Neighbors in Conflict

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Notes

CHAPTER 1. THE ETHNIC SETTING

1. An ethnic group is defined as a number of people "who conceive of themselves as being alike by virtue of their common ancestry, real or fictitious, and who are so regarded by others" (Tamotsu Shibutani and Kian Kwan, Ethnic Stratification [New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965], p. 47).

2. Conflict is defined as a struggle over scarce (real or perceived), interests and values "in which the immediate aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure, [thwart] or eliminate their rivals" in order to preserve or secure the interests (status, jobs, political power, etc.) and provide for the dominance of certain values. Value conflict can include a struggle over standards of conduct, the preferred state of affairs, or the criteria of choice. Since only one value system can dominate, this too can be thought of as a scarce object. Although all conflicts involve interests and values, one factor may play a more important role than the other. Group conflict should not be considered only in its most overt form, that of physical violence. It can manifest itself in many other ways, such as assaults or threats in the ethnic press or the use of economic or political power as a malicious force (e.g., boycotts). The goals of all its forms, violent and nonviolent, overt and subtle, are the same. Although conflict requires at least two parties with an awareness of the struggle, it can be initiated by only one and can remain essentially unilateral. The aggressor is the one who feels more threatened. Competition, on the other hand, is defined as a struggle over scarce (real or perceived) interests and values in which the main objectives are the interests and values rather than the elimination or injury of the rival. It is regulated by rules which "limit what the competitors can do to each other in the course of striving." Since the groups may be independently striving to secure these interests and to provide for the dominance of certain values, there may or may not be a conception of the struggle or a conception that the possible future positions of the two groups will be incompatible. (Robin M. Williams, Jr., The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions [New York: Social Science Research Council, 1947], Bulletin 57, pp. 40–43; Raymond W. Mack and Richard C. Snyder, "The Analysis of Social Conflict—Toward an Overview and Synthesis," Journal of Conflict Resolution 1 [June 1957]: 217–19, 233; Burton B. Silver, "Social Mobility and Intergroup Antagonism," Journal of Conflict Resolution 17 [December 1973]: 607; Quincy Wright, "The Nature of Conflict," Western Political Quarterly 4 [June 1951]: 197; Brewton Berry, Race and Ethnic Relations, 2d ed. [Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1958], p. 122; Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defense [New York: Harper and Row, 1962], pp. 4–5, 154).
3. See discussion of race relations cycles of Robert Park, E.S. Bogardus, and others in Berry, *Race and Ethnic Relations*, pp. 151–58. Some of these theorists do not feel that their cycles fit all occasions.

4. If, for example, only an insignificant degree of competition exists between two groups, or outside factors pull the two groups together, or the cultures are not inimical to each other, conflict can possibly be avoided. However, if these variables change, conflict may emerge (Ibid., pp. 115–17).


6. Conflicts are based, in varying proportions, on realistic and unrealistic components. Realistic factors would involve an actual rivalry for scarce resources. Unrealistic factors include, for example, deflected hostility related to feelings of frustration. In this case the hostility cannot be directed at the real source of frustration or threat and is therefore deflected to a suitable (vulnerable and visible) substitute, a scapegoat, who is now perceived as an opponent and the source of the group’s problems. This cause of conflict is most obvious in a situation in which a rural area experiences an outburst of anti-Semitism although few Jews live there (Robin Williams, *Reduction*, pp. 40–41, 52–53; Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., *Toward a Theory of Minority Group Relations* [New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967; reprint ed., Capricorn Books, 1970], pp. 42–44).

7. Silver, “Social Mobility,” pp. 606–9. *Status* is defined as a group’s acknowledged place in society determined by a number of diverse factors such as length of time in country, economic or political power, and perceived loyalty to one’s country.

8. *Accommodation* is defined as a temporary lessening of hostilities in which intergroup disagreements remain but are disregarded.


10. This reveals another unrealistic component of conflict: historical tradition, in which, for example, the resentments and hates of the old world would play a role in the conflict occurring in the new land. The Protestant–Catholic friction over religion was the continuation in America of the historical antipathy between these groups which had convulsed Europe so often. The groups in this case still see each other as rivals based on old conflicts which may no longer have any “relevance to current situations.” However, barring this unrealistic element, cultural differences such as religious beliefs are not necessarily a major factor in competition or conflict unless these values are seen as incompatible with or threatening to another group’s values (Robin Williams, *Reduction*, p. 41).


21. Interview with Charles S. Zimmerman, New York City, 30 March 1973; Glanz, *Jew and Italian*, pp. 25, 49–52; Rischin, *Promised City*, pp. 249–50; interview with Morabito. Zimmerman was a Communist leader in the ILGWU until he broke with the Party in 1929; in the 1930s he was vice-president of this union.


24. *Irish World and American Industrial Liberator*, 5 October 1929, p. 4, and 9 October 1937, p. 4 (hereafter cited as *Irish World*); *Brooklyn Tablet*, 25 March 1938, p. 12; Charles Corcoran to editor, *Brooklyn Tablet*, 15 April 1939, p. 5 (after 1939 the *Brooklyn Tablet* was called the *Tablet*). For further discussion on German political displacement, see chapter 3.

**CHAPTER 2. ECONOMIC COLLAPSE**


2. *Declining* means that these occupations exhibited a smaller percentage of the total gainfully employed workers in 1930 than in 1910, although they increased in numbers from 1910 to 1930. Their percentage of numerical increase, however, was the smallest for all the occupational categories in this period (17.7 percent for the manufacturing and mechanical industries and 29.3 percent for domestic and personal service).

3. The percentage of the gainfully occupied who were employed in this division increased from 8.0 percent in 1910 to 13.6 percent in 1930. In the other categories the percentage increases were professional service, 5.7 percent to 8.1 percent; public service, 1.7 percent to 2.2 percent; trade, 13.6 percent to 15.6 percent; transportation and communication, 8.1 percent to 9.2 percent.


7. An unemployment census of 1937 proved to be unusable, since it only recorded the number of unemployed in each industry and occupation without giving the number of gainful workers or employed workers in each category. It was therefore impossible to secure from this compilation data on the percentage of unemployment in each industrial or occupational category. The 1940 census had to be used instead.

8. The 1930 and 1940 figures (tables 1 and 3) are also not directly comparable and must be taken as suggestive. For example, the industrial classifications are not exactly the same. Moreover, the 1930 unemployment census included persons ten years old and over; the 1940 labor census included persons fourteen years old and over. The 1930 census is
based on gainful workers, those reported as having a gainful occupation and who have previously worked full-time, "regardless of whether they were working or seeking work at the time of the census." The 1940 figures in these tables are based on employed workers, not including those on public emergency work, and experienced workers who were seeking work. The difference involves such factors as retired workers, who were included in the 1930 census but not in 1940. However, although the data is not exactly comparable, a good indication of the industries and occupations most affected by the depression can be secured by using both tables. See United States, Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1940: Population—The Labor Force*, 3:2–5.

9. The part of the survey dealing with occupations considered only unemployed workers on relief. The section on industries considered both unemployed and employed workers on relief (those whose earnings were inadequate to support their families). This last group probably included many who were forced into part-time work.


14. Nonurban occupations such as mining were not included in my study, although they were listed in the 1900 data. Many occupations, however, were omitted by the Immigration Commission analysis. See E. P. Hutchinson, *Immigrants and Their Children, 1850–1950* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1956), pp. 174, 178.


17. Kessner, "Golden Door," pp. 172, 181, 188, 191, 194, 204, 235, 270–73, 275. The data in my study does not indicate rate of occupational mobility for each of the groups to the 1930s since that would have required information on individuals and their occupational movements, a task that would in itself require a book. Instead the information presented tries to note each ethnic group's occupational position in the 1930s, while at the same time giving some background information on the period of first arrival and afterward, which would help to explain that position. The stress is on their occupational level at various points in their history.

the Seventh Annual Conference of the American Italian Historical Association (November 1974): 34–35.

19. Scholars have disagreed as to whether the lack of enthusiasm by Italians toward schooling was the result of deeply ingrained cultural traits or was a temporary response to an economic position in society which forced them to concentrate on the struggle for existence rather than the luxury of going to school. It was probably a combination of the two. Schooling had come to have less meaning in the peasant Italian culture, and this was reinforced by their economic position both in Italy and America as well as by the inadequacy of the schools. See McClelland, *Talent and Society*, p. 150; Strodtbeck, “Family Interaction,” p. 150; Covello, “Social Background,” pp. 432, 625; Joseph Lopreato, *Italian Americans* (New York: Random House, 1970), pp. 152–57; Mary Fabian Matthews, “The Role of the Public School in the Assimilation of the Italian Immigrant Child in New York City, 1900–1914,” in *The Italian Experience in the United States*, ed. Silvano M. Tomasi and Madeline H. Engel (New York: Center for Migration Studies, 1970), pp. 127–28, 137–38.


24. These figures are not meant to indicate lack of significant upward occupational mobility but rather to show that the weaknesses in the Italian occupational structure were evident in the early settlement years as well as during the Depression.

25. Proprietors included owners of small businesses.


30. While only 2.2 percent of the Jewish gainful workers were in public service, they made up 21.4 percent of the total gainful workers engaged in this field (ibid., p. 20). Much of the 1937 report is included in the Goldstein study.

31. Ibid., pp. 18–24; *New York Jewish News*, 4 February 1938, p. 4.


34. The Italians, while also emerging as competitors in such areas as civil service, did not seem to pose as great a threat as the Jews. At least there was no evidence of hostility toward them based on the economic factor. Also Italians were very hard-hit by the Depression and therefore did not inspire resentment on this point.


36. In 1855, when the Irish constituted almost 80 percent of the foreign-born servants and waiters residing in Manhattan, the Germans composed only about 15 percent. One-fourth of the Irish gainful workers were servants, as compared to “one-tenth of the German workers.” The Irish also were 87 percent of the immigrant laborers in the City. This occupational group made up more than one-fifth of the Irish working population, while among the Germans only approximately 5 percent of their workers were laborers. The Irish were also concentrated in the construction trades; the Germans less so. The reverse was true in the apparel trades. Germans also dominated as cabinet makers and piano makers and were numerous as butchers and bakers. Robert Ernst, Immigrant Life in New York City, 1825–1863 (New York: King’s Crown Press, 1949; reprint ed., Port Washington, N. Y.: Ira J. Friedman, 1965), pp. 66, 69, 73–79, 87–88, 97; For similar conclusions using other cities see Theodore Hershberg et al., “Occupation and Ethnicity in Five Nineteenth-Century Cities: A Collaborative Inquiry,” Historical Methods Newsletter 7 (June 1974): 197–202.

37. Abstracts of Reports of the Immigration Commission, 1:101; Hutchinson, Immigrants and Their Children, pp. 123–28. Nonurban occupational categories such as agriculture or mining were not considered. All figures are based on the United States and not New York State or City.


39. Ibid., pp. 173–74, 177–78. Both the Irish and German second generation also showed concentrations in the position of messengers and office and errand boys. This information was omitted, since it was assumed that this included mainly the very youngest members of the second generation (census figures listed all those ten years of age and older).

40. McGill and Matthews, Youth of New York City, table 5.

41. Paul O’Dwyer, “Reminiscences,” 1:41–42. O’Dwyer places the Irish in the

42. New York Times, Daily News, and Herald Tribune, *New York City Market Analysis* (New York: 1934); New York Times, Daily News, Mirror and Journal-American, *New York City Market Analysis* (New York: 1943). This does not necessarily mean that all Germans and Irish in these neighborhoods fit this description. However, in all probability one can say that there were Irish residents of the city who were in an economically superior position to some Germans during the Depression. For an explanation of how I determined population and economic data for these neighborhoods see chapter 3, note 37, and chapter 7, note 19.

43. Frederick Franklin Schrader, ed., *The New Germany under Hitler* (New York: Deutscher Weckruf und Beobachter, n.d.), p. 28; *Deutscher Weckruf und Beobachter*, 16 July 1936, p. 6. In the period from 1934 to 1943, the largest number of relief cases handled by the German-American Conference Relief Fund was in 1938, indicating many Germans were affected by the recession (German-American Conference Relief Fund, *Annual Report*, 1943).


45. Civil service news was an important segment in the Irish press but was not found in the Jewish, Italian, or German papers. S. Burton Heath, “Investigation by Innuendo,” *Survey Graphic* 30 (October 1941):502; *New York Sun*, 5 August 1941; Charles Garrett, *The La Guardia Years: Machine and Reform Politics in New York City* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1961), pp. 132–34; interview with Paul O’Dwyer, New York City, 9 August 1973; Paul O’Dwyer, “Reminiscences,” 2:186–89. O’Dwyer was president of the American Friends of Irish Neutrality and the United Irish Counties Association. He was also a brother of the 1941 Democratic Mayoral candidate.


50. Although the *Tablet* during this period was ostensibly a general Catholic newspaper, it actually represented mainly an Irish viewpoint. This is illustrated by an editorial
in 1919 welcoming home the “fighting Irish” (the 69th regiment) which noted with pride that “we are Irish-Americans as were the majority of the Sixty-ninth.” There is also substantiation from the leadership of the Irish community for classifying the paper in this way. Paul O’Dwyer noted that the Tablet was the militant organ which appealed and spoke to mainly the Irish Catholics. For the purposes of this study, this is also revealed by the Tablet’s blatant support of Father Charles Coughlin’s anti-Semitism, which began in 1938, and its belittling of Jewish persecutions in other lands. The Tablet’s attitude is very similar to that found in the press of the Irish community, the Gaelic American and the Irish World. At the same time, the leading German and Italian-American papers were specifically rejecting anti-Semitism, had avoided it up to this point, and were sympathetic to the plight of the Jews in other countries. Only the Nazis, a very weak element in the German-American community, particularly by 1938, attacked the Jews in its press, although it did not agree with Coughlin and the Tablet on all other matters. The Christian Front, a grass-roots extremist organization directly inspired by Coughlin’s rhetoric and endorsed by the Tablet, also indicates this. The Front, like the Tablet, was strongly pro-Coughlin and anti-Semitic. Its leadership and rank and file was mainly Irish. The Catholic News, official organ of the archdiocese of New York and published by Henry and Charles H. Ridder (uncle and cousin of the Ridders who published the New Yorker Staats-Zeitung und Herold, the leading German-American newspaper in New York) also offers an illustration of mainly the German-American viewpoint, although it also expressed the views of more moderate Irish figures such as Patrick Cardinal Hayes and Archbishop Francis Spellman. This paper condemned anti-Semitism and spoke favorably of the Jews at the same time that the German papers were doing so (Brooklyn Tablet, 26 April 1919, p. 4; Interview with Paul O’Dwyer). See the discussion on anti-Christianity in chapter 5, below, and also chapter 4, note 59, and chapter 5, notes 5 and 32.

53. Gaelic American, 6 October 1934, p. 4; Social Justice, 11 September 1939, p. 1; George Johnson to editor, Brooklyn Tablet, 10 February 1940, p. 8.
54. Brooklyn Tablet, 3 September 1938, p. 8; Scanlan, “From the Managing Editor’s Desk,” 24 February 1940, p. 11; Ignatius Byrne to editor, Brooklyn Tablet, 17 September 1938, p. 6.
55. See the discussion on the Christian Front in chapter 5, below, and the discussion on South Bronx and Fordham in chapter 8. Some Jews recognized the economic factor in this conflict. See American Hebrew, 28 July 1939, p. 1. (From 1932 to 1935 this paper was called the American Hebrew and Jewish Tribune).
56. Jewish Examiner, 30 December 1938, p. 1 (the Jewish Examiner was called the Brooklyn Jewish Examiner from 1930 to 1933); New York Times, 28 December 1938 p. 5. Ads of this type would ask for Christian help or would note that the firm was a Christian one.
58. B’nai B’rith Magazine, December 1933, p. 83. From 1934 to 1938 this journal was called the B’nai B’rith National Jewish Monthly, and after 1938 the National Jewish Monthly.
59. There was a feeling among the Italians that they were progressing. See, for example, Casa Italiana Bulletin 2 (December 1931): 7.
CHAPTER 3. LA GUARDIA AND THE NEW ETHNIC ORDER


2. Before the 1920s the Jewish vote was often divided between the Democrats, Republicans, Socialists, and Progressives. Although the Democrats usually received the largest vote, it was often not a majority. During the 1920s Jewish voting somewhat stabilized, and a majority of these votes often went to the Democrats. This was the result both of a decline in the Socialist Party’s strength and the attempts by Tammany to support liberalism. However, Jews continued to support reform and liberal candidates. See Thomas Henderson, “Tammany Hall and the New Immigrants, 1910–1921” (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1973), pp. 24, 109, 112, 147–49, 230–32, 239, 247, 262–66. This study provides an ethnic voter analysis for Manhattan.


8. Il Progresso, 5 November 1933, p. 1. Although La Guardia did well in Italian areas in the 1929 mayoralty election, it was not until after his victory in 1933 with very
strong Italian support that the Democrats became seriously concerned about this ethnic vote (Mann, La Guardia, p. 279; Henderson, "Tammany Hall," pp. 267–68).


10. In the previous mayoralty election, Jews gave significant support to Morris Hillquit, the Socialist candidate (Ibid., p. 142).

11. Nathan Straus, Jr., was offered the mayoral nomination on the Fusion ticket before La Guardia, but he refused to accept, on the advice of other Jewish leaders who feared that having Jews as both governor and mayor might inspire anti-Semitism (Nathan Straus, Jr., "Reminiscences" (Oral History Project, Columbia University, 1950), pp. 74–75, 77.

12. Ethnic identification of aldermanic candidates was based on their names. I wish to thank Dr. Fred Massarik, scientific director of the U.S. National Jewish Population Study, for the use of his list of 106 distinctive Jewish names. The following works were also used as an aid to identification: American Council of Learned Societies, Report of Committee on Linguistics and National Stocks in the Population of the United States in American Historical Association, Annual Report, 1931 4 (1931): 232–48, 271–305; Edward MacLysaght, A Guide to Irish Surnames (Baltimore: Genealogical Book Company, 1964). Any ethnically doubtful names were not counted.


16. The information on La Guardia's department commissioners, board of estimate, and others is based on an ethnic study of their names and on obituary notices. Any ethnically doubtful name was not counted. See also note 12, above. For Jews appointed or elected to various positions see "Appointments and Elections," American Jewish Year Book, vols. 24–39, September 1922–September 1938.

17. The Irish Tammany bosses at first opposed the Lehman nomination, mainly owing to political rather than ethnic differences, but were forced to give in because of pressure placed on them by Roosevelt, various Jewish Democrats, and other Irish leaders such as Al Smith and Edward Flynn, head of the Bronx organization. See Allan Nevins, Herbert H. Lehman and His Era (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1963), pp. 127–30.

18. Italian Non-Partisan Committee for the Re-Election of Mayor La Guardia to Generoso Pope, 13 September 1937, LGP, Box 2721.

19. Both the Brancato and Pecora appointments were temporary ones given to fill some vacancies. However, both men won easily in the elections for these positions that same year with the support of the Democratic County organizations (New York Times, 6 January 1935, p. 1; 11 January 1935, p. 1; 16 January 1935, p. 1; 2 October 1935, p. 2; 4 February 1936, p. 11.

20. For more on the use of this tactic and an analysis of the vote, see chapter 7.


22. Ibid., 5 November 1936, p. 1; 11 November 1941, p. 6; 19 January 1939, editorial page; D. Spadafora to editor, 5 July 1938, editorial page; 1 November 1934, p. 1; 2 November 1937, editorial page; 3 November 1938, editorial page; 6 November 1938, editorial page; 13 November 1939, p. 1; 24 August 1939, p. 1. J.C.M. to editor, Brooklyn Tablet, 23 July 1938, p. 6. Telephone interview with Alfred E. Santangelo, 5 July 1972. Santangelo was district leader, state senator, and congressman from the East Harlem area
during the 1940s and 1950s, and brother of Paul Santangelo, district leader of Manhattan’s 1st A.D. East from 1937 to 1939.


27. The Communist appointee was Simon Gerson, who was added to the staff of the borough president of Manhattan in 1937. (see chapter 5, discussion on Gerson). Kern was fired in 1942, partially due to La Guardia’s desire to win favor with the Catholic Church in New York in an effort to secure an army position. See Charles Garrett, *The La Guardia Years: Machine and Reform Politics in New York City* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1962), p. 290.


32. Farley’s power in the higher ranks of the New Deal began to wane by the late 1930s. His failure to be considered seriously for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1940 was partly seen as the result of anti-Catholic prejudice. This once again reminded the Irish of their insecure place in America (*New York Times*, 17 March 1940, p. 12; 5 November 1940, p. 16). Other aspects of the New Deal also disturbed the Irish. See chapter 5, discussion on Catholics, Communism, and the New Deal.


35. This was true even though some of the left-wing leaders of the ALP, such as Eugene Connolly, were Irish. There was also a group in the South Bronx known as the Irish Workers League, which was identified with the leftist elements in the ALP.


37. Voting statistics in this study are based on election districts (New York’s voting divisions) which were over 50 percent Irish, Jewish, German, or Italian between 1932 and 1941 (a few of the election districts were 50 percent but contained no other ethnic concentration.) Census tracts in New York City were first identified ethnically for 1930 and 1940; those chosen for the voter analysis had a concentration of Irish, Jewish (Russian), German, or Italian foreign stock (first- and second-generation) population for both census years. Then those election districts or groups of election districts within these tracts
which remained the same in boundaries between 1932 and 1941 were identified. In some cases, while no single election district retained its boundary during this period, groups of election districts would maintain the same boundary and were therefore usable. The votes in these grouped districts were added together and considered as one unit, since they represented the same area in all elections. A name check, using the voter registration lists, was made of all these election districts to determine if they were over 50 percent Irish, Jewish, German, or Italian for 1932 through 1941. Care was taken to avoid election districts which fit this description but had a large concentration of another ethnic group. Therefore what was secured were 149 voting units (single or grouped election districts) which remained the same ethnically and geographically during the period under study—stable political and ethnic units which could be compared over time. There were 76 Jewish, 29 German, 28 Italian, and 16 Irish voting units. The 1930 census data was secured from the Community Council of Greater New York, which has the census tract tabulation sheets for 1930. This data, listing foreign stock by nationality group for each census tract, was never published. Also used for the 1930 information was Walter Laidlaw, ed., *Population of the City of New York, 1890–1930* (New York: Cities Census Committee, 1932), and William B. Shedd, *Italian Population in New York*, Bulletin No. 7 (New York: Casa Italiana Educational Bureau, 1934); the 1940 census data is from United States, Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States, Census Tract Data on Population and Housing, New York City: 1940* (New York: Welfare Council Committee on 1940 Census Tract Tabulations for New York City, 1942), and United States, Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1940: Population: Nativity and Parentage of the White Population, Country of Origin of the Foreign Stock* (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1942), p. 74. Since the 1940 census tract data contained information only on foreign-born heads of families for each nationality group, an estimate of the foreign stock population in each tract was made on the basis of ratios of foreign-born heads of families to total foreign-born, and total foreign-born to native born of foreign or mixed parentage for each nationality group, using borough and tract statistics. This ratio technique is the only possible way to secure even an estimate of foreign stock population by tracts in 1940. For both 1930 and 1940 an effort was also made to locate neighborhoods which contemporary observers had identified as Irish, Jewish, German, or Italian. This was especially useful for areas containing large numbers of an ethnic group beyond the second generation and therefore not classified by the census. In these neighborhoods, the same procedure as above was used to locate appropriate election districts. The name check was based on the City Record, *List of Registered Voters, 1932–1941*. For sources used as an aid in identifying ethnic names, see note 12 of this chapter. For election district maps, see New York City, *Maps Showing the Assembly Districts of New York City, 1932–1941*. To produce the voting statistics, use was made of the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS).


42. Although Marinelli was forced to resign his County Clerk position after this disclosure, he remained as district leader until 1939, when he was replaced by John DeSalvio, a friend of Frank Costello.

43. Costello noted later that four district leaders who were friends of his were Paul Sarubbi of the first assembly district; John DeSalvio of the second, west; Abraham Rosenthal of the eighth; and Clarence Neal of the twentieth (New York Times, 26 October 1943, p. 1; Moscow, Last of Big-Time Bosses, p. 54).

44. William O’Dwyer admitted that in 1943 he had been to Costello’s home, where he had seen Kennedy as well as other prominent Tammany figures (William O’Dwyer, “Reminiscences,” 6:103, 119–20; New York Times, 26 October 1943, p. 1; 27 October 1943, p. 1; Moscow, Last of Big-Time Bosses, pp. 55–56). Generoso Pope, publisher of Il Progresso and a growing power in Tammany, also supported Kennedy for the leadership of Tammany.


46. Ibid., 26 October 1943, p. 1; Senate, Third Interim Report, p. 123. Telephone interview with Alfred Santangelo, 5 July 1972.


48. See chapter 7, note 75, and the discussion on Roosevelt, the 1940 election, and the Italian vote.


50. Interview with Paul O’Dwyer.

51. Moscow, Last of Big-Time Bosses, p. 45.

52. New York Times, 8 August 1943, p. 38. Finn had also opposed Kennedy for the Tammany leadership in 1942 but failed to win. The Costello-controlled district leaders, as noted, were significant in this balloting (New York Times, 31 October 1943, IV:12).

53. The Italians, who for a number of years had been trying to win the district leadership in the eighteenth assembly district, north (East Harlem), finally did so in 1943 with Mancuso.


55. Lehman had faced an Irish opponent, William J. Donovan, in 1932 also. However, in that election the Irish-Jewish political competition was not yet severe. Also, all Republicans did poorly in 1932; the traditionally Democratic Irish remained in their party.
By 1936, there were significant defections. The 1934 governor's race was not included in this study, since both candidates (Lehman and Robert Moses) were Jewish.

56. For an analysis of the Roosevelt vote see chapter 7.

57. German Catholics did protest against the Lehman school bus decision and noted resentment over this issue (New York State Branch, Catholic Central Verein, Proceedings, 1935, pp. 41, 48). Other Catholic concerns included, for example, the Communist issue.


59. Interview with Paul O'Dwyer; New York Times, 15 October 1938, p. 9. See also chapter 7, note 64.

60. It was Lehman who had insisted on the Poletti nomination, but this was probably considered a good move, since the Republicans had an Italian, Edward Corsi, running for U. S. senator in this election.

61. When Bennett was nominated for governor in 1942 by the Democrats, the ALP refused to endorse him for basically the same reasons.


63. Ibid., 14 October 1938, p. 1.

64. Ibid., 15 October 1938, p. 7; 18 October 1938, p. 13; 19 October 1938, p. 1; press release, Charles Poletti to Edward Lodge Curran, 18 October 1938, HLP.


66. After 1938, as a result of the Christian Front issue, a split was noted in some Democratic party organizations, as in Brooklyn, between the Irish and Jews (William O'Dwyer, “Reminiscences,” 4:670–72).

67. Interview with Ward Lange, New York City, 14 December 1972; Roland News, October 1935, p. 4. Lange was chairman of the Bay Ridge, Brooklyn chapter and financial secretary of the New York State chapter of the Steuben Society during the 1930s; he later became national chairman of the organization. The Roland News was also known during the 1930s as Der Roland, Roland, and, in 1939, as the German-American.

68. Peel, Political Clubs, pp. 256–57; Steuben News, January 1934, p. 10; Roland News, October 1935, pp. 3–4; January 1933, p. 3; November 1934, p. 2; Steuben News, January 1934, p. 10. For German-American comments on La Guardia’s campaign and election in 1933 see Steuben News, September 1933, p. 3; Staats-Zeitung, 8 November 1933, p. 6.

69. For a fuller discussion of the boycott see chapter 4.

70. Richard Schween to La Guardia, 28 February 1935, LGP, Box 2564; Walter Arnold to La Guardia, 1 March 1935, LGP, Box 2564; Brooklyn Jewish Center Review, September 1935, p. 9; American Jewish Congress to Lehman, 18 December 1933, HLP; Bronx Jewish Democratic Club to Lehman, 22 June 1933, HLP; New Utrecht Democratic Club to Lehman, 23 March 1933, HLP; Moshe Gottlieb, “The Berlin Riots of 1935 and Their Repercussions in America,” American Jewish Historical Quarterly 59 (March 1970): 314–18.


72. Paul Windels to La Guardia, 24 July 1935, LGP, Box 2549; La Guardia to
CHAPTER 4. THE OLD WORLD INFLUENCE

1. Interview with Robert F. Wagner, Jr., 8 March 1973, New York City; interview with Ward Lange, 14 December 1972, New York City. Wagner, son of the senator, and a state assemblyman from Manhattan's Yorkville section (sixteenth assembly district), in the late 1930s, was active in German-American affairs.

2. Quoted in Donald S. Strong, Organized Anti-Semitism in America (Washington D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1941), p. 38. Anti-Nazis always had to make special efforts to prove that they were not anti-German. See Yorkville Advance, 1 July 1937, p. 1.


7. Ibid., pp. 111–18. Fritz Gissibl became Fuhrer of the Friends of the New Germany in November 1933 soon after a federal Grand Jury in New York indicted Spanknoebel for his failure to register as an agent of the German government. Spanknoebel subsequently fled but designated a successor before he left. Ignatz Griebel was chosen but served only from September to October 1933 since he was not the Nazi Party choice. They instead favored Gissibl. In March 1934 Gissibl was replaced by Reinhold Walter and in July 1934 Hubert Schnuch replaced him. However Gissibl controlled the Friends from behind the scenes and in 1935 again officially became leader.
8. The Friends will hereafter be referred to as the German-American Bund, since they were essentially the same organization.


13. See chapter 2, note 49, and discussion on downward mobility.


16. The 1935 order came as a result of State Department complaints to the German government concerning Nazi activities in the United States. Information on these activities was uncovered by the House Special Committee on Un-American Activities (McCormack-Dickstein Committee), which had been created in 1934 to investigate American Nazism. United States Ambassador to Germany William Dodd also complained personally to Hitler in 1934 about Nazi activities. Hitler expressed "surprise" that this was occurring in America and promised to discontinue it. (William E. Dodd, Jr., and Martha Dodd, eds., _Ambassador Dodd’s Diary_ [New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1941], p. 88). For an illustration of the discussions going on within the German government on whether German citizens should be allowed to join the Bund, see DGFP, series C., 3:1113.


18. The Bund itself was less under the control and direction of various departments of the German government than its predecessor, the Friends of the New Germany. However, extensive connections remained, although the Foreign Ministry, fearful of jeopardizing German-American relations, tried to sever these ties. A great deal of discussion took
place within the German government over the question of how strong the ties should be with the American Nazis. In terms of monetary assistance, the Bund did get some help. Their newspaper was partially financed through advertisements from Germany’s shipping and railroad firms, and propaganda items were supplied virtually free from Germany. However, most Bund money came from dues and the sale of propaganda items and Nazi emblems (Dies Committee, Appendix, part 4, 77 Cong., 1st sess., 1941, pp. 1448, 1461; DGFP, series C., 3:1117–21; series D, 1:675–78; Bell, “The Failure of Nazism,” pp. 591, 597; Diamond, The Nazi Movement, p. 30; Alton Frye, Nazi Germany and the American Hemisphere, 1933–1941 [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967], pp. 15, 82–85).

19. The German Ambassador to the United States, Hans Dieckhoff, noted in January 1938 that most German-Americans were indifferent to their German background. Even among those who had an awareness of being German, the Ambassador stated, most were unconcerned with Nazism; only a small number were Nazis. For many, this indifference and unconcern was soon to change (DGFP, series D, 1:667–70).


24. The German government made an effort to influence the non-Nazi German-American organizations through various tactics. Advertisements were placed in their publications, propaganda favorable toward Germany was supplied, and reduced rate trips to Germany were provided. There were a number of German government agencies whose main purpose was to appeal to German-Americans and other Germans living abroad (Diamond, The Nazi Movement, pp. 194–99, 228; Frye, Nazi Germany, p. 54).


26. Knobloch, “Nazi Bund Movement,” p. 33; New York Times, 12 July 1939, p. 13; Roland News, August 1939, p. 4; interview with Lange. A split occurred in the Steuben Society over the Nazi issue, since some officers were more sympathetic to Nazi ideology than others. Gustav W. M. Wieboldt, New York State chairman, had publicly criticized the Bund not only for its divisive tactics but also for its un-American principles. Theodore Hoffmann, national chairman, who criticized only the Bund’s tactics and who had complained to Hitler about this organization, also had supported in 1934 one faction of the Bund against another during an intra-party split in an effort to eliminate the Bund leaders who were criticizing the Steuben Society. There are suggestions that had
Hoffmann's favorite won the intraparty conflict, he would have supported the idea of the two organizations' joining forces. However, even with Hoffmann's attitude, the *Steuben News* did not support the Nazi racial philosophy (Diamond, *The Nazi Movement*, pp. 169–74; *New York Times*, 28 November 1934, p. 12; 3 December 1934, p. 18; 11 December 1934, p. 17; *American Hebrew*, 30 August 1935, p. 262; DGFP, series C, 3: 1116).

30. Erroneous judgment—when "incorrect inferences are drawn from known facts"—is considered another unrealistic component of conflict (Robin M. Williams, Jr., *The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions* [New York: Social Science Research Council, 1947], Bulletin 57, pp. 40–41).
37. The DKV stickers were imported from Germany. See Department of Justice,


39. Interview with Lange; interview with Rabbi Joseph H. Lookstein, New York City, 27 April 1973; Jewish Examiner, 20 April 1934, p. 12. During the 1930s Lookstein was the Rabbi of Congregation Kehilath Jeshurun in Yorkville which was just down the street from the New York Turn Verein where the Bund used to meet and from Bund headquarters.


42. Jewish Examiner, 7 December 1934, p. 1; 7 September 1934, p. 26; interview with Lange.


44. By September 1937, according to a Gallup poll, 58 percent of Americans answered yes, 24 percent stated no and 18 percent had no opinion when asked if they thought Nazis in the United States were a menace to the country (Hadley Cantril, ed., Public Opinion 1935–1946 [Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1951], p. 166). The German government was well aware of the increasingly hostile American reaction to the Bund. This led them in 1938 to order once again all German citizens in the Bund to resign (DGFP, Series D, 1: 664–65, 675, 709; 4: 675–78).


46. Steuben News, August 1938, p. 3; November 1941, p. 2; New York Times, 4 October 1937, p. 16; 3 October 1938, p. 1. The Steuben Society had made its intentions known to the German Ambassador to the United States (Hans Dieckhoff) as early as January 1938. Dieckhoff noted that Hoffmann of the Steuben Society had visited him to state that his organization would publicly disavow the Bund. The actual public disavowal, however, took many months. Perhaps the delay was caused by Dieckhoff, who might have urged a postponement of a public denunciation until he could attempt to eliminate the Bund. Dieckhoff prodded the German government to cut its connections with the Bund and direct German citizens to withdraw from the organization. Although both were done, the Bund still survived. The Steubenites therefore went ahead with their planned attack, with, most likely, little pressure from the Foreign Ministry to desist (DGFP, Series D, 1: 673, 677).


50. Bell, In Hitler’s Shadow, p. 84; Diamond, The Nazi Movement, p. 170 n. 21, 277; Staats-Zeitung, 15 November 1938, p. 8; 7 December 1938, p. 1.

51. Dieckhoff stated in 1938 that fear of an anti-German crusade had caused the German-American community to reassert its Americanism and reject Germany’s advances (Diamond, The Nazi Movement, p. 291).


53. New York Times, 22 November 1938, p. 5. See also Victor Ridder to Lehman, 26 April 1940, HLP.

54. Address of Anton Weidman to the German and Austrian War Veterans in the United States, 2 July 1938, in HLP; Roland News, May 1938, p. 2; June 1939, p. 3; New York Times, 23 August 1939, p. 9; Volksfront, 4 March 1939, p. 1.


56. Interview with Lookstein; Steuben News, September 1939, p. 3; October 1940, pp. 3, 8; Staats-Zeitung, 12 March 1938, p. 8; 14 March 1938, p. 8; 15 March 1938, p. 1; New York Post, 30 April 1938, in Noah Greenberg Collection; Staats-Zeitung, 16 March 1939, p. 10; 18 March 1939, p. 8; New York Times, 8 June 1943, p. 23; 7 October 1943, p. 21; 20 June 1945, p. 25; Steuben News, April 1936, p. 1; April 1938, p. 3; November 1938, p. 3; New York Times, 3 October 1938, p. 1. See chapter 6 for the German attitude after the outbreak of war.

57. Irish World, 25 July 1934, p. 4; Gaelic American, 21 March 1936, p. 4; 2 September 1939, p. 4. See also chapter 6 and note 4 for the Irish attitude after the outbreak of war.

58. To insure that American Catholics would accept the Nazi government, the German consulate in New York financed the publication of an English translation of the concordat. This document was then sent to Catholic priests in America (Frye, Nazi Germany, p. 37).

59. F. K. Wentz, “American Catholic Periodicals React to Nazism,” Church History 31 (December 1962):401, 404-5, 408, 417; Celtic Circle, Brooklyn, to Lehman, 3 April 1933, HLP; George Q. Flynn, Roosevelt and Romanism: Catholics and American Diplomacy, 1937-1945, (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976), p. 13. The Catholic News also criticized Germany at this time because of the anti-Catholic actions, but notably this paper, unlike the Brooklyn Tablet, attacked Germany for its anti-Semitism. Revealing the influence of the German Catholics (Henry and Charles H. Ridder published this paper),
the Catholic News took a strong stand in its editorials and articles against Germany's anti-Jewish policies at the same time that the German-American community was doing so (Catholic News, 16 July 1938, p. 2; 10 December 1938, p. 10; 17 December 1938, p. 4; 20 January 1940, p. 8).

60. Dies Committee, Hearings, 4, 76 Cong., 1st sess., 1939, pp. 3765–66, 3888, 3946; Appendix, part 4, 77 Cong., 1st sess., 1941, p. 1466; Department of Justice, "Outline of Evidence," p. 89; "Report on Bund Activities," German-American Bund Folder, ADL; German-American Bund Commands, no. 27, 15 January 1940, in German-American Bund Folder, ADL; Diamond, The Nazi Movement, pp. 318–20. A number of anti-Semites had direct ties with the German government and were being supplied with propaganda materials (Frye, Nazi Germany, p. 92; Diamond, The Nazi Movement, pp. 193–94). See also chapter 8, below, and note 38 for discussion on Bund-Mobilizer meeting in Bronx.


67. Interview with Covello, 20 February 1969; Robert Ferrari, Days Pleasant and Unpleasant in the Order Sons of Italy in America (New York: Mandy Press, 1926), p. 92; Diggins, Mussolini, p. 95.

68. Interview with Zimmerman. Antonini was also a vice-president of the ILGWU and later became state chairman of the American Labor Party. Others among the Italian anti-Fascist labor leaders were Vanni Montanna and Salvatore Ninfo of the ILGWU and Girolamo Valenti of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union.


70. Ibid., p. 116. Approximately eighty of the 129 Italian-language newspapers in the United States supported Fascism, whereas only about twelve of the 178 German-


77. Roberto Farinacci was a member of the Fascist Grand Council, former secretary of the party, and editor of *Il Regime Fascista* (Stephen Wise to Ferdinand Pecora, 3 December 1936, SWP).


80. *American Hebrew*, 14 October 1938, p. 3; *Jewish Examiner*, 12 August 1938, p. 1; *Forward*, 3 September 1938, editorial page; *Jewish Examiner*, 23 September 1938, p. 3.


86. *Il Grido della Stirpe*, 2 July 1938, p. 2; 9 July 1938, p. 2; 8 October 1938, p. 2;
26 November 1938, p. 2; 10 December 1938, p. 2; 17 December 1938, p. 2. This newspaper was published from 1923 until it was closed by the United States Government on 13 December 1941.


88. Marcantonio to Santo Modica, 22 February 1939, VMP; Circular of American Sons of Italy Grand Lodge, 1 June 1939, VMP; *New York Times*, 13 June 1939, p. 9.


91. The factors which muted the explosive issue did the same to other points of friction between Italians and Jews.

CHAPTER 5. COMMUNISM, COUGHLINISM, AND THE CHURCH


3. Gary T. Marx, *The Social Basis of the Support of a Depression Era Extremist: Father Coughlin*, monograph 7 (Berkeley, California: Survey Research Center, University of California, 1962), p. 60; O'Brien, *American Catholics*, p. 180. Among the various religious groups, Catholics indicated "the greatest approval of Coughlin both in the absolute per cent approving and in the ratio of approvers to disapprovers." The Lutherans also indicated support in that they were the only group, "with the exception of the Catholics, in which the approvers outnumber the disapprovers." In descending order of per cent approval of the radio priest, Lutherans followed Catholics (Marx, *Social Basis*, pp. 13-14).


p. 8). The Catholic News took a neutral position on Coughlin, in contrast to the strongly Coughlinite Brooklyn Tablet. In Philadelphia this also seems to have been true "since what little support the Charles Coughlin–backed Union Party received in Philadelphia [in 1936] appears to have been almost exclusively Irish" (John Shover, "The Emergence of a Two-Party System in Republican Philadelphia, 1924–1936," *Journal of American History* 60 [March 1974]: 999 n. 35; see also note 32, below.)

6. On a national basis Coughlin did not attract a majority of his followers to anti-Semitism (Marx, *Social Basis*, pp. 107–9).

7. On opinion concerning the general Communist threat see New York State Branch, Catholic Central Verein, *Proceedings*, 1932, p. 8; 1933, pp. 4–8; 1937, p. 5; 1939, p. 24. The Brooklyn local federation particularly noted in 1939 that it was active in fighting Communistic activities, which had grown in number and intensity in their area. Catholic News, 20 November 1937, p. 4; 16 July 1938, p. 4; 28 October 1939, p. 12; 11 November 1939, p. 12; 30 August 1941, p. 8; Irish World, 19 July 1930, p. 4; 16 July 1938, p. 4; 30 September 1939, p. 4; Brooklyn Tablet, 29 September 1928, p. 10; 17 February 1940, p. 10; Scanlan, "From the Managing Editor's Desk," Brooklyn Tablet, 26 August 1939, p. 9. The German community as a whole was not at first as united in acknowledging the threat of Communism and the need for a vigorous counterattack as were the Irish. Victor Ridder of the *Staats-Zeitung* did not initially recognize the danger of Communism. As Works Progress Administrator of the City in 1935, Ridder refused to begin an investigation of Communist activities in the W.P.A. (As he stated, "We are not going to waste time to find out whether a man is a Communist.") By 1937, however, he was much more concerned about the menace of this "ism." Dr. Frederick H. Knobel, president of the United Lutheran Church, stated in 1936 that although Communism presented a real peril to the Church, the threat did not necessitate hysterical action (*New York Times*, 18 October 1935, p. 3; 16 October 1936, p. 23; 18 April 1937, p. 1; 21 February 1938, p. 20). See also Steuben News, August 1936, p. 5; Roland News, November 1935, p. 3; October 1936, p. 4.

8. Catholic News, 1 January 1938, p. 4; 12 February 1938, p. 4; International Catholic Truth Society to Lehman, 2 February 1938; Catholic War Veterans, St. Albans Post no. 10, to Lehman, 15 February 1938; Ancient Order of Hibernians, Division no. 3, Kings County, to Lehman, 15 February 1938; Celtic Circle of Kings County to Lehman, 18 February 1938, HLP; *New York Times*, 21 February 1938, p. 20; Advertisement in Brooklyn Tablet, 22 January 1938, p. 4, asking readers to send letters and petitions to Lehman.

9. Isaacs was aware of Gerson's Communist affiliation before the appointment but felt that as long as he was qualified for the job there should be no question of his remaining in the position. La Guardia agreed to allow Isaacs to make the decision. However, in 1941, according to Isaacs, the mayor refused to support him for renomination to the borough presidency because of this decision. La Guardia was afraid of losing the anti-Gerson and anti-Communist Catholic vote (Stanley Isaacs, "Reminiscences" [Oral History Project, Columbia University, 1950], pp. 92–94, 133; *New York Times*, 23 December 1937, p. 17; 29 July 1941, p. 11). As a result of the Gerson appointment and Nazi activity, the McNaboe Committee, created by the New York State Legislature, began to investigate un-American activities. The result of its investigation was the Devany law, passed in November 1939, which barred Communists and fascists from public office, civil service, and teaching.

10. There was also suspicion that other Communists besides Gerson were in city government. See Irish World, 21 May 1938, p. 4; see also chapter 7, on La Guardia and the Communist issue. It was essentially the Irish press which regarded La Guardia in this way. Neither the Italian nor German press attacked the mayor for Communist sympathies.
The *Staats-Zeitung* even continued to support him. See chapter 7, discussion on 1937 and 1941 mayoralty elections and *Staats-Zeitung*, and *Brooklyn Tablet*, 6 November 1937, p. 10; *Gaelic American*, 17 September 1941, p. 4. La Guardia was always regarded more harshly in the Irish than in the German community since he symbolized to the Irish their loss of power in the City.


13. See, for example, *Brooklyn Tablet*, 29 September 1928, p. 10.


16. Scanlan, “From the Managing Editor’s Desk,” 17 January 1931, p. 11; Scanlan, 15 April 1939, p. 11; Scanlan, 6 January 1940, p. 11; *Brooklyn Tablet*, 11 June 1938, p. 11. Scanlan and the *Irish World* noted a trend toward Communism in the federal government when Roosevelt appointed Robert Lovett, an editor of the *New Republic*, to the position of government secretary for the Virgin Islands (Scanlan, “From the Managing Editor’s Desk,” 13 May 1939, p. 11; *Irish World*, 20 May 1939, p. 4).


20. Tabulations on this poll indicating national origin of respondents were supplied by the Roper Public Opinion Research Center, Williams College. The poll was numbered AIPO 147 (2 February 1939).

21. On the basis of the ethnic press and organizations, had German Catholics rather than all Germans been the respondents in this poll, support for Franco would probably have registered higher. See New York State Branch, Catholic Central Verein, *Proceedings*, 1937, pp. 6, 21; 1938, p. 6; 1939, p. 33; *Staats-Zeitung*, 22 July 1936, p. 2B; *Catholic News*, 18 September 1937, p. 4; 16 October 1937, p. 4; *Il Progresso*, 28 July 1936, p. 8-S; 9 August 1936, p. 8-S; *Irish World*, 21 January 1939, p. 4; 28 January 1939,
22. Interview with Paul O’Dwyer; William V. Shannon, *The American Irish* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963), pp. 303, 305. Coughlin pictured himself as a defender of the faith and was able to win support on this point. However, among the Irish and German Coughlinites, there was also an anticlerical attitude evident in their attacks on the clergy who dared to criticize the radio priest. Essentially, these Coughlinites were selective in their defense of the Church, supporting or attacking those forces seen as saving or destroying Catholicism and themselves. Coughlin was regarded as a saviour, and all those who criticized him—including other clergy—were considered misguided enemies of the Church (Wilfrid Parsons, ‘‘Father Coughlin: The Aftermath,’’ *America*, 29 June 1935, pp. 275–77; Shenton, ‘‘The Coughlin Movement,’’ pp. 366–69. Also see the discussion later in this chapter under the heading ‘‘The Christian Front’’ and note 56.


25. Stephen Wise to Morris Rothstein, 9 December 1941, SWP.


28. The Jewish support of the Loyalists tended to confirm, for some people, this group’s Communist sympathies. Scanlan noted that ‘‘the lining up of Jews . . . with the loyalist anarchists and Communists . . . is a more fearful indictment than any Father Coughlin ever uttered’’ (Scanlan, ‘‘From the Managing Editor’s Desk,’’ 4 February 1939, p. 11).

29. References in the Irish press linking Jews to Communist and anti-Catholic influ-
ences actually appear as early as 1919, although infrequently at that point. Beginning in 1933 the number of such references increases. See Scanlan, “From the Managing Editor’s Desk,” 6 December 1919, p. 4; Scanlan, 14 October 1933, p. 9; Brooklyn Tablet, 22 February 1919, p. 4; 9 September 1933, p. 7; 7 October 1933, p. 9; 14 October 1933, p. 7; 28 October 1933, pp. 1, 9.


31. As Covello noted, “the Italians were concerned about Communism, but not particularly so” (interview with Leonard Covello, New York City, 20 February 1969). For some Italian-American comment on Communism, see Carlo D’Alva to editor, Il Progresso, 3 November 1940, editorial page; Salvatore Cipolletti to editor, 6 November 1940, editorial page; John Guattroni to editor, 10 November 1940, editorial page.


33. Maurice S. Sheehy to Isadore Hershfield, 30 May 1935, SWP; Marcus, Father Coughlin, pp. 83, 126; Marx, Social Basis, 97–98; O’Brien, American Catholics, pp. 171, 266, n. 44; Social Justice, 28 August 1939, p. 6; 4 September 1939, p. 10; 15 January 1940, pp. 3, 6; John O’Hara to editor, 3 May 1937, p. 13.

34. Coughlin in his newspaper also linked the Jews to Communism because of their support of the Loyalists during the Spanish Civil War and repeatedly asked why the Jews do not seem interested in speaking out against Communism (Social Justice, 20 February 1939, p. 7; 4 September 1939, p. 10). See also 9 January 1939, p. 8.

35. Irish World, 24 December 1938, p. 4; see also 3 December 1938, p. 4; Scanlan, “From the Managing Editor’s Desk,” Brooklyn Tablet, 26 November 1938, p. 11; Brooklyn Tablet, 3 December 1938, p. 1; Mary Duff to editor, 3 June 1939, p. 3; William M. Ryan to editor, 1 July 1939, p. 8; Dick O’Brien to editor, Irish World, 24 December 1938, p. 4.

36. T. Fitzpatrick to editor, Social Justice, 6 February 1939, p. 17; Patrick Walsh to editor, 27 February 1939, p. 17; Brooklyn Tablet, 28 January 1939, p. 3; Catholic News, 10 December 1938, p. 5; 17 December 1938, p. 3; Marcus, Father Coughlin, p. 165; George Britt, “Poison in the Melting Pot,” Nation, April 1, 1939, p. 375.

37. Even among Catholics who opposed anti-Semitism there was resentment that only Jews seemed to receive sympathy and support. O’Brien, American Catholics, p. 174; Irish World, 3 November 1934, p. 4; Brooklyn Tablet, 25 March 1938, p. 3; 11 June 1938, p. 10; 22 April 1939, p. 1; 29 July 1939, p. 9; Scanlan, “From the Managing Editor’s Desk,” 19 November 1938, p. 11; Scanlan, 3 December 1938, p. 11. See also Irish World, 27 October 1934, p. 4; Scanlan, “From the Managing Editor’s Desk,” 14 October 1933, p. 9; Scanlan, 4 August 1934, p. 9; Scanlan, 31 December 1938, p. 9; Scanlan, 6 January 1940, p. 11; Brooklyn Tablet, 25 August 1934, p. 1; John Coughlin to editor, 25 August 1934, p. 6; 13 February 1937, p. 9; Benedict Fitzpatrick to editor, 28 October 1939, p. 8; H.J. Sullivan to editor, 27 January 1940, p. 8; 3 February 1940, p. 1.
Although it was quickly forgotten by the Coughlinites, the Jews did protest against the persecution of Catholics in Mexico, and there was some indication of a willingness among the Jews to support a boycott of Mexican goods (Jewish Examiner, 30 November 1934, p. 6; Brooklyn Tablet, 1 December 1934, p. 1).

38. O'Brien, *American Catholics*, pp. 171–72. Father Coughlin's Friends, *An Answer to Father Coughlin's Critics* (Royal Oak, Mich.: The Radio League of the Little Flower, 1940), pp. 9–14. Coughlin's supporters claimed that there was no evidence of anti-Semitism in his speeches. Father Curran noted that such accusations were "a rehash of what is being said by the leftist leaders of the country" (New York Times, 24 July 1939, p. 3).

39. Among the prominent Catholics supporting Coughlin were Herbert O'Brien, Justice of the Queens County Domestic Relations Court; Bernard T. D'Arcy, active in the Holy Name Society and Knights of Columbus in his diocese; William Goodwin, Democratic district leader of the fourth assembly district in Queens; Patrick Scanlan of the Brooklyn Tablet; and Father Edward Lodge Curran, head of the International Catholic Truth Society and Chaplain of the Kings County branch of the Ancient Order of Hibernians. Coughlin's continued support among various Catholic clergymen is attested to by a banquet held for him in 1941 in Brooklyn in honor of the twenty-fifth anniversary of his ordination to the priesthood. "Seated at the Dias and throughout the banquet hall were hundreds of priests not only from the Brooklyn Diocese, but from all over the Greater City" (Gaelic American, 5 July 1941, p. 1; see also Brooklyn Tablet, 26 February 1938, p. 4, and Social Justice, 2 January 1939, p. 11).

40. In the concept of Catholic Action, the laity would work under the direction of the Church hierarchy. The laity was first to be instructed in the Church's teachings and then organized to fulfill the goals of the program (which remained vague). Education of the laity included formal instruction as well as study and discussion groups on Catholic social principles.

41. Social Justice, 23 May 1938, p. 8; 20 June 1938, p. 5; 27 June 1938, p. 23; 11 July 1938, p. 23. The leader of the Front later claimed that the cause of the organization can be found "in the pages of Father Coughlin's Weekly, Social Justice" (John F. Cassidy to Christian Brother, 1939, in American Jewish Committee Files, New York City). Social Justice and the Brooklyn Tablet were sold at Front meetings.

42. Brooklyn Tablet, 13 August 1938, p. 2; McCarthy, "Christian Front," pp. 8–9. The Front also began to appear in other cities, such as Boston, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Jersey City, and Newark.

43. The organizers for the Front at this point were Jack and Harry Thorne and Marcel Honoré, musicians who were worried about Communist and Jewish influence in their union (McCarthy, "Christian Front," pp. 12–13; Dale Kramer, "The American Fascists," Harper's Magazine, September 1940, p. 384).


45. McCarthy, "Christian Front," pp. 11–15; American Jewish Committee, "Memorandum on Front Meetings, 1938," in American Jewish Committee Files. July 1938 was the time when the Italian-Jewish conflict was beginning (see chapter 4, discussion on Italian anti-Semitism).

46. The membership of the Front has been estimated to be as low as 2,000 and as high as 38,500 in the New York City area. However these estimates were never verified (American Jewish Committee, "Report on the Front,"; New York Times, 15 January 1940, p. 3).


54. See chapter 8 for a description of Front activities against the Jews in a number of neighborhoods. During the last six months of 1939 there were 238 arrests at Front outdoor meetings. Of these, 112 were for illegal activities in connection with anti-Semitism, and 126 were for illegal activities in connection with opposition to the anti-Semitism (*New York Times*, 23 December 1939, p. 6; 15 February 1940, p. 6).

55. *Brooklyn Tablet*, 23 September 1939, p. 8; Handbill, 1939, in American Jewish Committee Files; *Social Justice*, 20 February 1939, p. 2; 31 July 1939, p. 3; American Jewish Committee, “Report on the Front”; *Light*, August 1938, p. 12; *Gaelic American*, 9 March 1940, p. 3; “Father Coughlin’s Trojan Horse in the Catholic World,” *Equality*, March 1940, pp. 27, 31; McCarthy, “Christian Front,” p. 56; Marcus, *Father Coughlin*, p. 9; *New York Post*, 9 February 1940, in American Jewish Committee Files; *Brooklyn Tablet*, 17 February 1940, p. 10; 4 May 1940, p. 22; McCarthy, “Christian Front,” p. 80. Years later Patrick Scanlan would still refer to the Front as “a patriotic organization” (Patrick Scanlan to author, 4 January 1973). The *Catholic News* remained silent on the Front, neither attacking nor supporting it.

56. *New York Times*, 25 May 1940, p. 19; McCarthy, “Christian Front,” p. 132. The selective anticlerical attitude of the Coughlinites was evident at a Christian Mobilizer meeting (a spin-off of the Front) in which their leader, Joseph McWilliams, commented that Coughlin was the only priest preaching Christ’s gospel and that the other clergy were misguided. The selective militancy of Coughlin’s followers is best illustrated by the fact
that the Frontists and Mobilizers were anti-Jewish even after the Pope had condemned anti-Semitism. These Coughlinites defined for themselves what was needed to defend the Church, and this definition was based on the realistic and unrealistic components of ethnic conflict (Lawrence Phelan, "An Evening with the Mobilizers," Commonweal March 22, 1940, p. 472).


58. Essentially, McWilliams had tried to take advantage of Front popularity in order to build a personal organization loyal to himself. His real aim was political power, and he used the ethnic tensions as his drawing card. In 1940 the Mobilizers became the American Destiny Party, and McWilliams was their candidate for Congress in the Yorkville area. See chapter 8, discussion on McWilliams in Yorkville. See also Dies Committee, Executive Hearings, 4, 76th Congress, 3d Session, 1939–40, p. 1505; PM, 12 June 1941, p. 19.

59. New York Post, 28 August 1939 in ADL Files; McCarthy, "Christian Front," p. 48; Social Justice, 13 November 1939, p. 5; McCarthy, "Christian Front," p. 69, n. 108; New York Times, 22 January 1940, p. 3; McWilliams was not Catholic, although many thought he was (Jewish Examiner, 27 October 1939, p. 3; 10 November 1939, p. 1; Brooklyn Tablet, 2 September 1939, p. 6).


61. Of the eighteen, one was released immediately and the others were charged not only with conspiracy to overthrow the government but also with conspiracy to steal government property.

62. The defendants claimed that the bombs were supposed to be too weak to kill anyone. The idea was only to incite a Jewish-Communist reaction, not necessarily to kill people. The actual degree of violence contemplated in relation to the bombings is a disputed point. See New York Times, 15 January 1940, p. 1; 25 April 1940, p. 12; 30 April 1940, p. 8; 3 May 1940, p. 8; Brooklyn Eagle, 15 January 1940, p. 6.

63. Brooklyn Eagle, 15 January 1940, p. 6; Brooklyn Tablet, 20 January 1940, p. 18. New York Times, 15 January 1940, p. 1; 6 April 1940, p. 10; 30 April 1940, p. 8; Brooklyn Eagle, 15 January 1940, p. 6. On the U.S. arms embargo see chapter 6; the Coughlinites feared that this repeal would draw America into war.

64. Information on the plot and the sequence of events was provided by the defendants in statements to the F.B.I. at the time of arrest, by an F.B.I. informant in the group, by F.B.I. agents who had recordings of various conversations of the defendants gathered at some of their conspiratorial meetings, and by a witness who had heard two of the defendants talking in a bar about killing the Jews and overthrowing the government. Although some of the alleged plotters admitted to discussing and planning for these events, they denied that they were actually involved in a conspiracy. They stated first that this plan was strictly a defensive one and was not to go into effect unless a Communist Revolution appeared imminent. Secondly, the defense (and most of the defendants) claimed that William Bishop and Denis Healy, the F.B.I. informant, had masterminded the plot and led the others astray. The defense accused them of having been planted by the Russian government, the American Communist Party, and high United States officials to disgrace the Front. Cassidy and the others were therefore pictured as dupes of Bishop and Healy. When Bishop took the stand, however, he blamed everything on Healy, stating
that there had been no group called the Action Committee. (Actually, Healy had joined the Action Committee a few months after it was organized and therefore had nothing to do with its formation.) The bombs and guns, Bishop said, were to be used for peaceful purposes. An unsubstantiated claim was also made that Cassidy had agreed to go along with Bishop in forming the Action Committee only because he was suspicious of him and wanted to watch him. Supposedly Cassidy had disagreed with Bishop over the latter's excessive emphasis on violence and his idea of taking over the government. The prosecution did not accept this defense claim, since Cassidy had said nothing to the F.B.I. about this when he was arrested. It was mentioned only in the trial. Although Cassidy was acquitted, doubt about his role remained. Four years later the Brooklyn Appellate Division barred him from practicing law, noting that “according to the evidence before us, the applicant deliberately advocated and counseled the unlawful formation of armed units for use against what he considered subversive elements, and he advocated that if the Government failed to act promptly these units should take the law into their own hands.” See New York Times, 6 April 1940, p. 1; 19 April 1940, p. 10; 25 April 1940, p. 12; 30 April 1940, p. 8; 3 May 1940, p. 8; 17 May 1940, p. 13; 5 June 1940, p. 12; 12 June 1940, p. 26; 19 June 1940, p. 24; 15 November 1944, p. 29.

65. It was noted that three of those involved had become interested in the Front “as a result of local friction arising between partisan groups during the Spanish Civil War.” Another individual had joined the Front because he was influenced by Coughlin and felt that he was joining a crusade sanctioned by the Church (New York Times, 16 January 1940, p. 3; New York Post, 9 February 1940, in American Jewish Committee Files).

66. The government contended that Bishop's real name was William Hrnecek, a native of Austria who had come to the United States in 1926; he claimed otherwise. It was also unknown whether he was a member of the Front, although he had spoken at Front meetings (New York Times, 15 January 1940, p. 1; 16 January 1940, p. 3; 20 January 1940, p. 3; 3 May 1940, p. 8; 17 May 1940, p. 13; Brooklyn Eagle, 15 January 1940, p. 4).

67. How their goals were to be accomplished against such great odds did not seem to concern those involved. The weapons confiscated included fifteen partly made bombs, eighteen cans of explosive material with which to make bombs, seventeen rifles, one shotgun, and various small arms, plus ammunition. However, the group did plan to enlarge their force and arms (New York Times, 15 January 1940, p. 1; 19 June 1940, p. 24; 25 June 1940, p. 1).

68. Brooklyn Tablet, 20 January 1940, p. 10; Irish World, 27 January 1940, p. 1; Brooklyn Tablet, 20 January 1940, p. 18; Gaelic American, 9 March 1940, p. 3 (see also 21 June 1941, p. 3); Irish Echo editorial, quoted in Social Justice, 29 January 1940, p. 3. Paul O'Dwyer also observed that the Front received strong support in the Irish community (interview with Paul O'Dwyer).

69. Staats-Zeitung, 16 January 1940, p. 8. The Staats-Zeitung was not the only one to see Coughlin's influence behind the plot. See New Republic, 22 January 1940, p. 99; Commonweal, 26 January 1940, p. 293. Coughlin attacked and disavowed the Front upon learning of the arrests, presumably because he feared that people would think he was involved in the conspiracy. However, finding this stand to be unpopular among his supporters, he quickly reversed himself, offered a vigorous defense of those arrested, and claimed that it was “opposition to Communism” which was on trial (Social Justice 22 January 1940, p. 3; 29 January 1940, pp. 1, 4; Irish World, 27 January 1940, p. 1; McCarthy, “Christian Front,” p. 54).


71. Marx, Social Basis, pp. 13-15; McCarthy, “Christian Front,” p. 38; Myra
Dinnerstein, “Roosevelt’s Purge of John J. O’Connor” (M.A. thesis, Columbia University, 1963), pp. 133–34; see also Jewish Examiner, 9 December 1938, p. 12; 19 January 1940, p. 4; Saul Cohen to editor, 2 June 1939, p. 4; 4 August 1939, p. 4; Brooklyn Jewish Center Review, January 1939, p. 5; American Hebrew, 9 June 1939, p. 4; B’nai B’rith Magazine, February 1940, p. 176. See chapter 8 for further description of Jewish reaction to the Front.


74. Interview with Gerald L. Carroll, 27 February 1973, New York City (Carroll was on the executive board of this committee); Voice for Human Rights, September 1939, pp. 1–3; November 1939, p. 11.

75. Scanlan, “From the Managing Editor’s Desk,” Brooklyn Tablet, 8 July 1939, p. 9; Scanlan, 22 July 1939, p. 9; Scanlan, 16 September 1939, p. 11; Scanlan, 10 January 1940, p. 11; William Ryan to editor, Brooklyn Tablet, 5 August 1939, p. 8; Anna Crosby to editor; 16 September 1939, p. 8; George Fitzgerald to editor, 16 September 1939, p. 8 (see also Social Justice, 28 August 1939, p. 6); PM, 7 January 1944, p. 9; 21 January 1944, p. 10; Jewish Examiner, 4 February 1944, p. 3.

76. Jewish Examiner, 2 February 1940, p. 4.


78. Bishop Molloy did offer during this period some vague statements opposing intolerance and hatred (American Hebrew, 3 November 1939, p. 1; New York Times, 27 September 1940, p. 19). The American Hebrew was thankful for even this meager response.

79. Bronx and Washington Heights Jewish Review, 13 January 1944, p. 1. For Jewish reactions to anti-Semitic incidents see, for example, Forward, 31 December 1943, editorial page; 4 January 1944, editorial page; Jewish Examiner, 18 February 1944, p. 4; PM, 11 January 1944, p. 12.

80. Gaelic American, 11 March 1944, p. 1; Brooklyn Tablet, 8 January 1944, p. 1. The Gaelic American took a position similar to that of the Tablet, shrugging off anti-Semitism and speaking instead of anti-Christianity (Gaelic American, 15 January 1944, p. 2; 22 January 1944, p. 1; 5 February 1944, p. 6).


82. Ibid., 5 February 1944, p. 1; Gaelic American, 12 February 1944, p. 1; New York Post, 14 January 1944, p. 5. For a more detailed discussion on how Catholic cooperation finally helped to control anti-Semitism, see chapter 8, under “Conflict Resolution: Washington Heights.”

83. Interview with Paul O’Dwyer; interview with Leonard Covello, 20 February 1969; Caroline F. Ware, Greenwich Village, 1920–1930 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1935), pp. 128, 130–31, 137. It seems that by this decade an easing of the Irish-Italian conflict occurred in other cities as well, with politics being the main area of continued rivalry and hostility. Another possible area of competition was that for position and influence within the Catholic Church. However, my efforts to secure information on
this rivalry proved fruitless. I was allowed to search through parts of the Diocese of Brooklyn archives but found no pertinent material relating to this or any other question. Other attempts to get this information—for example, by contacting various clergymen for interviews—also were unsuccessful. Still, judging from the previous experiences of these two groups in the Church, it is likely that this competition did exist to some extent. It is perhaps worthy of note that not until 1968 was an Italian-American (Francis J. Mugavero) named to lead a Catholic diocese in New York State (Brooklyn) (William F. Whyte, “Race Conflicts in the North End of Boston,” New England Quarterly 12 (December 1939): 637–40).

84. Scanlan, “From the Managing Editor’s Desk,” 17 December 1938, p. 11. Over the generations the Italians were becoming more like the Irish in their religious practices. This too may have played a role in the new attitude on the part of the Irish. (see Nicholas J. Russo, “The Religious Acculturation of the Italians in New York City [Ph.D. diss., St. John’s University, 1968], pp. 295–98). At the dinner for Bishop Molloy, he was presented with a decoration by the Italian Consul General in New York for having shown “deep sympathy and understanding for the New Rome, the New Italy, the Italy of today” (Catholic News, 17 December 1938, p. 3). Social Justice also defended Fascism and encouraged anti-Semitism among the Italians. For example, Italy’s racial policies were defended on the basis that “most Jews were anti-Fascist.” Moreover, Mussolini was hailed as “Man of the Week” by the paper in 1938 (Social Justice, 27 March 1939, p. 11; 23 May 1938).

85. Scanlan, “From the Managing Editor’s Desk,” Brooklyn Tablet, 17 December 1938, p. 11. See also 11 June 1938, p. 10, for an editorial opinion.

86. Salvatore A. Marturano to editor, Brooklyn Tablet, 25 February 1939, p. 8.

CHAPTER 6. GOING TO WAR

1. Manfred Jonas, Isolationism in America 1935–1941 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), pp. 212–214, 215. A September 1939 Gallup poll found that 82 percent of those polled felt that Germany was to blame for the war. Only 3 percent blamed England and France. A Fortune poll in October 1939 stated that 83.1 percent of the American people desired a victory for England and France, and only 1 percent preferred that Germany win (ibid., p. 212). According to the results of a Gallup poll taken in November 1941, New York City was “more isolationist than the country as a whole” (New York Times, 8 November 1941, p. 34).

2. Irish World, 17 May 1941, p. 4. Paul O’Dwyer also noted that the desire to avoid getting into the war, based on the anti-British feeling, was strong in the Irish-American community (interview with Paul O’Dwyer, 9 August 1973, New York City).

3. Gaelic American, 18 January 1941, p. 4. See also 11 January 1941, p. 1. The Tablet warned particularly against following those “who would place us again, with India, Canada and Northern Ireland, under the English Crown” (Brooklyn Tablet, 18 October 1941, p. 10).

4. The German embassy, recognizing the hostility to England in the Irish-American community, tried to cultivate their support in order to bring pressure on Roosevelt to stop his aid to the allies program. However, Hans Thomsen, the German Chargé d’Affaires noted in 1941 that the Irish now perceived Germany differently from the way they had during World War I, when they had viewed Germany as a liberator. Now, he stated, the Irish were worried that Germany’s war with England would create difficulties for Ireland and, owing to the clergy’s influence, did not support National Socialism for ideological
reasons. However, the German embassy was active among the Irish-American press. The *New York Enquirer* worked closely with the Germans and served as their propaganda outlet in the Irish community. (William Griffin, the publisher of this paper, was indicted for sedition in 1942). Thomsen also mentioned that the *Enquirer* had provided for Embassy cooperation with such papers as the *Gaelic American*. Contacts with Coughlin and *Social Justice* also were maintained as a way of winning over the Irish. DGFP, series D, 11:1213–14.

8. Information on this poll, which was financed by the America First Committee, is contained in American Friends of Irish Neutrality Papers, St. John’s University, New York City.
12. Interview with Paul O’Dwyer. A Gallup poll taken in January 1941 asked whether Ireland should give up her neutrality and let England use Irish bases and ports. Irish-Americans answered 40 percent yes, 52 percent no, and 8 percent undecided as compared to the general public’s response of 63 percent yes, 16 percent no, and 21 percent undecided. In February 1942, with America now in the war, Irish-Americans were asked whether they would like to see Ireland permit allied use of its ports. This time 72 percent answered yes, 21 percent no and 7 percent were undecided. Although the percent answering yes was less than the national average of 90 percent, it indicated a shift in Irish-American opinion on the question, although not until after American entry. *New York Times*, 22 February 1941, p. 12.
16. *New York Times*, 8 February 1941, p. 1. O’Brien was also chairman of the Catholic Laymen’s Committee for Peace, of which William Leonard, chairman of the Brooklyn chapter of America First, was secretary.
Institute for Jewish Research, New York City; New York Times, 24 May 1941, p. 1. The Tablet carried numerous advertisements soliciting contributions to America First. See also Scanlan, “From the Managing Editor’s Desk,” 27 September 1941, p. 11.

18. Cole, America First, pp. 86–87. The Catholic Laymen’s Committee for Peace, led by a Coughlinite, was formed in response to the German attack on Russia and its implications for American involvement. See Brooklyn Tablet, 20 September 1941, p. 1; Gaelic American, 15 November 1941, p. 4.


20. Interview with Paul O’Dwyer.

21. The Front and other active anti-Semitic isolationist groups in New York City remained predominantly Irish. There are also no reports of German-Jewish confrontation over this issue on the neighborhood level.


23. Staats-Zeitung, 23 February 1941, p. 1 (on the Steuben Society’s views, see Steuben News, February 1941, pp. 1, 3; March 1941, p. 4); Staats-Zeitung, 2 March 1941, p. 1; 11 March 1941, p. 6 (the America First Committee’s attack on the lend lease bill also centered on the fear that it would give Roosevelt too much power); ibid., 22 February 1941, p. 6.

24. Steuben News, May 1940, p. 1; August 1940, p. 1; December 1940, p. 3; Staats-Zeitung, 11 December 1940, p. 6; 22 June 1940, p. 6. The Staats-Zeitung, which had been temporarily banned in Germany because of its earlier anti-Nazi statements, now began to publish items from the Trans-Ocean News Service, under German government control, which presented news with “the German viewpoint.” The United States government closed Trans-Ocean along with the German consulates on 16 June 1941. DGFP, series D, 8:432.


26. Smith, To Save a Nation, p. 229, n. 5.

27. New York Times, 9 May 1941, p. 12; Cole, America First, p. 104; Hans Thomsen, the German chargé d’affairs in the United States, had urged the Foreign Ministry in 1939 to avoid giving any indication of support for the American isolationists, since they were already under suspicion of working for Hitler. He felt that obvious backing would weaken the isolationist movement. However, this request did not prevent the German government from covertly aiding the America First Committee and the No Foreign Wars Committee and from helping to organize the Make Europe Pay War Debts Committee and the Islands for War Debts Committee. The Bund, which often disregarded Thomsen’s suggestion, remained the most obvious Nazi tie to the isolationist cause (DGFP, Series D, 8:127; 11:949–50; New York Times, 9 October 1941, p. 1; German-American Bund Commands, no. 23, 8 September 1939; no. 41, 20 January 1941—both in German-American Bund Folder, ADL).

28. Steuben Society of America, 20th Anniversary and Testimonial Steuben Day Banquet, 17 September 1939 (New York: Steuben Society of America, 1939); Staats-Zeitung, 2 September 1939, p. 6; 22 May 1940, p. 8; Volksfront, 9 September 1939, p. 1;
Roland German-American Democratic Society of New York to La Guardia, 5 September 1939, Box 2674, LGP; Roland German-American Democratic Society to Members, 1 June 1940, HLP.


30. *Steuben News*, August 1941, p. 4; *New York Times*, 15 September 1940, p. 47; see also 12 July 1939, p. 13, for similar comments about the German-American Conference; and see the discussion on Victor Ridder’s difficulties with a similar charge in chapter 4.

31. *New York Times*, 4 March 1941, p. 22. This became increasingly true as Nazi spies were captured. One ring, discovered in 1941, included some German-Americans from Queens. Others arrested were former Bund members (ibid., 31 August 1941, p. 16; 31 December 1941, p. 9).


36. *New York Times*, 11 June 1940, p. 1; see chapter 7, discussion on the impact which this statement had on Roosevelt’s Italian support.

37. *Il Progresso*, 7 June 1940, p. 1; see also 11 June 1940, p. 1; 23 June 1940, p. 1. Some of the organizations that restated their loyalty to America were the Order of the Sons of Italy in America, the American Sons of Italy Grand Lodge, the United Italian-American League (representing 500 Italian-American civic, religious, social, and political organizations in New York State), and the Columbia Associations of New York City (representing Italian-Americans in civil service). Individuals included such notables as Luigi Antonini and Charles Polletti (*New York Times*, 12 June 1940, p. 18; 14 June 1940, p. 10; 16 June 1940, p. 19; 28 June 1940, p. 15; 13 October 1940, p. 30; Columbia Associations of New York City to Roosevelt, 12 October 1940, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, OF233A, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York).


40. *Il Progresso*, 11 June 1940, p. 1; 24 June 1940, p. 2; 22 June 1940, p. 2; 22 June 1940, p. 6; 24 June 1940, p. 2; 25 June 1940, p. 6; 27 June 1940, p. 6.

41. There were a number of complaints concerning discrimination against Italians by this time (Italian Bronx Community House to Lehman, 18 March 1941, HLP; Louis Franchi to La Guardia, 30 April 1941, and Armand Sabatini to La Guardia, 30 April 1941, LGP, Box 2546). Pressure on Pope from outside sources is illustrated by the American government’s initiation of an investigation of his activities in 1941 (Diggins, *Mussolini*,...
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pp. 347–48). In addition, the Italian consulates and agencies in the United States were closed in June 1941.


45. *New York Times*, 24 June 1940, p. 34; 6 May 1940, p. 6. Rabbi Wise was involved in the organizational meeting of the New York Chapter of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. This chapter merged with the New York Chapter of the Fight for Freedom Committee in August 1941 and urged all-out American participation in the war.


49. The Keep America Out of War Congress also attacked the anti-Jewish aspects of the speech (*New York Times*, 21 September 1941, p. 27); *Chicago Herald-American*, 17 September 1941, in American Jewish Committee Press Clippings; *Brooklyn Tablet*, 27 September 1941, p. 1.


51. Ibid., 12 December 1941, p. 22; *Steuben News*, January 1942 (see, for example, the front page letter to Roosevelt); *New York Times*, 11 January 1942, p. 27; 21 November 1943, p. 7; interview with Ward Lange, 14 December 1972; *Steuben News*, April 1942, p. 2.


53. *Il Progresso*, 12 December 1941, p. 1; 14 December 1941, pp. 3, 9; 21 December 1941, p. 16 (see also Pope to Stephen T. Early, 16 December 1941, Roosevelt Papers, PPF 4617); *New York Times*, 12 December 1941, p. 22; *Brooklyn Eagle*, 12 September 1942, p. 2; Italian-American Labor Council, *First Annual Report*, 1941–1942. This council was organized on 20 December 1941 as a central body of Italian-American organized workers. Luigi Antonini was president.

54. New York State War Council, Committee on Discrimination in Employment,
Report, 24 September 1942, Poletti Papers; Department of Labor, Survey of Industries and Employment, p. 2. One of the main reasons for the formation of the Italian-American Labor Council was to prevent discrimination against their ethnic group.

55. The government did not remove the enemy alien classification from non-citizen German-Americans, although curfew restrictions were eliminated in December 1942.

56. Il Progresso, 13 December 1941, p. 10; Pope to Stephen T. Early, 16 December 1941, Roosevelt Papers, PPF 4617; New York Times, 12 December 1941, p. 22. La Guardia was one of the first to note the theme that Italy was under the control of Germany and in reality a conquered nation (New York Times, 8 May 1941, p. 11).

57. Diggins, Mussolini, pp. 403, 405. At this time Pope also began his rapprochement with Roosevelt, which culminated in their meeting in October 1944. See Henry F. Pringle to William D. Hasset, 13 March 1943; Roosevelt Papers, PPF 4617; Memorandum for James M. Barnes, Eugene Casey, Jonathan Daniels and David Niles, 4 April 1944, ibid. See also chapter 7, note 75. On the divisiveness in the Italian-American community concerning the future of Italy, see Diggins, Mussolini, pp. 402-21.

58. Gaelic American, 13 December 1941, p. 1; Brooklyn Tablet 13 December 1941, p. 1; Irish World, 20 December 1941, p. 4. For an indication of Irish-American opinion after American entry see n. 12 this chapter. The American Friends of Irish Neutrality disbanded on 13 December 1941 in order to focus their attention on winning the war (Publicity Release, 13 December 1941, American Friends of Irish Neutrality Papers).

59. New York Post, 28 March 1944; Herald Tribune, 2 May 1944, in American Jewish Committee Press Clippings; Gaelic American, 4 December 1943, p. 4.

60. Marcus, Father Coughlin, p. 205.

CHAPTER 7. WINNING THE VOTES

1. O'Brien was mayor at the time, having won a special election in 1932 to complete James J. Walker's term. Immediately following Walker's resignation McKee had been acting mayor until the special election could be held.

2. The Recovery party had been organized at the request of Roosevelt, who instructed Ed Flynn, Democratic leader of Bronx County, and Jim Farley to persuade McKee to run, with probable help from the White House. The president was angry at Tammany for not supporting his nomination the previous year and wished to secure control of the New York City Democratic organization (Jeremiah Mahoney, "Reminiscences" (Oral History Project, Columbia University, 1949), p. 129; Paul Windels, "Reminiscences" (Oral History Project, Columbia University, 1949-1950), p. 79; Edward Flynn, "Reminiscences" (Oral History Project, Columbia University, 1950), p. 19; New York Times, 23 October 1933, p. 4; Arthur Mann, La Guardia Comes to Power 1933 (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1965), pp. 95-96, 105, 116.

3. Roosevelt never endorsed McKee. Adolf Berle, one of the president's advisors, noted on a number of occasions that Roosevelt was neutral in this campaign and that McKee was not the New Deal candidate. McKee nevertheless pictured himself as such (New York Times, 2 November 1933, p. 1; Mann, La Guardia Comes to Power, pp. 105, 151; Charles Garrett, The La Guardia Years: Machine and Reform Politics in New York City [New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1961], p. 109).

4. New York Times, 22 October 1933, p. 27; 28 September 1933, p. 2; William E. Ringel to Victor Ridder, 24 July 1934, LGP, Box 2702; Steuben News, September 1933, p. 3; Roland News, November 1933, p. 5; December 1933, p. 2.

5. New York Times, 7 October 1933, p. 17; Irish World, 21 October 1933, p. 4;
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Gaelic American, 21 October 1933, p. 5 (see also 15 July 1933, p. 4); 14 October 1933, p. 5; Patrick S. Hickey to La Guardia, 25 September 1933, LGP, Box 2717.

6. Il Progresso, 5 November 1933, p. 1; Italian-American Civic Association to La Guardia, 15 September 1933, LGP, Box 2715; United Italian-American Democratic Club to La Guardia, 23 September 1933, LGP, Box 2719; Italian Medical Society of Brooklyn to La Guardia, 4 December 1933, LGP, Box 2717; Joseph Graziano to La Guardia, 4 November 1933, LGP, Box 2717. Numerous letters expressing support are scattered throughout the La Guardia papers.

7. Mann, La Guardia Comes to Power, p. 140.

8. In 1929, for example, when he was the Republican mayoral candidate, La Guardia had suggested that American soldiers be sent to Palestine to aid the Jews against the Arabs (New York Times, 27 August 1929, p. 3; 5 September 1929, p. 2; see also Lawrence H. Fuchs, The Political Behavior of American Jews [Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1956], pp. 156–57). Although La Guardia was part Jewish (his mother was Jewish), this was not known to the general public until later in the decade. Even then, however, neither the Jewish community nor La Guardia himself recognized him as Jewish in any way. By nationality background and culture he was Italian, and by religion an Episcopalian. Later on, when his Jewish heritage was brought up, he remarked, “I never thought that I had enough Jewish blood in my veins to justify boasting of it” (quoted in Arthur Mann, La Guardia: A Fighter Against His Times, 1882–1933 [Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1959], p. 330).


10. Mann, La Guardia Comes to Power, p. 113.

11. Joseph V. McKee, “A Serious Problem,” Catholic World 101 (May 1915): 210–12. This article was reprinted in the New York Times on 17 October 1933, p. 2. According to one of his campaign managers, La Guardia had known about McKee’s article and originally had decided not to use it, but finally had done so because of McKee’s use of the anti-Semitic issue. The article meanwhile had been removed from all of the city’s libraries, and La Guardia’s staff had to go to the Congressional Library in order to secure a copy. McKee, according to Nathan Straus, Jr., a prominent Jew who ran as the Recovery party’s candidate for president of the board of aldermen, was well aware of the danger of this article. Straus felt that he had been put on the ticket to counteract any political damage among the Jews in case the article was revealed (Paul Windels, “Reminiscences, Additional Interview” (Oral History Project, Columbia University, 1953), pp. 14–17; Nathan Straus, Jr., “Reminiscences” (Oral History Project, Columbia University, 1950), p. 80.


13. Samuel Untermyer to Herbert Lehman, Felix Warburg, Henry Morgenthau, and Jonah B. Wise, 23 October 1933, HLP; Stephen Wise to Herbert B. Swope, 23 October 1933, SWP.

14. See, for example, Harry B. Kossove to La Guardia, 17 October 1933, LGP, Box 2718; Harry L. Koenig to La Guardia, 18 October 1933, LGP, Box 2718. There are many letters in the La Guardia Papers which comment on this issue.


16. New York Times, 1 November 1933, p. 3; 2 November 1933, p. 3; Press Release, 1 November 1933, LGP, Box 2716; Jewish Examiner, 3 November 1933, p. 8.


19. Socioeconomic data for the election districts was determined from *New York Times*, Daily News, and Herald Tribune, *New York City Market Analysis* (New York: 1934), and *New York Times*, Daily News, Mirror, and Journal-American, *New York City Market Analysis* (New York: 1943). In these economic surveys the neighborhoods of New York were analysed by using census tract information gathered from the 1930 and 1940 census. The economic status of each tract and each neighborhood was determined on the basis of annual family expenditure (based on rent or home value information). Census tract and election district boundaries were matched against the maps provided in the *Market Analysis* thus enabling me to secure a class description of the voting units with which I was working.

Because of the Depression, class categorization of the census tracts, and therefore election districts, changed from 1930 to 1940 as many were downwardly mobile. Only the Jewish election districts were represented in all class divisions in 1933 (based on the 1930 census data) and in all but the upper-middle class in the 1937 and 1941 elections (based on the 1940 census data). The Irish election districts in 1933 were represented only in the middle-middle and lower-middle class. In the 1937 and 1941 elections the same Irish election districts were categorized in the lower-middle class and lower class. The German election districts in 1933 were found in upper-middle, middle-middle, and lower-middle-class tracts. In 1937 and 1941 they were in the middle-middle, lower-middle, and lower class. The Italian areas were represented in the middle-middle and lower-middle class as well as the lower class in 1933. For the 1937 and 1941 election they were found in the lower-middle and lower class. Although there were certainly Irish, Germans, and Italians in other class divisions, they could not be found in election districts that were comprised of at least 50 percent of their own group and that retained the same boundaries over the years.

20. In a few election districts where Tammany (but not Democratic) boss control had been diluted, the lower-class Jewish vote went to McKee rather than O’Brien. The McKee vote in the lower-middle-class Jewish areas was 22 percent, and in the lower-class Jewish areas, it was 21 percent.

21. Jewish discontent with Tammany had been revealed in the 1932 special mayoralty election when O’Brien ran far behind Lehman and Roosevelt in Jewish areas. Many Jewish votes went to the Socialist Morris Hillquit (Mann, *La Guardia Comes to Power*, pp. 141-42).


25. *Deutscher Weckruf und Beobachter*, 9 September 1937, p. 3; *New York Times*, 10 September 1937, p. 12 (see also *Staats-Zeitung*, 31 October 1937, p. 9); *Steuben News*, 3 June 1937, p. 3. That some resentment against La Guardia existed in the German-American community has been confirmed in an interview with Ward Lange, 14 December 1972, New York City.

27. Gustav W. M. Wieboldt, for example, former chairman of the New York State Council of the Steuben Society, was appointed a city magistrate in April 1936 to fill an unexpired term, reappointed in May 1937 for a full term, and elevated to the Court of Special Sessions in 1938.

28. Ernst L. Graue to La Guardia, 21 October 1937, LGP, Box 2721; Roland News, October 1937, p. 5.


31. For some Jewish comment on the parade see anonymous to La Guardia, 1 November 1937; Sidney Strykes to La Guardia, 28 October 1937; Jewish War Veterans, Borough Park Post, to La Guardia 27 October 1937; Temple Israel, Long Beach, to La Guardia, 28 October 1937; Young Folks Jewish Social Clubs to La Guardia, 26 October 1937; R. Zavolin to La Guardia, 29 October 1937—all in LGP, Box 758.

32. Copy of Goldstein radio address, 26 October 1937, and War Veterans Committee pamphlet, in LGP, Box 758 (see also Jewish Veteran, December 1937, p. 14); The Day, 1 November 1937, in American Jewish Committee Press Clippings.


35. New York Times, 27 August 1937, p. 7; 28 October 1937, pp. 1, 19; 1 November 1937, p. 3; 2 November 1937, p. 1; Mahoney Pamphlet, in LGP, Box 2722; Mahoney advertisement in Irish World, 20 October 1937, p. 6. It was the Irish rather than the German Catholics who accused La Guardia of having Communist sympathies (see chapter 5, note 10).

36. Irish American Non-Partisan Committee for La Guardia, Publicity Release, 1937, LGP, Box 2721. Also see chapter 3, discussion on Irish attitudes toward La Guardia.

37. Political Pamphlet in LGP, Box 2721. That this tactic was used was substantiated in an interview with Paul P. Rao, 7 August 1973, New York City. Rao was chairman of the Italian-American Division of the Mahoney Campaign. See also Yorkville Advance, 15 January 1937, p. 3, on Rao’s comments concerning the mayor’s appointments.

38. Political Pamphlet in LGP, Box 2721. Also see chapter 3, discussion on Democrats’ efforts to win the Italian vote after 1933.

39. Being a Tammany district leader who was the choice of the other county Democratic organizations, Mahoney could not seriously offer himself as a reformer or good-government candidate.


41. According to one political analyst, the German-Americans, because of Mahoney’s and La Guardia’s anti-German statements, actually preferred U. S. Senator Royal Copeland. Copeland ran against Mahoney and La Guardia in the Democratic and Republican primaries, respectively, but lost in both. His defeat left this community with little choice. Copeland was Tammany’s original selection. He was also associated with an anti-New Deal position (Max Lerner, “Tammany’s Last Stand,” Nation, 11 September 1937, p. 256).

42. Roland News, October 1937, p. 5.

43. Jewish Examiner, 4 February 1939, p. 4; 7 July 1939, p. 1; 14 July 1939, p. 4; Jewish Veteran, January 1940, p. 12; New York Jewish News, 3 February 1939, p. 4;
Brooklyn Jewish Center Review, June 1939, p. 1; Abraham Cahan, editor of the Forward, to La Guardia, 26 June 1939, LGP, Box 2539; Rabbi Louis Spitz to editor, American Hebrew, 28 July 1939, p. 7; Equality, September 1939, pp. 14–15.

44. New York Times, 21 July 1939, p. 5; 23 December 1939, p. 6. The Mayor may actually have thought the situation was under control, since two of his undercover agents reported in November 1939 that anti-Semitism was no longer an acute problem. This was a premature conclusion, since just two months later, in January 1940 the Front was involved in a spectacular treason plot (see chapter 5). The Mobilizers continued to be active through 1940, and the Front reappeared in 1941. For the report of the undercover agents see Nathan Frankel and Byrnes McDonald, “Final Report to Mayor from Committee to Investigate Anti-Semitic Groups in New York City—Confidential,” 6 November 1939, LGP, Box 2539.

45. The police also arrested people who unlawfully interfered with the anti-Semitic speakers (New York Times, 23 December 1939, p. 6; 15 February 1940, p. 6). In cases of picketing and strikes (and presumably other forms of protest), La Guardia was of the opinion that if the malcontents were allowed to demonstrate freely, they would not resort to violence (Garrett, The La Guardia Years, p. 386).

46. O'Dwyer was speaking about Herbert O'Brien, a leading Coughlinite, whom La Guardia had appointed as a justice in the Queens County domestic relations court (New York Times, 19 September 1941, p. 1).

47. Ibid., 27 October 1941, p. 10; 21 October 1941, p. 19; 22 October 1941, p. 17; O'Dwyer pamphlet in LGP, Box 2735.

48. Murray E. Plager to La Guardia, 22 October 1941, LGP, Box 2546; Jewish Examiner, 31 October 1941, p. 4; 29 March 1940, p. 4. William O'Dwyer suggested in an interview years later that the mayor had not wanted to eliminate the Front because he had wanted to avoid antagonizing Catholics and at the same time had wanted to use this issue to win Jewish support. O'Dwyer noted that La Guardia “could always shake his fist at Hitler, or say something dramatic, and hold onto the Jews, who in the main were not alert to what La Guardia was doing to them with the Christian Front.” Also, as O'Dwyer stated, the mayor benefited from the Front because it kept the Jews and Irish divided and therefore split the Democratic party in certain areas (William O'Dwyer, “Reminiscences” (Oral History Project, Columbia University, 1960–62), 4: 670–72; 1: 151–52.


51. Interview with Paul O'Dwyer. Less than a week after O'Dwyer's attack on the anti-Semites, the Coughlinites formed the American Rock Party on a platform of isolationism and anti-Communism. They decided to run as their candidate William J. Goodwin, Democratic district leader of the fourth assembly district in Queens, a member of the editorial board of the Tablet, and a man who was extremely active in the Coughlin movement and anti-war crusade. However, the elections board voided the nominating petition of this party because of an insufficient number of signatures. The lack of signatures most likely was the result of the time element, since this was a hastily organized party which was not even suggested until after the campaign had begun. The party's followers probably voted for O'Dwyer—at least, before O'Dwyer's attack, this group was pictured as being ready to support his candidacy. Immediately before the election, Social Justice excused O'Dwyer's critical statements by noting that he was forced to say those things because of Jewish pressure. Therefore the go ahead to vote for O'Dwyer was given

52. New York Times, 19 September 1941, p. 1; 14 October 1941, p. 20. See chapter 5, note 9, for more on the Gerson issue.

53. The Day, 13 October 1941, in LGP, Box 2735.


55. La Guardia had faced a strong challenge in the Republican primary from John R. Davies mainly on the question of the mayor’s support for an interventionist foreign policy. He had also antagonized Republican voters by enrolling as a member of the American Labor party.


57. New York Times, 8 November 1941, p. 34. The Roosevelt percentage vote in 1940 correlated a high .777 ($r^2 = .604$) with the La Guardia percentage vote in 1941, indicating a strong relationship. They were drawing their votes from the same election district constituency. The votes in the Jewish election districts for example were strongly for Roosevelt and La Guardia and show an almost complete identity of support with little variance. See also Gaelic American, 17 September 1941, p. 4; 18 October 1941, p. 2.

58. Staats-Zeitung, 1 November 1941, p. 6.


60. See the discussion on Democrats and Italians in chapter 3, and the discussion on Mahoney and the Italian vote earlier in this chapter.

61. Interview with Rao; telephone interview with Leonard Covello, 22 June 1972; telephone interview with Alfred Santangelo, 5 July 1972. However, Il Progresso could still boast upon La Guardia’s election that Italians were advancing and demanding more respect, although, as in 1937, the paper did not endorse any mayoral candidate (11 November 1941, p. 6).

62. Although economic conditions had improved by November 1941, there was surely still resentment in these areas related to the recent economic hardships, which in some cases still continued.

63. Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, Vintage Books, 1963), p. 55. Although appealing to the fears and frustrations of the various ethnic groups, the Democrats did not want to encourage a situation which would destroy their party in certain neighborhoods. They therefore tried to eliminate the more overt manifestations of conflict, such as the street meetings, while still continuing their narrow ethnic appeals (see chapter 8, discussion on South Bronx).

64. The Lehman campaigns for governor involved the issue of anti-Semitism. For example, a whispering campaign was directed against Lehman in 1938. Moreover, Lehman charged in that year that the Republicans were waging a campaign of racial and religious intolerance. However, according to Dewey, Lehman would use the tactic of waving the “bloody shirt” of anti-Semitism toward the end of every campaign in an effort to smear his opponents (New York Times, 6 November 1938, p. 1; Thomas E. Dewey and Rodney Campbell, ed., Twenty Against the Underworld [New York: Doubleday and Company, 1974], pp. 415, 435). See chapter 3, discussion on 1938 campaign.


66. Ibid., pp. 172, 184, 186–87; New York Times, 29 September 1940, p. 39. There was some truth in the statement that the German government favored a Willkie victory.
The German embassy, for example, tried to defeat Roosevelt through the publication of materials on Poland which appeared to show the president’s desire for war. See DGFP, series D, 9:48, 57; 10:48-49; Alton Frye, Nazi Germany and the American Hemisphere (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 132–33.  
69. Staats-Zeitung, 4 November 1940, p. 6; Dorothy Thompson, quoted in Divine, Foreign Policy, p. 73.  
70. The importance of the foreign policy issue in the 1940 election is noted in a report, submitted to Roosevelt in 1941, entitled “Research Project on the Influence of Nationality Groups on Election Returns” and containing information on New York. Louis Bean was director of the project which compiled the report. In 1944 Bean and others published an article which contained parts of the 1941 report. Both studies note a shift away from Roosevelt between 1932 and 1940, particularly between 1936 and 1940, by German and Italian voters. Bean stated that this shift could not be explained by economic factors. Further analysis, based on national sample survey data (American Institute of Public Opinion) for 1936, 1940, and 1944, is contained in an unpublished report by Robert T. Bower and Leo Srole. This study notes a decrease in the percentage Democratic vote among Italian and Irish voters in 1936, 1940, and 1944 and an increase among Jewish voters (Germans were not included in this study). The report states, however, that variables other than ethnicity (e.g., economic status) played a significant role in determining this vote. While this is true (since upper- and middle-income individuals are less likely to vote Democratic than are those in the lower economic categories), economic rank was not as important as ethnicity in 1940, according to my study, although it did influence voting behavior (see table 15). For example, there was less difference in the way units in the same ethnic grouping were voting than there was among units in the same economic category. The 1941 report is in OF 4351, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York, and is discussed in Louis Gerson, The Hyphenate in Recent American Politics and Diplomacy (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1964), pp. 119–21. For the 1944 study see Louis Bean, Frederick Mosteller, and Frederick Williams, “Nationalities and 1944,” Public Opinion Quarterly 8 (Fall 1944):371–72. The AIPO Analysis is in Robert T. Bower and Leo Srole, “Voting Behavior of American Ethnic Groups 1936–1944” Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University, 1948.  
71. Had the Ethiopian crisis not been settled by the 1936 elections, Roosevelt probably would have lost significant Italian support in that contest. The Italian community was angry at Roosevelt’s statements and his intended actions against Italy. Although the Republicans tried to use this issue in 1936, it did little good. Italy had annexed Ethiopia by this time, the League of Nation’s economic sanctions had been removed, and the war was old news. An indication that even pro-Fascists were now supporting the president can be observed from the pages of Il Progresso. Pope, who accepted the chairmanship of the Italian division of the Democratic National Committee in 1936, hailed Roosevelt in a number of editorials and even noted that the people of Italy were hoping for a Roosevelt victory. See Il Progresso 19 October 1936, p. 4; 31 October 1936, p. 6; 2 November 1936, p. 6; Republican political advertisement, 3 November 1936, p. 11; John P. Diggins, Mussolini and Fascism, The View from America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 302–05.
72. Mark A. Bogart to Marguerite LeHand, 24 October 1940, Roosevelt Papers, OF 233A; Luigi Antonini to Marguerite LeHand, 10 February 1941, Roosevelt Papers, PPF 7382; Alfred F. Beiter to Edward J. Flynn, 1 October 1940, Roosevelt Papers, PPF 2532; Charles Rappina to Roosevelt, 21 October 1940, Roosevelt Papers, OF 233A; Elsa Riccio to Roosevelt, 26 October 1940, Roosevelt Papers, OF 233A; Ralph Manzoni to Marguerite LeHand, 8 October 1940, Roosevelt Papers, OF 233A.


75. *New York Times*, 13 October 1940, p. 22; Divine, *Foreign Policy*, p. 64. After the election Roosevelt continued to woo the Italians. In May 1941 he appointed Paul P. Rao to the position of assistant U.S. Attorney General in charge of customs. Rao was an important figure among Italian Democrats in New York, and the position had been offered in order to make amends for the "stab in the back" speech, which still caused bitterness. Roosevelt and Pope, who were at odds after the publisher's lack of support in 1940, managed to bury the old resentments before the 1944 elections. Roosevelt felt Pope was important for purposes of winning the Italian vote and at Ed Flynn's urging invited Pope to the White House in October 1944 and agreed to permit the publisher to be seen coming out. The president and his political advisors were also concerned about the situation in Italy, after that country's defeat, knowing well that Italian-Americans were watching the president's actions carefully (Interview with Rao; *New York Times*, 30 May 1941, p. 3; Edwin Watson memo to Roosevelt, 9 October 1944, Roosevelt Papers, PPF 4617; William O'Dwyer, "Reminiscences," 5:942-43; Gerson, *The Hyphenate*, p. 127; Diggins, *Mussolini*, pp. 417-18.


77. *Gaelic American*, 16 November 1940, p. 4; *PM*, 12 June 1941, p. 17; for examples of political ads, see *Irish World*, 2 November 1940, pp. 3, 6; *Gaelic American*, 2 November 1940, p. 1; 16 November 1940, p. 4; *New Republic*, 26 October 1940, in American Jewish Committee Press Clippings. Based on a Gallup Poll in 1938, there is an indication that the drop in Roosevelt's vote in 1940 was related to a loss of Coughlinite support. For example, "Coughlin supporters who had voted for Roosevelt in 1936 were more likely to have changed their opinion concerning the President [by 1938] than were Roosevelt voters who disapproved of the radio priest." Furthermore, those 1936 Roosevelt voters who still approved of Coughlin in 1938 were more likely than anti-Coughlinites to switch their vote to the Republicans in the 1938 congressional elections. In general more Coughlinites than anti-Coughlinites were opposed to Roosevelt. However this opposition decreased as one moved down the income scale. Most of the poor and those on relief who approved of Coughlin also supported Roosevelt, seeing them both as aiding their income class. This might partially explain Roosevelt's high Irish and German vote in 1936 even after Coughlin had come out against the president in New York State. It may also have been a contributory factor to Roosevelt's majority Irish vote in 1940 (Gary T. Marx, *The Social Basis of the Support of a Depression Era Extremist: Father Coughlin*, monograph 7 [Berkeley, California: Survey Research Center, University of California, 1962], pp. 74-76, 79-80, 92; Seymour Martin Lipset, "Three Decades of the Radical Right: Coughlinites, McCarthyites, and Birchers," in *The Radical Right*, ed. Daniel Bell (New York: Doubleday and Company, Anchor Books, 1964), pp. 387-89; *New York Times*, 1 November 1936, p. 48).

CHAPTER 8. IN THE NEIGHBORHOODS

1. Archbishop Mooney in 1942 demanded that Coughlin terminate his nonreligious public activities or leave the priesthood. Coughlin chose the former. Social Justice's second-class mailing privileges were revoked under the Espionage Act of 1917. McWilliams was brought to trial in 1942 along with twenty-five others for sedition. The Bund, after Kuhn's arrest and conviction, was split and weakened. On 11 December 1941, the F.B.I. raided its headquarters and seized its records. Subsequently a number of Bund leaders were brought to trial and convicted for sedition and conspiracy to violate the Selective Service Act.

2. *Brooklyn Jewish Center Review*, January 1944, p. 3.

3. Washington Heights' boundaries are West 158th and 159th streets on the south, Manhattan's borough limits on the north, the Harlem River on the east, and the Hudson River on the west.


6. Washington Heights Jewish population figures are from C. Morris Horowitz and Lawrence Kaplan, *Jewish Population, New York Area, 1900–1975* (New York: Federation of Jewish Philanthropies, 1959), p. 98. Since Jewish population figures for all New York areas in the 1920s were available only for 1923 and not for a census year, it was necessary to estimate the total population of these areas for 1923 by noting the rate of increase or decrease between 1920 and 1925. Tract data is computed from Walter Laidlaw, ed., *Statistical Sources for Demographic Studies of Greater New York, 1920* (New York: The New York City 1920 Census Committee, 1922), pp. 125–35, which lists foreign-born for each nationality group in each census tract; and Walter Laidlaw, ed., *Population of the City of New York, 1890–1930* (New York: Cities Census Committee, 1932), p. 265, which offers a ratio of native-born persons of foreign or mixed parentage to foreign-born persons, by borough, for each nationality group in 1920. It is possible from this and the Laidlaw 1920 data to get a good estimate of the foreign stock population, by nationality, in each census tract.

7. Lendt, *A Social History*, p. 73; interview data from the leading citizens of Washington Heights was collected as part of the Lendt study. Although these interviews are confidential, Dr. Bruce Dohrenwend of the Social Psychiatry Research Unit, College of Physicians and Surgeons, Columbia University kindly allowed me to submit questions to his staff who then searched through the interviews for appropriate answers and quotations. The confidentiality of the interviews was kept intact in this way since I did not see the interviews, while at the same time I was provided with valuable data from long-time residents of this community that was not utilized in the Lendt study. On information pertaining to early anti-Semitism, interview number 0019 was valuable. These interviews will be hereafter cited as Social Psychiatry interview (with the appropriate number).

8. All Irish, Russian (Jewish), and other ethnic tract figures for 1920 for Washington Heights were computed from Laidlaw, *Statistical Sources*, pp. 125–35, and Laidlaw, *Population of the City of New York*, p. 265. The 1940 data is estimated on the basis of ratios of foreign-born heads of families to total foreign-born, and total foreign-born to native-born of foreign or mixed parentage, for each nationality group, using borough and
tract statistics. See United States, Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Census Tract Data on Population and Housing, New York City: 1940* (New York: Welfare Council Committee on 1940 Census Tract Tabulations for New York City, September 1942), pp. 149, 153–54; United States, Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Population: Nativity and Parentage of the White Population, Country of Origin of the Foreign Stock, 1940* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1942), p. 74. This ratio technique is the only possible way to secure even an estimate of Irish and Russian (Jewish) tract populations for 1940. All tract figures and percentages must therefore be considered estimates, although according to neighborhood surveys and data based on larger units than tracts (e.g., health areas) they seem to be accurate.

9. Voter registration data was also considered to determine if there was an Irish presence in the Jewish tracts west of Broadway.

10. The Index of Dissimilarity was 26 for 1920 and 35.5 for 1940. Census block statistics by ethnicity were not available for either 1920 or 1940.

11. All voter registration material comes from various volumes of the City Record, City Record Supplement, *List of Registered Voters*. In this case the volumes for 1910, 1920, 1930, and 1940 were used. This compilation lists registered voters by election district, street, and house number. An identification of the ethnicity of the registered voter was made by considering the person's name. Voters with ethnically doubtful names were not assigned to any group. See chapter 3, note 12. Efforts were made to confirm the name technique through the use of census tract ethnic information and neighborhood social surveys. For example, Irish-sounding names were identified as Irish only on streets within census tracts that were estimated as having an Irish presence and/or which were described by neighborhood surveys as having Irish residents. Although voter registration lists were not the ideal data base to use, it was the only one available for the years under examination. The lack of any city house directories in New York which list residents by street address precluded an attempt to find all residents (not just registered voters) at an address and compare them over the years. While perhaps the voter registration lists are not totally accurate in revealing the exact number of each ethnic group in each house, they are accurate in revealing a group mobility pattern over the years, and this is what I was most interested in finding. The alphabetical city directories, which are arranged by name, end with 1933/34. Telephone directories, which obviously left out many people in the 1930s, particularly in low-income areas, must be used after that date.


16. Social Psychiatry interview 0018; Front Pamphlet, 1938, in American Jewish Committee Files; Social Psychiatry interview 0021 noted the resentment Irish Catholics felt toward the movement of German Jewish refugees into the neighborhood because many came with some money and were able to buy small shops.

17. Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, “Reports and Affidavits on
Washington Heights," in ADL Files, New York City. (hereafter cited as ADL Reports); Social Psychiatry interviews 0018, 0021; New York City, Department of Investigation, Report on Investigation of Anti-American and Anti-Semitic Vandalism, 5 January 1944, pp. 18, 125; New York Post, 22 December 1943, p. 3; 29 December 1943, p. 3; 14 January 1944, p. 5; New York Times, 30 December 1943, p. 19; New York Sun, 31 December 1943. Some Protestant churches were also attacked. Only Catholic places of worship were left untouched.

18. These gangs were identified as Irish (Social Psychiatry interview 0021; interview with Ann Lee Jacobs [Raff], 5 April 1973, New York City).

19. This included 161st Street and Amsterdam Avenue, J. Hood Wright Park at 174th Street and Fort Washington Avenue, and the area between 162nd and 163rd Street on Fort Washington Avenue. The Shamrocks operated around Sherman Avenue and Dyckman Street. The influence of the earlier anti-Semites on these juveniles was attested to by Ann Lee Jacobs, who was involved in efforts to rehabilitate the Shamrocks (interview with Jacobs).


21. Voice for Human Rights, January 1940, p. 14. One Washington Heights resident noted that in the fight with the Front the Irish politicians had a lot to lose politically by speaking out against this organization and Coughlin. Apparently some did so anyway (Social Psychiatry interview 0023).

22. Interview with Jacobs; Social Psychiatry interview 0021.

23. Interview with Jacobs; ADL Reports; New York Post, 29 December 1943, p. 3; 30 December 1943, p. 5; Bronx and Washington Heights Jewish Review, 13 January 1944, p. 1. Suspicion of the police was also based on their involvement as members of the Front. See chapter 5, discussion on Front occupational breakdown.


25. Department of Investigation, Report, p. 13 (see also New York Post, 11 January 1944, p. 4); New York Times, 30 December 1943, p. 19; PM, 7 January 1944, p. 9; New York Post, 14 January 1944, p. 5; New York Post, 3 January 1944, p. 5; 10 January 1944, p. 4. For La Guardia's earlier actions against anti-Semitic activities, see chapter 7.

26. Interview with Jacobs.

27. Ibid.; Social Psychiatry interview 0012. Ann Lee Jacobs ran the Youth Aid program.

28. Social Psychiatry interview 0021; Lendt, A Social History, p. 76; Interview with Jacobs; ADL Reports; New York Post, 6 January 1944, p. 4. See chapter 5, regarding how the New York City Catholic Church hierarchy reacted to these incidents. There was still an ambivalence on the part of the Church in relation to condemning anti-Semitism and the remnants of the Front.

29. That the Front and anti-Semitic issue continued to disturb the community is revealed by two political events. Many believed that Jacob Javits' victory over Dan Flynn for Congressman in this area in 1946 was related to Flynn's earlier failure to take a stand against anti-Semitism. Flynn was also bothered during the campaign by the rumor that he had been associated with the Front. In the second case, Paul O'Dwyer noted that when he campaigned in Washington Heights in 1948 for the congressional seat, he was attacked by remnants of the Front because of his earlier opposition to them. (Social Psychiatry interview [no number given]; New York Times, 2 August 1946, p. 10; interview with Paul O'Dwyer).

30. The boundary of the South Bronx on the north is approximately 161st Street, running across to Longwood Avenue to Tiffany Street to Whitlock Avenue to Bryant

32. Based on information compiled from the List of Registered Voters, 1910.


34. Laidlaw, Statistical Sources, pp. 139–69; Laidlaw, Population of the City of New York, p. 265; Community Council of Greater New York, Census Tract Tabulations, 1930; Bureau of the Census, Census Tract Data, 1940, pp. 15–16; Bureau of the Census, Population: Nativity and Parentage, p. 74; List of Registered Voters, 1920, 1930, 1940 (see notes 6, 8, and 11 above); interview with Brown; Bronx Council of Social Agencies, "A Study of the Lower Bronx," September 1939, pp. 4–5, 100. Crimmins, Cypress, and Powers avenues were heavily Jewish in the St. Mary’s Park area. Also parts of Beeckman Avenue, Beech Terrace, Oak Terrace, and St. Mary’s Street were Jewish in this section. In the Hunts Point section, those of Russian foreign stock, which did not include all Jews, were 32 percent (1,781) of the population in tract 101 and 29 percent (3,979) of the population in tract 83 in 1940. The percentage Irish in these tracts were 2 percent (412) and 5.4 percent (743) respectively. However, in the area west of St. Ann’s, tract 25 was 34 percent Irish foreign stock (3,743) and only 3.9 percent Russian (426); tract 39 was 38 percent Irish (4,659) and 3.6 percent Russian (440) in 1940.

35. New York Market Analysis, 1934, 1943. In a health area (number 46) where the Irish predominated, 11.1 percent of the total dwelling units either needed major repairs or had no private bath in 1940. In a predominantly Jewish health area (number 42), the percentage was 2.5 (Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Housing, Data for Small Areas, 1940 [Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1942], 1:76; Bronx Council, "A Study of the Lower Bronx," pp. 5, 91–92).

36. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Population and Housing, Statistics for Health Areas, New York City, 1940 (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1942), pp. 34–35. In Washington Heights a similar breakdown was not possible, since no health area, which consists of a number of census tracts, was predominantly Irish.

37. Except for the Bundists, conflict in this community remained mainly an Irish-Jewish one (Interview with Brown; Florence S. McDonough to Roosevelt, 22 October 1941, Roosevelt Papers, OF 300).

38. The Bund met mainly at Ebling’s Casino (156th Street and St. Ann’s Avenue) near the German section or at the Triborough Palace (137th Street and Third Avenue) in a mixed but predominantly Irish area, in what were social and propaganda meetings. For example, beginning in 1936, every Thursday the Bund conducted a "Beer Evening" in an effort to camouflage a membership recruitment program as a social evening with free food and drink. They also held street meetings. The Mobilizers met at both the Casino and Palace and were at times provided with Bund guards. The Front met at the Palace ("Report on Bund Activities in the Bronx, Manhattan and Brooklyn," German-American Bund Folder, ADL; Dies Committee, Hearings, 4, 76 Cong., 1st sess., 1939, 3765–66, 3888, 3946; Hearings, 14, 77 Cong., 1st sess., 1941, 8369; Hearings, Appendix, part 4,


40. Contemporary observers agree that the Front and Mobilizers influenced the later juvenile anti-Semitic agitators who were active in the 1940s. One Irish girl whose father had been prominent in the Mobilizers was one of the leaders of the vandals in 1943 (Department of Investigation, Report, pp. 38–39, 51–52, 66–67, 72, 81, 128).


44. McDonough was active in the Democratic party during the 1930s and later, in the 1960s, became leader of the Bronx County Democratic organization.


46. Florence S. McDonough to Roosevelt, 22 October 1941, Roosevelt Papers, OF 300. Florence McDonough was the wife of Henry McDonough. The effort of the Democrats to crush the overt anti-Semitism may have been due to a desire to avoid a further split between two of their stalwart groups—the Jews and the Irish—which would have been disastrous for the party in certain areas.


49. The boundaries of these areas are as follow: for West Side, 74th to 106th Street, and Central Park West to Riverside Drive; for Fordham, Tremont Avenue on the south, Van Cortland Park South on the north, Gun Hill Road and Bronx Park East on the east, and the Harlem River and Riverdale Avenue on the west; for Highbridge, 161st Street to 170th Street, and Jerome Avenue to Harlem River; for Flatbush, Prospect Park and Lefferts Avenue on the north, Avenue R to Gerritsen Avenue to Avenue X on the south, Remsen Avenue and Ralph Avenue on the east, and Coney Island Avenue on the west.


51. Department of Investigation, Report, p. 16; Mary F. Hall to editor, Brooklyn Tablet, 22 April 1939, p. 5; Joseph Sweeney to editor, Brooklyn Tablet, 24 February 1940, p. 7 (the Front began to meet on the streetcorners which on other nights were used by the Communists); New York Times, 4 November 1941, p. 6; Brooklyn Eagle, 10
September 1942, p. 12; Brooklyn Jewish Community Council, Third Annual Convention, 1942, p. 4.


53. Interview with Rabbi Joseph H. Lookstein, 27 April 1973, New York City; see also chapter 4. Yorkville’s boundaries are Central Park to the East River, and 57th Street to 96th Street.

54. McWilliams’s Christian Mobilizers became the American Destiny party for the purposes of his campaign.


56. New York Post, 8 June 1940 in American Jewish Committee Press Clippings, YIVO Institute for Jewish Research, New York City.

57. Interview with Wagner; interview with Lookstein. It should be noted again that the Front did not permit Bund members to join.

CHAPTER 9. ON ETHNIC CONFLICT

1. On an individual basis, some people may have been drawn into conflict because of psychological needs which had little to do with group tensions. This component of conflict must also be considered but not overstated. As one social scientist commented, "There would be a basis for group conflict even in a world in which there were no sick individuals or sick societies, provided only that groups . . . are operating as distinct entities that are in competition or rivalry for scarce values" (Robin M. Williams, Jr., Strangers Next Door [Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964], p. 357).


5. Ibid., p. 41.
