The first significant manifestation was the adoption of the "New Course" in August, 1953, an overt admission that the extreme pressure placed on the national resources and economic machine by Stalinist requests had to be relaxed, and a more rational economic policy adopted.\(^1\) Indicative of the scope of this change was the dissolution of the Sovroms and the new emphasis placed on the production of consumer goods, designed to satisfy the minimal domestic requirements. However, official policies continued to stress rapid socialization of agriculture; and Russian-imposed and -oriented patterns dominated cultural intellectual activities, suppressing national manifestations regarded in any way as bourgeois. In short, there was to be no liberalization in any area that might jeopardize the stability of the regime. The policies of

\(^1\) A penetrating review of post-1952 conditions and problems is contained in Gheorghiu-Dej's report to the Second Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party on December 23, 1955, which is contained in Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, *Articole si cuvintari (decembrie 1955–iulie 1959)* ("Articles and Speeches, December 1955–July 1959") (Bucharest, 1959), pp. 6 ff. An informative and intelligent analysis of the "New Course" may be found in *News From Behind the Iron Curtain*, III, no. 7 (July, 1954), 3–11.
the New Course reflected solely a reappraisal of Rumania's economic potential to attain the "national" goal. This re-evaluation, completed in 1955, resulted in two separate formulas for cooperation and integration with other states, and the tentative formulation of a third principle, that of "peaceful coexistence" à la roumaine, now the distinctive feature of Rumanian international relations. These decisions of 1955 were realistically conceived in terms of the domestic and foreign factors affecting international cooperation and integration.

In the simplest terms, as expressed that year by Gheorghiu-Dej at the Second Party Congress, the Rumanian regime favored international cooperation with all nations, regardless of their social systems, provided that the principles of international equality and of noninterference in domestic affairs were recognized. These relations, defined as "of the new type," were to be developed primarily among members of the socialist camp, but "coexistence" with nonparty states was also desired. The areas of international cooperation would be determined by the nations concerned, although as far as the Rumanian regime was concerned, the preferred spheres were military and economic. The limits of cooperation indicated by Gheorghiu-Dej reflected the motivations of the Rumanian communist leadership in seeking diversification and redefinition of its international relations. The so-called Rumanian independent course, which became evident only in the early sixties, was actually initiated after Khrushchev's ascendency in the U.S.S.R. and the first ascertainable manifestations of Sino-Soviet friction. The motivations of Gheorghiu-Dej and his close associates were basically

2 Gheorghiu-Dej, *Articole si cuvintari*, pp. 69 ff.
Identified as they were with Stalinism, their power could be threatened by a more liberal leadership in Moscow and by decrease in the number of Stalinist members in the Rumanian Workers' Party. The threat of Khrushchevism was evident to Gheorghiu-Dej from as early as 1954, and the initial measures of political self-preservation date from that year. The doctrine of "relations of the new type" was tentatively adopted in 1954, and the basic identification of Rumanian interests with the Chinese—both measures opposed to Khrushchevism—was first stated in the exchange of telegrams on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of Rumania's liberation (on August 23) stressing national self-determination within the socialist camp.

The need to seek identification with the national historic tradition and to attain historic legitimacy as a Rumanian state, albeit socialist, was an essential requirement for assertion of the doctrine of "relations of the new type" within the socialist community of nations. It is doubtful that the reopening of Rumania's borders to noncommunists from the West, and related statements on coexistence were—or for that matter could have been—intended to seek alternative roads to socialism or political and economic bridges to nations inimical to the U.S.S.R. But it should be assumed that the equating of the Party's interests and policies with those of the Rumanian state was designed to secure the allegiance of the people to the "Rumanian" leadership of Gheorghiu-Dej as against "internationalist, cosmopolitan," probably pro-Khrushchev elements in the Rumanian Party. Thus, the major tenets, na-

3 A detailed analysis of these problems is contained in Fischer-Galati, The New Rumania, pp. 44 ff.
tional and international, of communist nationalism—or Gheorghiu-Dejism—were formulated by 1955. They affected Rumania's policies toward integration with other systems for years to come.

Degree of Integration of Rumania with Other Systems

The maintenance of internal stability and of the international communist party-state system in Eastern Europe remained a question of fundamental concern to the Rumanian regime. But it also created dilemmas and contradictions. Thus, the conclusion of the Warsaw Pact in 1955 was enthusiastically supported, even though the military agreement entailed subordination of the Rumanian to the Soviet military machine. The military integration of the bloc recognized the principle of equality among the members of the alliance to an infinitely greater degree than had the bilateral alliances of the Stalinist period. Russia's regarding military integration as a corollary to economic integration under COMECON posed more serious problems for the Rumanian leadership. The reactivation of COMECON, which had operated as a shallow and meaningless façade for direct Russian exploitation of the East European satellites since its establishment in 1949, did in fact test Rumania's proclivities toward integration in the Soviet bloc.

The extent to which the Rumanian regime endorsed


COMECON in 1954 is not clear. Gheorghiu-Dej and his associates apparently regarded the *primus inter pares* relationship as preferable to previous Stalinist ties, given the lack of viable alternate solutions to Rumania's economic problems, and her enormous dependence on Soviet economic and military support. Insofar as economic integration was loose in form and long range in purpose, the initially favorable Rumanian response to the reactivation of COMECON does not offer an accurate barometer of the regime's intentions. In any case, the Rumanians did not regard participation in COMECON as prohibiting the development of "relations of the new type" with nonmember nations. In fact, the regime had concluded its first significant economic agreements with the industrial West in 1954, and established the first meaningful economic contacts with party states in the Far East, including China and North Korea. It is noteworthy that the value of Rumania's trade with noncommunist countries had reached nearly $60,000,000 by 1955 (in contrast to $35,400,000 in 1951), approximately 20 percent of the country's total foreign trade. The Rumanians seemed anxious to broaden the scope of their international economic relations, preferably on a bilateral basis, although the principle of economic integration in COMECON was not rejected or even challenged at that time.

International cooperation outside the socialist camp in activities other than economic was not sought. The common cultural milieu of the Soviet bloc, based on "socialist realism," could not be altered without jeopardizing the security of the Party and state. The "correctness" of the regime's views was proven in 1956 at the time of the Hungarian revolution. The basic opposition of the inhabitants of Rumania to Moscow and
the domestic communist regime was expressed in pro-Hungarian manifestations in Transylvania, much of whose Magyar population demanded reincorporation of that province into a Free Hungary, and in student demonstrations in Bucharest and Iasi, aimed at the restoration of the traditional French and Western cultural ties and the abandonment of the exclusively pro-Russian ideological and cultural orientation. But these “bourgeois-nationalist” manifestations were skillfully rechanneled into “socialist patriotism” by a Romanian regime bent on exploiting the crisis of 1956 to its own advantage.6

The regime, aware not only of the survival of “bourgeois-nationalist” tendencies in Transylvania and elsewhere but also of the improbability of repetition of “1956” in Eastern Europe, adopted its own carrot-and-stick policy. Bourgeois-nationalism and Western provocation in Hungary and elsewhere in Eastern Europe were fiercely denounced, and cultural liberalization in the form of renewed ties with the reactionary West unequivocally rejected. However, while strictly prohibiting any deviation from socialist realism, the Party allowed the introduction of “patriotic” themes into literary and artistic productions. Moreover, intellectuals who had been barred from professional activities because of “unhealthy” social origin or ideological commitments were gradually reinstated on condition of strict adherence to the Party line.

To consolidate his own position vis-à-vis Moscow—which was forced during the Hungarian crisis to ac-

knowledge the theoretical equality of all members of the socialist camp—and to build a basis for stronger popular support at home, Gheorghiu-Dej also proclaimed the need for radical economic improvements, including a rising standard of living for the masses, goals which were to be attained by economic cooperation with all nations on the basis of "relations of the new type" and "mutual advantages." In this respect he could be persuasive, considering the significant improvement in the country's economy recorded by the end of 1956. The Plenum of the Central Committee met in December of that year and reviewed the achievements which indicated a tremendous rise in industrial production since 1953. In heavy industry, for example, the production of power, fuel, and building materials more than doubled; and even in the consumer goods sector, increases of 150 per cent were not uncommon. Nevertheless, considering the continuing growth of the urban population (from 3,713,139 in 1948 to 5,474,264 in 1956) and the general growth rate from 15,872,624 inhabitants in 1948 to 17,489,450 in 1956, the supplies of consumer goods and foodstuffs and the general wage scale remained inadequate. These discrepancies were remedied by the Plenum by reducing capital investment in heavy industry while increasing it in consumer goods, raising wages, and abolishing the system of compulsory deliveries in agriculture. The collectivization drive was intensified; but persuasion and financial and technical aid replaced brute force in this "socialist" search for ways to improve the efficiency of agriculture and increase the general well-being of the population. These measures and principles, in effect, weakened the possi-

7 On these measures and their significance consult Ionescu, *Communism in Rumania*, pp. 275 ff.
bility of close economic integration through COMECON, inasmuch as that organization could not provide the most effective means for attaining the economic and political goals of the regime. Rumania then sought to gain safety for its infantile autarchic tendencies by championing the unity of the socialist camp in general, as opposed to mere unity of the Soviet bloc, while advocating the extension of peaceful coexistence with all nations in Western Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere, who were willing to engage in "relations of the new type." The principle of broad international relations in the economic field was firmly restated in 1957 in Rumania's interpretation of the principles of the Moscow Declaration of that year. By this time, the regime's views on such matters were generally acceptable to the majority of the population.

Compatibility of Demands Relevant to Integration

The Hungarian revolution made most Rumanians realize that any changes in the domestic as well as in the international position of the country would have to be entrusted to the leadership of the Rumanian Workers' Party. Whatever hopes of "liberation" or "liberalization" the anticommunist population might have entertained were frustrated by the events of 1956. In effect, those who had been politically active prior to the establishment of the communist state, as well as those nurturing hopes for the restoration of a political order different from the prevalent power struc-

8 Gheorghiu-Dej, Articole si cuvintari, pp. 336-49.
ture, lost all expectation of "liberation"; coexistence with Gheorghiu-Dej's regime became a necessary reality. Those intellectuals, professional people, bureaucrats, and technical cadres who had made their peace with the regime, hoping for liberalization through the restoration of cultural, if not political, ties with the West, knew in 1956 that this could not be attained. The most that could be hoped for after the Hungarian revolution was a lessening of dependence upon the Soviet Union, a broader network of international relations in nonsensitive areas, and in a negative context, the possible development of difficulties within the socialist camp that might be exploited by the Romanian leadership to its advantage. In other words, the "relations of the new type" and "coexistence" formulas, as first stated by Gheorghiu-Dej in 1953 and reconfirmed both in 1956 and in the interpretation of the Moscow Declaration of 1957, were faute de mieux acceptable to the Rumanians. The statements and declarations of the party leadership evincing an ever-so-slight degree of independence in the conduct and formulation of international affairs seemed in 1957 to justify a modicum of optimism.

What remained a well-guarded secret for all except the policy-making Party élite, however, was the gravity of the Sino-Soviet conflict and the Rumanian Party's determination to exploit it to gain immunity from Soviet direction of Rumanian affairs. The Rumanian leadership had indeed discovered as early as December, 1956, that the Kremlin was unprepared to respect the political integrity of members of the bloc, enunciated unequivocally during the Hungarian crisis; rather, they intended to use the Hungarian revolution as an instrument for repudiation of all concessions wrested
from Moscow since 1954. The Kremlin's rejection of Rumania's demands for limited economic independence and for the eventual withdrawal of Soviet military forces, submitted in December, 1956, reflected centralistic tendencies comparable to Stalin's. Whereas Stalinism was actually espoused by Gheorghiu-Dej and his associates in 1956 it had, in their view, to be legitimized by reaffirmation of the validity of the new principles governing relations among members of the bloc and the socialist camp in general, that is, equality among Stalinist communist states. The Kremlin's refusal to accept this doctrine, coupled with basic suspicion of Khrushchev's ultimate intentions toward Gheorghiu-Dej and his nationalist-Stalinist supporters, led to the strengthening of the Rumanians' bonds with China, whose basic attitude toward Khrushchev in the wake of the Hungarian uprising coincided with the Rumanians'.

The validity of Gheorghiu-Dej's fears and suspicions was indeed confirmed in July, 1957, when Khrushchev's forces in Moscow defeated the Molotov-Bulganin “anti-Party” group, and the pro-Khrushchev forces in Rumania, headed by Miron Constantinescu, made a concurrent—but unsuccessful—challenge to the Rumanian Stalinists in power. These events caused Gheorghiu-Dej to consolidate his own forces against the threat of Khrushchevism and to accelerate Rumania's transformation into a nationalist-Stalinist "independent" communist state. A positive, if still camouflaged, independent course was in fact devised by November, 1957.

Consensus on Present and Future Integration

It must be emphasized that the tendencies of the regime in 1957 were not based on any historic factors favoring or opposing integration, nor did they represent concessions to anti-Russian and pro-Western mass sentiments. The "autarchic" policies were formulated by the communist leadership exclusively in terms of its self-assigned raison d'être. Consolidation of power entailed the most rapid and efficient attainment of the goals of 1945, as restated at the Party Congress of 1955, and the reduction of obligatory dependence on the U.S.S.R. and the members of the Soviet bloc. Had the Soviet Union agreed to recognize Rumania's ambitions and to make the proper concessions, particularly in COMECON, the Rumanian regime would have espoused the principle and practice of close coordination within the bloc on economic, political, and cultural levels. However, Russia and the more advanced industrial nations of the bloc—most notably Czechoslovakia and East Germany—refused to accept the Rumanian views on "relations of the new type."

The anti-integrationist tendencies displayed by Rumania after 1957 have generally been ascribed to Rumania's dissatisfaction with COMECON policies. Rumanian opposition to being relegated to the position of producer of raw materials for the bloc, justified as it was in terms of Gheorghiu-Dej's plans, was in fact symptomatic only of Rumania's determination to resist restoration of Russian supremacy in Eastern Europe.10

The very goal of rapid and multilateral industrialization expounded by the Rumanian regime was political, for only an industrially strong Rumania could exert leverage on Moscow for the acceptance of Gheorghiu-Dej’s views on relations among members of the camp. It is also evident that Russia’s resistance to Rumania’s demands for greater recognition in COMECON and the Soviet formulas for multilateral industrialization were based on a correct assessment of Rumania’s political aims. The political nature of the conflict became more evident in 1958, when the Rumanian regime expanded the scope of its international activities, both within the socialist camp and without, and pursued national communist policies at home, all in a manner disagreeable to the Kremlin.

The maintenance of friendly relations with Moscow’s principal communist opponents, Yugoslavia and China, was rightly interpreted as Rumanian opposition to Khrushchev’s views on socialist unity. Most offensive to Moscow was Gheorghiu-Dej’s exploitation of Peking’s resistance to Russian military domination of the socialist camp—which in the case of China resulted in refusal to join the Warsaw Pact, and in the case of Rumania resulted in the exertion of joint pressure with the Chinese for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Rumania. The “voluntary” removal of the Soviet armies in the summer of 1958 presaged acceleration of Rumania’s policy of disengagement from the Soviet bloc. The reinforcement of links with Western nations, most notably Germany and France, ostensibly in the pursuit of “peaceful coexistence,” was explicitly designed to seek alternate avenues to industrialization. But the renewal of schemes for cooperation among Balkan nations, originally proposed by Georgi Dimitrov (and rejected by Stalin) in 1948 in the form of
the Rumanian "Stoica Plan," was an assertion of Rumania's self-assigned place in the socialist camp and the international community in general as a force for the promotion of peace and friendly relations among all nations regardless of their socioeconomic and political order. These multilateral international activities, to which could be added official visits to nations of the tiers monde by Rumanian communist leaders, were ultimately designed to demonstrate Rumania's right of initiative in international affairs and her ability to pursue foreign policies based on principles formally approved by Moscow but denied to all satellites.\textsuperscript{11}

The essentially anti-Russian character of these actions was emphasized by the pursuit of a ruthless Stalinist campaign at home directed against "revisionists" of all sorts, a euphemism for "Khrushchevites," "cosmopolitans," and all who in any way opposed Gheorghiu-Dej's plans for a Stalinist and socialist Rumania. The formal commitment to the construction of a Rumanian Socialist Republic à la roumaine was made at the Plenum of the Party in November, 1958.\textsuperscript{12} That Plenum agreed on the need to strengthen the country's economy sufficiently to withstand external pressures and to consolidate the communists' power at home. It decided to accelerate the industrialization of the country as well as the socialization of agriculture and to secure such capital as might be needed for the attainment of its ambitious goals by increasing its trade with the West. It also decided to satisfy the economic requirements of the population at large by providing the masses with higher salaries, better prices for their

\textsuperscript{11} A detailed analysis of these problems is contained in Fischer-Galati, \textit{The New Rumania}, pp. 67 ff.

\textsuperscript{12} The principal measures adopted at the Plenum and their significance were outlined in Gheorghiu-Dej's speech to that meeting published in \textit{Scinteia}, December 2, 1958.
produce, improved housing, and, above all, a sense of participation in the construction of socialism in their own fatherland. The significance of these decisions became evident by 1960. At the Party’s Third Congress in June, 1960, Gheorghiu-Dej was able to summarize the country’s economic achievements and to outline future economic goals. By then the rate of growth in industrial production was the fastest in Eastern Europe. In certain industries—chemical, mining, and building materials—production had virtually doubled in less than five years. The collectivization of agriculture was virtually complete. The pattern of foreign trade had changed significantly since 1958; though most of that trade was still with the Soviet Union and members of the bloc, the total volume and proportion of trade with Western Europe had nearly doubled. Most significant was the increase in trade with West Germany, which by 1960 exceeded Rumania’s total trade with all socialist nations outside the Soviet bloc. The trade with West Germany and the tiers monde was actually one-third of Rumania’s trade with all nations of Eastern Europe other than the U.S.S.R. Trade relations with France, the United Kingdom, and Italy had also shown remarkable progress; all in all, nearly 25 per cent of Rumania’s total foreign trade was with the West. The doubling of all economic indices was sought for 1960–65; in certain areas of production, such as mining, electric power, and machine building, the rate of increase was to be even higher.

Nevertheless, until the spring of 1963 Rumania did not reject the possibility of remaining a faithful member of the Soviet bloc on compromise terms favorable to the Rumanians. To gain such terms, the Rumanian

\footnote{13 A detailed account of the Congress of 1960 may be found in Ionescu, \textit{Communism in Rumania}, pp. 316 ff.}
leadership relied mainly on the Sino-Soviet conflict and the consequential disunity of the socialist camp. In these years, too, the expression of Rumania's disaffection with Moscow's centralistic tendencies continued to focus on Rumania's position in COMECON—a position symbolic of the country's status in the Soviet bloc, the socialist community, and the international communist movement.

The basic Rumanian position vis-à-vis COMECON was recorded at the Third Party Congress in 1960 when Rumania was proclaimed to have reached a plateau of socialist development that entitled her to major stature in the Soviet bloc and in the socialist camp as a whole. The international policies of a prestigious industrial nation were bound to be different from those of "underdeveloped," pre-communist Rumania, and even from those of the pre-1960 party state. The country could now rightfully insist on observance of "relations of the new type" by all nations. The continuing rejection by Russia, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany of Rumania's claims, and their insistence on coordinated planning and assignment of responsibilities among member nations according to their natural resources and relative industrial development, precipitated the Rumanians' adoption of national and international policies of an increasingly independent character.

At home, the crucial development was the ever closer identification of the Rumanian historical tradition with the communist tradition, that is, the evolution of a doctrine of coincidence between the country's historic legacy and the communists' program for socialist construction. In sum, the communists claimed to be the executors of the country's historic goal: an independent, prosperous, and equalitarian Rumania.
This search for historic legitimacy, of total identification between the Rumanian Party and the Rumanian state, did not entail identification of "communist nationalism" with "bourgeois nationalism," nor did it entail identification of the bourgeois tradition with the revolutionary tradition until after Rumania's new independence was asserted in 1964. Neither was the role of the Party as unquestioned leading force in the country and in the process of socialist construction altered in any way. Authoritarianism, Stalinist in nature, remained the basic form of rule; democratic centralism was rejected as a principle unsuitable to Rumania's conditions. The Party was still being rebuilt in 1960 by the Rumanian Stalinists who had purged Miron Constantinescu's "Khrushchevites" from 1957 on. Its total membership was only 834,000—4.6 per cent of the country's total population—and the proportion of workers in the membership, less than half, but it was united behind Gheorghiu-Dej's plans for the development of communist Rumania.

Nevertheless, within the limits of political security—internal and external—required for the survival of the Gheorghiu-Dej regime, the budding communist nationalism was designed to secure a stronger base of domestic support for the execution of autarchic policies which the masses could identify as Rumanian and, in effect, anti-Russian. The intimate identification of the Party with the state was also necessary to allow the further development of economic relations with the noncommunist world for the fulfillment of the new raison d'État—the building of the Rumanian socialist state. Recognition of the validity of Rumania's goals by the forces favoring polycentrism would entail acceptance of the communists as rulers of a historic state and allow the pursuit of "mutually beneficial" rela-
tions among sovereign states on the basis of the principles of "peaceful coexistence."\(^{14}\)

It must be recognized, however, that the communists' search for legitimacy and identification with the national historic tradition was far more cautious and gradual than the concurrent drive for equality among members of the socialist camp. At home it was limited to the exoneration and rehabilitation of progressive historic figures of the past and of "bourgeois" intellectuals and professional cadres ready to serve the country in the construction of socialism. The rewriting of Rumania's history began in 1960 and emphasized the contribution the Rumanian masses and their leaders had made to the attainment of national identity and social progress. An olive branch was extended to the intellectual community in the same year by increasing its representation in the Party, in recognition of its contribution to the country's socialist transformation. Universities and institutions of higher learning were gradually opened to individuals previously excluded because of improper social origin, and the general educational and professional requirements were made more stringent in an effort to raise the calibre of the "builders of socialism." By 1962 the educational and professional standards had reached levels of high competence, adequate for the constantly rising expectations of a rapidly developing industrial society. But intellectual and professional contacts with the West remained severely circumscribed. The historic tradition of close relations with Western Europe remained, in fact, limited to economic exchanges.

The international crises, focusing first on Berlin and later on Cuba, and the residual opposition to Ru-

manian Stalinism by the Rumanian masses, favored reliance on the Chinese lever in the years antedating the Cuban crisis. Certainly after the issuance of the Moscow Declaration of 1960, the Rumanian communists echoed the Chinese positions relative to the conditions for unity of the socialist camp and the role of member states, even if only to the extent to which Peking's views coincided with Bucharest's and did not directly affront the Kremlin. Nevertheless, the expected price of Rumania's moderation in the Sino-Soviet conflict was Russian adherence to Rumania's demands for equality in the camp, bloc, and COMECON. As "persuasion" appeared futile, the Rumanians seized on the "humiliation" of the Soviet giant in the Cuban crisis (and consequent need for accommodation with the United States), and on the consequent exacerbation of the Sino-Soviet conflict, to force acceptance by Moscow of Gheorghiu-Dej's terms for unity of the bloc and of the socialist camp. The original expression of Rumania's rejection of Russian domination of the bloc and camp was pro forma limited to COMECON and issued in that context in March, 1963. The rejection of Russia's hegemony in the bloc and leadership of the camp, and the statement of Rumanian independence, were made public in April, 1964.\footnote{Statement of the Rumanian Workers' Party, pp. 269 ff.}

The character of Rumania's opposition to Soviet hegemony as expressed in the 1963 and 1964 statements reflected the irreconcilability of the Sino-Soviet conflict. In the spring and summer of 1963 the Rumanian leadership sought to secure independence from the COMECON prescriptions for economic development and cooperation (which it rejected in March, 1963) through intensification of friendly relations with China. Economic pressure by Russia and her faithful
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allies, combined with China’s inability to provide viable economic alternatives, forced the Rumanian regime to veer more and more toward the West later in that year and to seek unequivocal recognition of the communist regime’s legitimacy abroad and at home. The preferred solution for the maintenance of independence remained, however, the securing of general international acceptance of Rumania’s views on the equality of all members of the camp and of their right to pursue national policies compatible with their national interests. The growing threat of polarization of the communist camp into Chinese and Russian blocs, with resultant weakening of Rumania’s chances to maintain her independence among pro-Soviet neighbors, precipitated the adoption of a neutral attitude in the Sino-Soviet conflict. In fact, in the fall of 1963 the Rumanian communists assumed the role of mediators in the Sino-Soviet conflict as self-styled champions of the unity of the socialist camp. The failure of their mediation efforts, recorded in both Peking’s and Moscow’s February, 1964, rejection of the compromise proposed by the Rumanian “honest brokers,” forced readjustments in the Rumanians’ plans of how best to maintain their independence from Moscow. This was because the attempted mediation involved intra-Party as well as intra-state problems.

The Chinese opposition to Moscow in 1964 focused on ideological differences as well as on territorial problems. Territorial revisionism relative to Mongolia and other Soviet possessions in the Far East was placed by Mao Tse-tung in the context of illegal seizure of territory by the Soviet Union elsewhere, including Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, wrested from Rumania in 1940 and not restituted after World War II. Potentially this Chinese revisionism—so dear to Ru-
manian "bourgeois nationalists" but until that time studiously side-stepped by Rumanian "communist nationalists"—was one more bond beyond the established one of opposition to Soviet domination of the camp. But the Chinese failure to offer reasonable terms for a possible solution of their conflict with the Russians while raising issues so offensive to the Soviet Union placed the Rumanian "mediators" in a precarious position. In March, 1964, Khrushchev appeared determined to excommunicate the adamant Chinese from the socialist camp, to re-establish Soviet leadership in the socialist community of nations, and, in any case, to restore Soviet hegemony in the bloc. Rumanian independence at both the Party and state levels had to be arrested, if not altogether terminated. This threat forced the Rumanian leadership to issue the celebrated "Statement on the Stand of the Rumanian Workers' Party Concerning the Problem of the International Communist and Working-Class Movement" in April, 1964, which outlined the fundamental Rumanian views on international relations in general and relations within the communist camp in particular. The statement has become the fundamental law of Rumanian "national communism," currently a principal force of disintegration of the Soviet bloc, of the unity of the international "socialist movement," and of the socialist camp as a whole.¹⁶