In my next volume, I hope to consider that panoply of medieval commitments and imperatives which stocked the psyches of *trecento* Florentine citizens. That these values were in crisis and frequently in disarray does not imply they lacked durability. The present volume, however, has subsumed experience under the metaphor of *growth* and, therefore, treated them with less consideration than they deserve. The next will be concerned with the vexing problem of aging. Older beliefs were precisely those generating tension in the political sphere and anxiety in the social realm. The dialectic between past and present gave the times their dimension, if not their tragic import. The filter of the public world, as constructed in this volume, is hardly adequate for suggesting the intricate qualities of medieval culture. A brief survey of the ideas of prominent thinkers such as Petrarch or Salutati would demonstrate that the varied subtleties of their literary minds cannot be confined within the limits of a public forum, no matter how grand the architectural design.

There is also the fact of political and social loss that cannot be suggested in a volume devoted to emergence and triumph. Yet the tamed and sometimes defeated patriciate of *trecento* Florence should elicit the sympathy of the historically minded. Further, there were those who were all but excluded from the citizen world of the late *trecento*: the working class (*il popolo minuto*) were discriminated against in a brutal manner by the rule of guild law. If aristocrats rejected the claims of the state as an offense to honor as well as a contradiction of higher allegiance, *il popolo minuto* suffered the economic oppression of the disinherited. Their revolutionary activity was over after 1382 and their political vitality eradicated from historical memory. Justice and the territorial state of the greater guildsmen meant exploitation for a Florentine proletariat whose experience is little commented on in this volume. A tax system, crucial to the formation of the territorial state, was constructed to guarantee the affluent a substantial return on state bonds. It was hoped that interest payments would be met by levies falling on petty producers and consumers.

The subsequent extirpation of egalitarian religious ideas, widespread among *il popolo minuto*, must be delineated. To understand the consequences of the de-
RISE OF THE TERRITORIAL STATE

feat of revolutionary medieval ideology is a formidable problem. From the vantage point of Italian *quattrocento* culture the frustration of medieval democratic ideas meant the undermining of the solid bridge between private and public worlds. Had medieval democracy intensified after 1382 instead of being aborted, a univalent political and moral code might have been achieved. The more extensive the popular participation in the signory, the greater the likelihood that a single standard would prevail. Florentine puritanism was a product of mid-*trecento* democratization and was manifest in a fervency in enforcement of sumptuary laws, in legislation against prostitution, statutes against sodomy, and implementation of court verdicts against delinquent magnates. The challenge to inadequate standards for judging the behavior of the *maiores et potentes* was linked to the admission of *novi cives* into the signory. Likewise, severe legislation against the Tuscan church necessarily weakened the hold of ritualistic and aristocratic Christianity. The growth of religious nonconformity, connected intimately with the diffusion of heresy, peaked in the year 1382. Again, had democratization continued, sacramental religion might well have receded further and popular religious conscience undergone more extensive habitation.

Without additional investigation such inferences can be formulated only in the pluperfect subjunctive. Much more vulnerable is the historical problem of the emergence of the Florentine burghers from the corporate world of the Middle Ages. Although Burckhardtian insights concerning their individuation are valuable, they still require modification. First, we must recognize that this individualism was not only a source of energy and pleasure, but also of anxiety. The burden of selfhood and the problem of alienation remain to be studied by the historian of the *trecento*. Clearly, the individual acted both to affirm and to subordinate his identity to the public world. He sought surcease from the erosion of traditional ritual ties, sacramental bonds, and ceremonial identities by legitimizing the quest for fame. Like the civic world that conferred renown upon the individual, so, too, the nuclear family served to repair his frayed ego. Second, liberation of the citizen from time-honored corporate restraints did not foster that unbridled egoism of which Burckhardt speaks with such exquisite concern. Indeed, the Florentine public world of late *trecento* and early *quattrocento* seldom allowed this egoism to operate as an effective social force. General histories of the earlier renaissance risk misunderstanding the texture of culture when they deny the Florentine penchant for strict enforcement of law and unyielding constitutionalism. The citizen was released from certain medieval restraints only to be contained posthaste within a demanding world of public discipline. Increasingly, the imperatives most likely to shape his persona were those of the polis. Not accidental is the fact that new humanist ideas of educating the young for service to polis were first formulated in early *quattrocento* Florence.

To affirm repression is not to suggest that the citizen role was quiescent or
that civic humanism lacked confidence in the vitality of human will. From Petrarch and Salutati through Bruni and Alberti the image of "man the maker" (homo faber) was elevated until it became that hallmark of his uniqueness and dignity. Even so ascetic a thinker as Marsiglio Ficino celebrated the earthly role of man the builder. Basic to this theme was the belief that civilization is a human construct. Later, Renaissance thinkers drew upon this faith when proclaiming the power of man to transform his world. The earlier intellectual movement contributed heroically to the sixteenth-century belief in the magical capabilities of human vitality. What we observe in the early *quattrocento* is a tension between extreme voluntarism on the one hand and the repressive mechanism of society on the other. If culture was in process of intensifying a feeling for community, with the polis as focus of man's political life and the Renaissance family as core of his moral expectation, there was still lively criticism of public values and social forms. Repression produced its antithesis in the free play of critical imagination that sometimes denied even the possibilities of the minimal co-operation necessary for human association. Witness the obsessive interest of Poggio and others with the motif of hypocrisy.

The individual emerged from the corporate and associative world of the late Middle Ages. His citizen ego was stripped of numerous props; he stood remote from many of the comforts of a hierarchical medieval cosmos just as he was alienated from older extended sociabilities. The emotional history of the Renaissance was characterized in part by the quest for new ego supports. The search for fame assumed legitimacy only when collectivized concepts of honor were failing. If the individual became more liberated, he was also more vulnerable. If *homo faber* was celebrated, his dwelling lost many of the sociable qualities of communal life and assumed the burden of privacy. Just as the extended family business gave way to the impersonal holding company of the early Renaissance, so, too, did the world of the extended clan contract into that of the nuclear family. The amplitude of social constructions, wherein medieval ideals of pervasive love assisted the generalization of emotionality until they became increasingly lateral, was on the decline. The Renaissance family circumscribed and deepened affection by channeling it only to the immediate kin. Intensity of feeling was reserved for father, mother, and wife. The child became an object of veneration. The household was elevated to a religious ideal and *quattrocento* painting and literature served to make domesticity sublime. Renaissance naturalism in painting must not be explained in nineteenth-century terms, with its penchant for the sensual. Limited burgher society became a receptacle for sacred objects, and when Ghirlandaio depicted society with such fidelity in his fresco cycles at Sta. Trinita, the apotheosis of the bourgeoisie was achieved. Instead of longing after the subtle and illusive, one elevated the familiar and everyday.

In the early fifteenth century, when Bruni set out to write the life of Dante, he made obeisance to the earlier biography written by Boccaccio. Despite Boccaccio's concern with his subject's public career, Bruni thought this *Vita* to be
too full of sighs, yearnings, and the other sweet ingredients of love: "... this most delightful and charming Boccaccio of ours wrote the life and manners of so sublime a poet just as though he were writing the Filocolo, or the Fiametta. For it is all full of love and sighs and burning tears; as though man were born into this world only that he might take his place in those ten amorous Days wherein enamoured ladies and gallant youths recounted the hundred Tales. And he grows so warm in these passages of love that he drops the weighty and substantial parts of Dante's life, passing them over in silence, while he records trivial matters and holds his peace concerning grave ones."

What became dominant was the externalization of perspective whereby character and action were viewed from the vantage point of the public world—"the weighty and substantial parts." Deeper psychological insights were sacrificed in order to portray the civic Dante of politics and warfare. Medieval strategies for gaining knowledge of the interior world, such as scholastic psychology, metaphysical poetry, and the introspective tactics of chivalric literature, receded. The pull of the public world intensified, and humanists were anxious to lend support to a beleaguered ego by justifying claims for civic identity and renown. A separation between the highly cultivated civic persona and the deepest recesses of interiority emerged.

What was in process of being colonized in the human mind was the rim of consciousness visible to society and the psychic center ministered to by the ceremonial and liturgical. The culture was all too anxious to furnish justification for the civic persona as well as consolation to the unquiet center. The obligation to make viable connections between rim and core was not encouraged by early humanism. Petrarchism, so popular among north Italians, established nobility of ego as an operational principle. The human condition was, then, precisely defined by its failure to sustain ideals and commitments. Further, the psyche was depicted as being circumscribed by its own laws, which rendered much of religious and ethical philosophy useless. The lyricism of the Renaissance became a noble stance in the face of inevitable loss. Renaissance poetry was constructed from such antitheses as love and hate, youth and old age, thus demonstrating the evanescence of all things human. A depth psychology could not readily be formulated to connect these polarities of human experience. Italian prose employed a behavioristic psychology whereby character was revealed through action and there was little temptation to probe the recesses of the human mind. Clearly, the comic view of antiquity provided the most entertainment and comfort, for it alone recounted man's fate and charted his knowable personality. Significantly, the tragic mode was alien to Renaissance dramatic art. Finally, in humanist historiography it was the phenomenological and limited that were championed against the transcendent and infinite. More thoroughly than any other intellectual activity, Renaissance historians rejected the grand quest for the noumenal.

A new taste for the gaudy in religious ceremony accompanied the accentuation
EPILOGUE

of styles and forms in civic life. What is suggested here is that the origins of the baroque were in the early Renaissance. In order to believe in the public world it became necessary to exaggerate its qualities. Intellectuals were perhaps too tender and solicitous in their desire to provide justification for the newly acquired ego props. Moreover, their fideism and contempt for metaphysics and theology encouraged a separation between the deep center of irrational yearning and the rim of cultivated ego.

In the north of Europe neither public world nor civic Christianity served to structure personality. Moreover, the extended sociability and chivalric ethos of medieval times still sustained the individual ego. Metaphysics, theology, and pietism readily acknowledged mystical alternatives; hence guilt and expiation were at the level of consciousness. The northern intellectual may have suffered more, but he continued to maintain his awareness of evil and sin. His world witnessed the gradual recession of medieval magic (sacramental bonds, ritual ties, and ceremonial identities); therefore the irrational was omnipresent, luring him to seek a deeper understanding of its equivalent in himself. His sensibilities became protestant: the colonization of the rim of the mind (public world) diminished and his energies served to clear new pathways between the outer and inner worlds.