RUMANIA IN THE PRE-ENTRY PERIOD

Historical Legacy

Up to the end of World War II, Rumania was generally regarded as a backward, corrupt, and disreputable Balkan state. Tsar Nicholas II's only bon mot, "Rumania is not a nationality but a profession," epitomized the impression of those familiar with Romanian politics in the twentieth century.¹

An objective appraisal of this diagnosis, in the light of the historic perspective, would not necessarily question its accuracy but would offer explanations for it. The history of Rumania has been one of unrealized expectations. Since its inception in the Roman era Rumania has had a history of dissolution, division, and struggle for survival. The historic antecedents of the second century A.D., when the territory inhabited by the future Rumanians included virtually all lands comprising Rumania today, are still invoked by Romanian historians and statesmen as the basis for a correct interpretation of the country's historic evolu-

tion. The restoration of that golden age of power, wealth, and grandeur—albeit in contemporary garb—has been the ostensible goal of Rumanian leaders since the dissolution of the Daco-Roman state began in the third century. That dissolution was complete some time before the founding of the principal component provinces of the Rumanian state of the future, Wallachia and Moldavia, around 1300. By that time the important region of Transylvania was part of Hungary, and Wallachia and Moldavia themselves had close ties with the Hungarian kingdom. The division of the three major parts of what is now Rumania was deepened and prolonged by the Turkish conquest of the Balkans and the Turkish advance into East Central Europe which began in the fourteenth century, and by the contemporary expansion of Habsburg power in the same area. Wallachia and Moldavia became vassal states of the Ottoman Empire, while Transylvania fell first under Ottoman and later under Habsburg domination. The historically relevant aspects of political and socioeconomic life were, in Moldavia and Wallachia, serfdom and corruption; in Transylvania, serfdom and denationalization.

The oppression of the peasantry was more cruel in Wallachia and Moldavia because the Turks' exactions increased severely during the decline of the Ottoman Empire after the middle of the sixteenth century. But the demands of the Turks, and of the Greeks, who were the main executors of Turkish will in the Rumanian provinces, do not account exclusively for the prevalent destitution and deprivation. The Rumanian feudal aristocracy and ruling princes themselves collaborated with the Turks and their agents to maintain their rights and privileges, and in the process resorted to the same methods of fiscal evasion, bribery, and extor-
tion, to the very mores and practices that characterized the officials of the Ottoman Empire. Fortunately for all concerned, the enormous agricultural resources of the Rumanian provinces assured the enrichment of all oligarchies and at least the marginal survival of the peasant.

The problems were somewhat different in Transylvania, where the exploitation of the peasant masses was not connected with a Rumanian feudal aristocracy or with Turkish masters. There the majority of the peasantry was Rumanian and the feudal lords were Hungarian. The Rumanian serfs in Transylvania enjoyed a much higher standard of living than those in Moldavia and Wallachia; such opposition as was expressed against the socioeconomic and political order was based on the denial of the Rumanians' political existence by the dominant nationalities—the Hungarian, Saxon, and Szekler. The absence of social mobility for the few Rumanian intellectuals, merchants, and landowners led, in the eighteenth century, to the voicing of political demands by this Rumanian élite, who sought the recognition of the Rumanian nation as a political entity in the province. By the early nineteenth century, demands for political rights, even political autonomy, were proposed separately but not independently by leaders in all Rumanian provinces—Transylvania, Wallachia, and Moldavia—but socioeconomic reform for the masses was at best an insignificant aspect of the programs of the politically conscious.

As a consequence, at least in Moldavia and Wallachia, political activity was restricted to the problems of agrarian-feudal societies and reflected the interests of the feudal élite. Throughout most of the nineteenth century these interests were equated with governance by a Rumanian aristocratic oligarchy, without inter-
ference by the Turkish suzerain or the overprotective and growingly imperialistic Russian empire. The divisive issue in Wallachian and Moldavian political life was whether the modernizing aristocracy, exposed to French influences, should lead the struggle for independence or whether that task should be entrusted to the conservative feudal aristocracy, closely tied to conservative Russia. The conflict was at least temporarily resolved in 1859 when the two Rumanian provinces were united into an autonomous Rumania ruled by the “liberal” elements of the aristocratic champions of independence. But the modernizers themselves had a narrow concept of modernization: they opposed, almost as ardently as the conservatives, the breaking up of the village, which would have freed the manpower required for the exploitation of Rumania’s nonagricultural riches. The politics of “neo-serfdom”—as characterized by a leading critic of pre-World War I Rumania—prevailed even after the establishment of the independent state, the Old Kingdom, in 1878, and the development of a primitive Rumanian industry in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In an unsuccessful effort to contain peasant discontent (there was a major peasant revolt in 1907), the rulers of Rumania substituted nationalism for social reform as the political panacea for all inhabitants. The union of all Rumanians, whether inhabiting Hungarian Transylvania, Austrian Bukovina, Russian Bessarabia, or the Turkish Dobrudja, became the political *raison d’être* of “liberals” and “conservatives” as World War I approached.

These narrow political views and broad territorial aspirations were only partly shared by the Rumanians of Transylvania, where political activity was directed toward the establishment of a viable and unitary Ru-
manian nation. From the middle of the nineteenth century the goal of all Rumanians, whether politically conscious intellectuals and bourgeoisie or peasantry, was the gaining of political equality with the privileged nations—Magyar, Szekler, or Saxon—and the modernization of Rumanian society. Rejection of the Rumanians' national aspirations by the Austro-Hungarian political oligarchy did not prevent the gradual evolution of an affluent middle class, an organized industrial labor force, and a reasonably prosperous peasantry—all accepting the political leadership of an intellectual-bourgeois coalition, the Transylvanian National Party. As the intransigence of the dominant nations increased in the early twentieth century, the Transylvanians regarded national unification into a Greater Rumania with favor, but not at the cost of sacrificing the nonpolitical gains realized under Austro-Hungarian rule. And the same desires and reservations were entertained by the Rumanians in other parts of the Austro-Hungarian state, including Bukovina, and even by those in Bessarabia as World War I ended the empire of the Habsburgs and the tsars and made the creation of a Greater Rumanian state, focusing on the only victorious component, the Old Kingdom, an inevitable political reality.

Greater Rumania did not prove viable for a variety of reasons. \(^2\) Politically, it was threatened from its inception with revisionistic claims by Hungary, Bulgaria, and Russia for territories acquired by Rumania in the process of integration. The seriousness of these demands could be discounted in the twenties, but they were used by the political leaders of the Old Kingdom

\(^2\) The most authoritative study of Greater Rumania is by Henry L. Roberts, *Rumania: Political Problems of an Agrarian State* (New Haven, 1951).
as justification for retaining political power as defenders of Rumania's territorial integrity and national interest. The defense of the country by its creators was also directed against "internal enemies" such as national minorities, "communists" and their sympathizers, and all other politically conscious or organized segments of the population that were seeking a more equitable distribution of political power and a greater role in the modernization of the state. Refusal to accept the party system as an instrument of political action and expression led first to political paternalism by the Bucharest oligarchy headed by the Bratianu family, and, in the thirties, to royal authoritarianism, culmination in the establishment of a royal dictatorship under King Carol II in 1938. The political conflict in the years between the world wars focused on agrarian problems and the role of the peasantry in Greater Rumania. The major agrarian reform, precipitated by the Bolshevik Revolution and enacted in the Old Kingdom at the end of the war, together with the reconfirmation of the rights of the peasantry, could have led to the gaining of political power by the peasantry through peasant parties. That disaster was averted, with a resulting isolation of the villages, continuing substitution of nationalism for socioeconomic and political reform, and consolidation of the power of the political establishment. That establishment, consisting before the war of the "liberal" and "conservative" parties, and after the war of the Wallachian and Moldavian middle class and conservative intellectuals, fought for the maintenance of the status quo. The development of the country's vast economic resources was neglected. Industrialization proceeded slowly, frequently with inadequate capital. Social welfare and education fared badly. The mechanization of
agriculture was nominal. Nevertheless, the tremendous natural wealth in agricultural products, petroleum, and minerals, combined with a cheap labor force, permitted the development of an industrial base and the maintenance of relative prosperity and stability at least until the Great Depression.

The depression ushered in a period of grave difficulties for Rumania, not all economic. In fact, the economic problems per se had only a marginal effect on the underdeveloped agrarian economy and the slowly developing industry. The problems faced by the country were political, related to the rise of Hitler’s Germany, the consolidation of the Stalinist order in Russia, and the weakening of the West. In the thirties the Germans became Rumania’s principal customers and in the process extended their sphere of economic and political influence into the country. This led, on the one hand, to acceleration of industrial development and general economic growth and, on the other, to the strengthening of Rumanian fascism. Rumanian fascism, of a populist-anti-Semitic variety, antedated Hitler’s. Organized in the Iron Guard, it gained momentum in the thirties, seeking and securing the support of the disgruntled peasantry for a national Christian crusade against the existing political establishment, the city, and the Jew, and for redistributing the national wealth to the masses. That momentum grew steadily, with German financial and moral support, until the party system was abolished in 1938 by King Carol II. The strength of the fascists was the decisive factor in the establishment of the royal dictatorship. But Carol acted also in the defense of the country against potential aggression by the revisionist Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, and the Axis’ revisionist allies, Hungary and Bulgaria.
The stability ensured by dictatorship was precarious and short-lived. Greater Rumania crumbled in 1940 under the extreme pressures generated by foreign revisionists and Rumanian fascists. The Soviet Union, following the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement, seized Bessarabia and northern Bukovina. The Hungarians and Bulgarians, with German support, annexed northern Transylvania and southern Dobrudja. The Rumanian fascists, blaming the King for dismemberment of the country, forced his abdication and assumed power as the German armies were occupying Rumania as a base for the forthcoming conflict with the U.S.S.R. A new dictatorship, under General Ion Antonescu, replaced that of King Carol and pursued a policy of national unification for the purpose of recovering the territories lost to Russia and fighting a national Christian crusade against communism. The war against the Soviet Union began in June, 1941, and ended in August, 1944, when the Rumanians abandoned Antonescu and Nazi Germany as the Red Army neared Bucharest.

Throughout her history, Rumania has displayed a basic reluctance toward integration with other states, particularly the present party states of the communist system. The historic Rumanian provinces—Moldavia and Wallachia—jealously guarding the modicum of autonomy bestowed upon them by the Turks, avoided associations with the future nation states of Bulgaria or Serbia, for example, as long as these areas were Turkish pashaliks, for fear of jeopardizing their own

relatively privileged position. Possible integration with other nations—enemies of the Ottoman Empire—was also resisted in the same spirit. Austrian attempts to transform Wallachia into a dependency were as strenuously opposed in the eighteenth century as were earlier Polish attempts at incorporation of Moldavia into the Polish kingdom. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Rumanian goals were the opposite of integration: first the United Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, then the Old Kingdom, were active promoters of the disintegration of the Habsburg Empire and a main force in precipitating the ultimate dissolution of that empire as well as of the Ottoman. The history of Wallachia and Moldavia does not record enthusiasm for integration into the empire of the Russian tsars, particularly after Russia’s imperialistic intentions became evident in the eighteenth century. The Rumanians were singularly opposed to Panslavism and to their inclusion by the Russians among those to be liberated from foreign oppressors.

The other provinces that were to become components of Greater Rumania at the end of World War I showed no greater interest in integration than the Old Kingdom itself. Transylvania, Bukovina, and Bessarabia were thorns in the flesh of the Habsburg and Romanov emperors for nearly one hundred and fifty years before World War I, and then of Greater Rumania. Even the Dobrudja, though more pliable than the other constituent provinces of Greater Rumania, showed no propensity toward integration. Most significantly, the divisive forces generated by particularism in these provinces prevented their effective integration into a United Rumania after 1918. What was the relative importance of these internally divisive forces in impeding integration then and now? May it
not be argued that external factors overshadowed domestic considerations after the establishment of the independent Rumanian state in 1878 and of Greater Rumania at the end of World War I? Indeed, how relevant is the historic legacy in the formulation and implementation of policies favoring or opposing integration with other states?

Economic Structure

Pre-communist Rumania was an underdeveloped agrarian country, with the notable exception of its industrial exploitation of petroleum and its development, on a modest scale, of corollary industries. The production of cereals—principally wheat and maize—was high by East European standards. Between 1921 and 1925, for instance, the average yearly production of these crops amounted to 24,377,000 and 35,613,000 quintals (1 quintal = 220 lbs.). By 1938 these figures were 49,124,000 and 52,231,000, respectively. By contrast, the production from food-processing and industrial plants was nominal. Cereals and wood constituted the bulk of Rumania's export trade: in 1925, 25 per cent and 23 per cent, respectively; in 1938, 25 per cent and 11 per cent. Animal products represented only a small fraction of the export trade (about 10 per cent in 1938), the balance consisting almost entirely of petroleum (40 per cent of the total trade in the 1930's).

Rumania's oil deposits, the second largest in Europe, have been exploited systematically since the middle of the nineteenth century. Modernization of

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Valuable data on Rumania's economic structure and development are contained in Joseph S. Roucek, Contemporary Roumania and Her Problems (Stanford, 1932), pp. 247–353.
equipment and extractive techniques occurred only after World War I, with dramatic increases in output. Thus in 1921 crude oil production amounted to only 1,168,000 tons; it reached 8,703,000 in 1936, and declined, because of decreased export requirements, to 6,225,000 on the eve of World War II. It is characteristic of the country's underdeveloped industrial capacity that until Rumania became communist, crude oil rather than petroleum derivates were exported. In terms of value of exports, those derived from petroleum amounted to over 40 per cent of the total Rumanian export trade in the nineteen thirties.

Industrial production not related to petroleum output was marginal in the thirties. The most significant area of development was the food industry: 974 industrial establishments (with more than 20 employees) out of a total of 3,767 in the country as a whole were devoted to food production in 1938. The total investment of capital in the food industry was 10.7 billion lei ($25,000,000 at the free market rate of exchange)—approximately 20 per cent of the total capital invested in Rumanian industry in 1938. The chemical, metallurgic, textile, and wood industries were the next most developed, but the total investment of capital in all these together amounted to a mere 31 billion lei. Significantly, the total personnel in all Rumanian industry on the eve of World War II was just under 300,000, and the total of the salaries paid to those workers was 8.3 billion lei. Rumanian industrial production, except for agricultural products and petroleum, was insufficient to meet even the modest requirements of the country's inhabitants.

Thus before World War II Rumania produced and exported raw materials and imported almost exclusively finished goods. Between 1929 and 1938 over 80
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per cent of the total imports were finished goods. Most of the lucrative trade was with West European countries, particularly Germany, which was normal considering the overabundance of agricultural products in Eastern Europe and the general lack of industrial development in that area. These factors account also for the absence of a tradition of regional economic cooperation and, in the current perspective, for the continuing Rumanian opposition to Russian schemes for economic integration of the bloc under COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Aid).

Ecological-physical Factors

Consideration of relevant ecological-physical features as factors for or against integration yields contradictory results. The contiguous open borders with Russia, Bulgaria, and Serbia, for example, could have facilitated integration with these present members of the communist state system. In reality, however, the opposite was the case, since the very concept of integration beyond that of political alignments was unknown to the essentially feudal Old Kingdom. Nationalism in its primitive forms was clearly the determining factor in international relations, as the prewar alliances testify. Proximity to Russia was regarded as a handicap in the attainment of the national goal of a Greater Rumania; and the other neighboring states—Serbia, Bulgaria, and Hungary—either entertained rival claims to those of the Rumanians or were the would-be victims of Bucharest’s territorial ambitions in Rumanian-inhabited areas. Ecological-physical factors should also have favored closer integration efforts by Greater Rumania. The acquisition of Transylvania and other
areas rich in natural resources should have facilitated economic cooperation at least with Hungary and Yugoslavia, yet such opportunities were again subordinated to political considerations, and obstacles were raised by Hungarian irredentists, German imperialists, and Russian communists. The maintenance of the territorial gains realized at the end of World War I against claims by neighboring countries transcended all other factors.

There is no evidence that domestic ecological-physical factors affected the official Rumanian attitude toward international cooperation. Localism and provincialism, aggravated by the geographic isolation of certain communities and even provinces, were inconsequential to Bucharest.

Demographic Structure

The country's demographic structure, on the other hand, explains some of the most obvious difficulties related to international cooperation. The size of the population nearly quadrupled between 1878 and 1918, increasing from 4,500,000 to nearly 18,000,000. By 1941, subsequent to the loss of northern Transylvania, southern Dobrudja, Bessarabia, and northern Bukovina, Rumania's population fell to 13,500,000. At the end of World War II, through restoration of the Transylvanian territories lost in 1940, the population again rose to approximately 16,000,000. The urban-rural distribution remained relatively constant between 1878 and 1945, fluctuating between 15 and 85 per cent and

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23 and 77 per cent on the respective dates. In 1930 the proportion was 20 to 80 per cent. It is noteworthy that only five towns in Greater Rumania had more than 100,000 inhabitants at any given time before the establishment of the communist regime—Bucharest, Cluj, Timisoara, Ploesti, and Iasi. Each had a population of approximately 100,000, except Bucharest, whose size varied between 600,000 inhabitants in 1918 and 1,000,000 in 1945. It is also remarkable that of the 13,500 towns and communes in Rumania at the end of World War II, fewer than 200 had a population in excess of 5,000, and nearly 10,000 had less than 1,000 inhabitants.

**Ethnic and Language Groups**

The ethnic composition of the population remained fairly constant between 1918 and 1945, except for major fluctuations in the German and Jewish groups. The overwhelming majority were Rumanians (80 to 85 per cent); the largest minorities were the Hungarians (10 per cent), the Germans (5 per cent until the end of World War II and 2 per cent after their resettlement), and the Jews (1 per cent at the end of World War II, but about 8 per cent in the interwar period). The rest of the minorities, including Gypsies, Serbs, and Croats, Russians, Bulgarians, Turks, Poles, Tartars, Albanians, and others, comprised approximately 2 per cent of the total population. The linguistic divisions followed those of the ethnic cultures, except for the Jewish population which, in most instances, spoke Rumanian.
Religious Groups

The population of Rumania has always been overwhelmingly Greek Orthodox. In 1938 the Orthodox Church had 13,000,000 adherents as compared with the 1,400,000 Uniates (Greek Catholics), 1,275,000 Roman Catholics, 700,000 Calvinists, 750,000 Jews, and 400,000 Lutherans. Following the territorial readjustments at the end of World War II, these figures varied slightly in accordance with the relocation of the German population, Jewish emigration, and war losses. Nevertheless, nearly 80 per cent of the population belonged to the Greek Orthodox faith, whereas the Roman Catholic membership declined by approximately 275,000, the Calvinist by 125,000, the Lutheran by 150,000, and, more significantly, the Jewish by 500,000.

Belief System and Social System

Demographic factors, including the weighty question of illiteracy, become important in any consideration of the belief and social systems of Rumania. The percentage of illiteracy in the Old Kingdom, which was inhabited almost exclusively by Rumanians of the Orthodox faith, had declined from 78 per cent in 1900 to approximately 60 per cent at the time of the establishment of Greater Rumania. In Transylvania and the Banat illiteracy amounted to approximately 40 per cent in 1918 and was confined primarily to the Rumanian population. Incorporation of these regions into Greater Rumania further increased the gulf between the Rumanian masses on the one hand and the Rumanian aristocracy, bourgeoisie, intellectuals, and non-
Rumanian population on the other. The comparative reduction of illiteracy to a total of 38 per cent in 1930 to 23 per cent in 1948 has not altered this gulf, which, more than other internally generated factors, has affected the integration potential, if not the integration policies, of Greater Rumania.

Basic Values and Goal Values, Cultural Orientation, and Religion

The official "national" Rumanian goals prior to the establishment of the communist regime may be defined as the attainment of a Greater Rumania, and subsequent to that achievement, the preservation of the Greater Rumanian state. These goals, however, represented the lowest common denominator of the aims of the various elements and groups of the heterogeneous population and were devised largely as substitutes for satisfaction of basic socioeconomic and political desiderata. Before the establishment of the Greater Rumanian state, the conflict between the official goal and the desires of the masses was self-evident. In the compact Old Kingdom, the boyar dominated, landlord oligarchy was determined to seek national aggrandizement as a panacea for all problems. The goals of this "neo-feudal" order conflicted directly with the basic goal of the peasantry—individual ownership of land subsequent to a radical land reform. Mass identification with the nationalistic policies of the Rumanian government was minimal; by exploiting religious prejudices, however, the ruling groups were able to develop anti-Semitism as a domestic nationalist tradition. The Jew, traditional moneylender and estate manager for the frequently absent landlord class, was
depicted by priest and teacher alike as the exploiter, and therefore the enemy, of the Rumanian peasant. While the influence of such arguments on the masses was not as great as expected, it nevertheless developed a sense of national consciousness at least among the younger members of the peasantry. The identification of rural prejudices with the professed national aim of the oligarchy did not eliminate the fundamental conflict between the goals of the masses and the ruling class, nor did the superficially pro-Western cultural orientation of the aristocracy and bourgeoisie alter the realities of the goal conflict. The predominantly pro-French cultural ties stressed the "Latin" aspects of both Rumania and France. This common heritage was interpreted as a mandate for irredentism rather than for social reform in the French manner. It militated against international cooperation with neighboring states, all of which were irredentist as well as non-Latin.6

The complex goals of the various ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic groups of Greater Rumania, and the conflict between them and the official "national goal" of maintenance of the Greater Rumanian state are, however, far more relevant to the basic problems raised by this paper. The multinationalization of Rumania deepened the contradictions between the aims of the ruling class and those of the masses, insofar as most non-Rumanian elements were opposed to that very goal. A majority of the Hungarians of Transylvania and the Banat, for instance, favored Rumania's

“disintegration” and the incorporation of these provinces within a reconstituted Hungary. This counter-irredentism was also manifest among the Bulgarians of southern Dobrudja and, to a considerable extent, among the Transylvanian Germans following Hitler’s rise to power. Furthermore, the socioeconomic goals and cultural orientation of the Hungarians and Germans was at variance with that of the Rumanians. This was less true of the peasant groups, who nevertheless regarded themselves as superior to their Rumanian peers, than of the bourgeoisie inhabiting the Sieben Bürgen. The members of the middle class regarded themselves as heirs to and exponents of a Hungarian or German culture, with strongly anti-French overtones and with definite contempt for the parvenu, neo-Latin Rumanians. These sentiments, reflecting general dissatisfaction with Rumanian rule, were encouraged by the Catholic and Protestant churches, thereby increasing the friction between Bucharest and the non-Rumanian Transylvanians.

The belief system of the minority groups in other parts of pre-communist Rumania is of little importance to us here; no clearly defined goals, cultural orientation, or religious conflicts need to be singled out. Although they did not oppose the regime directly, none of the minority groups endorsed the official national goal. More significantly, the goals of the Rumanian masses remained in conflict with those of the ruling classes; the official doctrines in domestic and foreign affairs enjoyed only limited acceptance by the majority of the inhabitants of Greater Rumania.

It is evident that the prewar ruling oligarchy, whose power before the agrarian reform of 1918–21 had rested on control of the land as well as of the peasant,
was forced by circumstances to alter its goals; the economic base of the ruling class had to be readjusted. Although land ownership still constituted a significant part of the rulers' wealth, participation in industrial and financial ventures assumed greater importance. Thus, employment in the state or private bureaucracy, preferably as front men for foreign and Jewish capitalists, or as members of the diplomatic corps, was the ultimate goal of the postwar ruling élite. These aims and ambitions came into direct conflict not only with those of the non-Rumanian bourgeoisie but also with those of the rising groups of second-generation Rumanian peasants, whose social and political mobility was limited by the pre-empting of the key political and economic positions by the former landlord class and their descendants. As compromises were reached with ethnic Rumanians of the Old Kingdom and Transylvania, the co-opted elements assumed the attitudes and goals of their benefactors.

The preservation of privileges and of Greater Rumania itself were the paramount goals of the entire ruling class. In order to maintain its position, that class encouraged, or at least condoned, both domestic and foreign-oriented nationalistic manifestations, including chauvinism and anti-Semitism at home, and counter-irredentism in relations with Rumania's neighbors. In justification and defense of Greater Rumania, this group emphasized the country's Latin roots and relied on French political protection. These considerations transcended the realities of domestic and international pressures and, given the superficiality of the élite's aims, did not encourage economic integration or inter-Balkan cooperation against common external enemies. Rumania was officially depicted as the tradi-
tional friend of France in the East, as a country culturally superior to its Balkan neighbors and to the Soviet Union, and as a Latin oasis in southeastern Europe. Bucharest was proudly proclaimed the Paris of the East, and international cooperation was possible only with other superior or like-minded East European nations, particularly Czechoslovakia and Poland. Countries like Bulgaria and Albania were held in contempt; Hungary, a revisionist nation, was treated with nationalistic hatred; Yugoslavia, though not highly esteemed, was nevertheless tolerated for reasons of political security.

Degree of Integration of Rumania with Other Systems

The prevalence of such attitudes meant that the crises of the interwar years, although understood, were not subject to rational solutions. French protection and reliance on the Little Entente were regarded as adequate barriers against pressures exerted by Communist Russia and Nazi Germany. Neither compromise nor cooperation with the Soviet Union were accepted, because of the dual threats of communism and revisionism. Cooperation with Hitler's Germany could be rationalized in terms of German anticommunism, anti-Semitism, and, until 1940, neutrality toward Hungarian and Bulgarian revisionism. It is noteworthy that the positive economic advantages offered by Germany to an economically distraught Rumania during the depression years were not regarded as an excuse or justification for cooperation.

The integration potential of Greater Rumania was further diminished by the social, economic, and polit-
ical pressures generated by an unstable social system. As in all East European countries, there was little correlation between the aspirations of the masses and official policies. Political decisions were seldom made at the polls (where intimidation, bribery, and fraud were the rule), or in Parliament, even before the abolition of political parties and the establishment of the royal dictatorship in 1938. The establishment of the dictatorship merely recorded a shift in the exercising of political power through political parties as controlled by the crown and ruling oligarchy to that of personal rule, made necessary by forcible challenge to the traditional order by the Iron Guard and its external sponsor, Nazi Germany. This challenge reflected growing dissatisfaction with the inability of political parties and the ruling class to solve the economic problems of the peasantry, the industrial workers, the urban intellectuals, and the professional students of the depression years.

The greater political mobility, employment opportunities, and economic reforms inherent in the Iron Guardist brand of populism—with its supranationalistic, anti-Semitic, and anti-minority group philosophy—threatened to alter radically the existing domestic political order and foreign political orientation. Even the fascist propagators of social and political revolution at home were, as guardians of the integrity of Greater Rumania, opposed to international collaboration with the country's irredentist neighbors. In their eyes, only bilateral relations with Nazi Germany were to be en-

7 In addition to the works cited in note 6, consult the stimulating—if not always unbiased—studies by Lucretiu D. Patrascu, Sub trei dictatori (“Under Three Dictatorships”) (Bucharest, 1945), and Un veac de framantari sociale (“A Century of Social Turmoil”) (Bucharest, 1945). See also Hugh Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe Between the Wars, 1918–1941 (Cambridge, 1945), pp. 198–216.
couraged. Thus the views of the challengers and of the challenged on the substance and extent of international cooperation differed only in the choice of partners.

The maintenance of territorial gains transcended all other political goals, and this supreme goal could not be realized with Rumania's own, limited, military resources. The primary area of international cooperation was thus military and political. Before the accession of Carol II in 1930 and Antonescu's dictatorship in 1940, there was little recognition of the necessity of strengthening the economic foundations of the national security system through economic and technological exchanges with other nations. The pooling of the natural resources with which Rumania is so richly endowed was generally, but not altogether, precluded by nationalist political considerations. Rumania's membership in the Little Entente, her bilateral agreements with France, Poland, and Yugoslavia, her wartime alliance with Nazi Germany and belated joining of the Allies at the end of World War II, were all forms of political and military cooperation. Instances of economic cooperation are recorded only in modest bilateral agreements with the members of the Little Entente and, of greater significance, in the blueprint for an area-wide program of economic collaboration as discussed in the Balkan conferences of the thirties. The latter scheme, although essentially subordinated to the maintenance of national integrity in the face of external political pressures, and unsuccessful on account of traditional inter-Balkan political conflicts, nevertheless provided a new concept of international cooperation. It may therefore be regarded as an antecedent to the Stoica Plan and other similar Rumanian proposals for collaboration among the Balkan nations, plans that were submitted in post-Stalinist years. A
more comprehensive scheme of integration of the Rumanian economy with that of Germany was drafted and partly implemented under the Antonescu regime, in an attempt to coordinate the common war effort against the Soviet Union.

Other forms of international cooperation were even more limited in scope. In the interwar period, cultural relations were developed between Rumania and several members of the present party state system in Eastern Europe; such bilateral agreements as were concluded with Poland, Czechoslovakia, or Yugoslavia were auxiliary to political alignments. Rumania's interest in the League of Nations—most dramatically expressed in Nicolae Titulescu's pleas for broad international cooperation—was a reflection of the country's concern with national security rather than of readiness to sacrifice any of its political goals.

The extent to which Rumania shared in the decision-making process in international cooperative efforts varied with the relative strength of the partners involved. Her share of power was nominal in relations with European powers, and basically equal in the bilateral and multilateral agreements with the smaller neighboring states of Eastern Europe. Only during the military-political Balkan alliance of 1913 and the Balkan Conference meetings of the thirties did Rumania enjoy a position of power; in decisions—a result of her relative military strength in 1913 and her industrial development in the interwar period.

*Compatibility of Demands Relevant to Integration*

Before World War II, the Rumanian ruling elite favored integration exclusively in areas—military and
political—expressly related to the attainment and preservation of the narrow political order. Before the establishment of Greater Rumania the problem centered on whether the Triple Alliance or the Triple Entente offered the best alternative to territorial aggrandizement. After the establishment of Greater Rumania, the issue of preservation again focused on the choice between the French system of alliances and the German. The pro-French sentiments and cultural orientation, temporarily abandoned during World War II, became relevant again at the end of that war.

The views on integration of the rest of the politically conscious population—the non-Rumanian bourgeoisie and intellectuals—were incompatible with the official doctrine. Separatism, coupled with integration into rival or enemy states such as Hungary and Bulgaria, was the aim of most, except for a few elements of the Jewish communities of the Old Kingdom who subscribed to pro-French internationalism. The outspoken advocates of broad international cooperation within the framework of the League of Nations in the twenties and thirties were, in fact, the politicized Jewish and Rumanian intellectuals. The Jews, motivated less by patriotism than by the spirit of self-preservation, saw security in the League, and in Leon Blum’s France. A nucleus of Jewish intellectuals also favored closer ties with Russia, as they regarded communism, if not the Soviet regime, as an equalitarian doctrine opposed to racial or religious discrimination. Contrary to the popular view, however, the number of Jews in the Rumanian communist movement of the interwar years was as infinitesimal as that of their predecessors in the pre-1917 socialist movement. The opposition of the politically conscious Hungarian and German elements was far more effective in the thirties and in the early
months of World War II than the limited Jewish internationalism. The Jews were cowed into submission or destroyed; the Hungarians and Germans played a significant part in the dismemberment of Greater Rumania in 1940.

Consensus on Present and Future Integration

The relevance of the aforementioned factors for present and future international cooperation and integration is open to question. The most recent Rumanian statements on national rights and independence have been interpreted by many as a manifestation of Rumanian nationalism, a reflection of the historic opposition to the surrender of essential elements of national power. But the continuing allegiance to the principle of “unity of the socialist camp” and equivocal statements on international cooperation with all nations tend to qualify (or at least modify) that contention. It is therefore appropriate to consider the present and future problems of integration and cooperation in the light of pre-communist legacy and post-World War II developments.
