Once the white flag of the Bourbons fluttered again over the pink façade of the Toulouse Capitole in the summer of 1815, the leading ultraroyalists of the city—Limairac, Joseph de Villèle, Savy-Gardeilh, Gounon, and others—found they were able to apply in practice their views on local government. Throughout France, in the wake of the second humiliation of Waterloo, there was a press of candidates for official posts who stated their desire to purify and strengthen the government that was obviously corrupted by the politics of the past quarter of a century. During the Restoration, there was a much wider participation and interest in government on the part of nobility, from its highest to its lowest echelons. Now that the upper reaches of army, church, and law could no longer be considered essentially noble prerogatives, the nobility wished not merely to recover lost ground, but to re-think its attitudes to other kinds of state service. Toulouse was no exception to this novel development. Service in municipal offices and on advisory councils of arrondissements and the department, the committee work that was considered before the Revolution not only vulgar and inelegant but dreary and demeaning, was now highly regarded as politically useful and morally worthy. There was a clear tendency for the former seigneur to become mayor in the place where his family lands had been located before the Revolution—if he still possessed them; Villèle was mayor of Mourvilles-Basses, Chalvet de Rochemonteix at Mervilles, and Baron de Montbel at Beaumont. They saw this as the practical affirmation of a
"paternal" interest in their villages. It might well be said that the Restoration prefects who encouraged this practice were often short of suitable candidates for office. In the Haute-Garonne, the mayor was usually literate, while his adjoints and members of the council were often unable to read and write adequately; the clearest administrative instructions were frequently misunderstood. Nobles were asked to fill positions for the simple reason that they were often the only person who could read and write that was available in smaller communities. On the other hand, the nobles were now aware of a moral obligation to take on such tedious duties. The son of the last seneschal of Toulouse, Chalvet de Rochemonteix, wrote to the prefect about the difficulty of finding candidates for municipal office who were confirmed royalists and of good morality, displaying zeal, ability, and strong character. He went on to lament the absence of such model men in the gloomy and exaggerated style so typical of the ultras:

You appear to wish that these functions should be filled as much as possible by the former seigneurs. The frightful effects of this destructive Revolution have dispersed some of them, others by its dreadful effects lost their fortune and no longer inhabit those places which were dear to their childhood, and of which they have seen themselves unjustly stripped by the consequence of their fidelity to the King and to legitimate principles.

Nevertheless, the Haute-Garonne had a high proportion of mayors who were Old Regime nobles, and these men took their social responsibilities seriously.

Service in the local government of a large city like Toulouse was obviously different from serving as the mayor of a country community. It was even more vital that the major city in the region should be controlled by men of royalist outlook. Despite the fact that nominations had to be approved by the ministry in Paris, it was evident that many of the city fathers were partisans of "the good cause." They never tired of describing the capitoulat's glories and pointing out the need to watch carefully for revolutionaries.

Edmond Lamouzèlè wrote in 1910 that, despite the differences between municipal governments in the Old Regime and those that

1 AN, F10II (Garonne, Haute-) 8.
2 AB, Chalvet de Rochemonteix to Prefect, March 22, 1816.
followed, the former contained the “fertile seeds” from which grew the nineteenth-century municipality of Toulouse. Another local historian, Ramet, rejected this, pointing to the abolition of the capitoulat, changes in the territorial divisions of the city, and different electoral procedures as signs of a complete break between the old and the new. However, Lamouzèle was certainly right in seeing a significant social continuity. Names like Savy-Gardeilh, d’Olive, Baron de Montbel, Miègeville, and Puymaurin were to be found on the lists of the capitouls and on the registers of the nineteenth-century municipality.

On the other hand, the institutional structure had undergone many changes. During the Revolution, there were rapid and successive changes in local government. The Consulate established, in the year VIII, the system of government which remained in force until 1837. Appointments to municipal councils were made for twenty-year periods, with a renewal of half of the membership every decade. Continuity in office was clearly more important than representation; until the Monarchy of July, the Councillors, once appointed, remained in office until they resigned. The desire for stability was stated under the Empire as well as the Restoration; Picot de Lapeyrrouse (appointed mayor in 1800), and his successor Bellegarde (appointed in 1806), each emphasized this theme in his inaugural address. When Bellegarde was appointed to the Corps Législatif in 1811, he was replaced by a pious and charitable old regime noble M. de Malaret, known locally as an excellent farmer.

This traditionalism was also to be found among the members of the municipal council, composed of lawyers, landowners, professional men, and some merchants. The men of law were well represented, even disproportionately so, in the years VIII, 1815, and 1830. There was an increasing tendency to call wealthy landowners to office; even the merchants were substantial propriétaires, men who at retirement from their business careers had translated their profits into the respectability of fields, woods, métairies, and country houses.

It is difficult to separate this rural base of wealth, enhanced by property in the city, from the politics of the councillors. Are they countrymen or city dwellers in their outlook? Many students of the pre-industrial city have emphasized the preponderantly urban nature of upper-class elements who were large landowners.⁶ The actual running of estates was largely in the hands of managers, and the landowner often had little direct contact with the lands which provided his income. Yet it is equally difficult to suppose that the pre-industrial city differed very much from the surrounding countryside. The city was a place where special skills and a variety of bureaucratic and social functions were concentrated for the benefit of the rural population. The peasant coming to market, school, cathedral, or court, as well as the landowner on a visit to his property, the merchant supplying the cottagers, or the doctor on his rounds were part of a complex symbiosis. In Toulouse, peasants lived within the city walls and went out daily to work in the garđiage. In such a situation, it is misleading to see a simplistic contrast between town and country.

The landowners of the municipal council of Toulouse varied in the degree of their civic concern. Some were assiduous and others made only token appearances. The small Protestant community in Toulouse had a spokesman in Courtois of the banking family, while the tiny Jewish community had no representation. In the absence of the mayor, the adjoints controlled the city and dealt with much of the daily routine of the municipality. The municipal council provided a forum for discussion of matters of general interest, and set up committees of investigation into problems such as what sort of water fountain was best to be constructed.

The polarization of ultraroyalist views on the council came about not in 1814 (although, to some extent, it had occurred then also), but in 1815, after the Hundred Days. The search for scapegoats upon the return of Bonaparte placed political sympathies of the municipal councillors under scrutiny. During the brief return of the Empire, a number of candidates for municipal office were proposed by the new prefect, among them Picot de Lapeyrouse, the ex-mayor; Ayral, who owned many biens nationaux; Saget, an “ami de la liberté” and a big landowner; and the iron-merchant Garrigou, who was described as a partisan of revolutionary principles. These

nominations were a roll-call of men distasteful to the ultras. Only Picot de Lapeyrouse, of a noble family, a leading member of the Society of Agriculture, and the Director of the Botanical Gardens, and Malaret, the turncoat mayor left in office although the Bonapartists considered him irresolute and at heart the protector of priests, dévots, and royalists, had an acceptable social background. The others were parvenus.

After the news of Waterloo, recriminations began. The local establishment had been inglorious in their easy acceptance of Bonapart’s return. Officials outdid themselves in declaring their loyalty to Louis XVIII and their revulsion against the fallen emperor. The municipal council proclaimed they had nothing to do with the “horrid treason” which had taken place, and that “the force of bayonettes and furious oppression by the revolutionary government were used to stifle their expostulations.” This was hardly to be taken seriously, and as if to compensate for it, those who had actually declared themselves for the Empire were savagely criticized. The prefect de Réusmat, who had held a number of important posts under the Empire before 1814, saw the need to bring this name-calling to an end. He wanted to make changes on the council to avoid possible grounds for disorder, and the men he put forward were something of a concession to the exasperated ultras. He had suggested a former sub-prefect of Toulouse as one of the new adjoints, a man disliked by the ultras, but he could not take the job because he had been given a new sub-prefecture in the neighboring department of Gers. Instead, Félix Gounon, son of the wealthiest merchant in Toulouse on the eve of the Revolution and himself a heated supporter of ultraroyalism took the position. His colleagues were Bruno Dubourg, a brother of the abbé from the noted counterrevolutionary parliamentary family; Ricard, later to be a deputy and much noted for his piety; and Paul Thoron, the import-export merchant who had retired as a landowner on the profits of his cloth trade with the Levant. The prefect claimed that he tried to avoid proposing ultra candidates in an attempt to prevent a further increase in the local power of Joseph de Villèle, who had been made mayor by the Duke of Angoulême in August, 1815, and who remained in office despite his prolonged absences as a deputy to the Chambre Introuvable. Réusmat failed in this effort.7

7 AN, F19II (Garonne, Haute-) 26.
The list of candidates for municipal councillors included men like Baron de Montbel, a relative of Villèle and a chevalier de la foi who was to hold office in the Polignac ministry of 1830. There were no forceful rivals to the ultra ascendancy on the reformed council of 1816.

Between 1820 and 1830, the intake to the council consisted of men of law, three landowners, a banker, a merchant, and the payeur du departement. For the rest of the Restoration, the council changed little in its composition and less in its political views, but continued to uphold the traditional outlook of the men of law and the landowners of Toulouse.

What then was the nature of these static municipal politics, and how were they expressed? Certainly they coexisted uneasily with the highly emotional outbursts of the White Terror. Joseph de Villèle, soon to become one of the major figures among the ultra-royalists in the capital, had little sympathy for hotheads. The prefect de Rémusat came to appreciate the quiet administrative talents of the new mayor and to admire his private virtues. The main problem was, in fact, the father of Villele who showed considerable ability as a farmer and who had a firm grasp of taxation law, both of which he passed on to his son. However, the father had not the same emotional self-control. Even in the Old Regime he published vituperative pamphlets denouncing a local tax official, and with advancing years he became increasingly cantankerous. He often appeared at the town hall as well as in the royalist salons as the deputy of his son, and he took every opportunity to denounce dangerous modern innovations. Joseph de Villèle, while always a respectful and submissive son, seconded the prefect in calming his father's exaggerated denunciations of "Jacobins" and discounted them as mere imaginative outbursts of an inflamed meridional temperament. Rémusat thought that Villèle disdained "the vaporous passions of occitan royalism." At the same time, Villèle was more committed to his excitable friends than to the prefect for obvious reasons, and the path he trod was a narrow one. He had to show opposition to the royal appointments, but provide sensible guidance for local ultras. His adjoints in the municipality called for firm measures against subversives while the prefecture insisted that

8 AN, F10II (Garonne, Haute-) 26.
imprisonment should not be arbitrary.10 Villèle wavered between arresting and releasing the suspects.

The ultraroyalists called constantly for dismissals at all levels of government. The Villèle family archives provide an insight into the grounds for appointments in an undated "List of persons who ought to be brought to the attention of mayor, of recognised ability, being of good life and morals, devoted to the family of the Bourbons by their conduct." Many of these were without doubt, rank-and-file members of the vérédets. Their qualities were of the order of "very learned in writing," or "good writer," and one, in fact, was described as a "royal volunteer, good for a writing job in an office or at the octroi." They were destined to replace men described as a "great fédéral brigand," an "owner of biens nationaux," or "faking royalism." Minor officials like the dues collectors at the Arnaud Bernard, Montgaillard, and St. Etienne gates, the five employees of the bureau central, and the clerks and the inspector of the Canal du Midi were under heavy attack.

The Ministry of the Interior looked on this situation in Toulouse with considerable suspicion. Villèle thought in 1816 that he should resign from the post of mayor because of the hostility shown to him by officials at the ministry. He found that he was of little help to his fellow citizens, since his lobbying in Paris was usually ignored. He resented being accused of complicity in the Ramel assassination, an accusation which he considered intolerable. Mme de Villèle wrote to him that the adjoints would probably follow him if he resigned, thus bringing about disorganization of the municipality and, still worse, replacements by unsuitable men. Discouragement and fear would be sown among the common people who had showed devotion to the royal cause and who would feel deprived of any support. She warned that, if the ultras needed popular support in the future, this might not come; the people would remember that they had been "vexed for having served the cause too well."11 The adjoints also felt hindered by political enmities and one, Thoron, did resign in February, 1817, a year before Villèle finally gave up the mayoralty. Throughout the period from the end of the Hundred Days to February, 1818, the municipal government was acutely conscious of the hostility of the central government.

10 ADHG, 4 M 39, correspondence between procureur du roi and the municipality of Toulouse.
11 AV, Mme de Villèle to Joseph de Villèle, December 11, 1816.
At the beginning of 1818, the prefect Saint-Chamans reported concern in the city, caused by rumors of Villelé's resignation. The mayor was the most prominent exponent of ultraroyalism in Toulouse and in Paris, and books and pamphlets expressing the ultra point of view were spread in profusion and read avidly in the city. When Saint-Chamans nominated Baron de Bellegarde, a mayor of the city during the Empire who was appointed by Paris, it was to be expected that he would be denounced. Anglaret, one of those who were tried for complicity in the Ramel assassination, wrote to Vil­lèle that all the wicked in the city were delighted with the new official. Bellegarde, for his part, protested that his health, a projected visit to England, and above all the violence of political opinions made his job difficult. Even so, he accepted, and proved to be a talented if tactless administrator. In July, 1818, he clashed in the municipal council with Marquis d'Escouloubre over the hospital budget. The discussion became very heated when Bellegarde stated that it was unclear what had become of the 12,000 francs for which Escouloubre was responsible. The marquis, enraged, challenged him to a duel and, in consequence, was forced to resign. Episodes of this sort made the ultras his enemies. He tried to end the political rancor which was prevalent in the city; for example he organized two "Festivals of Reconciliation and For­getting the Past"—a banquet, various sports events, dances, and processions—in the districts most Napoleonic in sympathy, Saint Cyprien and Arnaud Bernard. Political views appeared in addresses and resolutions of the municipal council. The assassination of the Duc de Berry by Louvel as he was leaving the Paris Opera in February, 1820, reinforced local criticism of freedom of the press. The municipality called on royal authority to chain irreligion so that the social order would no longer be menaced with destruction and France could again find the stability that had been enjoyed by it for eight centuries and that could be guaranteed only by the Bourbons. A year later, on the anniversary of the assassination, another address was voted, calling for severe repression of seditious doctrines. The original

12 AN, F79659.
13 AV, Anglaret to Villelé, March 17, 1818.
14 AN, F111I (Garonne, Haute-) 26.
included the ominous words: “Justice! Justice! The heads of the obscure are insufficient to redeem such a crime.” The procureur général was able to report, with satisfaction, that the wiser members of the council suppressed this vague threat. In 1822, the council was angered by liberal protests against the new censorship laws and again called for strong action against subversive publications. More than this, it said that although the Chamber of Deputies should be a forum for discussions of the welfare and happiness of the people, too often revolutionary doctrines were to be heard there, with insults to France, apologies for revolt, and seditious appeal to the population. This would have to be halted.\textsuperscript{16}

There was an ultra clique in the municipal council that pressed these views with particular passion. It was led by the first adjoint Félix Gounon, who has already been discussed in another connection. He met frequently with his friends in a café on the Place Rouaix, the meeting place of the city ultras. There he planned the opposition to mayor Bellegarde. The mayor became very irritated by this constant resistance to his policy on the part of his subordinate, a resistance he put down to Gounon’s desire to become mayor and a deputy. The extremists of the Café Rouaix and the \textit{Echo du Midi} encouraged Gounon’s ambitions. They wanted war to be declared on the liberal government in Spain, villified those who were moderate towards liberals, and hoped for a vigorous ultra-royalist municipal policy. At the beginning of 1822, Bellegarde sent his own complaints against Gounon and his carping friends to Villèle in the hope that Gounon could be made to retire, but his adversary in fact outlasted him. Bellegarde resigned in 1823, but Gounon, the darling of the ultras, stayed in office until the July Monarchy and provided for a decade a focus for ultra views inside the Toulouse municipality.

Gounon could direct his disapproval against Bellegarde’s moderate successor, Comte Joseph-Thimoléon d’Hargenvilliers, a nobleman of military origin who had fought in the American War of Independence. He returned to France and served in the army during the Revolution in the general staff of the army of the Pyrenees with the rank of a général de brigade, but he was suspended in December, 1793, and sentenced to imprisonment by the revolu-

\textsuperscript{16} AMT, registers of municipal deliberations, February 21, 1820; February 8, 1821; April 20, 1822.
tionary tribunal of Perpignan. Released after the 9th of Thermidor, his career advanced; he attended the coronation of Napoleon and was made a Baron of the Empire. Despite this, after the Hundred Days, the Duc d'Angoulême appointed him commander of the Tarn and Aveyron. He was not confirmed in this position, but was named to preside over the cour prévôtale of the Aveyron. He lived in Toulouse. The prefect Saint-Chamans thought well of him, but his successor, Comte de Juigné, strongly recommended Baron de Montbel, a kinsman of Villele, to replace Hargenvilliers.

Guillaume-Isidore, Baron de Montbel, was named mayor of Toulouse in January, 1826. His adjoints were the indestructible Félix Gounon, Bernadet, Duchan, and St. Raymond. The Echo du Midi was delighted with this nomination. It considered him to be a virtuous citizen, an enlightened magistrate, and a faithful royalist who would give royalists the guarantees necessary for the interests of religion, monarchy, and the city. Montbel, in short, was an ultra candidate, the first one clearly so since the mayorality of Villele from 1815 to 1818. He also favored economic progress and technical education in a city particularly dear to the heart of Charles X.17 Indeed, his administration was marked by a number of successful innovations, and he was elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1830. He was replaced by a noble of parlementary origins, de Rességuier.

Rességuier did not hold office for long. His appointment of November, 1829, was soon to be terminated by the Revolution of 1830. On August 3, 1830, the prefect broke with the past, and called on the local banker Joseph Viguerie to be mayor of the city. The Viguerie family was better known for its doctors than for its businessmen, and Joseph, while rich, was of a conciliatory character. He had been an unsuccessful liberal candidate in the elections. Thus he was not prepossessing as a vigorous representative of a new order, but he was put forward since nobody more suitable could be found. In turn he was proposed for the post by two deputies who lived in the city but were not elected by the department, “for the reason that the Haute-Garonne has no constitutionnel deputy.”18

The new mayor set about replacing members of the municipal

17 Echo du Midi, February 14, 1826.
18 AMT, registers of the deliberations of the municipal council, August 3, 1830; AN, F16II (Garonne, Haute-) 26.
council who were clearly ill-disposed to the government of Louis Philippe. A new council was called, the flower of local liberal opinion, composed of seven landowners, seven lawyers, and sixteen men of commercial interests (including five bankers, a stockbroker, and others ranging from a sculptor to a physics professor). This was clearly a new emphasis on recruitment, different from that which prevailed under the Empire and Restoration. In France at large, Guizot’s ordinances dismissed over six thousand municipal officials, half of whom were mayors. 19

After 1830, the legitimists were divided between the policy of continuing in municipal politics or holding aloof. In the later years of the decade, a number of them rejoined the struggle to express their ideas, but they were never to regain the ascendancy of the Restoration years.

A place on the conseil général of the department or on one of the conseil d’arrondissement was even more attractive to ambitious ultras than service in municipal government. Such councils not only demanded less time of the members, but they seemed to be a continuation of those regional assemblies of the Old Regime which were so often cited as the models for effective local administration. Comte Louis de Villeneuve, a very active member of the Society of Agriculture, declared in 1816 that a prosperous agriculture would result from the creation of departmental administration which was a strengthened conseil général. This was the way to establish the type of government that produced the prosperity of the pays d’états before 1789. 20 Many of his fellow ultras shared this favorable view of the councils. The membership of these bodies became increasingly aristocratic during the Empire and the Restoration. Napoleon encouraged the recruitment of noblemen and, as a liberal author noted in 1827, the address of the councils showed how narrowly the public interest was identified with that of the local nobility. The councils were “aristocratic in essence and by nomination,” and this did not escape the notice of the Toulouse ultras. 21


20 Journal des propriétaires ruraux des départements du Midi, XII (1816), 134–53.

21 Eyraud, De l’administration de la justice (Paris, 1825), I, 251–70.
The departmental conseil général convened annually for no longer than fifteen days at the chef-lieu in order to advise the prefect, and ultimately the government, on matters of local administration and finance. At the time of its creation under the dispositions of the law of 28 Pluviôse VIII (February 17, 1800), the council represented five arrondissements in the Haute-Garonne, one of which was subsequently transferred to the Tarn-et-Garonne at the creation of that department in 1809. The prefect could, and did, attend meetings in order to contribute to the discussion among those of the twenty-four members who were present. These men were supposedly appointed for a fixed time; the Sénatus-Consulte of 16 Thermidor X laid down that the council should be renewed by a third every five years. Not until after the law of June 22, 1833, were these regulations on renewal observed precisely.22 As a result, until this date, the members of the council enjoyed long tenure and became well acquainted with the details of the allocation of the tax load among the arrondissements, public welfare, and the need for road works, changes in agriculture, and encouragement of industry. They made adjustments in tax allocations after hearing appeals, and they decided on the number of centimes additionnels facultatifs to be levied to cover purely local expenses. These men had the task of dealing with public issues of some consequence; and while the time limit on the annual meeting was deliberately intended to prevent a political body emerging, it was inevitable that this group of big landowners evolved into a corporate entity. During the Empire and the Restoration, the council frequently expressed an opinion on political and economic subjects, and on occasion criticized the government.

The recruitment to the council before 1814 reflected the Napoleonic attempt to enlist the support of local notables for the Empire. The council included members who had substantial holdings in biens nationaux. It boasted a number of Old Regime nobles. Joseph de Villelêle, a member of the council, said all the notable landowners of the department belonged to the council under the Empire. There was no serious shake-up under the First Restoration of 1814. A local nobleman of slightly tarnished reputation, Baron

22 A. Godoffre, Conseil général du département de la Haute-Garonne, délibérations de l'an VIII à 1838 (Toulouse, 1869–70), I, 22; Félix Ponteil, Les institutions de la France de 1814 à 1870 (Paris, 1966), chapter III.
of the Empire Charles de Caffarelli, former prefect of the Ardèche, Calvados, and Aube whose career had begun in the canonicate of the cathedral of Tours, was forced to join in 1814, after being threatened with the loss of his pension. He followed a dignified course at the Hundred Days, however, and refused the oath to Napoleon. A number of his colleagues followed a less proper line. After having signed an address of loyalty to Louis XVIII which promised their fealty to the death, they neither fought nor died as the Emperor retook control of France. The council was convened during the Hundred Days, and three members of the former council actually took the oath; the rest simply did not appear; and Lasplanes and Caffarelli deliberately refused. The new appointments included a number of juges and avocats, like the young Romiguieres, who were to be associated with the liberals thereafter.

Just as in the case of the municipal council of Toulouse, the restoration of Louis XVIII to his throne produced recriminations against the weak behavior of the council. Rémusat thought a number of councillors who were particularly compromised should be changed, but the government in Paris, already alarmed by reports of the “government” of the Duc d’Angoulême and his ultra entourage, by the murder of General Ramel, and by the terrorizing of Protestants and various officials, thought no useful purpose would be served by appearing to sanction the White Terror by such dismissals. The prefect replied that the municipal council was almost deserted, and the same thing could happen to the conseil général; the majority of members would not attend, rather than compromise themselves by sitting with men of “bad” political views. In any case, old and sick members should be replaced, and he suggested collective appointments to avoid unpleasant distinctions. When his first letter went unanswered, he put the same argument a second time: “Please believe also that in an area (pays) where heads are incandescent, the methods of keeping peace must be changed constantly; very little cause can furnish the pretext of breaking it.” The replacements he was proposing were prudent and judicious men, he assured the minister, and constituted in every respect the

23 ADHG, 2 M bis 2.
24 AN, F1 II (Garonne, Haute-) 8, Rémusat to Minister of Interior, March 15, 1816.
25 AN, F1 II (Garonne, Haute-) 8, Rémusat to Minister of Interior, June 14, 1816.
elite of the department. When the reply came, however, it contained a sharp reprimand for vague condemnations and insidious distinctions. Should not the merchant Hémet, for example, who was proposed for replacement on the grounds that his business affairs were disordered (although he was neither dishonest nor in danger of bankruptcy), be retained for the reason that he was the only member engaged actively in commerce? The prefect responded by saying there were two very enlightened merchants on the council, Lafont-Cazeing and Thoron, whom he had only designated as landowners on his list of candidates because they owned very considerable property. As for Hémet, "without speaking of his disordered business affairs as a merchant (négociant), which is important because he has almost no property," he had also been involved in fraudulent bookkeeping. In fact, the prefect placed a heavy emphasis on the absolute necessity of removing a number of present members from the departmental and arrondissement councils if a really serious scandal was not to be caused when they met.26

For a variety of reasons, some political and some related to health and age, nineteen members of the old council were not reappointed in 1816. Significantly, several of those retained in office had sworn the oath to the Emperor, like Lafont-Cazeing who made a fortune during the Revolution by selling sheep and cattle, particularly in the Saint-Lys region and at Toulouse. He was the wealthiest man in the department, apparently honest, with numerous business interests and an annual revenue estimated at about 200,000 francs. His total fortune, calculated on the contemporary assumption that revenue equaled five percent of the total capital was at least one million francs.27 Lassus-Camon, son of a councilor to the Parlement, was one of the rare individuals from that milieu who adapted to the new political situation during the period of Revolution. He had made a fortune in the lucrative, if disreputable, post of commissaire des guerres. He also took the oath during the Hundred Days, was mayor of his community, and had extensive holdings in biens nationaux.28 The nine new members were all land-

26 Ibid., Minister of Interior to Rému sat, June 22, 1816.
27 J.-C. Duphil, "Les notables patentes de Toulouse sous le premier empire," Mémoire pour le diplôme d'études supérieures, Toulouse University, 1959, B.U.T.
28 ADHG, 2 M 7.
owners, but included Paul Thoran, a retired merchant who could be assumed to have an appreciation of commercial interests, the notary Anilhau, and Alexandre de Cambon. In short, the conseil général underwent a shake-up, but not a real purge of those who had not behaved well during the Hundred Days. The general tone of the council became decidedly ultra, for Villèle, Escouloubre, Marsac, and Palarin now spoke out on most public issues without the discretion of earlier times.

Although the council became increasingly noble during the Restoration as new members were recruited, there were variations in the range of wealth. Lafont-Cazeing had a very large annual revenue of 200,000 francs, while the only active merchant, Hémet, had only a modest sum of 3,000 francs.29

Toulouse and its arrondissement had a disproportionate representation on the council. In November, 1824, fifteen members of the council were from Toulouse, three from Muret, three from St. Gaudens, and three from Villefranche. A table drawn up to establish the ratios of population and tax paid by the arrondissements showed that, while the three districts other than Toulouse were less wealthy, their representation should be increased in the interests of equity. At the same time, it was noted that several members of the council noted as residing in Toulouse had “in all probability, a large part of their property in other arrondissements.”30

During the period of 1816-30, there was only a slight turnover in the membership, caused by deaths and resignations. Nine new members joined the council, only one of whom was a commoner, and all of whom were ultras. All these appointments were dismissed after the July Revolution. Their names are a roster of influential ultra landowners: the Vicomte Marcel de Marin, Baron Mathieu-Louis Hocquart, Baron Anne-Antoine de Roquette-Buisson, Baron de Saintegène, Chevalier Armand Dubourg, Comte de Brettes-Thurin, Morier, Prévost, and Duran. Four of them were deputies and foreshadowed the typical deputy-mayor of the Third Republic. Armand Dubourg said that he could explain local issues at the Chamber of Deputies, and told his fellow councilors of the

29 See Table 1, p. 189. Information taken from AN, F1bII (Garonne, Haute-) 7, 8; ADHG, 2 M bis 1, 2, 3. These figures are conservative, and show rough official estimates of the wealth of members.
30 AN, F1bII (Garonne, Haute-) 8.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE ULTRAS

difficulties which faced the government in an attempt to satisfy all requests.\textsuperscript{31}

Sixteen councilors, including the most distinguished ultras, left the conseil général after the July Revolution. It was the year of 1830 that marked a decided reverse for the landowners of conservative views who had used this organization for expressing their views since the First Empire. The excellent results of the administrative practice of the Estates of Languedoc were being cited in July, 1800, during the first session. Napoleon wrote from Milan in December, 1807, asking the Minister of the Interior to report on the impudent views expressed in the council by some members: “It appears that the worst frame of mind is displayed there: that comparison has been made between the Old Regime and the New, that regrets have even been expressed for the former Estates of Languedoc.”\textsuperscript{32} During a discussion of the droits réunis, the most unpopular of Napoleonic taxes, Lasplancs, Monna, Escouloubre, de Villeneuve-Vernon, and Romiguières the elder, were heard, all employed by the former government either as barons of the Estates of Languedoc, or as members of the Parlement. These gentlemen did not restrict themselves to speaking against the tax on wine, a subject on which they had the least to say, but they attacked all the institutions created by His Majesty. They demanded the abolition of the prefectures, the re-establishment of the provincial estates, and of the religious teaching orders, they attacked the establishment of lycées, observing that the military instruction given in them could only corrupt morals and that the vices which had been introduced into these schools could only exhaust youth: they even allowed themselves to slander odiously the chiefs of the Toulouse lycée. They attacked the gendarmerie and the game-keepers [gardes champêtres]. They spoke out against the administrations of water and forests, taxation, and the division of expenditures. They carried their delirium to the extent of saying that the re-establishment of the Estates of the Province was the only remedy to bring to an end the deplorable state in which the department found itself. Such extravagances demonstrate the character of the membership.\textsuperscript{33}

This vigorous criticism, somewhat exaggerated by the report, shows that the council saw itself as more than an intermediary between

\textsuperscript{31} See Table 2, p. 190.
\textsuperscript{32} AN, F11-V (Garonne, Haute-) 2.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid.
the government and the taxpayers of the department. The views of new institutions, in an unfavorable contrast with the old ones, adumbrate ultra views that were so often put forth during the Restoration.

The departmental councils tended, inevitably, to be anti-centralist, like the earlier provincial assemblies set up before the Revolution, which they resembled in some important respects. In 1814, Villèle published a pamphlet that attacked not only representative government, but the centralized administration as well. He signed his diatribe as "a member of the departmental council" and called for a return to local liberties which existed before 1789, when the nobility was protected in its material independence by provincial privileges.

In 1816, these views were expressed in a major attack on centralism, produced by the council and probably largely the work of Villèle. The statement was preceded by the maxim that in political administration, as in mechanics, unnecessary complexity was to be avoided. They wanted to navigate between the concentration of power in a national center and too much dispersion of local representation, which would result in ineffectual institutions. France in the Old Regime had thirty-three intendancies [sic] which had been inflated into eighty-three departments: Languedoc alone had been divided into eight departments, despite the dubious administrative advantage and the certain economic damage which this produced. The council declared that the old province of Languedoc cost annually 340,000 francs to administer, but that the new administrations which replaced the former one cost 995,159 francs. At a time when prisons, hospitals, roads, and the clergy of the area desperately needed extra funds, the conseil général was disturbed to consider 665,146 francs unnecessarily spent on maintaining a greedy bureaucracy. Moreover, the poorer departments could not collect sufficient centimes additionnels to pay the cost of their prefects, sub-prefects, councilors at the prefecture, and the rentals of courts, prisons, prefectures, etc. On the other hand, the council said any regrouping of administrative units must consider the rights of the community, which were like those of an individual, contrary to the departments which were essentially artificial modern innovations. The reason was that communes were the sole remaining traces of the former monarchy that even the Revolution had been unable to smash, presumably because they were coterminous with the former
parishes and thus made up the basic unit of local life. The council envisaged a reorganised administrative system in which there would be larger blocs within France, controlled by wealthy landowners. Men holding local offices, "of necessity unpaid," provided the stability needed to govern. Certainly the existing system of mayors in communes was unsatisfactory, for it was difficult to find men in each commune suitable for the office and willing to discharge it. Many of the mayors were peasants who worked land with their own hands, and were illiterate; yet they were entrusted with tasks more difficult than those given to the former consuls. Many communities had ineffectual municipal government, where councillors could not even make out a budget. The public interest, and what was described as a return to healthy ideas, made it necessary to appoint officials who were above the people, and by the greater social distance free from the suspicion and attacks of those administered.

The council also called for reform of the Napoleonic legacy in the matter of regional appeal courts; for Toulouse, they felt, was abused by the Empire. In 1789, the city had held the second Parliament of France, whereas in 1816 it was merely the seat of an appeal court. Agen, Rioms, and Poitiers—all smaller cities—boasted larger courts. The council also criticized the proliferation of courts of First Instance, not only because it was unreasonable to expect an able man to live in some remote village on a poor salary, but more importantly because it was unwise to provide the peasants with the opportunity to start litigation. Members of the council which represented essentially the great landowners of the department thought it unwise to give the rural families close contact with "men whose interest is to encourage intestine strife."\(^{34}\)

Not content with the sweeping recommendations contained in this report of 1816, the council obliquely criticized royal moderation in politics. In an address which it voted to be presented to the throne, there was an arch allusion to the enthusiastic reception given to the ultra deputies of Toulouse upon their return from Paris, by implication a criticism of the policy which the Chambre Introuvable so vigorously combatted. When the relevant sections

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\(^{34}\) AN, FrV (Garonne, Haute-) 2. Report of commission requested to give opinion on new limits to be given administrative and judicial bodies of the kingdom. Procès-verbal, July 26, 1816.
The ultras constantly criticized the centralization of French administration, which they correctly saw as the most striking governmental consequence of the Revolution. In 1824, the council made a major statement of this important royalist theme of hostility to the extension of bureaucratic power. The prefects were particularly obnoxious, and the prefectural system was called a “product of imperial despotism resulting from the distrustful and rapacious spirit of that dictatorship.” (The similarities to the system of intendants were not mentioned.) The paternal authority of the Bourbons rested on the foundation of popular affection; therefore, the excessive strain of decisions placed on the ministers could well be given over to the charge of local notables most intimately concerned with them. An intermediary body between Paris and the communal level, inspired by the experience of the departments, the Estates of Languedoc and the Provincial Assemblies, and the conseils généraux would be invaluable. As the council put it, the government could draw from the rich treasure of experience and traditions all that was compatible with the circumstances after the major changes of recent times. The reorganization would also have the effect of effacing the memories of “agitations politiques” and would increase popular gratitude for the Restoration. The wisdom and generosity of the King would thus prevent demagoguery or political excesses.

The statements of 1816 and 1824 were representative of the views of landowners who wanted to counterbalance the attraction of national politics and influence which flourished in Paris around the ministers and which menaced their own local ascendancy. At the same time, they saw themselves as well above the common people of their own area, whom they wished less to represent than to rule. Their wealth and family status meant little if unbuttressed by real power; and while some of the group had been able to become deputies in the capital, it was also necessary to provide a local stage for the satisfaction of the ambitions of their fellows. The former provincial estates offered themselves to the minds of the members as the vehicle for directing an essentially federal state,
based on historic and hence "organic" regions. They saw these bodies as the necessary counterpart to centralized authority. Local notables, by exercising political power, broke that simplified line of authority which led to despotism. These views were commonplace in nineteenth-century France long before de Tocqueville's brilliant expositions of the theme. Camus de Martroy, the prefect of the Haute-Garonne who took office in 1829, took up this idea in his inaugural address. He flattered the council as being a direct continuation of the Estates of Languedoc and of the provincial assemblies. He spoke warmly about the value of their advice, the power of moral persuasion which they exercised. The council was, he said, an element of stability in the unstable lives of representative governments; while ministers and prefects come and go, the annual meetings of this group of worthies are fixed and regular. Was not the Haute-Garonne (excepting the arrondissement of Saint Gaudens, specifically singled out for reproach) among the most faithful, most law-abiding, most prompt ones in paying tax of all the departments of France?

Local liberties were the main political concern of the council; the price of grain was the major practical concern in a wheat-producing area. The famine of 1816-17 brought about very high prices, from which many of the council members had profitted; but it was followed by a steady decline in the level of wheat prices throughout France, a decline which was felt particularly keenly in the valley of the Garonne. During the famine, Russian wheat, shipped from Odessa, appeared on the Marseilles market, and during the following decade of good harvests and low prices caused by overproduction, the growers of the South-west, South, and Burgundy consistently blamed falling prices on the presence of foreign wheat. While this "blé exotique" made up an insignificant fraction of the supply, various laws were passed to mollify angry wheat producers; in July, 1819, a sliding scale of duties was imposed on imported wheat, reminiscent of the Corn Laws in Britain. The Haute-Garonne conseil général declared the measure inadequate even before it had been put into effect, claiming that, with only a small duty levied, the brokers of Marseille could market Russian wheat at a price which undercut French prices. Quite apart from the absurd exaggeration of the figures cited—it was claimed that Mar-

32 Ibid.
scilles, after duty, could sell wheat at 14.75 francs the hectolitre while the national price was 22 francs—there was inconsistency in the council's views. In their petition of 1819 they said that, in the year XI, wheat prices fell to 9 francs the hectolitre during the blockade, at a time when French producers were supplying armies in the field and foreign regions of the Empire. This made nonsense of the protectionist system they wished to introduce, but the council attacked the theory of free exchange as illusory in a situation where it was unevenly applied by governments. The council was indignant at the impractical chatter of economists of the liberal school: "... there, however, is the result of these pretty theories which are good in the study to occupy idlers who don't have much to do with the world; they ought to stay there and never come out, because facts contradict them and we ought to have been cured a long time ago."28 When it became widely apparent that the 1819 law was having no effect on the downward trend of prices, a call went up for more stringent legislation, especially in an area where the sale of wheat was the vital nerve of economic activity. A law of 1821 again raised duties on imported wheat, and by an artifice in the choice of markets, the official price of wheat was consistently cited as lower than the level which actually prevailed. Toulouse, a center of wheat production, won completely over the port of Marseilles, which was a centre of consumption and importation. Despite the protective legislation, prices continued to fall, to the complete exasperation of the landowners. The council noted in 1824 that the economic stagnation of an agricultural department was causing public opinion to turn against the government. If further measures were taken to stop the import of foreign grain, the people would be able to bear their sufferings with more equanimity. The council went on to say that if the poor were interested only in cheap food (a proposition which conflicted with earlier statements), the interests of the producers should also be considered.39 Unwilling to drop Russian wheat as the explanation for all difficulties, many conseils généraux suggested that the entrepôt of Marseilles was used as a contraband device. Finally, in 1825, the entrepôt was suppressed. This gave satisfaction to the ultra landowners, who never tired of

38 AN, F1v V (Garonne, Haute) 2.
proclaiming that agriculture should not be sacrificed to trade: “Does liberty, or to say better, speculative lucre, need to grow until it destroys the constitutive principle of France?”

Decentralization and wheat prices were much on the minds of the councilors, but other issues of social control were also considered in their discussions of education, prisons, roads, and public life. The touchstone for all these principles was religion. Wanting to encourage a strong clerical influence in education and public life, the council praised religious orders providing public service within the department. The Dames de Refuge, many of whom were from the upper classes, were commended for running a reformatory for penitent prostitutes. This was not only a religious establishment, but one which would have had to be established by secular authorities if it did not exist (although, as the council put it, only piety and charity could effectively provide such a service. Incidentally, the council observed that only one-tenth of the prostitutes came from Toulouse, although almost all were from the department). Although this allowance had already been vetoed once by the ministry, on the grounds that it was not within the council’s jurisdiction to bestow, it voted a grant of 4,000 francs to the reformatory. The Brothers of the Christian Doctrine, the ignorantins, were commended in 1811 for spreading virtue among the lower classes of society that would be depraved without these good offices, and in 1823, the council offered 6,000 francs to the first community to provide lodgings and support for this order. In 1826, a call was made for more aid to teaching orders, for the suppression of lotteries, and for a check on the license of the press that corrupted the towns and countryside of France with anti-monarchist works. The council called for higher clerical salaries and more priests in the department, and generally expressed the support for accelerated training and recruitment plans of the Church, underway during the Restoration.

This loud devotion to the interests of the Catholic Church had limits, however, as was shown rather quaintly by the reply given by the council to the Archbishop of Toulouse Clermont-Tonnerre, who requested the return of the former episcopal palace that had been confiscated during the Revolution and subsequently became the prefecture. The council, while heartily protesting its esteem for

40 AN, F119 V (Garonne, Haute-) 3; ADHG, 1 M 11.
the archbishop, refused to take on the expense involved in finding new quarters for the prefect. The councillors made the snide observation that the Christian charity of Archbishop Clermont-Tonnerre would make him suffer in face of hardships to taxpayers involved in the enabling taxation: "... how can such sacrifices be required of taxpayers when revenue sources dry up because of low cereal prices and the almost total obliteration of commerce makes necessary the most severe economy?" Clermont-Tonnerre did not take refusals of any kind lightly and renewed his request in the following year, but the council then stated categorically that it could not redress the situation of the "ci-devant clerge." As was so often the case, the ultras of Toulouse showed that they did not confuse their practice with their preaching.

The council in each arrondissement was a lesser version of the conseil général, with similar advisory powers on matters of local concern, especially roads and distribution of the tax load. In 1805, the prefect nominated to the council of Toulouse arrondissement a former advocate to the Parlement, a former engineer of the royal Ponts et Chaussées, and a retired enregistrement inspector. All of these were substantial landowners. At the time of the Hundred Days, there was a division of political opinion about the Napoleonic regime. Six members of the council took the oath of allegiance, three men refused it, and one man abstained or, more precisely, was never heard from. Two of the men who refused to take the oath were hospital administrators (Barrué and Sabatié) and were in close touch with pious ultras.

The major shake-up of membership in 1816 followed the same general trend as indicated by the conseil général. The new council was composed of seven important landowners, a former councilor to the Parlement (de Fajolle-Giscaro), a lawyer, a former trésorier de France, and an émigré officer who had become expert in mining. Eight years later, most of these men were still in office. As in the conseil général, the regulations about renewing the membership were virtually a dead letter under the Restoration. Those replacements who did take their seats were ultras: Félix Gounon (adjoint to the mayor of Toulouse discussed above) and de Marcorelle.

41 Ibid.
42 AN, F1bII (Garonne, Haute-) 8.
43 ADHG, 2 M bis 2.
44 AN, F1bII (Garonne, Haute-) 8.
This lesser council showed its similarity to the *conseil général* in more than the patterns of recruitment and service. It held also the same political views. In 1816, the authority of the Bourbons was invoked whenever political dissension was to be halted. Under the Old Regime, France had seen less bloodshed than in the twenty-five years following 1789, it was observed. Besides praising the exercise of a conservative royal power, the council dealt with a petition, discussed the prisons, and encouraged the efforts of the Society for Agriculture.45 In all of this, there was the same covert disapproval of the central government's moderate policy as was expressed by the departmental council. The mining inspector Aubuisson de Voisins wrote to Lainé in 1816 that opposition to government policy was to be found on both the municipal and *arrondissement* councils of Toulouse.46 Later in the Restoration, the council was particularly insistent on the need for more religion in French life. They also campaigned against low wheat prices, blamed on the import of cheap foreign wheat at uncompetitive prices.47 In short, the views of the *conseil d'arrondissement* were a reflexion of the views of the *conseil général*.

Public service of this sort at the communal, city, arrondissement, and departmental level attracted the most important ultras. Villèle was a mayor and a *conseiller général*; Gounon was an *adjoint* to the municipality; and Dubourg a *conseiller général*. The opportunities for really effective political action on these bodies was limited, but they provided a range of offices and status for the ultras. Their absorption in the minutiae of local government and their constant reiteration of authoritarian and religious principles became in large measure an end in itself that had little relation to developments in the rest of the country. If such activity was its own reward, this was not the case of the administration of justice, the traditional concomitant of landed wealth in the Toulousain. The continuity of the parlementarians in the judicial system and the way in which the ultras saw the organization of social control are the subject of the following chapter.

45 *ADHG*, 2 M 34; July 8, 1816.
46 E. de Fereeval, *Un adversaire de Napoléon, le vicomte de Lainé...* (Paris, 1926), II, 68.
47 *ADHG*, 2 M 36.