vietnam on terms acceptable to Hanoi (and Washington), which occurred at the time of a Rumanian state visit to China in June, 1967, resulted in the Rumanians strengthening their bilateral relations with fellow "neutrals" in the Far East, most notably North Vietnam and North Korea, and in similar intensification of bilateral contacts with neutral nonruling communist parties.

Rumania had entertained close relations with North Korea since 1958 when the Rumanians cited the example of Chinese troop withdrawals from that country as a precedent for withdrawal of foreign troops from all fraternal communist countries. But North Korea's geographic remoteness, and her poverty, limited contacts to cultural exchanges and Rumanian statements of support for North Korean policies in the Far East, particularly vis-à-vis "American imperialism." In February, 1968, however, the Rumanians went beyond their traditional support of North Korea by endorsing not only the correctness of Pyongyang's policies in the
Pueblo incident but also the “independent”—in this case “neutral”—course in the Sino-Soviet conflict, while stressing the similarities between Rumanian and North Korean views of intracamp and international affairs. The Rumanians took it upon themselves, probably with Pyongyang’s consent, to speak for the “absent fraternal parties,” which included the North Korean, at the Budapest meeting and to justify the ideological and political correctness of the Korean decision not to attend.

Rumania’s relations with North Vietnam have been less well defined than those with North Korea. Before the Vietnamese war they were generally limited to formal exchanges of greetings and Rumanian endorsement of Hanoi’s struggle for liberation and national unification of the Vietnamese people. The internationalization of the Vietnamese “war of liberation” through active American intervention placed Bucharest in the difficult position of potential mediator between the United States—whose support it needed for pursuit of its own policies of independence from the Soviet Union—and North Vietnam—a small communist state whose national interests were frustrated by the United States.

As the Rumanians have been the greatest defenders of the rights of the small national state against acceptance of the will of “imperialistic” giants, the North Vietnamese were the first to question the sincerity of the Rumanians’ dedication to their own views on the unity of the camp. The endorsement by the Rumanians of mutually accusing slogans devised by Peking and

SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF RUMANIA

Moscow that only restoration of the unity of the camp could bring common communist action against the American imperialist aggressor—without, however, indicating whose slogan they were in fact endorsing—allowed Bucharest to pursue its ambiguous policies toward Moscow, Peking, Washington, and Hanoi. Attempts at mediation could be and have been conducted in all ideological and political capacities, the latest in that of the "third force" in the socialist camp and champion of international peace. Whether Hanoi accepts Bucharest's "neutral" posture at face value and regards the Rumanians as true brethren in the socialist camp is uncertain. In practical terms, North Vietnam has rejected the Rumanian efforts and has carefully avoided drawing similarities between the Rumanians' independence and their own. Certainly, neither Rumania nor North Vietnam has done much to strengthen the "unity of the camp," and both are using that slogan for the attainment of their own national interests. In that respect there is coincidence between Rumanian and Vietnamese independence and neutrality. There is also some coincidence between the Rumanian and the Vietnamese parties' wooing the "neutral" non-ruling communist parties. The Rumanian intensification of receptions for, and statements of common principles issued by, representatives of such parties visiting Rumania coincides, perhaps accidentally, with similar Vietnamese efforts. But as they all stress the principles of unity of the camp and anti-imperialism, it is difficult necessarily to equate the Vietnamese with the Rumanian positions. In the case of the Rumanians there can be little doubt that the wining and dining of representatives of fraternal parties with like sentiments is to gain support for Rumanian views on rela-
tions among communist parties and states and, whenever possible, recognition of Rumania's leadership of the neutrals.

The neutralist stand, but even more so the posture of fellow independents, has governed Rumania's relations with Yugoslavia. These relations, like those with China, have posed serious dilemmas for Bucharest because the Yugoslavs could provide little leverage for the Rumanian struggle for independence, certainly not enough to justify Rumania's emulation of the Yugoslav formula for independence. Titoism has been suspect to the Rumanians because of its "liberalism" and its unorthodox economic policies; and Rumania's independence, in turn, was looked upon with mistrust and later jealousy by Belgrade. As late as the summer of 1964, Tito tried to dissuade the Rumanians from pursuing an independent course too offensive to Moscow, presumably because he had pre-empted the position himself. As the Rumanians moved ahead of their own accord and by their own formulas, they began to compete with Yugoslavia for the favors of the West and invaded the previous Yugoslav sphere of influence among the tiers monde, with substantial success.

Undoubtedly, the Yugoslav adherence to the policies of the Soviet bloc in the Arab-Israeli war—from which the Rumanians alone deviated—was partly motivated by the gradual displacement of Yugoslav influence in the Middle East by aggressive Rumanian economic penetration. Cooperation with the Rumanians has been largely limited to economic matters of mutual national benefit such as the so-called Iron Gates project for developing hydroelectric power through harnessing and exploiting the potential of the Danube. Ideological consultations on matters related to Soviet "imperial-
ism" within the socialist camp have been held periodically since 1964 and frequently since 1967, with both Rumanians and Yugoslavs anxious to maintain the validity of their common doctrine of equality of members in the socialist camp. But there has been no emulation by the Rumanians of the Yugoslav internal policies, and few meaningful contacts between Yugoslav liberals and Rumanian conservatives in the intellectual and technical areas.

Common independence, if not necessarily neutrality, is the basic tie linking Rumania with Cuba and Albania. Relations with Albania, which in 1964 were designed to impress Moscow with Bucharest’s independence and the possibility of Rumania’s following in the Albanians’ footsteps, have become less important as Rumania’s independence became a fact. Relations are correct but insignificant. Relations with Cuba have been strained because of Cuba’s refusal to identify its own independent course with that of Rumania and because of Havana’s refusal to refrain from implicit (occasionally explicit) condemnation of Rumania’s flirtation with the archenemy, America. The Rumanians and the Cubans nevertheless share enough common problems—most notably proximity to hostile superpowers and the fear of a compromise between the United States and Russia—to voice common opposition to Soviet moves for re-establishment of unity of the camp à la russe.

The complexity of Rumania’s relations, forced upon her by the need to protect the interests of the Party and the related independent course, has not resulted in the consolidation of her position within the bloc or the camp. In fact, the Rumanians are aware of their isolation, most painfully since their solo exit from the
Budapest conference in February and the Czechoslovak crisis of August, 1968.

*Relations Outside the Socialist Camp*

Rumania's attempt to ensure her independence through relations outside the socialist camp has not provided a clear-cut solution to her problems. In accordance with her principle of international cooperation with all nations, regardless of their socioeconomic and political structures, she has indeed been most active in supporting cooperative international activities whenever possible. The Rumanians have frequently deviated from the Soviet bloc and from other members of the socialist camp in supporting broad international decisions by the United Nations. They have worked for the strengthening of that organization in all aspects of its activities and, symbolically, the General Assembly's president for 1967–68 was the Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Corneliu Manescu. Rumania has also evinced interest in some form of auxiliary membership in the Common Market and has been an ardent exponent of the integration of the European community of nations for the benefit of Europe as a whole. On a regional basis, she has steadfastly advanced the Stoica Plan for Balkan unity and multilateral cooperation.

These attempts are, however, unproductive by their very nature. They are ideologically suspect because they entail direct or indirect collaboration with the main enemies of the socialist community—the "American imperialists," "German revisionists," and "Israeli Zionists." Ideological considerations aside—though a
close rapprochement with these “hostile elements” may weaken the Rumanian communists’ position at home and within the socialist camp—the current international political and financial crises are not conducive to realization of Rumania’s economic and political interests in a manner that would assure her true independence from the Soviet bloc. The United States, for example, has not yet rescinded the discriminatory tariffs applicable to members of the communist camp, despite repeated demands for granting Rumania favored-nation treatment. West Germany, Rumania’s most active Western trading partner, is branded as an aggressor by the Soviet Union and its conservative partners in the bloc, a fact which forces caution upon both Bonn and Bucharest. France, despite the steady consolidation of traditional, cultural, and even economic ties, and a state visit by De Gaulle in May, 1968, has carefully avoided long-range commitments, as has “neutral” Rumania. And ties with India, Pakistan, or Iran have not brought meaningful economic benefits to Bucharest.

Thus, in the constant process of evaluation of, and adjustment to, the realities of the international situation and the “objective Rumanian conditions,” the Rumanians have chosen as their slogan, “By ourselves.” This slogan, borrowed from the National Liberals of the twenties, reveals the need for flexibility and adjustment and in the last analysis for a total national commitment to independence. How feasible is that formula in the late sixties? How successful will the Rumanians

11 The extraordinary increase in Rumania’s trade with West Germany—which quadrupled in less than eight years—is likely to diminish as a result of the Czechoslovak crisis and Soviet denunciations of West Germany and of Rumania’s too-friendly ties with Bonn.
be in attaining their goals by themselves? And at what cost?

The viability of the Rumanian formulas for integration and community building within the family of communist party states will be determined by the degree of national commitment to the purposes of the Rumanian Communist Party and state, the country's economic development, and the evolution of international relations both within and without the socialist camp.

Geographic and Demographic Factors

The Rumanian doctrinal positions on international cooperation presuppose that the construction of socialism in a free and independent Rumania represents the supreme desire of all her inhabitants. It recognizes the significance of geographic factors to the extent that the country's proximity to the U.S.S.R., as well as its geographic location within the Soviet bloc, renders Rumania vulnerable to Soviet pressures, political, economic, and even military. These factors limit Romania's freedom of action, forcing certain compromises in the formulation of Rumanian policies. Were Romania's geographic location different, it is quite probable that her independence would have been proclaimed sooner and her disengagement from the Soviet bloc would have been at least as complete as Yugoslavia's. Rumanian spokesmen have repeatedly emphasized the significance of these factors and have tended to justify their cautious approach to external problems on the risks inherent in proximity to the
"Russian bear." 12 More significantly, they have justified their "conservative" internal policies on the same grounds. However, short of military intervention or total economic isolation, the Soviet Union cannot remove the present leadership from power. There are no pro-Soviet groups in the Rumanian Party or society at large that could be used by the Kremlin for subverting the regime. The Russians have encouraged the Hungarian minority to seek closer ties with Hungary—a more trustworthy Soviet partner than Rumania—with a view to reopening the Transylvanian question, but apparently with limited success. There is no evidence that the Hungarians of Transylvania prefer Hungarian communism to Rumanian, although many are dissatisfied with the growing anti-Magyar nationalism manifest in Transylvania. The Rumanian rulers claim that their policies of international cooperation are in no way influenced by internal ecological and demographic factors, that they represent the interests of all inhabitants of Rumania regardless of race, religion, and nationality. In practice, however, the non-Rumanian inhabitants have little or no say in the formulation of Rumania's independent policies. The composition of the ruling Communist Party faithfully reflects the country's ethnic structure (approximately 87 per cent Rumanian); the all-powerful central organs of the Party are entirely Rumanian. The Rumanization of society and of the Party has affected the Hungarian minority less than the Jewish. The Hungarians were never influential in the higher Party echelons, but the Jews were. Ana Pauker, Iosif Chisinevski, Leontie

12 The latest statement to that effect is Nicolae Ceausescu's of September 20, 1968, contained in Scinteia of September 21, 1968.
Rautu—to name just a few—had held major posts in the Party and government, and a significant part of the leading bureaucratic and technocratic cadres had been Jewish at least through 1957. The gradual downgrading and even removal of Jewish communists from positions of authority in the Party and state was due less to their association with Moscow and communist internationalism than to the resurgence of Rumanian nationalism, albeit in a socialist state. The Jews, even if Stalinists rather than Khrushchevites, could never be nationalists. The Rumanian communists' claiming of the national historic legacy, and the support of the Rumanians for the attainment of the ostensible national historic goal of a Greater Socialist Rumania, could not fail to take into account the historic anti-Hungarian and anti-Semitic tradition. Thus, Rumania is alienating her principal minority groups, Magyar and Jewish, without, however, driving them into the arms of Moscow or even Budapest or Tel Aviv. But the identification of the Hungarians and Jews with the nationalist policies of the regime is limited. They are apprehensive that the doctrine of "By ourselves" would sooner or later lead to "Great Rumanian" chauvinism, perhaps even to a Rumanian National-Socialist state. Justified as these apprehensions may be in terms of current and anticipated domestic policies, there is no evidence that the changes in the social and political order have directly affected the course of Rumania's foreign relations. The treatment of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania—a crucial source of conflict between pre-communist Hungary and Rumania—has not been renewed as an issue in contemporary relations between the two countries; and the possibility of frontier revision is not based on ill treatment so much as
on ethnic considerations and intrabloc political factors. The revival of anti-Semitism has in no way affected Rumanian relations with Israel and the international Jewish community as a whole. In its official actions the regime has protected the rights of the Jewish population and condemned anti-Semitism. The loss of political power and relegation of the Jewish bureaucratic and intellectual cadres to subordinate positions is considered an internal affair by Jews in the rest of the world, while the State of Israel regards the official Rumanian position toward Israel and the rapidly expanding trade relations between the two countries as indicative of a better Rumanian order than that of the past, and one at least tolerable for the Rumanian Jewry.

Significant demographic factors are those generally pertinent to agrarian societies in transition to industrialism. Although the rural population has declined from 76.6 per cent of the total in 1948 to 61.8 per cent in 1967, the peasant-worker has not yet acquired the skills equal to the economic requirements of the socialist state. His acceptance of “By ourselves” may be genuine, but he is still unable to build socialism as rapidly and efficiently as desired by his rulers. The relative inefficiency of the labor force has been evident in industry; but in agriculture, too, greater efficiency and productivity would strengthen the economic power base of the state. These shortcomings are likely to be overcome in time and should thus be regarded as only temporary retarding factors in the attainment of the goals of the regime. More pertinent factors in the assessment of the viability of current policies are the extent of the Rumanian people’s commitment to the aims of the regime, and the degree of their identification with communist Rumania.
Belief System

In formulating and executing national and international policies, the rulers of Rumania presuppose the existence of a popular mandate derived in part from identification of the belief system of the peoples of Rumania with that of the communist regime. The original assumptions of identification with the Communist Party and the international communist movement were gradually abandoned as unrealistic and detrimental to the attainment of the independent policies of the regime. The gradual identification of the rulers' interests and identity with those of the Rumanian people through the common bond of national historic interest has gained momentum and more than a modicum of reality since 1964. The principal element of identification between ruler and ruled in the historic context is nationalism. The nationalism emphasized by the communists is that of affection for the mother country, with a resulting commitment of all inhabitants to the development of its potential—economic, social, and cultural—to the nation's optimum capacity. Rumania, through the work of Rumanians, is to become the leading small national-socialist state in the world; the dreams of all Rumanians, past and present, will thus be realized.

This synthesis of Rumania’s national and social aspirations into the new “socialist nationalism” appears to be both incomplete and unrealistic. The quintessence of historic nationalism—doubtlessly an integral part of the Rumanian belief system—was anything but socialist. The nationalist tradition was bourgeois, stressing anti-Communism, anti-Semitism, anti-Magyarism, anti-Russianism, and, above all, the Christian and Latin character of Rumanian civilization. The bour-
geois nationalist legacy identified the ultimate national goal as the "embourgeoisement" of the society (primarily that of ethnic Rumanians), political control by a landlord-bourgeois oligarchy headed by a benevolent monarch, in a superficially democratic structure, and retention of the 1918 frontiers. In all probability, the national goal was a Greater Rumania for the Rumanians but not a Greater Communist Rumania.

The destruction of bourgeois nationalism and of the historic tradition connected with it was pursued with such ferocity by the Rumanian communist regime before 1960 that it outraged and alienated the vast majority of the population. The restating of the national historic legacy and the resulting search for mass identification with a socialist national interest started with recognition of the validity of the cultural components of bourgeois nationalism. The Latin characteristics of the Rumanian civilization were restored as early as 1962. Freedom of literary and artistic expression and rehabilitation of classical nationalist authors followed by 1964. As cultural contacts with France, Italy, and other Latin nations (or Western nations identified with the Latin tradition) proved politically benign, intensification of cultural relations with all Western nations gained momentum, after 1965. The strengthening of these relations, and the lessening of interbloc cultural ties, secured the adherence to the principles of the new "socialist" nationalism of pro-Western, chiefly Francophile, intellectuals, professional cadres, and students.

As the political conflict with Russia became more intense, the regime encouraged or tolerated the traditional anti-Russian sentiments of the population seeking disassociation between Rumanian communist poli-
cies and Russian. In the process of self-exoneration the Rumanian communist leadership placed the onus for its Stalinist abuses of the fifties on "foreigners" like Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca, and like-oriented Rumanian Moscovites. This line resulted in intensification of anti-Russianism and the unleashing of suppressed xenophobic, chiefly anti-Semitic, sentiments. In that respect, too, the sublimation of the main elements of bourgeois nationalism into the new nationalism became possible. The renewal of territorial claims to Bessarabia, and assertion of the integrity of the legitimate, historic boundaries of the nation, further secured the support of militant old-style nationalists for the modern version. The regime has also recognized the historic validity of the Rumanian Christian tradition—ostensibly as a cultural and historical phenomenon—and utilizes the Church and the residual religious feelings of the population as a complement to Marxism-Leninism in the creation and propagation of a Rumanian national socialist faith.

The communists' identification with the Rumanian historic tradition and the regime's derivative legitimacy have for the most part been accepted by the population, but the degree of acceptance of the "socialist" element of socialist nationalism is not clear. It would be erroneous to assume that the Rumanians had been historically identified with a democratic tradition or had entertained democratic aspirations. Authoritarianism had been the rule, not the exception. Modern dictatorships like Marshal Antonescu's received more

13 The extent of mass acceptance of the new nationalism was demonstrated during the Czechoslovak crisis of August, 1968, when spontaneous pro-Ceausescu (and anti-Russian) manifestations occurred throughout Rumania. See Scintea, particularly the issues published between August 23 and 31, 1968.
than passing popular approval. Nevertheless, at least since the emancipation of the peasantry in 1864, all regimes had paid at least lip service to the principles of democracy and of respect for individual property rights. The rigidity of the communist police state before 1958 was to a considerable extent a reaction to mass dissatisfaction with the violation of individual property rights. It was the peasants' opposition to agricultural collectivization, and the destruction of the traditional spiritual and material bases of the village which followed, that scared the communists—at least as much as the disaffection of the intellectuals and of the former propertied classes. The continuing rigidity, even after the need for popular support for an anti-Russian course became evident, was largely the result of continuing political insecurity because of mass disaffection.

The encouragement of traditional nationalism, with all its implications, doubtlessly conditioned the reaction of the masses to the communist regime, making them more receptive to a modus vivendi. The regime's economic concessions—such as increases in wages and farm subsidies, restoration of private property rights to the extent of granting the population the right to acquire private residences and engage in certain private commercial activities, and, above all, the steadily greater allocation of funds for the production and distribution of consumer goods—have increased the domestic support for Ceausescu's Rumania. However, not until 1967, and particularly since the Budapest conference of February, 1968, did the regime move in the direction of recognizing individual rights and abandoning its dogmatic positions. The doctrine of democratic socialism, implying popular commitment to "socialist nationalism," was enunciated explicitly
only in December, 1967. Then, at the National Conference of the Rumanian Communist Party, Ceausescu made a formal commitment to liberalization and decentralization of governmental and party activities and controls.

Nevertheless, despite planned economic and administrative reorganization of the country to coincide with the continuing decentralization of economic and industrial activities away from Bucharest, the ultimate direction of all economic and political activities rests with the Party. Experimentation and decentralization comparable to Yugoslavia's or even to Hungary's are not likely in the foreseeable future. Nor are innovations contemplated in altering the role of the Party in governmental and cultural affairs. The explicit condemnation of Stalinism and of Gheorghiu-Dej's Stalinist practices of earlier years contained in the Party's decision of April, 1968, to rehabilitate victims of Stalinist oppression promised no reforms comparable to those carried out in contemporary Czechoslovakia. The Party remains the ultimate source of power and the ever-present director of all activities of the population. Liberalization is possible only through the Party, and ultimately through Nicolae Ceausescu who, symbolically, assumed the dual role of head of the Party and of the state in December, 1967.

The nation's response to this limited liberalization has been positive, but it has not overcome the spirit of passive opposition, if not outright resistance, of a substantial segment of the collectivized peasantry to the agricultural policies of the regime. This opposition is likely to diminish as further economic concessions are

made. However, nothing short of decollectivization would fully placate the rural population. Pockets of discontent are found also among intellectuals and professional cadres dissatisfied with inadequate housing and salaries and continuing restrictions on freedom of travel abroad. Nevertheless, the regime’s foreign policies are endorsed, often with enthusiasm, by the vast majority of the population. The success and viability of those policies, as they affect integration and community building, will not be affected by lack of popular support; rather, success will be determined by economic and external political factors.

*Rumania as a Self-fulfilling Unit*

Rumania's ability to attain the planned economic goals with her own resources was carefully scrutinized in the 1964 statement; the conclusion justified the autarchic policies advocated by the regime, in that the country's natural resources are basically adequate. However, the same analysis revealed that integration under COMECON would not serve Rumania's aims insofar as her resources would be used for developing the economies of only certain members of that organization in a manner detrimental to the national interest. Such integration would not be based on the principle of mutual advantage, and it would jeopardize the completion of socialist construction in Rumania because of the imposition of external economic policies on the national economy. By contrast, the fullest utilization of Rumania's natural and manpower resources in collaboration with non-bloc nations would bring about the most expeditious and advantageous development of
the country's economy, as well as the most effective and rapid attainment of the national goal.

The experience since 1964 has largely corroborated these basic assumptions. The annual average growth rate in industry has been quite spectacular, exceeding 20 per cent in the chemical and electric power industries, 15 per cent in machine building, metal working, and nonferrous metallurgy, 12 per cent in ferrous metallurgy and light industry, and somewhat lower percentages in other spheres of industrial development. Agricultural production has also increased considerably; the growth rate has been 7.5 per cent per annum.\textsuperscript{15} Rumania's economic dependence on the Soviet bloc, however, has not decreased at a comparable rate. Even though her foreign trade with the West, most notably with Germany, France, Italy, and the United States, has nearly doubled since 1964, that with the Soviet Union alone is still nearly twice as large as with those four countries combined.\textsuperscript{16}

Altogether, the member nations of COMECON could strangle the Rumanian economy should concerted economic pressures be contemplated by the Soviet Union, while Russian economic pressures alone could paralyze certain areas of industrial development. In fact, Russia's slowing down of deliveries of industrial equipment and raw materials, for ostensibly economic reasons, has reportedly created minor economic crises since 1967, and could conceivably retard the attainment of the country's ambitious plans for economic development. Even if in 1968 the possibility of Russia's delivering a paralyzing economic blow is still remote, the Rumanian leaders are fearful of Soviet

\textsuperscript{15} Consult Montias, \textit{Economic Development}, pp. 1 ff.
\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 135 ff.
retaliation. Self-sufficiency is an illusion in terms of current Rumanian plans for economic development, and it is recognized as such by Rumanian economic planners. Despite the continuing emphasis on independence, interdependence is gradually being accepted as a fact of economic life. Relations with COMECON are being normalized on the bases of mutual advantage and respect for the rights of individual members, although the search for alternatives continues unabated. The Rumanians would prefer economic independence from the Soviet bloc, but such seems hardly attainable at the current juncture in international economic affairs. Thus, in 1968, the Rumanian formulas for economic integration within the bloc and development of extra-bloc relations entail serious risks despite their essential success.

Consensus on Present and Future Integration

In the last analysis, the determination of Rumania's leaders to attain the national goal "By ourselves" and with partners of their choice—in other words, through voluntary and mutually advantageous association with sovereign states (and friendly communist parties)—is dependent upon the vicissitudes of international political relations. The possibility of forcible termination of the independent course and reintegration of Rumania into the Soviet bloc by Russian military or economic action can by no means be excluded after the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. Reassertion of Soviet domination over a smaller socialist camp, with corresponding strengthening of the Soviet position in Eastern Europe, has in fact become probable. The Rumanians are painfully aware of these potential dangers to the maintenance of their independence and
are trying to appease the Soviet Union without, however, sacrificing the basic tenets of their political and socioeconomic philosophies.\textsuperscript{17} The essential question, in the fall of 1968, is whether Ceausescu's Rumania will be able to avoid the fate of Czechoslovakia and maintain its status as a sovereign communist nation state.

The basic factor in evaluating the current, and prognosticating the future, Rumanian policies toward integration and community building remains that of irreconcilability of the fundamental political conflict with the Soviet Union. A meaningful reconciliation appears unlikely so long as the present Rumanian and Russian ruling élites remain in power. So long as that situation persists, anything but \textit{pro forma} reintegration of Rumania into the Soviet bloc is excluded. This is not to say that integration would be detrimental to Rumania were it possible to achieve it under terms safeguarding the Rumanian Party's vital political interests. In the absence of such safeguards, Rumania's "independent course" is likely to be pursued, albeit with greater caution and finesse. Should Ceausescu be able to walk the tight-rope successfully, his regime would be assured of ever greater popular support; his "socialist nationalist" goals may, however, prove elusive.

\textsuperscript{17} The repeated Rumanian assurances given to the Soviet Union and her conservative partners by Ceausescu on Rumania's loyalty to the cause of socialism and commitments to the Warsaw Pact and COMECON did not imply renunciation of Rumania's commitment to the maintenance of advantageous relations with all nations, including West Germany, and protection—by force of arms if necessary—of the country's independence. All of Ceausescu's speeches—contained in \textit{Scinteia} almost daily since August 22, 1968—are unequivocal in that respect.