During the Napoleonic period, southern royalists were, as one noble beauty put it, "a caste which made up for its lack of numbers by the religious cult it dedicated to its political faith, and by its pitiless rigor towards apostasies or even towards lesser failings." She saw this group as essentially made of the nobility and a few commoners. This political faith of the royalists was little more than a vaguely legitimist set of sympathies or, more exactly, a feeling that the contemporary world was less satisfactory than that before 1789. News of the Bourbons was in very short supply. The Imperial censorship carefully deleted references to the former dynasty which might encourage royalist hopes. The publications which did circulate were full of panegyric about Napoleon and his military exploits. Even a royalist family like the Villèles lacked accurate information about the Bourbons. A quaint example of this lack of news was provided by abbé Trenqualié who preached enthusiastically at Saint Etienne in 1814 on the good fortune of France in regaining its legitimate sovereigns and praised the Queen, obviously unaware that she had been dead for four years. As Chateaubriand observed, the Bourbons were as little known in Restoration France as the children of the Chinese Emperor. Royalist political associations of a sort existed at Toulouse,

2 Guillaume-Isidore de Montbel, Souvenirs... 1787–1831 (Paris, 1913), p. 115.
such as the clique of the octogenarian Villeneuve de Beauville, who by virtue of a discreet retirement to the country during the Revolution had passed without trouble through the Terror. During the Empire he met with elderly cronies of similar royalist ideas who were known derisively as the Conseil des Anciens. They were too senile and inept to be considered dangerous by the authorities. There is no evidence of royalist-motivated discontent other than trivial incidents, like the minor official of the Parlement who had been an émigré with French royalist forces in Spain before his return to Toulouse where he lived on the Rue du Salin in the parlementary district. Poor and proud, he lived by his wits as a general sollicitor and was accused of spreading rumors against the Emperor and encouraging young conscripts to avoid military service. The reports on him made clear that he was an unhappy neurotic rather than a menace to public order.

The economic security of the nobility was increasing; Ramet's claim that the majority of the Toulouse nobility was ruined by the Revolution is clearly unfounded. Examination of the lists of the Six Cents Plus Imposés, the men who paid the highest tax in the department, makes this evident. Even those who had been touched by the Revolution were still largely able to keep their wealth, despite exceptions like Dupac de Bellegarde. Of the 354 names on a list of suspects in 1799, all save five were ci-devants; eighty-five of these figured either in person or by family in the six cantons around Toulouse during the Restoration, and fifty-five of these paid over 1,000 francs in tax and were men of substantial wealth. It is a curiosity to note that nobles had bought biens nationaux: a chevalier de Saint-Louis, Cazals; a former trésorier de France Voisins-Lavernière; and the son of a high official of the Provincial Estates, Marcassus-Puymaurin, were all among big buyers. A Toulouse mer-

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3 Poitevin-Peitavi, "Eloge de M. de Villeneuve de Beauville," Recueil de ... Jeux Floraux ... 1814-1815-1816 (Toulouse, 1816), p. 109.
4 AN, F: 8437. Report on Ledoux: "Cet homme, qui est dans la misère, était huissier au parlement; il se lamente souvent sur la perte d'un état qui le faisait vivre."
chant in 1799 quite rightly thought the nobility the wealthiest group in local society.8

The economic crisis of 1811 revealed the fragility of the few innovations in manufacturing. Boyer-Fonfrêde went bankrupt and the Bose armaments works scarcely outlived the death of its director. In 1806 the prefect had reported a drop in land values because of poor revenues and also a fall in the price of urban properties.9 It was not surprising that so many looked to the past for the model of prosperity. One local worthy expressed it in a petition which requested Napoleon to set up an Imperial Palace at Toulouse. The presence of a court would give the city some of its former prestige and would generate expenditures lost as a result of the Revolution: “Toulouse has lost everything: its universities, its academies, its churches, its colleges, its courts, its hospitals: surrounded by ruins she is not at all Toulouse the Holy or Toulouse the Learned: she is no longer the capital of the Midi...”10

The Empire seemed initially to have brought religious peace to the city by the Concordat. An archbishop had been appointed who was detested by the Old Regime nobility because he had been a juring priest and, still worse, because he was born a commoner. Archbishop Primat had to be accepted in the name of the renewal of the French Church after the trials of the revolutionary period. He worked patiently to reorganise the clergy, to stop the spiteful recriminations to which many of his priests were addicted, and to work out an acceptable arrangement with the Napoleonic regime. He personally considered that his flock was a trial sent to him by God for his sins.11 Certainly the renewed conflict of Empire and Papacy and the imprisonment of the pope, Pius VII, in the summer of 1809 made this hope for harmony less likely to be fulfilled.

Elsewhere in France, the Empire was under scrutiny for its flaws, and a new royalist organization emerged in Paris to coordinate propaganda and to establish cells throughout France. Mathieu de Montmorency visited Toulouse in 1812 to organize a local section, drawing on the nobility and veterans of earlier groups which had

8 AN, F10111 (Garonne, Haute-) 3, Girard to Minister of Interior, 20 pluviose VII.
9 H. Martin, Département de la Haute-Garonne, ... Toulouse, lxviii.
10 AN, F10111 (Garonne, Haute-) 4; J. Bataillé-Madron, Vœu présenté, n.d.
been hostile to the regime. Many well-known names among the Toulouse ultras appear here: Pons de Villeneuve, d'Hargicourt, d'Escouloubre, de Limairac, de Villèle, Baron de Montbel. They did not engage in any very dangerous sabotage activities or contribute materially to the success of the invasion when it came. However, they stimulated discontent with conscription and heavy taxes and circulated propaganda and some pins in the form of fleur de lys, but this campaign did not have any widespread significance until the very eve of Wellington's entry into the city. Joseph Caffarelli, a councilor of state, had been sent as a special envoy to the tenth military division to coordinate resistance. He was, in fact, related to the wife of a member of the chevaliers de la foi, Mme d'Hargicourt du Barry. He reported on the activity of the royalist associations: they were "winning hearts by the practice of charity," the same technique as used during the Revolution. The enthusiastic and devout welcome given to Pius VII on February 2, 1814, on his return to Italy from Fontainebleau showed the temper of the city. There was no surge of patriotic resistance as the enemy armies approached. When Wellington entered the city after the battle of April, 1814, the royalists showed their hand: the White Flag was flying, officials and many inhabitants wore white cockades and sashes, and the enemy troops were given a warm welcome in the city streets.¹²

The First Restoration was joyfully welcomed by clergy and nobility in Toulouse. However, in their exuberance after more than twenty years of greater or lesser restrictions, they struck a lot of very impolitic attitudes. Besides violent recriminations against the most active servants of the Revolution and the Empire, there was a lot of loose talk about returning the biens nationaux to their rightful owners. The rumor circulated in the countryside that tithes were to be reimposed, and the peasantry also feared that the unpopular conscription and various exactions of the Empire might be continued. There was rancor over the maintenance of the droits réunis. At the same time, there was pleasure at the change in

government, and for the poorest part of the population it had long
been clear they could hope for more from catholico-royalists than
from other sources. There were clear signs, however, that this fund
of good will was spent quite recklessly. Then, in the spring of
1815, the bombshell burst: Napoleon was once again Emperor of
the French.

The Hundred Days at Toulouse was marked neither by clear en-
thusiasm for nor by hostility toward the Empire. All parties eyed
each other suspiciously. The supporters of the regime were the
most likely to show their hand, but they commanded little popular
support. The anti-clerical secretary of the prefecture, Dantigny,
tartly described the most influential faction in the city as com-
posed of a lot of women, especially from the upper classes, various
decrepit chevaliers de Saint Louis, and the members of the clergy.
He concluded by writing that "persons of the noble class, or those
who pretend to be such, together with those who are entirely under
priestly influence, are perhaps more numerous at Toulouse than in
any other city of the Empire." On the other hand, the Empire
could look to the support of a volunteer force called the fédérés,
who were backed up by the troops stationed in the city. The
fédérés had been formed on May 27, 1815, in a way similar to that
followed in Brittany, Lyons, and Paris, by maréchal-de-camp Julien,
a protestant related to the revolutionary pastor of the same name,
and the manufacturer Boyer-Foüfrède, known as an owner of biens
nationaux and a bankrupt. Neither the Fédération nor popular
Bonapartism have yet received the study which they merit, but the
Toulouse fédérés seem to have attracted former revolutionary offi-
cials, protestants, some retired officers, and adventurers. They were
united by an aversion to royalist arrogance and intimidation.

During the Hundred Days, rich royalists were pressured to pay
a Forced Loan, and lower-class supporters of the Bourbons jostled
their opponents on the boulevards. Vicar-general Cambon was
arrested when he refused to hand over the keys of the Carmelite
church to the fédérés; his arrest and exile caused consternation
among the devout. In June, possibly as many as twelve hundred
fédérés paraded in the streets, but no effective resistance was op-
posed to the regime. 

14 AN, F9055, Dantigny to Minister of Police, April 8, 1815.
Even on June 26, 1815, when news of Napoleon's abdication reached Toulouse, the most serious royalist demonstration was relatively restrained. One man was killed on the Place Saint Etienne. The fédérés were led by men like Philippe Louis Saves, dit Sempé, a septuagenarian retired officer who lived on the Rue des Chapeliers. He paraded through the streets, carrying the tricolor flag at the head of noisy processions, and he menaced residents of the place Rouaix, the center of royalist activity, with a drawn saber. He railed against clients at the café Cresp, known for an ultra clientele, and he abused a pharmacist whose shop was close by. The pharmacist's son described Sempé as accompanied by the Saint-Cyprien fédérés, from the working-class suburb across the Garonne. A businessman and money-changer who lived on the Place had his door struck by Sempé's saber; two porters who served ultra masters in the district, the gatekeeper of a large house on the street where Sempé lived, as well as a woman nearby, all were threatened with violence.\(^{16}\) Certainly the actual casualties of the transitional period appear to have been fairly light, but the talk of murder and revenge, the threat of violence, and the summary imprisonment of suspects caused panic and hardship. News of the disturbances elsewhere in the Midi elaborated in the telling, heightened the panic among those who were implicated with the Hundred Days. It is not our task to recount the course of events in Toulouse such as the local manifestation of the White Terror, the end of imperial authority, the assassination of General Ramel on August 15, 1815, the attacks on known Bonapartists, and the demand for jobs on the part of the royalists. Dr. Resnick has devoted a chapter of his recent study to these events.\(^{17}\) It is important to note, however, the existence in the city of a royalist committee, drawn from members of the chevaliers de la foi, royalist militants who had been involved in one of the various para-military organizations formed since March, 1815, and local nobles. The committee, sometimes called the “royal commission” or the “royal council,” met at the Hôtel MacCarthy in the parliamentary district. It had twelve members, although more were consulted on important matters. The most prominent noble families of the city were involved: Reversat de Marsac, Palarin, Quinquiéry d'Olive, Chalvet de Roche-

\(^{16}\) ADHG, 223 U 7.

monteix, Lordat, d’Aguin, Lasborde, and Davisard. They called for rigor against subversion and unfavorably contrasted the pardons given to Bonapartists by Louis XVIII with the “firmness” of the Duc d’Angoulême.

Villèle deplored the welter of charges and counter-charges which were so common in the city. The excesses of the verdets (royalist terrorists), were sometimes a two-edged sword and soon alarmed many local notables who were more than a little shocked by the brutal assassination of General Ramel. In 1814, the English officers with Wellington’s army had been puzzled by the dichotomy between the real interests of the propertied classes, obviously dependent on civil order, and the apparent desire of these same men to use extremism for their purposes. They failed to see the distinction between words and reality in a culture of rhetoric, and were shocked to hear men whom they equated with English justices of the peace expressing their frustrations in a flood of verbal violence. The noble d’Arbou Castillon echoes the tone in his bitter lament that the Decazes Ministry was destroying all the good achieved by those appointed by the Duc d’Angoulême. Officials sent from Paris did not understand the south, he said, they were mistaken about public opinion, and did not understand that raucous joy was different from lust for vengeance. People had to be allowed to sing and shout a lot, and to serve the Bourbons faithfully. He might have added that northern bureaucrats had to understand a society of epic speech, with its own rules of hyperbole, symbolic aggression, and declamation, on its own terms. Henri Lefebvre has written brilliantly about the linguistic implications of the historic defeat of southerners by “silent barbarians, efficacious, and organised.”

It is important to bear this in mind if the White Terror is to be

19 AG, D 3. 3.
20 ADHG, 4 M 35.
21 AN, F 9659.
24 Henri Lefebvre, Pyrénées (Lausanne, 1965), pp. 150–55. Lefebvre points out the méridional desire to escape a “Procrustian bed of reality” through speech and verbal symbolism—and this was what northern revolutionaries described as the gasonnades and the faconde intarissable of the Midi. The speaker exaggerates knowingly and is known to “exaggerate” but this provides a liberty in language aided by the complicity of the listener.
truly understood. Recent studies of the counterrevolution identify men like d’Antraigues and Montlosier as typical and tend to present an imaginative picture of white Jacobins, _frondeur_ petty noblemen, avid for a bloody revenge. Yet Bonald and Villèle are equally credible examples from that same nobility. Moreover, verbal forms of violence often went wholesale into the records kept by local administrations, but must be contrasted with the real effects it generated. The ultra police of Savy-Gardeilh, established in Toulouse after the fall of Napoleon, provided an excellent example. On July 23, 1815, they arrested a man named Gabriel Sorto, who was wearing a tricolor rosette. Lest this not be considered sufficiently heinous, he was accused of killing two travellers near Launaguet. He was further described as an extremely dangerous man, “carried through the streets of Toulouse during the Revolution wearing a civic crown for having, with his own hands, killed Mr. de Roquebrune, émigré.” In the literal sense this was a web of fabrications, but to the ultra police it meant that the man was a convinced partisan of the Revolution. The rest was emphasis.

The summer of 1815 was frightening enough, and with good cause, but much less so than some historians of violence have pictured it. Tempers cooled quite quickly. The parlementary nobility and the landed notables of the area of Toulouse had only occasionally even thought of becoming a “Marat of the Counter-Revolution.” These legalistic, property-owning, cautious men were on the side of order rather than on the side of renovations in the style of peasant violence. The ultra notables endlessly repeated the complaints for which they were so pilloried by their political opponents: their vocabulary ran to words like groan, pain, lament, deplore, and repent. Pons de Villeneuve, closely associated with Angoulème, saw Paris engaged in a sinister attempt to dampen the ardor of the heartland of French royalism. He wrote indignantly that “some have desired to calm this opinion which it was so important to support, this opinion which, buttressed by Marseille and Bordeaux and having noble Spain in reserve, could overawe the Parisian conspirators and even the allies.” He deplored the dangerous results of a centralized administration in the capital that sent southwards prefects who talked nicely about Saint Louis in their speeches, but

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23 _ADHG_, 4 M 35.
26 _AV_, Pons de Villeneuve to Joseph de Villèle, 26 [November?], 1816.
did nothing practical to strengthen public opinion against future revolutions. The antidote was terror, and what more simple to provide than terrifying talk?

Men like the prefect Rémusat, an Old-Regime noble who had served the Empire, denounced by the royalists as a girouette (turncoat), found the declamation of local ultras exasperating, but he was unable to calm them. In a report, submitted when he took over the Toulouse prefecture, he pointed to the nobility as to clearly the most influential section of local society, able to use its socio-economic dominance in the city to muster popular support for ultra-royalism.27 A prominent ultra from a family of robe nobility and a close neighbor of Villèle in the country, Reversat de Marsac, described in November, 1815, the salutary effects of popular royalism in Toulouse on rural subversion.

. . . we are still very royalist, and even intolerantly royalist, at Toulouse. Our secrets, directed by M. Barthélemy, carry out various expeditions in the countryside, sometimes against Clauzel [a Napoleonic general from the Ariège department] who has been seen everywhere but is never found, sometimes against tricolor scarves [i.e., against minor officials appointed by preceding regimes]. These expeditions, irregular as they are, do good. They teach the revolutionaries and the country people that there is a force which can reach them, and thus they are less insolent.28

In an effort to halt intimidation, the prefect tried to use the prestige of the Duke of Angoulême to produce obedience, but with little success. Local ultras were well aware of the political divergencies which existed between Louis XVIII and his brother Artois, and they saw through the effort of using the Duke’s name against them.29 However, their opposition to the prefecture was always covert and subdued—as an adjoint to the mayor remarked, when measures to integrate the National Guard and the verdets failed.30 The prefect received little cooperation from local officials. His own staff was untrustworthy, at least in his opinion.31 At the Capitole,

27 AN, F7 9659.
28 AV, P. de Marsac to Joseph de Villèle, November 15, 1815. Other correspondents with Villèle, like Gounon and Aguilar, called for strong repressive measures.
29 AN, F7 9659, November 11, 1815.
30 AV, Félix Gounon to Villèle, December 9, 1815.
the father of Villèle exercised authority as his son's proxy after his offspring had been elected a deputy. The elder Villèle, an extremely opinionated man, aided by the adjoints, presided over a kind of ultra junta. They made it clear they distrusted the prefect and this hostility was extended into the salon. Mme. de Rémusat, who rather despised the pretensions of the noble ladies of Toulouse, wryly remarked on the lack of even social graces among the individuals who came to her soirées, which were boycotted by the best circles in the city. Rémusat found himself without local support, while he was constantly instructed by Decazes to suppress extra-legal associations.

By the first months of 1816 the worst excesses of the White Terror were over. The local aristocracy almost unanimously deplored the work of the Revolution, and gilded the story of their own conduct since 1789. In their adulation of the Bourbons, or at least of Monsieur, their self-proclaimed piety, and their abhorrence of the Jacobins, they were joined by some men prominent in commerce. The ultra deputies elected to the Chambre Introvable were naturally the leaders closely seconded and often criticized on the local scene by the clergy. The abbé Ducasse, in particular, was a vocal critic of any kind of accommodation with the Revolution.

The city at large was well pleased with the deputies who returned home in May, 1816, after the first parliamentary session of the Restoration. There was so enthusiastic and lavish a welcome that some notables were scandalised at the almost royal scale of these demonstrations. This adulation, however, gave them a local authority, which Villèle used in suppressing the most extravagant of rumors circulated. For example, when a fire broke out in the tobacco factory, a state monopoly which provided employment for many royalists, the director promptly blamed as its cause the intrigues of the fédérés rather than negligence. Villèle quashed these rumors. This was difficult to do when General Partouneaux, commander of the tenth military district, felt that this "plot" warranted declaring a state of siege. The prefect, who had complained

32 Ibid., I, 196–200; II, 320; AV, Villèle père to Mme. de Villèle, January 20, 1816.
33 AN, F9659, Rémusat to Minister of the Interior, May 16, 1816; E. de Perceval, Un adversaire de Napoléon; le vicomte Lainé (Paris, 1926), II, 68; AR, May 16, 1816.
34 AN, F9659.
two months earlier that military intelligence was too gullible, now had to add that the *procureur du roi* was equally convinced of a conspiracy.\(^{35}\) Some time later, an accidental explosion at the gunpowder factory caused more talk of a *fédéré* plot.

The prefect saw that Villele disassociated himself from that political extravagance that was to mark the most extreme group of royalists, those known as the *pointe*. He was in agreement with those who opposed the government but within orderly limits. In September, 1816, there was a flurry of excitement in Toulouse over the seizure of Chateaubriand’s book *De la monarchie selon la charte*. The city was covered with a rash of portraits of the author, and the nobility helped to distribute the banned book.\(^{36}\) If Villele approved of this kind of demonstration he remained prudent and measured in comparison to ultra hotheads. A man of this temperament and with a notable technical ability in finance debates was an asset and his star rose rapidly in the ultra salons of the capital. Local personalities also showed increasing trust in his future.

Lower-class support for this ascendancy was shaken by the grain shortages of 1816–17, which threw great strain on the self-projection of the royalists as the true friends of the people. The famine provided the opportunity for a paternalist regime to show its concern with the public good, but the actual course of events revealed that those principles were weak. The price of grain was already far higher than average in June, 1816, when grain was being exported from the city, as the news of a poor harvest spread. The ultra Chalvet-Gaujouse, writing to his crochety friend Daignan d’Empaillon at Auch, declared that wheat was selling much cheaper at Bordeaux than at Toulouse, where the monopolistic grain merchants fixed artificial levels.\(^{37}\) The new wheat which arrived in August caused only a temporary drop in prices, and by early September good grain was sold at 24 francs, and *mitadins* (mixed grains) were at 22.50 the hectolitre. Commercial interests bought heavily at Toulouse to supply the Bas-Languedoc and Provence, causing unseasonably high prices. Chalvet-Gaujouse said that wheat

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\(^{35}\) *AN*, F79659, Prefectural Correspondence with Minister of the Interior, July and August, 1816.


was being sent to Paris at the beginning of November, and that it was twenty years since such a thing had been known. Between October 30 and November 6, 1816, wheat prices continued to rise from just under 28 francs to almost 32 francs (the price considered normal for the time of year was 24 francs the hectolitre for good wheat). When grain carts were seen leaving the city, demonstrators stopped them at the gates. The police claimed that the municipality itself condoned this. On November 8, a very serious disturbance broke out, surpassing all others that had taken place in France during that autumn. Demonstrators shouting "Vive le roi, le blé à vingt-quatre francs!" forced the grain merchants to sell at this price. Three days later, demonstrators tried again to fix the price, and dragoons had to be called out to restore order on the La Pierre market and to suppress an illegal market on the Place Dauphine (Place Dupuy), adjacent to the Canal du Midi. On the other side of the city, in the Saint Cyprien quarter, barricades had been raised (although deserted when the troops arrived), and some wheat carts pillaged. Only on November 13 did calm return to the city.

This crisis threw light on the ultraroyalist response to a social crisis which called for real financial sacrifice. Bureaucrats did not have a heart of stone, declared Prefect Rému sat when he asked local landowners to supply the city with food. He also gave the population a lesson in laissez-faire economics, stating that if the free course of commerce had not been disturbed by violence, prices would be lower. General Partouneaux was not sure of how reliable his troops would be if asked to fire upon those with whom they sympathized. In fact, some national guardsmen joined with the rioters in the marketplace. Clearly, the great landowners and the municipality had to take a definite initiative in calming widespread resentment against the rising food prices. Villèle wrote to his wife that, if the population would only show the necessary patience with

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39 AV, correspondence of adjoints with Villèle.
40 AN, F79659, Rému sat, "Proclamation," November 12, 1816.
41 Dubourg and Thoron, in a joint letter to Villèle of November 19, 1816, made the same claim: "...une grande partie de la garde nationale étant composée d'ouvriers artisans qui vivent au jour le jour se disposan à faire cause commune avec les mutins...." (AV).
the temporary necessity of paying high wheat prices, the landowners would assume their responsibility to use increased profits to provide jobs for the common people. Quite apart from the question whether profits made in the country could generate expenditure in the town, this was a feeble answer to an immediate and pressing problem. However, it was better than that given by a rich marquis who, when asked to sell his wheat in Toulouse at a reasonable price, laughed off the request, as he told Mme de Rémusat that

“everybody has to think of his own business and that one was certainly disgusted with doing anything for the common people who would, in any case, knock down the nobles if they could.” Still others said the same to me, and when I replied, “if it not be for the people, at least let it be for the King whom you love or say you do and whose provinces must be kept in peace,” do you know the answer? “Ah! The King has his ministers whom he loves: it is up to them to get him out of his mess!”

These ultras showed the limitations of their windy declamations about social theory when the adjoint Thoron called for setting up ateliers de charité. Adrien Rességuier, subsequently to be a mayor of the city, offered to alleviate the grain shortage, but the bulk of the landowners proved themselves to be profiteers.

On November 22, 1816, there was more tension over wheat prices, which fluctuated between 32 and 33 francs the hectolitre. Thoron wrote to Villèle that the cry “Vive le roi, le blé à vingt-quatre francs!” had again been heard, and also a more sinister one: “Guerre aux nobles et aux riches!” The pessimistic adjoint imagined himself on the brink of a revolutionary abyss. This was clear in a nervous proclamation which he published, calling upon landowners to help supply the city. Subsequently, a commission was set up to organize the effective working of a Grenier d'Abondance, an institution whose inception dated from September, 1815, when Villèle requested help from the Minister of the Interior to set it up. The Grenier was to be filled with a reserve of two thousand hectolitres

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42 Villèle advised his wife to sell wheat from the Mourvilles-Basses estate in small quantities in order to pay off their outstanding debts, and then subsequently in small quantities to provide cash as needed. He suggested millets should be sold last since their price would probably rise sharply towards the end of the season. AV, Joseph de Villèle to his wife, November 15, 1816.

43 Rémusat, Correspondance, II, 246-47.

44 AV, Thoron to Villèle, November 23, 1816.
of wheat purchased with funds raised from the caisse municipale.\textsuperscript{15} It was rumored that the wheat purchased was of poor quality, but at least there was evidence of some foresight here.\textsuperscript{16}

The years 1816 and 1817 were dominated first by the White Terror and then, increasingly, by the food crisis. Popular attention wandered from the first to the second. Political news from the city became increasingly trivial. There was speculation on the health of Louis XVIII, his intention of abdicating in favor of Louis-Philippe, or his intention to exile Angoulène to Versailles.\textsuperscript{47} Decazes enquired of the prefect whether the green ribbons, ultra favors, which appeared on the white flags of the mayor and other prominent personalities had impressed the population, but was told they were of little importance as a sign of any organized resistance to the government.\textsuperscript{48} The food crisis had weakened the faith of many in the royalist unity of Toulouse.

The new prefect of the Haute-Garonne in 1817, St. Chamans, was a much less able man than Rémasat. He was noted for his bad temper, a family history of lunacy, and an inflexible character; he soon became acceptable to the ultras of the city, although he was received initially with much suspicion. When he assumed the office, he complained of the lack of cooperation from local officials who were, on the surface, docile and malleable but who, in fact, did not give any help to carrying out his policy:

\textit{... the measures ordered by the government which do not fit with the views of the dominant party are rejected and pushed aside by thousands of invisible hands; it is not a question here of an open war, there is no manifest resistance to break... nobody resists and nobody obeys... and in all the branches of the public service the party of exaggeration has several of its faithful, each involved in his own area to thwart all my measures...}.\textsuperscript{49}

He went on to say that this should be corrected for the simple

\textsuperscript{16} Grain merchants provided the information upon which mercurials were based, and this was probably inaccurate. AN, F79659; AMT, Register, June 17, 1816; Georges Frêche, Le prix des grains, des vins et des légumes à Toulouse, (1486–1868), (Paris, 1967).
\textsuperscript{47} AG, D136; Rémasat, Correspondance, III, 4–5.
\textsuperscript{48} ADHG, 4 M 46, Decazes to Saint Chamans, August 8, 1817.
reason that Toulouse set the tone of public opinion in the southern
departments of France, for despite the fact it had less population
and commerce than Marseille and Bordeaux, it exercised much
greater moral and political influence over the whole of the Midi,
where it was regarded as a respected metropolis.49

Villèle’s father enjoyed the part of the mayor of the city he
played as a stand-in for his absent son, proud of his role in the
insurrection of the year VII, and of his family’s connections with
many noble families. He wrote happily to his son that everybody
“qui pense bien” in Toulouse came to see him: Dubourg, a nephew
of the bishop of Limoges who organized clerical resistance to the
Revolution in Toulouse; Dupac de Bellegarde, who had been ruined
by the Revolution; Gounon, the ultra merchant whose father had
been a capitoul; the procureur général Bastoulh; and de Rigaud
and Savy-Gardcilh, both of them involved in the verdets and the
royalist committee.50 When Villèle resigned as mayor in 1818, the
prefect rightly said that nobody else could so well command
“the affection and hopes of the most influential class in society.”51
His successor in the office, the former mayor of Toulouse during
the Empire Baron Bellegarde, enjoyed no such esteem.

It was the clergy which was to provide the focus for the ultras’
resentment of a changing France. In November, 1816, archbishop
Primat, pious and gentle and bitterly reproached by the ultras for
too much Christian resignation in politics, died while carrying out
his annual tour of inspection. He was replaced by Bovet, who never
appeared in his archepiscopal see, on grounds of ill-health, and
who resigned in 1820. In effect, this left clerical administration in
the hands of the vicars general, and they had very close connections
with the noble and ultra circles in the city. One of them, abbé
Cambon, had been arrested during the Hundred Days. The prefect
did not mince his words in describing this clergy as “apostle of
intolerance, it seeks only to spread it; the pulpit never echoes to
words of peace: it is the den from which party-spirit spreads its
venom; all the new institutions are attacked furiously, there is
deplored unceasingly the fall of religion and subsequently that of

49 AN, F79659, St. Chamans to Minister of Interior, May 28, 1817.
50 AV, Villèle père to Joseph de Villele, February 2, 1818.
51 AN, F79659, St. Chamans to Minister of Interior, March 31, 1818. E.
Connac, “La réaction royaliste à Toulouse . . . ,” Revue des Pyrénées, X (1898),
448.
The haughty Clermont-Tonnerre, who ascended the chair of Saint-Sernin in 1820, was himself in favor of these sentiments of the clergy. He made no secret of his ultra principles, and on various occasions displayed a vindictive desire to humiliate former juring priests. He was also very vain about his nobility and the antiquity and good blood of his family. For almost the entire period of the Restoration, the catholic hierarchy in Toulouse was closely associated with ultraroyalism.

The secular forces also exhibited excellent principles; the soldiers frequently attended mass in the city. General Partouneaux was well thought of by the nobility. The para-military group called the **verdets**, well-known for their catholicism, still met and could be summoned if need arose. The Decazes ministry of 1819 was greeted with contempt in Toulouse in such circles; it was proper social form to consider the Paris government so deplorable that it could not be discussed. The ultras, disappointed earlier that year by a false prediction that the favorite would fall, were all the more delighted to hear in 1820 that he had been dismissed after the assassination of the Duc de Berry. The murder itself was seen as a striking vindication of their conspiracy thesis. The police reported a mournful calm in the city, apart from a few in the streets “qui se regardaient en faisant une grimace qui paraissait un signe d’approbation.” Not everybody lamented in the lachrymose style of newspapers and official proclamations; the memorial mass celebrated at St. Etienne drew a poor response from the student body, although held under the auspices of the law school. Just over a quarter of those enrolled attended. Mme. de Villèle was shocked at the joy which many “monstres” in the lycée had shown. Various prominent ultras called for censorship, like so many did elsewhere in France, to stop a flood of vicious and irreligious publications.

The electoral law of 1820, better known as the Law of Double...
Vote, gave two votes to the most wealthy quarter of the departmental electoral college and produced a swing toward the ultra-royalists analogous to other movements in French history, such as the June elections of 1968. Fear of subversion and economic instability caused a return to that political group which espoused the conservative views of landed proprietors, the dominant economic elite of the time. In 1820, the department voted the ultras in, as it had almost exclusively since 1815 with the exception of electing Cardonnel in 1815, and Cambon subsequently. What differences existed among these men were personal and cliquish; all were ultra. In a classification of departments on the basis of the number of left and center-left deputies returned between September, 1815, and the end of 1829, the Haute-Garonne was classified as eighty-second in the list, bettered only by the Haute-Alpes, the Vaucluse, the Loire, and the Bouches-du-Rhône in having more ultra deputies.\(^6^9\) The Haute-Garonne was as solidly reactionary then as it was to be radical in the twentieth century.\(^6^1\)

The year of 1820 also caused the ultras of Toulouse to look to Spain. Many of the ultras had visited Spain as émigrés or as tourists, and they saw the struggle of Ferdinand VII with the rebels of Colonel Riego as analogous to their own political ideas on the dispute between the Crown and the Charter. The *Écho du Midi*, the ultra newspaper in Toulouse, attentively followed the campaign of the French expeditionary force commanded by the Duke of Angoulême, and exulted at the victory of Trocadero on August 31, 1823, as a triumph for legitimacy and religion. The Bourbons had conquered where Bonaparte had failed. The Spanish royalists, the “Defenders of the Faith,” used Toulouse as a supply center, and they were given assistance by noble dévots in the parliamentary quarter of the city.\(^6^2\) The curé of the Dalbade Ortie, who had lived through the Terror of 1793–94, hiding at Toulouse as a clandestine assistant to the abbé Dubourg, was especially generous to these Spaniards.

When Joseph de Villèle became président du conseil in Paris, it

\(^6^0\) J.-B.-M. Braun, *Nouvelle biographie des députés ou statistiques de la Chambre de 1814 à 1829* (Paris, 1830), pp. 53–54.

\(^6^1\) AN, F74006. The general tenor of reports from the Thirteenth Legion of gendarmerie commented on the “bon esprit” which reigned in the city and its surroundings.

seemed only proper to recognize the high principles expressed by
the electorate of Toulouse. The ultra counter-opposition had never
been significant and relied on ecclesiastics like the abbé Ducasse
and the abbé MacCarthy, who backed Castelbajac as a representative
of the pointe. Castelbajac had been bought off in his opposition to
Villèle by office and favor from the ministry, and few dissenting
voices were to be heard in the fief of Villèle. The colonel of the
gendarmerie reported in 1823 that political misdemeanors were so
rare that, in effect, they did not exist.53

What disturbances did take place were usually in the form of
student brawls. On March 29, 1822, some fifty students demon-
strated to cries of “Vive la Charte!” and were dispersed from the
Place du Capitole, site of the most popular student cafés, by a
detachment of cavalry. In January, 1823, on the same square, a
peasant wearing a white cockade in his hat was attacked with mud
and stones by four people: the guilty ones were arrested. In May,
1823, a seventeen-year-old boy was beaten up, when he replied
“M...!” to an invitation from some ultra youths to shout “Vive le
roi!”54 These sporadic incidents were more part of the ongoing
pattern of drunken fistfights over prostitutes and grisettes and the
rivalry between students and apprentices than symptoms of signifi-
cant political resistance.

On a more respectable level was a sedate group of liberals, of
whom the most prominent was the advocate Romiguier who had
edited the Anti-Terroriste during the Revolution before deportation
at the time of Fructidor but who was less royalist subsequently.
He had been in charge of the city police during the Hundred Days,
as a result of which his career was in shadow during the Restora-
tion. He pleaded various “progressive” cases, notably in defending
the Spanish refugees and the Revue Méridionale which was prose-
cuted for a libel on the archbishop. Frédéric Malpel, professor of
civil law at the Faculty in Toulouse, was another figure of impor-
tance: he had protested against verdet terrorism in 1815–16.
J. G. D. Porte, son of an advocate of the Parlement and himself
holding the same office before 1789, had held various posts in the
revolutionary administration until he was elected représentant du
peuple in 1797. Under Napoleon, he became a sub-inspector of

53 AN, F4006.
54 Ibid.
revenues, of whom he was the oldest in 1805, but he was never promoted. His career was hardly subversive, but he was denounced as a *fédéré* chief in 1815: even a moderate past could haunt a man for many years. During the Restoration he was also considered a prominent liberal. These men were to be found in reading rooms which made liberal newspapers available, among the habitués of the masonic lodge (closed in December, 1815, as a result of pressure and threats, but reopened in 1818), and at the homes of lesser legal figures like the advocate and minor writer Tajan.

Thus liberals as well as ultras had strong antecedents among the men of law, although at different levels of the judicial system. Lawyers provided the intellectual and political framework of public opinion in the city, and in a real sense they still formed the transi­tional group between nobles and commoners during the Restora­tion. The personnel of the Royal Court in 1830 counted many with noble connections. Half the councilors, for example, had titles. This caused friction with those whose avenues of advance were blocked by these groups.

The mass of the city’s population was indifferent to politics. The persistent rhythm of markets, administration, jobs, feast days and births, marriages, and deaths were of greater momentum. There was little diversity of outlook. The Protestants in the city did not contest the Catholic supremacy and were on the defensive: there was only one consistory in the city and a small congregation. The Jewish community was small, poor, and unobtrusive. Jews and Protestants were buried in the cemetery outside the walls, near the Canal de Brienne. The elaborate processions which the inhabitants so enjoyed, in a confusion of banners and candles and religious reliquaries, the coming of a new play to the theatre with new songs for the *grisets* to learn and sing, and the price of bread, were all more important than politics to the occitan-speaking people of the streets. In language and outlook, Toulouse seemed isolated from the other France, a land of grey skies and revolutionary disposition in the north. "Toulouse es le Paris del Miéjou!"

This sense of apartness from the nation was noted by the authori­ties. When St. Chamans retired in 1823 because of mental ill­ness, he was replaced by a former prefect of the Cher, count

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Juigné, a man whose principles delighted the ultras. Baron Belle­
garde, thwarted within the municipal council by the ultra clique
which surrounded Félix Gounon, finally resigned in 1823, to be
replaced by Hargenvilliers. The prefecture was also affected by
ultra pressures, and Cambon denounced the prefect Juigné as
being the creature of “a vexatious and bigotted coterie,” influenced
by an administrative assistant who was a fanatic supporter of
Villèle, and only able to see religious probity among partisans of
the Jesuits.66

The dusty rhetoric of an 1827 electoral pamphlet exactly struck
the prevailing note in the city:

Inhabitants of Toulouse, faithful city above all, the whole of France re­
lies upon you: the honnêtes-gens have always been important there, and
the enemies of the social order have long known without a doubt that
among you they have always lost their money and their efforts... in
order to live and die peacefully with our possessions, arts, and com­
merce, we need in France more than anywhere else men who have
everything to lose in the revolutions and nothing to gain from them; in
a word, deputies like those whom you have always sent to the King, and
like those whom you are again going to send him....67

“To live and die peacefully” seemed to be the main aim of the
ultras. They hated all that disturbed social and intellectual cer­
tainties, and there seemed little likelihood of such upsets in Tou­
louse. Perhaps the intelligentsia were aware of the debates over
romanticism and liberal politics in the capital. Perhaps the French
economic crisis which followed the 1825 bank failures in England
and which was compounded by the bad harvest of 1827 produced
a widespread psychological climate of desire for change in the
north, but the year preceding the Revolution of 1830 seemed calm
enough in upper Languedoc; but in Toulouse there were few signs
of that political unrest. Neither the electorate nor the police rec­
ords showed any strong opposition to the ultra dominance of the
city. The new prefect, Camus de Martroy, appointed in 1829 by
Martignac’s ministry to replace Juigné, described Toulouse as being
like other French cities a decade earlier. It existed in a time lag.

66 AN, F110II (Garonne, Haute-) 8, Cambon to Minister of Interior, Sep­
tember 26, 1828.
Even the opposition to the Martignac ministry by the great landowners who regretted the fall of Villèle was feeble and took the form of nodding approval of the ultra papers, the *Gazette* and *Quotidienne*, and of believing that the Revolution might return. At the same time, they found it possible to be a royalist and to accept an official position.\(^6\)

The Revolution of 1830 was completely unexpected in Toulouse. None of the local deputies had signed the Declaration of the 221 which criticized the Throne Speech of March 2, 1830. There was not the same fear of mysterious fires that agitated Normandy and Picardy. The readers of the liberal papers in the various reading rooms anticipated student rowdiness perhaps in the face of the reactionary policy of Polignac, but it all seemed rather distant to them. On Saturday, July 24, 1830, the municipal council discussed some building projects, pension schemes, and the beautification of the flower gardens. On Monday morning, the *Moniteur* was on sale in Paris with the announcement of modifications of the electoral law, suspension of the constitutional regime, suppression of the liberty of the press, and dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies. The news caused surprise at Toulouse, and reports of the disturbances produced anxiety. Royalist prudence was not, however, overcome by emotion. The prefect called Villèle to Toulouse on August 2, 1830, in order to get his advice, but the former minister declined saying that it was not “proper” for him to appear. On August 3, the prefect called on the banker Viguerie to be mayor. The ultras let power slip through their fingers without resistance.\(^7\)

\(^6\) AN, F\(^7\)6769, Prefect to Minister of Interior, January 11, 1829.

\(^7\) ADHG, 4 M 49, Barennes to Minister of Interior, August 30, 1831.