In the history of the doctrine of human malleability we have traced representative forms of two different, fundamentally opposed doctrines, geneticism and organicism, each of which stressed the formative influence which men's environments have on their natures. However, in the period with which we are concerned, there were also those who espoused the doctrine of man's malleability, but were opposed to its predominantly environmentalist forms. Some among them, as we have noted, stressed man's inherent tendency toward self-fulfilment which, they believed, would manifest itself naturally, and ever more completely. This was a form of self-realizationism which we shall discuss in terms of the thought of Fichte and, among others, of Thomas Hill Green. However, if I am not mistaken, a more frequently exemplified view of the progressive nature of man was less antagonistic to geneticism, was explicitly hedonistic, and was not connected with the metaphysics of idealism. John Stuart Mill was the chief theoretical exponent of this position which, in slightly varying forms, was widely shared. It was characteristic of this view to hold that, through the development of forms of sensibility higher than those which were natural to man in an uneducated and undeveloped state, human nature had acquired new capacities, and had undergone radical transformations with respect to the old. According to Mill, Arnold, and Huxley, such changes had not been accidental, nor were they brought about primarily through external forces: they had been, and were, dependent upon the efforts of men.

In addition to these forms of progressivist doctrine there was, as we have noted, a third form which derived directly from evolutionary theory in biology. Since it arose later, discussion of it will come last. In terms of chronology, it would be equally appropriate to begin with a discussion of either the self-fulfilment doctrine or the doctrine typified by Mill. However, since the background for a discussion of Mill has already been provided by my discussion of geneticism, and by our having seen the reasons why he rejected the atomistic view of society which
had characterized the thought of Bentham and of his father (and since, indeed, the very title of this chapter is drawn from Mill) I shall commence my discussion with an account of his views, and of other views related to it.

1. Ideals of a Better Self: Mill, Arnold, and Huxley

In many ways, as we shall see, Mill represents a continuation of the thought of the Enlightenment, even though his rebellion against the position of Bentham and his father allied him with an important group of its foes. In considering both aspects of his doctrine, it must be remembered that, when we traced the influence on his thought of those whom he termed "the Germano-Coleridgians," our attention was confined to two quite specific points: first, his recognition of the need for a concrete-historical rather than a psychological-deductive approach to history and government; and, second, his recognition of the fact that the views of human nature accepted by Bentham and his father placed too little emphasis on feelings and on the imagination. Both of these points, as we shall soon see, had an important influence on his views regarding human nature. However, these departures from orthodoxy should not be taken as signs that, in other respects, he had abandoned the position of Bentham and of his father. For example, throughout his life, he continued to accept their associationism, not only as a basic doctrine in psychology, but as a foundation for his theory of knowledge. In this connection we may note that, before going on to praise other aspects of Coleridge's thought, Mill explicitly rejected the nativism which characterized his theory of knowledge. Similarly, it is not possible to conceive of Mill as accepting the "Coleridgian" view of moral notions, which (for example) was stated by F. D. Maurice when he held that "in the human mind [there is] a simple and primary idea of the distinction between right and wrong, not produced by experience, but developing itself in proportion to the growth of the mind." In contradistinction to this view, Mill always adhered to the Benthamite principle of utility, even though he modified Bentham's own application of that principle in many important ways. With respect to both his theory of knowledge and his moral theory, one may, then, in general, say that he remained within the tradition of geneticism no less than Bentham and his father had done, yet he so altered the earlier forms of that doctrine that it yielded a quite different picture of the nature of man. In order to understand how this could be the case, we must examine (however briefly) the changes which he introduced in the psychological assumptions of Bentham, and the ways in which he altered, or at least stretched, the system embodied in his father's *Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind.*

In spite of Mill's very great admiration for Bentham's accomplishments, in his essay entitled "Bentham" he severely criticized the limitations of Bentham's temperament, particularly his lack of sympathy for positions and for types of character which were divergent from his own. What has unfortunately been far too little known is that Mill had written another, earlier, anonymously published article on Bentham in which similar and even more damaging remarks were made, but in which those remarks were related to the differences between Bentham's psychological theory and Mill's own psychological views.
Whereas Bentham had supposed that men's actions are always directed toward achieving some future pleasure, or avoiding some future pain, it was Mill's position that men always act in accordance with the pleasantness or unpleasantness of their present ideas, whatever these ideas may be. Consequently, unlike Bentham, Mill did not hold that men were always acting under the guidance of what they took to be their self-interest; motives such as patriotism, or benevolence, or a sense of virtue, were no less effective sources of action than was a desire for some future pleasure for one's self. For example, on Mill's view, the only prerequisite necessary for patriotism to serve as an autonomous motive was that the course of action denominated by that name should, through past experience, have become an idea having a positive affective tone (i.e., that it should have become a pleasant present idea), or that lack of patriotism should have become an idea having a strong negative affective tone (i.e., that it should have become positively distasteful). This modification of Bentham's doctrine, which had stressed self-interest, led Mill to say:

The attempt to enumerate motives, that is, human desires and aversions, seems to me to be in its very conception an error. Motives are innumerable: there is nothing whatever which may not become an object of desire or of dislike by association.

And in one of his extensive notes to his father's *Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind*, Mill said (with perhaps too great praise of the subsections in question):

The two preceding subsections are almost perfect as expositions and exemplifications of the mode in which, by the natural course of life, we acquire attachments to persons, things, and positions, which are the causes or habitual concomitants of pleasurable sensations in us, or of relief from pains: in other words, those persons, things, and positions become in themselves pleasant to us by association; and, through the multitude and variety of the pleasurable ideas associated with them, become pleasures of greater constancy and even intensity, and altogether more valuable to us, than any of the primitive pleasures of our constitutions.

This doctrine, which holds that what was originally a means to pleasure can become an object desired for itself alone, is an instance of what is now often referred to as "functional autonomy." It was this doctrine (in a hedonistic form) which Mill immediately applied to moral questions; for example, he did so in *Utilitarianism*, where he accounted for the miser's love of money in these terms, seeking thereby to show how our conception of virtue, while ultimately founded on its association with good consequences, can become an end desired for its own sake. However, his application of this doctrine to questions of moral theory need not here concern us. What is important to note is that this psychological doctrine allows for the self-transformation of man: what was originally dominant in the individual's nature becomes transformed by association, and may in fact altogether cease to be dominant as an operative force in that individual's life.

I speak of this as a *self-transformation* of man's nature, but critics of Mill, and of associationism, might point out that, in a strict sense, it is not the individual who transforms himself: he has *become transformed* through the effects of his
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experience. In short, it might be claimed that the power of remaking the self does not, even on John Stuart Mill’s view, lie within the individual; it is a power external to him. Mill explicitly sought to refute this type of allegation in his chapter on “Liberty and Necessity,” in Book VI of his *System of Logic*. Whether that argument had the probative force which he assigned to it, I am inclined to doubt; but those doubts, even if justified, are not of crucial importance in the present context. What is important to note is that whether or not any given individual is in a position to change his individual nature, it is assuredly the case that Mill’s psychological theory did allow him to hold that human nature does change over the course of time, and that the source of change lies in the actions of men. In any generation, the effects of human action will lead to changes not only in the external conditions of life, but can lead to changes in the motives of men in the following generation. Because of these accumulating effects, we may say that it is men who are primarily responsible for what man has become.

This position marked a departure from those earlier views of associationism with which we were previously concerned; among earlier associationists there was no belief that during the course of history man’s fundamental motivation could change. Not only were the laws of association held to be constant (as, of course, John Stuart Mill also believed); but each individual had been looked upon in terms of his own experience, and the cumulative effects of the past history of the race tended to be left wholly out of account. In contradistinction to this view, Mill’s doctrine of the emergence of new, autonomous motives permitted him to regard history as effecting incremental changes in human nature over successive generations. The mechanism for such changes should be obvious. Forms of conduct which were originally associated with beneficial social consequences would, as we have seen, come to be prized for their own sakes. These evaluations would not have had to be learned anew by each generation on the basis of its own experience of what promoted social well-being; such evaluations would have been a natural and indeed an inescapable part of the education of successive generations. A failure to conform to modes of behavior which had come to be prized would, in some cases, be punished by external sanctions; in all cases, however, the internal sanctions of feeling would have became attached to an avoidance of that which was rejected by others, satisfaction being felt in acting in a socially approved way. Consequently, only a clear recognition that some forms of approved conduct are in fact disadvantageous to society will serve to undermine the authority which derives from their original utility. While Mill did believe that, in some cases, people had become accustomed to accept modes of conduct which had a definite disutility, he had faith that whenever such a disparity between established beliefs and actual utility arose, the exigency of facts and the application of intelligence would force the revision of those beliefs which had lost their original utility. On the other hand, forms of conduct which served to promote happiness would continue to be prized for their own sakes. Thus, Mill’s psychology provided him with warrant for his faith in the gradual improvement of human nature.

The form of this improvement was, on Mill’s view, primarily a matter of the
Mand as a progressive being

The cultivation of more complex—and, as he often said, higher and nobler—forms of feeling. To be sure, he held that knowledge also inevitably advanced with experience, but he did not hold that, in itself, knowledge transformed human nature; it was only an instrument by means of which deleterious modes of action could be cleared away, and by which improved social relationships could be discovered and translated into action, giving rise to further improvements. What directly transformed human nature was the manner in which experience affected the sensibilities of men. It increased the depth and the range of their social feelings, making them more sensitive to the rights and the welfare of others, thereby causing that welfare to be a matter of immediate personal concern; and, in addition, it opened to them, for their own immediate pleasure, the more cultivated and complex forms of enjoyment of civilized men.

As we shall very soon see, doctrines of a similar sort were to be found in thinkers as different from one another as Matthew Arnold and Thomas Henry Huxley. However, before withdrawing our attention from Mill, it is necessary to note that his theoretical interests and his practical-reformist interests (which were never wholly unconnected) led him to attempt to establish a new science whose generalizations would throw light on the formation of character under specific types of circumstances. This science, which was to deal with the character both of individuals and of nations, Mill termed "ethology." According to Mill's usage, ethology was to be distinguished from Psychology, in that the latter dealt with the basic laws of the mind, whereas the former traced the effects of these laws in complex sets of circumstances. While Mill believed that it was in many cases already possible to deduce from the general laws of Psychology what the effects of particular sets of circumstances on the formation of character would usually be, he held that it was necessary to establish "middle principles"—the principles of ethology—if one were to understand "the origin and sources of all those qualities in human beings which are interesting to us, either as facts to be produced, to be avoided, or merely to be understood." His own interest in this field of inquiry had already been made clear in his early essay *The Spirit of the Age*, and a recognition of its importance had been implicit in his criticism of the ahistorical assumptions of Bentham and his father with respect to the theory of government. We may also note that even though he believed that the methods of "political economy" did not rest on a consideration of ethology, but on the principle that "a greater gain is preferred to a smaller," he was aware of dangers in assuming that such laws held universally, regardless of the character of the people concerned. In fact, throughout his discussion of the social sciences, we see the importance which he attached to the still undeveloped science which he termed "political ethology," that is, "the theory of the causes which determine the type of character belonging to a people or to an age." Of this study he said:

To whoever well considers the matter, it must appear that the laws of national (or collective) character are by far the most important class of sociological laws. In the first place, the character which is formed by any state of social circumstances is in itself the
most interesting phenomenon which that state of society can possibly present. Secondly, it is also a fact which enters largely into the production of all other phenomena. And, above all, the character, that is, the opinions, feelings, and habits of the people, though greatly the results of the state of society which precedes them, are also greatly the causes of the state of society which follows them; and are the power by which all those of the circumstances of society which are artificial—laws and customs, for instance—are altogether moulded.  

As a result of this conviction, Mill held that a study of the principles of education as applied to social groups constituted the basis for the fullest understanding of history, and provided enlightenment as to those conditions which would best promote the future well-being of Humanity.

It is at this point that one can see that, in spite of Comte's great influence on Mill's philosophy of the social sciences, their views involved diametrically opposed assumptions. Ethology rested upon "psychology" according to Mill; and psychology therefore remained the fundamental social science. As Mill said,

"The succession of states of the human mind and of human society cannot have an independent law of its own; it must depend on the psychological and ethological laws which govern the action of circumstances on men and of men on circumstances."  

For Comte, on the contrary, psychology was not an independent science, and the laws of sociology were not in any sense derivative from laws of other sciences. Furthermore, Mill clearly believed that men could change their circumstances, and that they could do so deliberately through the powerful tool of education, for it was his belief that "the power of education is almost boundless." As he said in The Subjection of Women,

"Of all difficulties which impede the progress of thought, and the formation of well-grounded opinions on life and social arrangements, the greatest is now the unspeakable ignorance and inattention of mankind in respect to the influences which form human character. Whatever any portion of the human species now are, or seem to be, such, it is supposed, they have a natural tendency to be. . . . History, which is now better understood than formerly, teaches another lesson: if only by showing the extraordinary susceptibility of human nature to external influences, and the extreme variability of those of its manifestations which are supposed to be most universal and uniform."

It was Mill's view that the dominant thought of his own age neglected this fact, and accepted nativism. He attributed this to a failure to pursue an analytical account of the principles of psychology, and believed that this failure was linked to a reaction against the philosophy of the eighteenth century. In his criticism of this aspect of the thought of his age he included not only those who, like the Coleridgeans, had come under the influence of German metaphysics, but also Comte, since Comte believed that human nature (and also present differences between the psychological natures of men and of women) was determined by physiological laws. In looking back on the eighteenth century as a time in which the malleability of man was recognized, Mill of course had the traditions of geneticism in mind. While his own doctrine of malleability was, as we have seen,
more far-reaching than those of his predecessors, in this respect he represented a continuation of views which had been characteristic of eighteenth-century thought.

With respect to his belief that men could transform their own natures through the application of intelligence, and through the education of the individual, he was also closer to the traditions of the eighteenth century than he was to the organicism of Comte, or of Hegel, or of Marx. For example, unlike Comte, Mill did not believe that there were laws of social change which operated in a necessary manner, independently of men's wills. On the contrary, he was convinced that, with knowledge, men could to some extent control their own destinies. However, he did not base his faith in improvement solely on knowledge and deliberate design; as we have noted, the very mechanisms by which changes were brought about in men's nature's were not only capable of being changed, but the laws of association made it inevitable that, over time, they would change. In these changes Mill saw a growth in sensitivity to the needs of others as being capable of overcoming the complete dominance of self-interest. He also believed that past history showed an increasing interest in those forms of enjoyment which were related to ideal, rather than to material, ends. So long as these developments continued to bring about greater happiness in men's social life—as Mill had no doubt that they would—it was a principle of psychology, and not just a pious hope, that men would continue to develop their natures toward less selfish, nobler pursuits.

When one reads Mill's strictures on the society of his time in such essays as that entitled "Civilization," or his discussion of "Individuality, as One of the Elements of Well-Being" in On Liberty, it does not seem out of the way to associate his views with those of Matthew Arnold. To be sure, in their discussions of the scope of the state's authority, they appear as antagonists, although perhaps less antagonistic than Arnold had supposed. However, when one notes the profound effect of Goethe's ideals on the thought of Arnold, and recalls the extent to which Mill had modified Utilitarianism to accommodate similar ideals, the possibility of a fruitful comparison, rather than a contrast between them, suggests itself.

The comparison which I wish to draw is, of course, primarily a question of their views regarding human nature; of the possibility of regarding man as a progressive being, capable of transforming himself through the cultivation of his capacities for higher forms of sensibility. In this respect, as I shall show, their views were remarkably similar. To be sure, even here one must note points at which Arnold's views were different from those of Mill. For example, he frequently spoke as if the national characters of different peoples—a topic in which he, no less than Mill, was profoundly interested—were a function of racial inheritance, not of institutions and historical experience; and it is not to be overlooked that Arnold specifically characterized Mill's views as a degenerate form of "Hellenism." Nevertheless, once the views of Mill are disentangled from the stereotypes of Utilitarianism (Arnold, unfortunately, was never able to do this), one can see that Mill and Arnold were in basic agreement concerning the goals of life which it was their hope that the reform of contemporary society could achieve. Various of the similarities and differences between their views, as well as
the actual connections existing between them, have been carefully traced by Edward Alexander in his *Matthew Arnold and John Stuart Mill*. However, the specific similarity with which we shall here be concerned needs separate documentation. What must be shown is that, in spite of differences in their backgrounds and general philosophic positions (in spite, for example, of the differences in their positions with respect to religion and with respect to social reform), the form of Arnold's belief that human nature is capable of undergoing progressive change is similar to Mill's. What places them in the same stream of thought, distinguishing them from most other representatives of their age, was the fact that both held that the basis for human improvement consisted in the cultivation of human sensibilities, the effects of which are capable of transforming the lives of individuals and, through them, the lives of the societies to which they belong.

To establish that this was indeed Matthew Arnold's view, one must first establish that he did truly believe in progress. This point might be doubted on the basis of some of his best-known poetry; it might also be challenged because of his high estimate of Greek thought and his criticism of the state of affairs which he took to be characteristic of his own time. Yet there are numerous points at which he expressed an unmistakable belief in progress, and he frequently did so even when he had been serving as a critic of his time. For example, in spite of his hostility to contemporary middle-class culture, he saw in that class the possibility for progress, if middle-class education were fundamentally changed. In this connection he said:

The truth is, the English spirit has to accomplish an immense evolution; nor, as that spirit at this moment presents itself in any class or description amongst us, can one be perfectly satisfied with it, can one wish it to prevail just as it is.

But in a transformed middle class, in the middle class raised to a higher and more genial culture, we may find, not perhaps Jerusalem, but, I am sure, a notable stage towards it. In that great class, strong by its numbers, its energy, its industry, strong by its freedom from frivolity, not by any law of nature prone to immobility of mind, actually at this moment agitated by a spreading ferment of mind, in that class, liberalized by an ampler culture, admitted to a wider sphere of thought, living by larger ideas, with its provincialism dissipated, its intolerance cured, its pettiness purged away,—what a power there will be, what an element of new life for England!

It was his belief that if the middle class could be brought to a higher level of culture, it could also serve as an influence in transforming the working class. His sensitivity to the needs of the latter should not be overlooked. In one passage, for example, he referred to it as

...this obscure embryo, only just beginning to move, travelling in labour and darkness, so much left out of account when we celebrate the glories of our Atlantis, now and then, by so mournful a glimpse, showing itself to us in Lambeth, or Spitalfields, or Dorsetshire; this immense working class, now so without a practicable passage to all the joy and beauty of life ...

And immediately thereafter, addressing an apostrophe to that class, Arnold said:
Children of the future, whose day has not yet dawned, you, when that day arrives, will hardly believe what obstructions were long suffered to prevent its coming! ... You will wonder at the labour of its friends in proving the self-proving; you will know nothing of the doubts, the fears, the prejudices they had to dispel; nothing of the outcry they had to encounter. ... But you, in your turn, with difficulties of your own, will then be mounting some new step in the arduous ladder whereby man climbs towards his perfection; towards that unattainable but irresistible lode-star, gazed after with earnest longing, and invoked with bitter tears; the longing of thousands of hearts, the tears of many generations.

In addition to evidence of this sort, and to the many occasions on which Arnold invoked the concept of progress in his criticism of the culture of his own and of other times, there are passages in which he explicitly stated his own progressivist views. Three of these passages may be quoted, although they are perhaps less typical of Arnold, in being more abstractly phrased. In one Arnold said:

Other creatures submissively follow the law of their nature; man alone has an impulse leading him to set up some other law to control the bent of his nature; and in another he said,

The only absolute and eternal object prescribed to us by God's law, or the divine order of things, is the progress toward perfection,—our own progress towards it and the progress of humanity.

The third passage which I shall cite deals with the difficulty, and yet the possibility, of man's self-transformation. In discussing the need for a fuller development, Arnold said:

If it is said that this is a very hard matter, and that man cannot well do more than one thing at a time, the answer is that here is the very sign and condition of each new stage of spiritual progress,—increase of task. The more we grow, the greater is the task which is set us. This is the law of man's nature and of his spirit's history. The powers we have developed at our old task enable us to attempt a new one; and this, again, brings with it a new increase of powers.

Thus, like Mill, he held that it was possible for man to attain powers not originally part of his nature.

It was because Arnold believed that society had faltered in his own time, that the tone of his writings so often seems anti-progressivistic, as compared with the writings of most of his contemporaries. For example, in discussing what he took to be the dominant characteristic of England in his time, he said:

What brings about, or rather tends to bring about, a natural, rational life, satisfying the modern spirit? This: the growth of a love of industry, trade, and wealth; the growth of a love of the things of the mind; and the growth of a love of beautiful things. ... of these three factors of modern life, your middle class has no notion of any but one, the first.
However, this stricture on the material orientation of contemporary middle-class life should not be taken as suggesting disbelief on Arnold’s part in the potentiality of his time for progress with respect to culture. He took it as his task—the task of a critic—to develop such potentialities. In his famous essay on “The Function of Criticism,” he characterized criticism as a “disinterested endeavor to learn and propagate the best that is known and thought in the world,” and he believed that by this means the limitations of contemporary standards could be, and would be, transformed. He viewed his own era as “an epoch of expansion,” and he expressed not only a hope but a faith in the promise of culture, when, for example, he said

\[\ldots\] in spite of all that is said about the absorbing and brutalizing influence of our passionate material progress, it seems to me indisputable that this progress is likely, though not certain, to lead in the end to an apparition of intellectual life: and that man, after he has made himself perfectly comfortable and has now to determine what to do with himself next, may begin to remember that he has a mind, and that the mind may be a source of great pleasure.

From Arnold’s point of view, a too-absorbing concern for material goods, and all that he described as Philistinism, was not the only source of danger to his age, and to its potentialities for progress in thought and in all aspects of culture; he saw at least equally grave dangers in what he designated as “anarchy,” that is, a degree of individualism which to him betokened a failure in a concern for the state. However, in Culture and Anarchy it is clear that he did not speak as a traditional political conservative; on the contrary he identified himself as a liberal, but as one who did not belong within the then dominant liberal camp. As he said in his introduction to that volume,

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\ldots\text{although, like Mr. Bright and Mr. Frederic Harrison, and the editor of the Daily Telegraph, and a large body of valued friends of mine, I am a Liberal, yet I am a Liberal tempered by experience, reflection, and renouncement, and I am, above all, a believer in culture.}\]

What he sought was that men should be moved by forces beyond their individual interests and their class interests; that they should be guided by what he termed their best selves, not their ordinary selves; to ask this was to ask that they should be moved by an ideal of the State. One passage may illustrate this view:

Well, then, what if we tried to rise above the idea of class to the idea of the whole community, the State, and to find our centre of light and authority there? Every one of us has the idea of country, as a sentiment; hardly any one of us has the idea of the State as a working power. And why? Because we habitually live in our ordinary selves, which do not carry us beyond the ideas and wishes of the class to which we happen to belong. And we are all afraid of giving to the State too much power, because we only conceive of the State as something equivalent to the class in occupation of the executive government, and are afraid of that class abusing power to its own purposes. \ldots By our everyday selves \ldots we are separate, personal, at war; we are only safe from one another's tyranny when no one has any power; and this safety, in its turn, cannot save us from anarchy \ldots
But by our best self we are united, impersonal, at harmony. We are in no peril from giving authority to this, because it is the truest friend we all of us can have; and when anarchy is a danger to us, to this authority we may turn with sure trust. Well, and this is the very self which culture, or the study of perfection, seeks to develop in us.... So that our poor culture, which is flouted as so impractical, leads us to the very ideas capable of meeting the great want of our present embarrassed times\textsuperscript{44}

All of this may ring hollow, as if Arnold were totally unaware of the immediately pressing, practical needs of his time. It was with this charge that Frederic Harrison taunted him.\textsuperscript{45} Nevertheless, we must in fairness note that (as we have seen) Arnold was aware of the existence of a rising new class, the populace, and he did not regard their needs as being adequately satisfied. Part of his ideal was to remove inequalities; he held that to be placed in a position of inferiority, "to be heavily overshadowed, to be profoundly insignificant, has, on the whole, a depressing and benumbing effect on the character."\textsuperscript{46} What he advocated was that culture should animate the life of a whole people, that it should not be confined to any one class.\textsuperscript{47} For Arnold, culture was not an aristocratic ideal;\textsuperscript{48} it was what we should denominate (in the language of ethical theory) as a universalistic ideal:

And because men are all members of one great whole, and the sympathy which is in human nature will not allow one member to be indifferent to the rest or to have a perfect welfare independent of the rest, the expansion of our humanity, to suit the idea of perfection which culture forms, must be a general expansion. Perfection, as culture conceives it, is not possible while the individual remains isolated. The individual is required, under pain of being stunted and enfeebled in his own development if he disobeys, to carry others along with him in his march toward perfection, to be continually doing all he can to enlarge and increase the volume of the human stream sweeping thitherward.\textsuperscript{49}

This universalism, as well as Arnold's awareness of the handicaps under which the populace suffered—an awareness not diminished by a recognition that the current ideals of the populace were not ideals which he could accept—provides an exact parallel to what is to be found in the social conscience of John Stuart Mill.

An equally exact parallel exists in their conceptions of that nobility of character which is the goal of the individual's progress. In each case, however, it is difficult to specify the exact content of this ideal. In Mill, it was the ability to find happiness in those higher forms of enjoyment which are specifically human, to lead a life in which narrowness and selfishness have no part, and in which virtue comes to be loved for its own sake.\textsuperscript{50} Arnold emphasized similar ideals. "Culture," he said, "places human perfection in an internal condition, in the growth and predominance of our humanity proper, as distinguished from our own animality. It places it in the ever-increasing efficacy and in the general harmonious expansion of those gifts of thought and feeling, which makes the peculiar dignity, wealth, and happiness of human nature."\textsuperscript{51} As part of this personal ideal, Arnold expressed a deep and abiding concern for the social good:

... the impulses towards action, help, and beneficence, the desire for removing human error, clearing human confusion, and diminishing human misery, the noble aspiration
to leave the world better and happier than we found it,—motives eminently such as are called social,—come in as part of the grounds of culture, and the main and pre- eminent part.52

In such passages, the similarity between Mill's ideal of nobility of character and Arnold's ideal of culture shows itself to be very close indeed. If one were to seek a fundamental difference between them, it would arise in Arnold's stress on well-roundedness, on what is not improperly identified as a Goethean ideal of character. Thus, in speaking of perfection in human character, Arnold said:

Perfection—as culture from a thorough disinterested study of human nature and human experience learns to conceive it—is a harmonious expression of all the powers which make the beauty and worth of human nature, and is not consistent with the overdevelopment of any one power at the expense of the rest.53

It is unlikely that Mill, in spite of his criticism of any tendency to narrowness, would have placed as much emphasis as did Arnold on the equipotential development of all sides of one's character, for he recognized sources of strength in strongly marked elements of individuality. However, if the influence of Goethe with respect to this particular point separated Arnold from Mill, it separated him no less from those who, like Fichte and T. H. Green, had ideals of character which were formed on the model of what he termed "Hebraism," in contrast to "Hellenism." To understand this point, and to take further note of the affinities between Arnold and Mill, we must briefly examine what Arnold meant by these terms.

While he sometimes tended to identify Hebraism and Hellenism rather too closely with the peoples from whom he took these designative names, one must conceive of the contrast in broader terms, if one is to be faithful to Arnold's meaning. In general, Hebraism and Hellenism were taken by him to stand for two different attitudes, or stances, toward the world. To each of these attitudes there corresponded a different conception of what was intrinsically of greatest worth. In contrasting them, he said:

The final aim of both Hellenism and Hebraism, as of all great spiritual disciplines, is no doubt the same: man's perfection or salvation... and this aim and end is august and admirable.

Still, they pursue this aim by very different courses. The uppermost idea with Hellenism is to see things as they really are; the uppermost idea with Hebraism is conduct and obedience.54

While Arnold not infrequently claimed that true perfection must include both Hebraism and Hellenism,55 it cannot be doubted that his own sympathies lay with Hellenism. To be sure, he sometimes justified his strong advocacy of the latter by citing the fact that Hebraism had been too exclusively dominant in England for too long a time;56 however, what would seem to be a more correct view of his conception of the proper relationship between them was that the attitude represented by Hebraism, the attitude of moral earnestness and effort, had
been—and remained—a necessary element in progress, but that the end which was to be attained by such exertions, the goal of progress, was to be a condition of man represented by those attributes of the human spirit which Hellenism, rather than Hebraism, espoused.

That such was Arnold's view tends to be concealed by his initial characterization of Hellenism as "seeing things as they really are," a characterization which may be interpreted in too narrowly an intellectual sense. To offset this tendency one needs to supplement Arnold's initial description by another of his apothegms concerning these two attitudes toward the world: whereas Hebraism represented strictness of conscience, Hellenism represented spontaneity of consciousness; and spontaneity of consciousness was never, for Arnold, identified with intellectual activity alone. It was in fact identical with culture, in the honorific sense in which Arnold systematically used that term. That there was this connection, and that spontaneity of consciousness (and therefore Hellenism) was the goal to be attained, can be seen in the following passage, in which Hellenism is identified with sweetness and light—in short, with culture:

To get rid of one's ignorance, to see things as they are, and by seeing them as they are to see them in their beauty, is the simple and attractive ideal which Hellenism holds out before human nature; and from the simplicity and charm of this ideal, Hellenism, and human life in the hands of Hellenism, is invested with a kind of aerial ease, clearness, and radiancy; they are full of what we call sweetness and light.

What Arnold termed "sweetness and light" were the inseparable components of true culture; by sweetness he meant beauty, and light he identified with intellectual grasp. The culture in which they were combined was not conceived by Arnold as a condition in which individuals pursued these interests in isolation from one another, seeking merely the satisfaction of their own taste and their own curiosity; as we have already noted, Arnold's ideal of perfection included a strong universalistic element, "because men are all members of one great whole." Thus, although he conceived of perfection as an individual development—as did Mill—it was an individual development which was neither self-centered nor self-absorbed. The ideal of human perfection, as Arnold said,

... is an inward spiritual activity, having for its characters increased sweetness, increased light, increased life, increased sympathy.

Between this ideal and Mill's conception of what constitute the most essential elements in human character, there is no radical dissimilarity. At most, one might say that Arnold believed that it was both possible, and in the end necessary, for any one who was to approximate this ideal to combine all of these traits in a balanced harmony; whereas Mill was very much more willing to hold that, although all were important elements in the ideal, even the most admirable men were apt to combine them in varying degrees. This difference may be considered relatively minor when compared with the extent of their agreement. That agreement not only consisted in their general conception of the elements which entered
into individual well-being, but in the fact that, unlike many of their contemporaries, the standard against which they measured progress was solely a matter of that well-being.61

An actual and important opposition between the doctrines of Arnold and Mill is to be found in what they considered it necessary to do in order to promote a society in which the well-being of individuals could flourish to a greater extent than was the case in their own time.62 For Mill, it was necessary and proper for government to intervene wherever the social good was at stake, although he feared the interference of government in the private affairs of individuals, and wished to check the spread of such interference. Arnold, on the other hand, did not believe in the possibility of promoting individual well-being through direct action on the part of the government; however, he did fear the consequences of Mill’s attempt to give larger scope to the individual’s freedom of action. In both of these respects his position was closer to that of Burke than it was to the views of Mill.63 One sees this best in Culture and Anarchy. In the chapter entitled “Doing as One Likes,” he attacked Mill’s defense of the individual against the state, whereas in the chapter entitled “Our Liberal Practitioners,” he attacked interventionist reform. Near the conclusion of the latter chapter, he stated his own tenets as to how individual well-being was to be achieved, when he said:

Everything, in short, confirms us in the doctrine, so unpalatable to the believers in action, that our main business at the present moment is not so much to work away at certain crude reforms of which we have already the scheme in our own mind, as to create, through the help of that culture which at the very outset we began by praising, and recommending, a frame of mind out of which the schemes of really fruitful reforms may with time grow.64

In appealing to the long, gradualist processes of history to bring about reform, Arnold was appealing to the power of education, and the self-cultivation which it would bring. In the end, it was on this power that Mill also relied. The difference between them lay in whether or not it was necessary, as Mill believed, to enact legislation which would remove the chief obstacles to progress; it would be a travesty of Mill’s views to interpret him as believing that the elements of character on which progress depended could in any way be legislated into existence. In fact, he shared Arnold’s view that what ultimately counted was something much more positive than government could directly achieve: what counted was the education of individuals not only with respect to knowledge but with respect to their sensibilities, leading to an enlargement of their sympathy and their taste.65 Ultimately, then, Mill and Arnold represent closely allied positions not only with respect to their ideals of character, but with respect to what they believed to be the conditions necessary for the attainment of a society in which persons having such characters would provide the norm according to which all persons would live. Both recognized that no such society was close at hand, for neither possessed a superabundance of optimism, nor a high estimate of the state of society at the time. Yet, both believed that there was a tendency toward progress, and that in the course of that progress man would have changed his own nature, ridding himself
of many of those limitations by which he still remained chained to his earlier nature.\textsuperscript{66}

It may appear odd that Thomas Henry Huxley should be linked with Arnold and Mill, since Huxley is correctly identified with Darwinism, and neither Arnold nor Mill was significantly affected by Darwin's thought. Furthermore, even apart from questions directly related to evolutionary theory, Huxley's professional training forced him to lay far more stress on man's biological nature than is even implicit in the thought of Arnold or Mill.\textsuperscript{67} The effects of this contrast are particularly striking in Huxley's usual insistence that man can never extirpate, nor can he transcend, those tendencies which are associated with his biological nature;\textsuperscript{68} in general, Huxley took the position that it is only possible to exercise continuing control over these tendencies. Furthermore, we may note that Huxley stressed a biological basis for differences in character, which went far beyond Arnold's use of race to explain national characteristics. This was diametrically opposed to what we have seen to have been the view held by Mill, with Huxley claiming that there were fundamental racial differences in intelligence and traits of character between blacks and whites, and similar differences due to sex between men and women.\textsuperscript{69} Nevertheless, his beliefs with respect to biologically based differences in potentialities did not lead him to social views which were different from those of Mill: for example, he did in fact side with abolitionism, holding that the domination of one person over another was harmful to both, and in speaking of the rights of women he concluded his essay, "Emancipation—Black and White," by saying,

\begin{quote}
The duty of man is to see that not a grain is piled upon that load beyond what Nature imposes; that injustice is not added to inequality.\textsuperscript{70}
\end{quote}

A further contrast between Huxley on the one hand, and Mill and Arnold on the other, may be noted with respect to their views concerning the proper content of education. In numerous essays Huxley propagandized for scientific education as basic to any liberal education, and denounced the traditional emphasis on classical studies. Mill, however, agreed with Arnold in defending the values which they took to be associated with the classics, and both attached far more importance than did Huxley to the role of literature, and particularly poetry, in education.\textsuperscript{71} It is possible to overemphasize such differences. Though Arnold attacked Huxley's views with respect to the relative importance of science and the classics, his discussions of Hellenism were not intended to serve as defenses of classical literary culture only. As we have noticed, he specifically defined Hellenism as "the ability to see things as they are," and he connected it so closely with the satisfaction of curiosity that it could include scientific as well as aesthetic culture. Huxley, for his part, did not seek to exclude literary studies from the curriculum, nor did he deny that one function of education was to promote a love of beauty; what he attacked was, primarily, the great proportion of time allotted to such studies and the neglect of the sciences. It would be misleading to underestimate the differences in their views as to what was most essential in education if there were
to be an improvement in contemporary society. Huxley not only objected to the heavy emphasis placed on Latin and Greek literature, rather than on the modern literatures, and to the methods used in studying Latin and Greek; in effect, he was also attacking the class bias in such education. Arnold, for his part, did include science among the indispensable aspects of culture, but he was generally using the term “science” in that broad sense in which it is equivalent to “Wissenschaft,” and not in the sense which was of primary concern to Huxley. We may also note that, whereas Huxley was energetically and successfully advocating schools which emphasized technical education, Arnold took obvious and quite good-natured delight in satirizing the use of laboratory training. Recognizing this fundamental cleavage, it is probably fair to say that it had two sources. On the one hand, the opposition between them was to some extent (and possibly to a very great extent) dependent on differences between their attitudes toward the social forces which both felt to be transforming England in their time. For Arnold, as for Mill, De Tocqueville’s analysis of democracy had indicated very great dangers to the most important cultural values of modern society. Huxley, however, rarely exhibited such anxieties. On the other hand, their opposition also had roots in their views as to what was primary in the sphere of human understanding. As we see in the introduction to Literature and Dogma, Huxley was taken by Arnold as a representative of the claim that knowledge is of higher value than judgment, that “hard reasoning” is the way to wisdom. Arnold, however, was convinced that, for fair-minded men, judgment supervenes upon knowledge, gradually ripening into true understanding without the benefit of any “formidable logical apparatus,” such as that with which Huxley wished to equip the young men of his time. The great difference between them on this point is illustrated in the form and the substance of their respective attacks on the religious orthodoxy of their time. Originally, the controversies in which Huxley was engaged centered in his acceptance and defense of Darwin’s theory; in those controversies it was inevitable that questions of scientific fact would be of crucial importance. Nonetheless, questions directly related to evolutionary theory played an extremely small part in a majority of his religious controversies: the issues were for him, as they were for Arnold, questions of authority versus the true inwardness of religion. The difference between their modes of argument was immense: for Huxley, it was natural science and detailed scientific scholarship in biblical history that were to be the means for striking off the shackles of ecclesiasticism, whereas Arnold fought his battles almost solely with the weapons of the literary humanist.

Given all of these differences in their backgrounds and views, and their lack of explicit references to one another on many relevant occasions, one might almost suppose that even when they were engaged in similar tasks of biblical criticism, their arguments simply passed each other by, unrecognized. Yet, granted the eminence and the influence of each, such a supposition seems scarcely credible. Fortunately, the exchanges of letters between Arnold and Huxley, concerning Arnold’s St. Paul and Protestantism and his Literature and Dogma, are now relatively easily available. From this and other correspondence one can see that they
were not only acquainted, but were on extremely friendly terms.\textsuperscript{76} However, our own interpretative task is not one of tracing connections or of drawing detailed comparisons between them, but of seeing to what extent Huxley agreed with Arnold and with Mill in his general views regarding man's nature; and whether for him, too, man could—in Mill's phrase—be designated as "a progressive being."

The answer to this question is less easy to come by than might be supposed. Unlike many of his contemporaries who were identified with evolutionary theory, Huxley had strong reservations regarding the more widely diffused forms of the progressivist view. As two outstanding examples of such reservations, I might cite his regret that Darwin had accepted Spencer's terminology "survival of the fittest" as equivalent to "natural selection," because the superlative form ("fittest") suggested an enhancement of value;\textsuperscript{77} and, second, it is to be noted that his view of morality, as expressed in his Romanes Lecture, "Evolution and Ethics," consisted in holding that "social progress means a checking of the cosmic process at every step and the substitution for it of another, which may be called the ethical process."\textsuperscript{78} Nonetheless, I believe that it remains true that Huxley's own standard of value did lead him to believe that progress had gone on in the past and could continue (through man's efforts) well into the future. In holding his view, he also held that such progress involved a long, slow transformation in man's nature itself. As will become clear, this transformation was for Huxley—as it was for Arnold and for Mill—a transformation in men's sensibilities, as well as an increase in human knowledge. If there was a difference between Huxley and Arnold or Mill with respect to this point, it lay in the fact that Huxley placed far more stress than did they on the importance of organized knowledge as an instrument of progress.

The place at which one can best find a clear delineation of Huxley's views regarding human progress is in the essay which he wrote as a prolegomenon to "Evolution and Ethics," attempting to

\begin{quote}
...remove that which seems to have proved a stumbling-block to many—namely, the paradox that ethical nature, while born of cosmic nature, is necessarily at enmity with its parent.\textsuperscript{79}
\end{quote}

In order to remove that stumbling-block, Huxley contrasted nature in an uncultivated state with what is to be found after men have made gardens. In such gardens, he points out,

\begin{quote}
...considerable quantities of vegetables, fruits, and flowers are produced, of kinds which neither now exist, nor have ever existed, except under conditions such as obtained in the garden; and which, therefore, are as much works of the art of man as the frames and glass-houses in which some of them are raised. That the "stage of Art," thus created in the state of nature by man, is sustained by and dependent on him, would at once become apparent, if the watchful supervision of the gardener were withdrawn, and the antagonistic influences of the general cosmic process were no longer sedulously warded off, or counteracted.\textsuperscript{80}
\end{quote}
Huxley makes clear that he is not denying that "man, physical, intellectual, and moral, is as much a part of nature, as purely a product of the cosmic process, as the humblest weed." This acknowledgment does not contradict the statement that the actions of men can transform other elements in nature: as Huxley indicates, throughout nature there is a strife of forces, and the various manifestations of the same natural processes are often at war with one another. His argument is that man, in cultivating a garden, can stand in opposition to all of those elements in nature which would flourish were it not for the forces represented by man himself. The parallel between the garden and a moral society is pressed even farther by Huxley when he says:

Not only is the state of nature hostile to the state of art of the garden; but the principle of the horticultural process, by which the latter is created and maintained, is antithetic to that of the cosmic process. The characteristic feature of the latter is the intense and unceasing competition of the struggle for existence. The characteristic of the former is the elimination of that struggle, by the removal of the conditions which give rise to it. The tendency of the cosmic process is to bring about the adjustment of the forms of plant life to the current conditions; the tendency of the horticultural process is the adjustment of the conditions to the needs of the forms of plant life which the gardener desires to raise.

Given the fact that we are here dealing with Huxley's own views, "the gardener" in this illustration cannot be interpreted in a supernaturalistic way: he must either stand for the process of natural selection operating within and between societies, or he must be taken as representing man's own deliberate action in fostering conditions which produce "the survival of those forms which most nearly approach the standard of the useful, or the beautiful, which he has in his mind." These two possible interpretations do not involve incompatible alternatives; in fact, Huxley held that both natural selection and deliberate human intervention in natural processes have played a role in the evolution of man as a social being.

With respect to the first of these factors we may note that Huxley held it to be a part of man's biological heritage that he should have gregarious and sympathetic impulses; and, like Darwin, he believed that these non-egoistic springs of action were among the most valuable endowments in the struggle for survival. Thus, natural selection would tend to foster the preservation of these traits. Furthermore, Huxley pointed out that the more closely men came into contact with one another, as they would as their social life developed, the more effectively the sympathetic impulses would operate, and the more scope there would be for man's natural potentialities for imitative behavior. Thus, a social state of existence, in which sympathetic impulses and cooperation could flourish, would gradually and naturally come to supplant a state in which there was a constant and remorseless struggle for existence between individuals. To be sure, Huxley did not anticipate never-ending improvement in this respect. Like Mill and like Arnold, he was deeply troubled by the threat of population growth; he feared that if it were not checked, it would lead to a new struggle for survival, and a consequent tendency
to rely on those traits of human character which were most dangerous to the social order. Furthermore, he was aware of the existence of such forces operating within the economic and social conditions characteristic of his own time, the consequences of which were the degradation of large segments of the population in industrialized areas. It was at this point that Huxley found it necessary to rely upon the second factor in social evolution, man’s deliberate and intelligent interference in the social process.

One of Huxley’s best known similes is that in which he compared nature with a master chess-player, and in which he pointedly argued for the need of an education in the rules of the game, if men were not to be defeated by nature. These rules, of course, are to be discovered by the methods of science, and a failure to advance scientific knowledge would make it impossible for man to intercede successfully in the natural order. Thus, science could confer enormous new powers and practical benefits on society, and Huxley, with great rhetorical incisiveness, made the most of this fact in his superb essay “On the Advisableness of Improving Natural Knowledge.” However, the aim of that essay was to show that great as these immediate, practical benefits had been, they were of far less consequence than the effects which science had had in reshaping men’s beliefs. Those beliefs were partly intellectual, and partly moral, and in both respects Huxley regarded them as having been instruments of social progress. On the one hand, that intellectual advance which had originally been sought primarily for its practical benefits, had changed men’s view of the world and of their place in it. In this connection, Huxley emphasized the importance of such a change with respect to religion, as when, for example, he said:

If the religion of the present differs from that of the past, it is because the theology of the present has become more scientific than that of the past; because it has not only renounced idols of wood and idols of stone, but begins to see the necessity of breaking in pieces the idols built up of books and traditions and fine-spun ecclesiastical cobwebs; and of cherishing the noblest and most human of man’s emotions, by worship “for the most part of the silent sort” at the altar of the Unknown.

Connected with this shift in religious attitude and commitment, but even more fundamental, was the moral shift which Huxley held was demanded by the rise of scientific culture. This moral shift was away from authority and to tested knowledge, away from justification by faith to justification by verification. It was this lesson that led him to formulate the position which he named “agnosticism,” and which he insisted involved a moral commitment, not an intellectual one only. Agnosticism held it wrong, both morally and intellectually, “for a man to say that he is certain of the objective truth of any proposition unless he can produce evidence which logically justifies that certainty.” In this proposition Huxley was challenging ecclesiastical authority on moral grounds, just as vigorously as he had challenged it on the evidence which it claimed to possess. He found it intolerable that his opponent, Dr. Wace, should seem to be laying claim to moral superiority in the very same sentence as that in which he was saying that Huxley ought to have found it unpleasant to state plainly and forcefully what he actually believed.
For Huxley, such an attitude threatened to block every advance in knowledge; it was as an antidote to that attitude that he formulated the principle of agnosticism. As the magnificent concluding paragraphs of “Agnosticism and Christianity” make clear, Huxley was convinced that it was only through a rigid adherence to this principle that men could free themselves of a hidden inclination to allow personal interest to distort their beliefs, impeding their acceptance of truth. Thus, the principle was of the highest practical importance, and it was applicable not only to scientific inquiry but to the whole range of human choices. It was precisely what Huxley claimed it to be, “a principle which is as much ethical as intellectual.”

The justification which Huxley everywhere offered as a basis for this moral commitment lay in its utility, and it would be difficult to interpret his ethical theory in any but Utilitarian terms. His standard of value was always stated in terms of human happiness and, in his most explicit characterization of what constituted social well-being, he said:

I take it that the good of mankind means the attainment, by every man, of all the happiness which he can enjoy without diminishing the happiness of his fellow men.

After this characterization of the ideal end, Huxley immediately went on to list some of the forms of satisfaction which individuals could enjoy without diminishing the happiness of others, and he gave as his examples the happiness that comes from a sense of security or peace; from the fruits of trade; from art; from knowledge; and from sympathy or friendship. This list, like those instances of the higher pleasures in which Mill found man’s chief good to lie, obviously stressed specifically human forms of enjoyment, as distinct from the satisfactions of bodily appetites or specifically sensuous pleasures. This suggests what was in fact the case, that even though Huxley differed from Mill and from Arnold in stressing man’s kinship with the rest of the animal kingdom, he did regard the evolutionary process as one in which human beings developed new potentialities, and that it was in the satisfaction of these higher capacities that man’s true good lay. This conviction is repeatedly expressed in Huxley’s discussions of evolution and ethics, but nowhere more clearly than when he said:

The primitive savage, tutored by Istar, appropriated whatever took his fancy, and killed whomsoever opposed him, if he could. On the contrary, the ideal of the ethical man is to limit his freedom of action to a sphere in which he does not interfere with the freedom of others; he seeks the common weal as much as his own; and, indeed, as an essential part of his own welfare. Peace is both end and means with him; and he founds his life on a more or less complete self-restraint, which is the negation of the unlimited struggle for existence. He tries to escape from his place in the animal kingdom, founded on the free development of the principle of non-moral evolution, and to establish a kingdom of Man, governed upon the principle of moral evolution.

Thus, like Mill and like Arnold, Huxley conceived of man as a progressive being. While he held that this development was originally rooted in man’s biological inheritance as a social animal, and that its growth was at first slow and due
Man as a Progressive Being to the exigencies of increasing social life, Huxley looked upon the men of modern historical time as beings who, in large measure, have held their fate in their own hands. He regarded applied intelligence as the agency through which the past progress of Western civilization had come, and upon which, alone, the possibilities for future progress depended. In this he differed from many others among his contemporaries whose thought had also been connected with evolutionism and who believed in progress. On the whole, they had tended to regard such progress as inevitable, and had sometimes spoken as if there were a law of evolution, making for progress. Huxley's position was, on the contrary, a steadfast meliorism: he insisted that men do have it in their power to remove evils, and to promote good, thus improving the quality of life. In this he was wholly at one with Mill and with Arnold. Furthermore, what Huxley considered as an improvement in the quality of life was, in all essential respects, what Arnold and Mill also took as the standard of improvement: it consisted in the cultivation of men's sensibilities, so that every individual would become increasingly able to find enjoyment in forms of activities which had not existed, or at best could only have existed in a very rudimentary state, during most of the history of the human race. Furthermore, the possibility of a continuing advance lay open to men, if they made adequate use of their opportunities. In a society freed of those debilitating conditions of material deprivation which were all too characteristic of contemporary industrial society, men could increasingly come to find their satisfactions in the pursuit of knowledge, the enjoyment of things of beauty, and through the social affections. In such a society, religion could also increasingly become that which, at its best, it always had been: an inward state, "the reverence and love for the ethical ideal, and the desire to realize that ideal in life." Such an ideal demanded the suppression of man's ruthless egoism, and the cultivation of his more beneficent traits. Huxley regarded this development as one in which, unfortunately, man's susceptibility to pain had also increased. Yet even in stating his belief that such was the case, he showed no more hesitation as to which was the better form of life than had Mill, when Mill was forced to say whether it was better to be Socrates dissatisfied or a pig satisfied. In discussing pain, Huxley said:

This baleful product of evolution increases in quantity and in intensity, with advancing grades of animal organization, until it attains its highest level in man. Further, the consummation is not reached in man, the mere animal; nor in man, the whole or half savage; but only in man, the member of an organized polity. And it is a necessary consequence of his attempt to live in this way; that is, under those conditions which are essential to the full development of his noblest powers.

Huxley's acceptance of increasing pain as the price of enjoyments not directly connected with the satisfaction of man's physical needs, should suggest the strong kinship between his conception of human nature, and human good, and the conceptions that one finds in Arnold or in Mill. For all three, the standard of worth in human life is a standard which is inherent in man's own potentialities, and is not derived from any external source. The nature of that standard is defined in terms of enjoyment, but in those forms of enjoyment which Mill most
often referred to as "higher" or "nobler," and which were embraced within Arnold's use of the concept of "perfection." These were enjoyments which depended upon cultivation, which involved a transformation of men from a condition in which they were dominated by appetite and instinct, to a condition in which knowledge, taste, and a feeling of being at one with others, were the sources of their fullest enjoyments.

To speak of the standards accepted by Huxley and Arnold and Mill as standards linked to human enjoyment constitutes not only an accurate portrayal of their basic ethical theories, but immediately separates them from those thinkers with whom we shall now be concerned. The abrupt transition might be symbolized in the contrast between their views and Carlyle's gospel of work, but the stream of doctrine with which we are now to be concerned is of such general intellectual importance that it is best not to allow it to become entangled in the idiosyncrasies of Carlyle's thought. I shall therefore seek to introduce it through Fichte, who must be considered as one of its most characteristic, although one of its most extreme, representatives in early nineteenth-century thought.

2. IDEALISM AND ITS DOCTRINE OF SELF-REALIZATION

Fichte and those who stood in what, for convenience sake, I shall refer to as "his tradition" were no less insistent than Mill, Arnold, and Huxley that the standard for human conduct was rooted in man's own nature, that its content was not derived from any external source, and that obedience to it did not depend primarily upon the threat of sanctions. This, of course, was a heritage which came to Fichte from Kant's moral philosophy, and came to the age as a whole from the Enlightenment. It was also agreed that men were able to bring themselves to a stage of development in which the motives which most pervasively influenced their conduct could be regarded as evidence that there had been moral progress. Yet, in spite of these similarities between Mill, Arnold, Huxley, and the idealist tradition with which we are now to deal, we must immediately note two crucial points at which they differed. In the first place, Fichte and those who followed in his tradition rejected hedonism as a standard of conduct: they did not hold that the objectives which men ought to pursue could best be defined in terms of the relief of suffering on the one hand, and the cultivation of higher forms of sensibility on the other. In the second place, they held it to be a distinctive and essential aspect of human nature that men possess freedom, and that human action is not to be explained as if it occurred in conformity with causal laws. These two points of difference had a common root in the basically hormic view of man's nature that characterized the tradition with which we shall be dealing. That tradition rejected, and sought to extirpate, all traces of a psychology which analyzed experience in terms of elements given in sensation; it substituted concepts which suggested that man's nature was dominated by inner dynamic tendencies toward growth. This view is nowhere more extremely stated than in Fichte's thought, and it is with his formulation of the position that we shall first deal.
It is fortunately not necessary for us to follow the dialectic of Fichte's exposition of his technical philosophy, since his views concerning human nature and man's progress receive their fullest expression in works other than the multifarious expositions of his theory of knowledge. However, since he believed that his system provided a means by which one could move from entirely abstract, necessary principles to a psychological understanding of human action and of the goals of society, it will be useful to take note of what he took to be the ultimate foundation of his system.

As is well known, Fichte was one among many who found it impossible to accept the ultimate dichotomies within the Kantian system, and he radically altered that system through an unrestricted acceptance of the primacy of the practical reason, that is, a primacy of the moral over empirical and scientific forms of experience. In essence, what Fichte actually did was to stress only that part of Kant's doctrine according to which knowledge depended upon the mind's formative powers; he rejected the Kantian view that it also depended upon a faculty of receptivity, that is, upon something being given. Instead, Fichte interpreted the mind as wholly active, and the experienced world was taken to be a product of that inner, creative activity; not external facts (Thatsachen), but the ego's own acts (Thathandlugen) provided the materials for all that could be thought. In addition, Fichte identified those acts of the ego which were basic to knowledge as acts which expressed the self's own basic moral activity. When one recalls the manner in which Kant had deliberately separated morality from empirical knowledge, assigning to each its own competence, one can recognize the sharp break and the new beginning which Fichte's position represented in the history of modern thought. In a corollary to the first proposition in his Science of Rights, Fichte stated his position in terms which closely followed his more abstract statement of the same view in his theory of knowledge:

"It is here maintained, that the practical Ego is the Ego of original self-consciousness; that a rational being perceives itself immediately only in Willing, and that it would not perceive itself, and hence would also not perceive the world, and that it would therefore not be Intelligence, if it were not a practical being. Willing is the real essential character of reason. . . . The practical faculty is the inmost root of the Ego; to it everything else is attached, and with it connected (p. 36).

In the Vocation of Man, one can see the same position elaborated in more concrete terms, and therefore in a manner more closely related to the issues of moral practice:

"In short, there is for me absolutely no such thing as an existence which has no relation to myself, and which I contemplate merely for the sake of contemplating it;—whatever has an existence for me, has it only through its relation to my own being. But there is, in the highest sense, only one relation to me possible, all others are but subordinate forms of this:—my vocation to moral activity. My world is the object and sphere of my duties, and absolutely nothing more."

In the whole tenor of such passages it becomes clear that Fichte's theory of
knowledge was primarily a propædeutic to an exposition of his view of man’s nature as a free, creative, moral being. Because of his epistemology, and the metaphysics which followed from it, man could not be considered as a product of an alien and external world of nature: on the contrary, empirical objects, as we experience them, have to exist as they do because of the relationships in which they stand to our own inner being. Furthermore, our being is not under the influence of an external causal law: the necessity which we attribute to the external world has no place in a true conception of ourselves. This emphasis on human freedom was all-pervasive in Fichte’s thought; as he said in a letter to Reinhold, who was his predecessor as professor at Jena, “My system is from beginning to end only an analysis of the idea of freedom.”112 Even the world of nature, which may sometimes limit human action, is interpreted by Fichte as being—in an ultimate analysis—that which has existence only because it is needed as a source of opposition and resistance against which men are to struggle and exert the force of their creative energy. To exert this force is to be what one truly is, “for man is his own end,—he should determine himself, and never allow himself to be determined by anything foreign to himself.”113

The radical nature of Fichte’s view of man’s freedom expressed in such statements, and in his metaphysics, obviously separates his position from that of Mill and that of Huxley—and it would be difficult to find any strong ties between it and what Arnold believed. No less important, however, and no less intimately connected with Fichte’s hormic psychology, was his absolute rejection of happiness as a standard of value. In a passage reminiscent of Spinoza’s psychology, and anticipating the standard psychology of self-realization, Fichte said:

An article of food has a pleasant taste to us, and a flower a pleasant smell, because they exalt and enliven our organic existence; and the pleasant taste, as well as the pleasant smell, is nothing but the immediate feeling of this exaltation and enlivenment.114

This doctrine was basic to his view of morality, for he held that whatever was moral consisted in the exercise of man’s inherent active powers. As he said in another passage which is also reminiscent of Spinoza, but has a different, moralistic twist:

...far from being true that man is determined to moral goodness by the desire for happiness, the idea of happiness itself and the desire for it, rather arise in the first place out of the moral nature of man. Not, *That which produces happiness is good;*—but, *That only which is good produces happiness.*115

Not only the rejection of a hedonistic standard separated Fichte from Mill, Arnold, and Huxley, he also differed in his over-riding moralism: there probably has never been another philosopher who so clearly represented the view of life which Arnold designated as Hebraism. For example, in the *Vocation of Man,* Fichte said:

There is but one point towards which I have unceasingly to direct all my attention,—namely, what I *ought to do,* and how I may best fulfil the obligation. All my thoughts
must have a bearing on my actions, and must be capable of being considered as means, however remote, to this end; otherwise they are an idle and aimless show, a mere waste of time and strength, the perversion of a noble power which is entrusted to me for a very different end.\textsuperscript{116}

The goal of this noble, active power was conceived by Fichte to be a progressive transformation of man to a higher condition of existence; it was this which, in \emph{The Vocation of Man}, he expressed as follows:

In the mere consideration of the world as it is... there arises within me the wish, the desire,—no, not the mere desire, but the absolute demand for a better world. I cast a glance on the present relations of men towards each other and towards Nature; on the feebleness of their powers, on the strength of their desires and passions. A voice within me proclaims with irresistible conviction—"It is impossible that it can remain thus; it must become other and better."

I cannot think of the present state of humanity as that in which it is destined to remain.... Only in so far as I can regard this state as the means towards a better, as the transition-point to a higher and more perfect state, has it any value in my eyes;—not for its own sake, can I support it, esteem it, and joyfully perform my part in it.\textsuperscript{117}

The basic clue to the character of that better world is to be found when one recognizes that Fichte held that man's essential self-realization was necessarily incomplete except insofar as it could be completed in and through social existence. For Fichte, man is not merely social by nature, possessing social impulses among his other basic impulses, he is \textit{essentially} social: "Man becomes man only amongst men."\textsuperscript{118} While Mill, Arnold, and Huxley would probably not have interpreted this doctrine in as strong a sense as did Fichte, it would not have been wholly unwelcome to them. However, by virtue of Fichte's theory of self-realization, the fact that man was essentially social in nature led to the view that the true goal of human action, man's only true welfare, is not to be found in his own individual fate, but in the progress of the race:

\begin{quote}
The Life according to Reason consists herein,—that the Individual forget himself in the Race, place his own life in the life of the Race and dedicate it thereto... there is but One Virtue,—to forget one's own personality;—and but One Vice,—to make self the object of our thoughts....

He who but thinks \textit{at all} of his own personality, and desires any kind of life or being, or any joy of life, except \textit{in} the Race and \textit{for} the Race, with whatever vesture of good deeds he may seek to hide his deformity, is nevertheless, at bottom, only a mean, base, and therefore unhappy man.\textsuperscript{119}
\end{quote}

The particular content of the Fichte\textendash{}ian ideal of the progress of the human race need not occupy us in detail, although one may in passing note that Fichte should be assigned a place of some importance in the history of socialist thought. For our purpose, it is sufficient to be cognizant of the fact that in the ideal state toward which man's sense of perfection inclines him, there would be "\textit{reciprocal} activity, \textit{mutual} influence, \textit{mutual} giving and receiving, \textit{mutual} suffering and doing"; not \textit{subordination}, but \textit{coordination} among \textit{free, reasonable beings}.\textsuperscript{120} This internal social harmony was not conceived by Fichte as being restricted to any one nation.
or any one civilization; in fact, he insisted that if there is to be that ultimate progress of which man is capable, and for which he strives, progress must include all peoples:

... until the existing culture of every age shall have been diffused over the whole inhabited globe, and our race become capable of the most unlimited intercommunication with itself, one nation or one continent must pause on the great common path of progress, and wait for the advance of others. [But] when every useful discovery made at one end of the earth shall be at once made known and communicated to all the rest, then, without further interruption, without halt or regress, with united strength and equal step, humanity shall move onward to a higher culture, of which we can at present form no conception.121

In this connection we may finally note that Fichte recognized that the achievement of this ideal demanded the self-transformation of men:

Humanity is not so far cultivated in us; we ourselves still stand on the lowest grade of imperfect humanity, or slavery. We ourselves have not yet attained to a consciousness of our freedom and self-activity, for then we should necessarily desire to see around us similar,—that is, free beings.122

If it be asked how Fichte proposed that such a self-transformation in human nature was to be achieved, the answer is that he believed it would follow naturally from man’s inherent nature. To be sure, in his own country, at his own time, the requisite tendencies toward growth needed to be fostered by a radically reformed educational system; as the structure of his Speeches to the German Nation makes clear, the education of youth is the foundation of the life of a people.123 However, Fichte recognized that an educational system can only help to develop capacities which are already incipiently present, and in an interesting flight of fancy in the Science of Rights he contrasted man’s inherent nature with the nature of animal species, holding that men are not suitably compared with animals, but are in some respects more like plants.124 Unlike animals, they are not equipped from birth with preformed instincts which are sufficient to meet the exigencies of life; men are dependent on others for their early nurture and care, and their development does not proceed in accordance with an inherited pattern. Nature, Fichte says, has allowed the human race latitude for shaping its own destiny, which no animal species ever has.125 Thus, in this passage as elsewhere, Fichte drew a sharp contrast between man’s inherent nature and what is commonly referred to as “man’s animal nature:” from the first, man is not an animal, and therefore need not suppress or control an alien animal inheritance. He is by nature a moral being—a being who is free, and freely aspires to a constantly expanding sphere of activity. Thus, for Fichte, the history of mankind is not one in which the fundamental attributes of human nature undergo any change; men simply become better able to express their own essential natures, to realize themselves. However, through this greater self-realization, Mankind will have progressed, and the conditions of life will have become such that all men can fully enter into a harmonious relation with one another; they will then be at one with
that fundamental principle of Reason which lies behind and beyond Nature and which is indeed the well-spring from which the individual's own free, creative activity comes.

The similarities between the thought of T. H. Green and Fichte are striking, in spite of the differences between the points of departure which characterized their theories of knowledge. Whereas Fichte had attempted to overcome dichotomies within the Kantian system, and thus correct it, Green was not primarily concerned with its outcome; instead, he used Kant's general view of the mind's judgmental activity as a means of attacking the empiricist tradition in British philosophy. As we shall see, he too reached an idealist metaphysics in which nature itself was taken to be an expression of mind; this led him—as it had led Fichte—to reject the view that the mind's activities were subject to natural law, and therefore unfree. Furthermore, like Fichte, he couched his theory of man's basic nature in terms of a striving toward self-realization and, in defending this standard, he too was emphatic in his rejection of hedonism.

All of this constituted a self-conscious attack on the current form of British empiricism. However, it should be noted that Green's was by no means the first such attack within the century: others, both in England and Scotland, had already been influenced by Kant and German idealism, and had attempted to introduce that philosophy into Britain. In this connection, Coleridge and Sir William Hamilton were the outstanding figures, as Mill's testimony bears witness. There also were others: Carlyle, who had been influenced by Fichte as well as by Goethe, and liberal Anglican theologians, such as F. D. Maurice and Julius Hare—both of whom were closely allied with Coleridge—may be mentioned in this connection. Nonetheless, associationism and Utilitarianism remained important and perhaps dominant forces in the interpretation of human nature, partly because of the influence of Mill, and the added influence of Bain in psychology; but perhaps especially because Herbert Spencer, among others, effectively merged an empiricist account of knowledge with evolutionary theory. However, Green's book-length introduction to the works of Hume, which he and T. H. Grose edited in 1874-75, constituted a full-scale attack on empiricist assumptions, and by the mid-1880s, when his Prolegomena to Ethics was posthumously published, a new anti-associationist tendency was strikingly evident. This tendency can readily be seen in almost every volume of Mind which appeared during that period. Since psychological theory had been intimately linked with ethical theory, both by Utilitarians and by evolutionary theorists, this change had immediate repercussions on ethics, and therefore also on political theory.

The chief documents in this attack on the presuppositions of recent British psychology probably were the first chapters of Green's Prolegomena (originally published in Mind in 1882), and Ward's famous Encyclopaedia Britannica article, "Psychology," which appeared in 1886. Both challenged associationism on the ground that the facts of consciousness presuppose the existence of a perduring self. In attempting to establish this contention, each emphasized the importance of a grasp not of the atomic elements of sensation alone, but an apprehension of relationships. A similar emphasis on the importance of relationships characterized
the psychological analyses of William James and of F. H. Bradley, even though neither construed the presence of these relationships within experience as providing a basis for arguing to the necessary existence of a knowing, judging self. However, common to all four was the conviction that experience cannot adequately be interpreted if it is held to consist of entirely separate elements, that is, if relationships are not regarded as equally ultimate constituents of knowledge. The contrast between the new and the old views can be seen in Bain’s balanced and appreciative appraisal of Ward’s *Encyclopaedia* article. He quoted Ward as saying, with reference to the basic process involved in the individual’s psychological development, that

Psychologists have usually represented mental advance as consisting fundamentally in the combination and re-combination of various elementary units, the so-called sensations and primitive movements, or, in other words, in a species of mental chemistry.

To which Bain himself immediately replied:

Not altogether without reason, as it seems to me. Our education from first to last takes principally the form of adding unit to unit, under the retentive or adhesive attribute of our nature, with which we are so marvelously gifted; and any other process is quite secondary in comparison.¹²⁷

Even though Bain remained unconvinced, the effective days of an associationist psychology were at an end in England, and, at the time, the movement found no growing room in America. As we shall shortly see, the emphasis on instincts which was connected with evolutionary theory was of some effect in limiting the claims of associationism; however, as the example of Spencer shows, evolutionism and associationism were not necessarily antagonists. Rather, as I have suggested, what was of paramount importance was an attack on the “atomism” of associationist doctrine. Those who criticized this aspect of the theory—a theory which had relatively little to do with the experimental work on associations and memory which was proceeding in Germany—criticized it for distorting experience because of metaphysical and epistemological preconceptions. For example, William James put the case in the following way:

The traditional psychology talks like one who should say a river consists of nothing but pailsful, spoonsful, quartpotsful, barrelsful, and other moulded forms of water. Even were the pails and pots all actually standing in the stream, still between them the free water would continue to flow. It is just this free water that psychologists resolutely overlook. Every definite image in the mind is steeped and dyed in the free water that flows round it. With it goes the sense of its relations, near and remote, the dying echo of whence it came to us, the dawning sense of whither it is to lead.¹²⁸

This was a point to which James constantly returned, and he labeled a failure to recognize its importance as “the psychologist’s fallacy.” And in F. H. Bradley’s psychological papers one finds the same insistence that relationships are basic among the data of consciousness. For example, in “Association and Thought,” Bradley said:
First, the Atomism must go wholly. We must get rid of the idea that our mind is a
train of perishing existences, that so long as they exist have a separable being, and, so
to speak, are coupled up by another sort of things which we call relations. If we
turn to what is given this is not what we find, but rather a continuous mass of presenta-
tion in which the separation of a single element from all context is never observed.\textsuperscript{129}

I cite both James and Bradley to suggest that this form of criticism was common
to those whose views on other philosophic topics might differ very sharply. Even
among idealists, such as Green, Ward, and Bradley, an emphasis on relationships
was not used in exactly the same ways, nor in the interest of similar metaphysical
conclusions. For example, whereas Green used the judgmental grasp of relation-
ships as entailing a self, and made the existence of that self basic to his meta-
physical doctrines,\textsuperscript{130} Bradley (as we have noted) denied that the relationships
found within experience entail any such self. While Ward criticized Bradley's
doctrine,\textsuperscript{131} he—unlike Green—refused to interpret the self which was presup-
posed by psychology as providing an adequate basis for any form of metaphysical
theory.\textsuperscript{132} These are but a few of many illustrations which might have been
chosen to suggest that a list of English and American philosophers and psychol-
ogists who, at the time, sharply rejected the assumptions of associationism would
be both long and impressive. However, it is our aim to trace Green's views on
human perfectability, and with reference to this topic he differed profoundly
from the other critics whom we have mentioned; and we may note in passing that
he also differed significantly from Bosanquet, who became another of the chief
critics of associationist assumptions.\textsuperscript{133}

Having taken the consciousness of relations as indicative of the existence of a
perduring self which is able to apprehend these relationships, and viewing reality
as involving a system of relationships, Green was led to the following conclusion:

If by nature we mean the object of possible experience, the connected order of
knowable facts or phenomena.... then nature implies something other than itself, as
the condition of being what it is. Of that something else we are entitled to say... that it
is a self-distinguishing consciousness; because the function which it must fulfil in order
to render the relations of phenomena, and with them nature, possible, is one which,
on however limited a scale, we ourselves exercise in the acquisition of experience,
and exercise only by means of such a consciousness.\textsuperscript{134}

It is noteworthy that Green had introduced the foregoing statement by saying:

The purpose of this long discussion has been to arrive at some conclusion in regard to
the relation between man and nature, a conclusion which must be arrived at before
we can be sure that any theory of ethics, in the distinctive sense of that term, is other
than wasted labour.

Thus, Green's metaphysical idealism was frankly put forward as a basis for a
moral philosophy, and the noumenal self which he held to be presupposed by our
conceptions of nature was, at the same time, held by him to be a moral self. Of
course, this had also been characteristic of the thought of Fichte, with whom
Green is too infrequently compared.
For Green, as for Fichte, this metaphysical doctrine meant that the self was not under the dominance of natural causation: its actions did not form a part of a chain of events in which each antecedent is linked to each consequent in an invariant sequential relationship. Rather, he conceived of the self as "a free cause," that is, as an originating agency acting in terms of its own consciousness of self, and of its own ideal ends.\(^{135}\) When drawing this distinction between natural events and moral actions, Green also distinguished between "cause" and "motives."\(^{136}\) Since Green believed that it is not possible to construe motives as themselves being dependent on natural causes, he held that, although moral actions could be said to be "determined" by motives, the agent must be said to be free: an agent's actions expressed the character he had made for himself by the ends he had chosen. Whether or not Green's classic statement of this idealist form of the self-determinist position is both self-consistent and tenable is not our concern. What is important in the context of our present discussion is that he should have viewed the self as creating its own character, as making itself by its own choices what it was ultimately to become. While some aspects of this doctrine are noticeable in many other, earlier forms of a self-realizationist psychology— one thinks, for example, of Aristotle on habit—Green's whole moral psychology is couched in terms of this form of progressive self-development. All experience becomes transformed through the moral growth which ensues when men, in concert with one another, pursue ideal ends. These ends, needless to say, do not consist in promoting a life characterized primarily in terms of enjoyment. Like others of his generation, Green had rebelled against a hedonistic psychology, saying of those who held that view:

Whereas with them the good generically is the pleasant, in this treatise the common characteristic of the good is that it satisfies some desire. In all satisfaction of desire there is pleasure, and thus pleasantness in an object is a necessary incident of its being good . . . but its pleasantness depends on its goodness, not its goodness on the pleasure it conveys.\(^{137}\)

Similar accounts of the relationship between desire, pleasure, and the good came to be widely accepted, and the dominant moral psychology of the time changed from hedonism to self-realizationism.\(^{138}\) However, unlike most who later developed the position of self-realizationism, Green's moral psychology was wholly cut off from any naturalistic base: the self which was to be realized did not, for Green, include those organic needs which linked man to the biological realm.\(^{139}\) Nor did Green attempt to define the content of a life in which the self is increasingly realized, specifying the basic types of needs and desires common to all men. There were many later attempts to build such moral systems, but Green's position followed that of Fichte in holding that man's striving for the good assumed whatever form of growth was necessary to his nature as a moral being. Or, to alter the figure of speech, there were not set channels through which the tendency toward good always flowed. Of course, what constituted the moral good did not, according to Green, consist of a life in which transient and incoherent desires were satisfied; a good life represented a growth in character, and therefore in self-
determination toward a desirable end. On the basis of his metaphysical view that there is a divine being working within all individuals, Green held that "the right path" that each should follow is "the path in which [man's consciousness] tends to become what, according to the immanent divine law of its being, it has in it to be." Green not only admitted that such a characterization does not concretely specify the ultimate goal of man's self-realization, but he denied that it is possible to state in any positive terms what such a goal, which he refers to as "the Best," would be. Instead, he appealed to the existence of what might be termed a tropistic tendency in man toward those forms of realization which are better than his current state of being. Thus, while we do not know the Best, we can at any time discern that which is Better, and Green speaks in this connection of

...how man has bettered himself through institutions and habits which tend to make the welfare of all the welfare of each, and through the arts which make nature, both as used and as contemplated, the friend of man. And just so far as this is plain, we know enough of ultimate moral good to guide our conduct. As this quotation suggests, Green conceived of the Better as involving a growing sense of the needs and aspirations of others, and a widening of the aims of the self. Unlike Mill and Huxley, it was neither through an appeal to needs for cooperation, nor through inborn tendencies such as sympathy, that Green accounted for man's sociality; in fact, he rejected any attempt to offer a genetic account of this characteristic. Instead, he insisted that man's social nature must be taken as a primitive fact. In a manner reminiscent of Fichte's insistence on the social nature of man, Green simply started from the fact that personality, as we are conscious of it in ourselves and in others, can only be present in society. This did not imply that he accepted a theory of society in which social institutions were autonomous; unlike Comte, Hegel, or Marx, he insisted that social institutions depend upon the recognition of one personality by another—ultimately depend upon what Green characterized as a relationship of "I" and "Thou." And the standard of value against which society was to be measured was always a standard defined in terms of individual personality. While Green agreed with Fichte in holding that there was an immanent tendency toward a social growth which would include the whole of humanity, the good of the Race was not that which was the proper object of man's aspiration and love: it was with his own self-development, and—as a necessary part of that—with the self-development of his fellow human beings that a man was to be concerned. At this point one can see the difference between Green and his student Bosanquet, to which I have already alluded; for it is probably not unfair to say that for Bosanquet, as for Hegel, the State itself, and its institutions, were expressions of the Absolute, whereas for Green the Absolute was only to be known in and through individual persons, whose autonomy and creative power were its only finite manifestations.

The growth of individuals in history, the growth of their community of spirit, involved a transformation of the whole condition of man's existence, and Green's doctrine can be looked upon as being, indeed, a spiritual Evolutionism. Of that doctrine he said:
According to the doctrine of this treatise, as we have previously endeavoured to state it, there is a principle of self-development in man. He is capable of being moved by an idea of himself, as becoming that which he has it in him to be—an idea which does not represent previous experience, but gradually brings an experience into being, gradually creates a filling for itself, in the shape of art, laws, institutions and habits of living, which, so far as they go, exhibit the capabilities of man, define the idea of his end, afford a positive answer to the otherwise unanswerable question, what in particular it is that man has it in him to become.\[146\]

3. Evolution and the Malleability of Human Nature

This Spiritual Evolutionism, as I have termed it, was regarded by Green, and by others, as involving a radically different view of man and the world than was to be found in naturalistic evolutionary theories. In this, they were indisputably correct. However, if we do not focus our attention on the question of man’s place in nature, but on the present characteristics and future hopes of mankind, the two forms of evolutionism were, in some cases, more nearly similar than opposed. To illustrate these similarities, it will be useful to consider the thought of Darwin and of Spencer.

In approaching Darwin’s interpretation of man, it is necessary to bear in mind the conditions under which he put forward his views. In the Origin of Species he had deliberately avoided all questions concerning the applicability of his conclusions to the human race, though his work was immediately received in terms of its implications for the interpretation of man.\[147\] Twelve years later he published The Descent of Man, and in it he attempted to establish the view that he had long held, offering evidence to show that there was continuity between man and the rest of the animal kingdom not only with respect to physical form, but with respect to mental powers as well. Now, if we recall Darwin’s use of the comparative method, we shall not expect him to start his analysis from any overall characterization of human nature. Instead, we shall expect just what we find: a collection of instances in which specific traits which are supposedly distinctive of human nature can be shown to bear a close resemblance to a series of traits found among non-human species. The range of the traits which Darwin discussed was extremely wide, and he made no pretense of offering either a systematically constructed list or an exhaustive one; nonetheless, it is possible to interpret what he said as providing a general conception of man’s fundamental nature.

In the first place it is clear that, apart from intelligence, Darwin connected many of man’s basic traits with the instinctive behavior of animals.\[148\] Given this assumed connection, one might suppose that his theory of man’s nature would minimize malleability: earlier theories of instinct had tended to identify that which was instinctive with that which was universal and necessary, and our more recent conceptions of animal instinct have also emphasized the rigidity of instinctive behavior. However, Darwin’s approach was a phylogenetic one, and from this point of view he could easily combine a theory of human nature in which instincts were of preponderating importance in human behavior with the conten-
tion that man’s nature was subject to important changes over time. The primary mechanism of such phylogenetic changes was, of course, the possibility that there are slight variations among individuals with respect to their instinctive patterns of reaction, that such variations can have a relation to the survival of the individuals possessing them, that they are inherited, and thus that natural selection is brought into play. 149 Furthermore, we must recall that Darwin did not deny that, in some cases, it was possible for individually acquired characteristics to be inherited; therefore, in addition to explanations in terms of chance variations, he was able to hold that habits might sometimes be transformed into instincts, after many generations. 150 For example, in accounting for the sagacity of animals in avoiding traps in those regions in which trapping had long been practiced, he assumed that the results of past learning had been transformed into an instinctive wariness. 151 Regardless of the source of the changes which were introduced, natural selection would of course operate on them; in the course of time, new forms of instinctive behavior would therefore arise, becoming dominant in the species, whether animal or human. 152

Darwin’s emphasis on the role of instinct in human behavior, and his interest in establishing continuity between the higher animals and human forms of behavior, led him to reject a consistently hedonistic account of human motivation. While he attributed some actions to the operation of the factors of pleasure and pain, he did not hold that it was warranted to do so in all cases. For example, after recognizing instances in which fear-reactions were attributable to the effects of pain, he said:

In many cases, however, it is probable that instincts are followed from the mere force of inheritance, without the stimulus of either pleasure or pain. A young pointer when it first scents game, apparently cannot help pointing. A squirrel in the cage who pats the nuts which it cannot eat, as if to bury them in the ground, can hardly be thought to act thus either from pleasure or pain. Hence the common assumption that men must be impelled to every action by experiencing some pleasure or pain may be erroneous. 153

Thus, at two fundamental points, Darwin’s psychology came into conflict with the traditions which had dominated English and French geneticism: first, in rejecting its emphasis on the individual’s acquisition of distinctively human traits through the medium of his social environment, and second, in rejecting a hedonistic psychology. On the basis of these changes in point of view, Darwin and the Darwinians did not look upon the individual as being fundamentally malleable; however, malleability remained characteristic of the race as a race. It is to a consideration of that malleability that we now turn.

In tracing the continuity between human nature and its origins in animal instinct, Darwin devoted most attention to the problems of the development of a moral sense. He did so since it was commonly held that, in this respect, there was an even greater gap between human nature and animal instinct than there was with respect to man’s intellectual powers. It was Darwin’s aim to show that this gap could be bridged by using the same comparative method and the same explanatory concepts that he had used in accounting for the origin of new species.
To understand the manner in which he proceeded we must understand his conception of human morality. He believed in the existence of a special moral sense or conscience, which he regarded as a component in man's affective and volitional life but not as a source of cognitive insight. His conception of morality also included the acceptance of a non-egoistic moral standard which he identified with the Golden Rule, saying "this lies at the foundation of morality."  

Given this general conception of morality, and seeking its remote origins in animal instinct, it was natural that Darwin should have concerned himself primarily with the social instincts in animals. To find continuity between such instincts and the social behavior of men, he could not lay primary stress on the patterns of instinctive action found in birds, ants, bees, etc., with which he had been mainly concerned in the *Origin of Species*. Instead, he focused attention on those forms of behavior among the higher animals which might have a more direct evolutionary connection with social impulses in man. Out of such impulses, when coupled with a higher degree of intelligence, it might then be presumed that man's moral sense had developed. Darwin stated this general hypothesis clearly and explicitly at the outset of his treatment of the origins of the moral sense:

> The following proposition seems to me in a high degree probable—namely, that any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts, would inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience, as soon as its intellectual powers had become as well developed, or nearly as well developed, as in man.  

The following proposition seems to me in a high degree probable—namely, that any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts, would inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience, as soon as its intellectual powers had become as well developed, or nearly as well developed, as in man.  

The particular instincts on which Darwin placed primary emphasis were not examples of those forms of behavior in which animals hunted in packs or banded together in mutual defense, although he cited such instincts as being of importance to the survival of species, and his use of them did illustrate the fact that instinctive behavior was not necessarily anti-social, as some had tended to maintain. The two forms of instinctive behavior which he regarded as especially relevant to human social behavior were those which, even in speaking of the lower animals, he designated as love and as sympathy. Although he did not attempt to state what characteristic differentiated love and sympathy from other instincts, it is perhaps accurate to say that in these cases Darwin assumed that the animal's behavior was tied to the well-being of some other animal whose actual presence elicited the response. For example, he cited instances of animal attachments to their young as instances of love, and a dog's attempt to defend its master as an instance of sympathy. Unlike instincts which governed hunting in packs, and similar cases (which he often referred to as "special instincts"), love and sympathy were *directly* connected with promoting the good of another individual. Therefore, the presence of this same sort of instinctive reaction throughout a species would tend to establish close bonds among the individuals living in proximity to one another. Darwin also referred to a tendency toward imitative behavior as a factor which could serve to strengthen common forms of behavior within a group. It was out of these basic instincts that he believed morality had originally grown.
The specific steps in that growth need not be followed in detail. With respect to the question of the ultimate origin of an instinct such as parental affection, Darwin was inclined to invoke chance variations and natural selection, since this instinct would have been of help in the struggle for survival. A similar conjecture was offered by Darwin to account for the development of sympathy and of other social instincts. He pointed out that such instincts not only lead to a more gregarious form of existence, but that they tend to flourish and become habitual under these circumstances: thus they tend to be self-reinforcing, or, as we should now say, to continue developing due to positive feedback. Furthermore, as we have noted, Darwin was wholly willing to acknowledge that persistent habits were inherited; thus, sociality would have continued to develop by gradual increments over time. However, Darwin had not established what he had sought to establish: an account of the basis of conscience as an effective influence, among other influences, on conduct. Now, conscience—according to his view of morality—always reflected man’s social impulses, not those which were connected with self-regarding instincts; and the question which Darwin therefore wished to answer was how conditions could arise which would make the force of conscience stronger than hunger, and stronger even than the instinct of self-preservation. His answer consisted in holding that the social impulses are actually stronger than impulses such as hunger in so far as they are more persistent. For example, the social impulses constantly maintain themselves, whereas impulses such as hunger are transient, and disappear as soon as they are satisfied; thus, according to Darwin, the reverberations of the social impulses continue, expressing themselves in the discomfort of conscience, when we have succumbed to a transient impulse. On future occasions, this will help to forestall a repetition of the same behavior. These effects of the social impulses are then reinforced, according to Darwin’s account, by the praise and blame of others. Thus, social morality comes into existence.

This by no means concluded what Darwin had to say concerning the moral standard which had thus originated. Adhering to his evolutionary point of view, the specific forms of conduct which were praised or blamed, and which were thus reinforced within any given group, were necessarily those forms of conduct which aided the group to survive. Thus the actual standard of judgment which underlay all moral codes was a standard of the general good of the group, and Darwin contrasted this conclusion with Mill’s “Greatest Happiness” principle. To be sure, in the history of the race, many different customs received moral sanction because they contributed to the good of the group under whatever conditions then obtained, and, as a consequence, different societies sometimes praised different virtues and condemned different actions as vices. Nevertheless, there were some general forms of action which would, under almost all circumstances, be either beneficial or deleterious, and Darwin praised Bagehot’s articles on Physics and Politics for having pointed to the existence of these forms of sanctioned and of prohibited behavior. While such standards were not in most instances originally attributable to man’s powers of foresight and reasoning, Darwin readily admitted that our judgments of right and wrong came to be more and more
directly related to an apprehension of that which would promote the general good.\textsuperscript{163} Any society which maintained standards which did not promote the welfare of the group, or in which ignorance and superstition beclouded man's judgments as to group welfare, were societies which could be criticized by moralists; they were also societies which would not, in the long run, survive. Thus, progressive enhancement of group welfare was a natural accompaniment of the historical process, and while Darwin was not an extreme progressivist,\textsuperscript{164} he did conclude his discussion of how natural selection applied to civilized nations with words which we have already quoted:

It is apparently a truer and more cheerful view that progress has been much more general than retrogression; that man has risen, though by slow and interrupted steps, from a lowly condition to the highest standard as yet attained by him in knowledge, morals, and religion.\textsuperscript{165}

In addition to Darwin, there were others who used the principles of individual variation and natural selection to account for long-term changes in human nature, and for social change. As we have already noted, Bagehot used the Darwinian theory to explain why some traits were socially sanctioned and others were not, and Darwin accepted his account. Furthermore, the investigations of Francis Galton, Darwin’s cousin, arose out of an interest in questions raised by Darwin,\textsuperscript{166} and his book, \textit{Hereditary Genius}, was highly praised by Darwin in \textit{The Descent of Man}. In Galton’s later work, \textit{Inquiries into Human Faculty}, in which he reported his research on the capacities of twins, Galton stated the problem with which he was concerned as being that of estimating the relative forces of “Nurture and Nature,” and he summarized his conclusion in saying that he had established “the vastly preponderating effects of nature over nurture.”\textsuperscript{167} This work, which was a primary source of the eugenics movement, fitted very closely with Darwin’s own views, for \textit{The Descent of Man} placed far greater emphasis on the effects which inheritance has on the intellectual and moral qualities of individuals than one would today be inclined to do.\textsuperscript{168} This emphasis on inheritance, together with the analogy which Darwin always drew between natural selection and selection under conditions of domestication, led to the ideal of a controlled improvement of the human race, which Galton summarized in saying:

My general object has been to take note of the varied hereditary faculties of different men, and of the great differences in different families and races, to learn how far history may have shown the practicability of supplanting inefficient human stock by better strains, and to consider whether it might not be our duty to do so by such efforts as may be reasonable, thus exerting ourselves to further the ends of evolution more rapidly and with less distress than if events were left to their own course.\textsuperscript{169}

In W. K. Clifford’s essays, one can find a parallel to Galton’s application of Darwinian principles; however, unlike Galton, Clifford applied these principles not to individuals primarily, but directly to societies. As Frederick Pollock informs us, Clifford was one of a group who had been enormously influenced by
the concept of natural selection, and wanted to establish on the basis of it "a new system of ethics, combining the exactness of the utilitarian with the poetical ideals of the transcendentalist." In his early exposition of his conception of the development of human nature, Clifford invoked what he took to be a basic biological law, "that the development of an organism proceeds from its activities rather than its passivities." In other words, he regarded change as being induced in an organism from within, and not because of its relation to its environment. This doctrine, which fitted well with the ideal of freedom and self-development which Clifford connected with Mazzini, and with his emphasis on constant growth and development in individual character and in history, also fitted (though only loosely) with Darwin's theory: it minimized any direct action of the environment, and located the primary source of the variability of species in traits possessed by the organisms themselves. While this analogy between their views regarding the sources of variability is only a very loose one, the factor of selection to which Clifford appealed was, precisely, Darwin's own theory. And in his later essay, "On the Scientific Basis of Morals," Clifford emphasized the element of selection in a thoroughly Darwinian manner.

However, there was one fundamental difference between Darwin's theory and that of Clifford. In analyzing moral development, Darwin had placed emphasis on the attributes of individuals, and had tended to regard the survival of a society as dependent upon these character traits. While Clifford accepted Darwin's genetic account of the origins of the individual's conscience, and while he apparently saw no difference between his own theory and that of Darwin, he tended to identify all that was moral with the dominance of what he termed a "tribal self" over the individual self. It was Clifford's conviction that among primitive peoples a sense of group-identity preceded a sense of individuality, and he designated as "Piety" the disposition to give supremacy to those motives which had their origins in the tribal self; in other words, piety was acting for the benefit of the group. On this basis he gave the following account:

The tribe has to exist. Such tribes as saw no necessity for it have ceased to live. To exist, it must encourage piety; and there is a method which lies ready to hand. . . .

If a man does anything generally regarded as good for the tribe, my tribal self may say . . . "I like that thing that you have done." By such common approbation of individual acts the influence of piety as a motive becomes defined; and natural selection will in the long run preserve those tribes which have approved the right things; namely, those things which at that time gave the tribe an advantage in the struggle for existence.

While this stresses the role of natural selection and social well-being in the development of moral standards, just as Darwin's theory had done, Clifford's account of morality was fundamentally different. He did not seek its roots in the utility of a number of different forms of individual action, such as instinctive tendencies to love and sympathy, or dispositional traits such as courage and self-control, nor in mental capacities such as foresight: morality rested for him on group solidarity, on the dominance of the tribal self. Consequently, when he came to make value
judgments, he did not regard particular traits as morally good because they did in fact contribute to the welfare of the social group: they were only morally good in so far as the welfare of the group was the end toward which they were explicitly directed.\(^{178}\) In the same connection, he distinguished between piety and altruism:

Piety is not Altruism. It is not the doing good to others as others, but the service of the community by a member of it, who loses in that service the consciousness that he is anything different from the community.\(^{179}\)

For Clifford, it is piety, not altruism, which is basic to morality. We can say with some assurance that Clifford's position would have been rejected by Darwin, both as an account of the roots of morality and as a judgment of relative value. Nevertheless, his position was typical of the emphasis of a good many later writers who assumed that the only point of view from which a Darwinian should assess the value of a trait of character or of a form of action, was with respect to the contribution which it made to social survival. To be sure, there were also many writers who interpreted Darwinism in a quite different and incompatible way, holding to a completely individualistic standard of value; on their view, each individual was committed by his nature to ruthless competition with others in a struggle for survival. The opposition of these two views—each of which was fundamentally different from Darwin's own account of morality—suggests the need for characterizing what constitutes the underlying form of explanation which, when applied to man's nature, can properly be called "Darwinian." This form of explanation involves more than an appeal to "natural selection," which, following Spencer, Darwin termed "the survival of the fittest." In addition, it involves an account of the genesis of the particular characteristics upon which the selective process operates. In this respect it is probably fair to say that no account of an evolutionary process is "Darwinian" if it does not hold that new characteristics arise as random variations among the traits of individuals belonging to a particular species, and that such variations are passed on by biological inheritance to the offspring. Finally, we may note that no theory would generally be termed "Darwinian" if it did not include the hypothesis that there is, in some form, a "struggle for survival," that is, that there is competition which does not permit all new variations to survive.

A characterization of this sort obviously excludes some forms of evolutionary theory from being designated as Darwinian; for example, Bergson separated his orthogenetic evolutionism from the Darwinian theory on the basis of his postulate that there is a directional factor in variability, which Darwin had left out of account. Furthermore, if one carefully considers Lamarck's evolutionary theory (and does not equate it with a belief in the inheritance of the effects of use and disuse, which Darwin in some cases also accepted), one finds that the fundamental difference between Lamarck's theory and that of Darwin consists in their conceptions of how the environment operates in fostering the development of new species. According to Darwin's theory, the primary influence of the environment is selective. Apart from some few cases in which he, like Buffon, assumed that it
could have a direct effect on the genetic constitution of animals and plants, Darwin held that variations arose independently of environmental influences. Consequently, when one speaks of “adaptation” in Darwinian evolution, one is speaking of how well a particular variety can survive and multiply in the particular environment in which it exists. In a Lamarckian theory, however, the need for adaptation is the basis on which new structures gradually arise, and the lack of a need for a particular structure eventually causes it to disappear. Thus adaptation is a positive factor, being the tendency of an organism, impelled by its inner needs, to grow into closer relationship with its environment. Thus, on Lamarck’s theory, there is a tendency on the part of every type of animal to make itself into that which, given a particular environment, it will eventually become. This Lamarckian view of evolution was characteristic of Herbert Spencer’s biology, and of his psychology as well.

The role which positive adaptation to the environment played in Spencer’s theories was evident in the first edition of his Principles of Psychology, a work antedating his First Principles. In it he defined life in a manner that then became fundamental to his biology, saying:

The broadest and most complete definition of Life will be—*The continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations.*

Spencer then developed this concept in terms of an equilibrating interplay of forces, as was demanded by his acceptance of a *total* evolutionism. At a later point in the same work he said:

*It is scarcely possible too much to emphasize the conclusion, that all these processes by which organisms are re-fitted to their ever-changing environments, must be equilibra-
tions of one kind or another. As authority for this conclusion, we have not simply the universal truth that change of every order is towards equilibrium; but we have also the truth which holds throughout the organic world, that life itself is the maintenance of a moving equilibrium between inner and outer actions—the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations.*

Spencer recognized that his theory was fundamentally different from Darwin’s, though it could include Darwin’s principles as being of some importance in the evolutionary process. In one section of his Principles of Biology, Spencer made his position absolutely clear, saying “There must be a natural selection of functionally-acquired peculiarities, as well as of incidental peculiarities”; or, in other words, chance variations and natural selection alone could not account for the origin of new species—direct adaptation to the conditions imposed by the environment was the primary factor on which change depended.

To be sure, if these adaptive changes were to be effective in bringing about evolutionary change, they had to be transmitted by inheritance; and Spencer, looking at the process of evolution as a whole, rather than considering what could be observed with respect to individual organisms and their offspring, was willing to allow far wider scope to the inherited effects of experience than Darwin had
done. This difference is particularly evident with respect to Spencer’s views regarding the evolution of mind. While Darwin had, for example, taken most animal instincts to be ultimately dependent on chance variations,\textsuperscript{183} Spencer regarded them as compound reflex actions which had grown up through accumulated experience, and were preserved by the inheritance of the effects of that experience.\textsuperscript{184} Spencer’s theory of the particular way in which experience affected the individual, and hence (ultimately) the race, was through the establishment of an association of ideas. To hold, as he did,\textsuperscript{185} that the effects of the association of ideas would be inherited was clearly at odds with earlier forms of geneticism; however, its acceptance becomes somewhat more intelligible when we take into account Spencer’s correlation of mental phenomena with the nervous system: if other bodily changes brought about by habit could be inherited, then the effects of an association of ideas, which could be reflected in “the modified nervous tendencies produced by such new habits” could also be passed on to later generations.\textsuperscript{186} In fact, we find that Bain, who was the most eminent associationist psychologist of the day, and who did a great deal to relate the traditions of associationism to the growth of physiological knowledge, also believed that simpler and constantly iterated habits, when they were of importance to the animal, could be inherited, since “in virtue of the acquired strength of nervous connections, these might in some degree persist in the germ.”\textsuperscript{187} Nevertheless, Bain was far more restrictive than was Spencer with respect to the characteristics which could be inherited.\textsuperscript{188} For Spencer it was even possible that, within the scope of modern history, new capabilities had developed through habit, and that these capabilities had—within that relatively short time—become inherent traits.\textsuperscript{189} Since only those capabilities which represented successful adaptations would eventually survive, it is not surprising that, unlike Darwinians who counted more on chance variations than on adaptive habits as the primary source of inherited variations, Spencer believed that the basic facts of psychology and of biology assured mankind of a continuing cumulative progress.

In addition to the fact that his associationist psychology and his belief in the inheritance of acquired habits provided an explanation of the progressive tendencies of mankind, Spencer explained the sequence of historical change in terms of tendencies inherent within societies themselves. Unlike Darwin, or Galton, or Bain—and with an emphasis quite different from that of Clifford—Spencer’s evolutionary account of man’s development depended upon his recognition not only of changes in the nature of individual men, but of changes in social institutions.\textsuperscript{190} For Spencer, the realm of societal facts was to be characterized as different from the physical and from the organic realms: it was designated by him as “superorganic.” Like Comte, or Hegel, or Marx, he held that the phenomena characterizing the structures of society are not capable of being understood in terms of the principles which explain individual actions, even when these actions represent responses to the presence and the actions of other individuals.\textsuperscript{191} Thus, according to one meaning of the term “organicism,” Spencer might be characterized as belonging to that school of thought. However, as I have already indicated,\textsuperscript{192} I am not here using that term with that particular signification; in-
stead, "organicism" is here only being taken to refer to a certain type of theory regarding the relationship which exists between the characteristics of individual human nature and the societies to which those individuals belong. With respect to this issue, Spencer did not hold an organicist doctrine, as will now become clear.

Spencer identified a society as a discrete aggregate, of which the aggregated units were individual human beings. Since he believed that the character of any aggregate depended upon the nature of the units of which it was composed, and upon the forces influencing them, it is clear that he did not view an individual’s nature as being wholly molded by society. Nor would such a view have been consistent with there being an independent science of individual psychology, in which—unlike Comte and unlike Hegel—he did of course believe. On the other hand, Spencer did not hold that man’s nature was constant over time. This was obviously precluded by his insistence on an evolutionary development in which acquired habits became inherited traits. What he held, therefore, was the view that there was a constant interplay between society and its units:

This interplay involved a moving equilibrium, since the nature of the individuals would not remain static because of their accumulating experience, and the institutions would likewise be changed by the individuals, and also by external factors, such as changes in the geographic environment. And such a dynamic equilibrium was, of course, precisely what Spencer’s total evolutionism demanded: a constant interplay and redistribution of forces. With respect to the applicability of this principle to the relationships between individuals and their society, we find Spencer saying:

Conformably with the laws of evolution in general, and conformably with the laws of organization in particular, there has been, and is, in progress an adaptation of humanity to the social state, changing it in the direction of such an ideal congruity. And the corollary before drawn and here repeated, is that the ultimate man is one in whom this process has gone so far as to produce a correspondence between all the promptings of his nature and all the requirements of his life as carried on in society.

Once again, it might be assumed that the acceptance of such a standard brought Spencer close to the "organicism" of Comte, Hegel, or Marx. However, once again, it is important to remember—and the extreme individualism of Spencer’s social ethics should remind us of the fact—that he placed no less emphasis on the individual than he did upon society as an aggregative organism. Pleasure and pain remained touchstones of value, for they were signs of well-being in the functioning of the individual, and the good of society never supplanted the good of indi-
vials, according to Spencer's view. Throughout his statement of his theory and his evaluation of change, both the individual and the social organism maintain themselves as distinct although interacting elements, both of which are to be considered in understanding the forms of life which have characterized human history. As each has grown, so has the other, and if society is now more developed, and more progressive, so too is man. While this conclusion is directly deducible from what Spencer regarded as the ultimate law governing the evolutionary process, he was never wholly arbitrary in his use of that law. As we have noted, his theories of the association of ideas, of the inheritance of habitual associations, of the need for adaptation to the environment, and of the interrelation of individuals and the social institutions under which they live, provided what he took to be an adequate explanation of the vast mass of data which he attempted to survey, giving scientific support to what from the first he had believed:

Progress... is not an accident, but a necessity. Instead of civilization being artificial it is a part of nature; all of a piece with the development of an embryo or the unfolding of a flower. The modifications mankind have undergone, and are still undergoing, result from a law underlying the whole organic creation; and provided the human race continues, and the constitution of things remains the same, those modifications must end in completeness. As surely as the tree becomes bulky when it stands alone, and slender if one of a group; as surely as a blacksmith's arm grows large, and the skin of a laborer's hand thick;... as surely as a clerk acquires rapidity in writing and calculation; ... as surely as a passion grows by indulgence and diminishes when restrained; as surely as a disregarded conscience becomes inert, and one that is obeyed active; as surely as there is any meaning in such terms as habit, custom, practice;—so surely must the human faculties be moulded into complete fitness for the social state; so surely must evil and immorality disappear; so surely must man become perfect.195

When Spencer speaks in this fashion, the term “man” must not be taken as referring to any individual human being, nor to individuals taken simply as a collective aggregate, but to a historically developing entity, Man or Humanity; and this applies also to most of those with whom we have been dealing in discussing either organicism or the doctrine that Man is to be conceived as a progressive being.196

As we have seen, this was a view which was, at the least, different in emphasis from that held by those philosophers of history in the Enlightenment who discussed the education or the progress of Mankind. Change had been viewed by them as a tendency to bring about conditions under which truth and happiness, and the other values of civilization, could be individually and collectively achieved. Consequently, their emphasis was placed on the goal of the process, on what was the ideal condition of man. Given their cosmopolitan standards, little sympathy was evinced for the earlier stages of history, which had to be overcome before that goal could be reached. It was as a revolt against this and other aspects of Enlightenment standards of value that another conception of the historical development of man was introduced: cultural diversity was emphasized, as was the element of tradition which served to bind a people together, giving unity to
historical change. However, on this view of the human race, as one sees it particularly in Herder, the species expressed itself in a multitude of different ways, but it was not itself a historical entity, a subject which had reality and underwent historical change. On the other hand, according to the metaphysical idealists, the human condition did not remain the same: the race, as a race, had developed and, through self-education, brought about not merely a fulfilment of desires which were already present, but a wholly new condition of man. Thus, for example, in his *Speeches to the German Nation*, Fichte claimed that through education mankind would endow itself with a new form: it would actually create itself, making itself that which it had always implicitly been. And Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* actually attempted to trace the stages in such a self-creation of humanity, in which an increasing depth and comprehensiveness of the spirit took place.

This general view was not a special characteristic of German metaphysical idealism; it was, for example, equally characteristic of Comte, and of all who came under his influence. Furthermore, we may note—not without surprise—that in spite of Mill's rejection of Comte's social views, he praised the Comtean conception of Humanity as an object of religious reverence. Totally apart from that praise, the conception of progressive transformations of human nature was present throughout Mill's writings; this was, in fact, the point at which, as we have seen, he profoundly modified the associationist psychology of his predecessors. And after Mill, even independently of biological and sociological evolutionism, there was a tendency toward a historical, developmental psychology of the human race. One sees this in G. H. Lewes' *Study of Psychology*, in spite of the fact that his philosophic convictions demanded that he view the human mind as directly related to the body. The point was put very forcibly when he said, "Psychology investigates the Human Mind, not an individual's thoughts and feelings." The manner in which Lewes harmonized these apparently antithetical views was through his acceptance of the doctrine of emergence. For example, in the passage just cited he went on to hold that in man "animal impulses are profoundly modified by social influences, and his higher faculties are evolved through social needs." And, again, one finds him saying,

Biology furnishes both method and data in the elucidation of the relations of the organism and the external medium; and so far as Animal Psychology is concerned this is enough. But Human Psychology has a wider reach, includes another important factor, the influence of the social medium. This is not simply an addition, ... it is a factor which permeates the whole composition of mind.

Thus, Lewes' psychology was wedded to an historical consideration of man's nature, and the psychology of the individual became in effect a psychology of the General Mind.

Finally, we may note that in the self-realizationism of Wundt, which was relatively far removed from the philosophic presuppositions of Lewes, and certainly from those of Spencer, the same historical developmentalism was at work. In
Wundt's *Ethics*, which dates from 1886, *development* furnishes the underlying preconception of the whole work.\textsuperscript{206} The basis for his actual working out of his theory was in the famous doctrine of *heterogeny* of ends:

... manifestations of will, over the whole range of man's free voluntary actions, are always of such a character that the effects of the actions extend more or less widely beyond the original motives of volition, so that new motives are originated for future actions, and again, in turn, produce new effects.\textsuperscript{207}

Since Wundt (like T. H. Green) held that the ends which an individual strives to attain are not purely individual ends, it is obvious that his doctrine of the heterogeny of ends opened the door to a belief in an indefinitely extended range of human progress. This belief Wundt consistently maintained. Moral value did not reside in the satisfaction of desires which had the individual's own ends as their goal; it was confined to those desires which were directed toward universal ends.\textsuperscript{208} However, it was not merely the universal satisfaction of desire, the general happiness, which man had as his goal; rather, man strove for self-realization through an ever-increasing flow of psychical creations,

... a process in which the individual consciousness bears its part, yet whose final object is not the individual himself, but the universal spirit of humanity.\textsuperscript{209}

Thus, "the ultimate end of human morality is the moral ideal, ... its immediate end is the progressive perfection of humanity."\textsuperscript{210} While the individual consciousness plays an all-important part in this progress, Wundt might well have said with Clifford:

Conscience and reason form an inner core in the human mind, having an origin and a nature distinct from the merely animal passions and perceptions; they constitute the soul or spirit of man, the universal part in every one of us. In these are bound up, embalmed and embodied, all the struggles and searchings of spirit of the countless generations which have made us what we are. Action which arises out of that inner core, which is prompted by conscience and guided by reason, is *free* in the highest sense of all; this at last is *good* in the ethical sense. And yet, when we act with this most perfect freedom, it may be said that it is not we that act, but Man that worketh in us.\textsuperscript{211}

The belief that one can legitimately speak of Man, or Mankind, or Humanity, as a unitary historical being, as that which transcends every individual, making each of us what we are, was a belief which was among the most distinctive tenets of nineteenth-century thought. Like geneticism and like organicism—with both of which it was not infrequently connected—it rested on philosophic preconceptions which it would be well to examine. And to such tasks we shall now turn.