Conceptions of Chinese Democracy

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Abbreviations

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Chapter 1: Discussions of Democracy in the Work of Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, and Chiang Ching-kuo


1. For a recent invocation of this theme, see the news story “Activist Touts Taiwan Democracy.”

2. The most recent works on the Chiangs are Taylor’s biographies, The Generalissimo and The Generalissimo’s Son, and Fenby’s Chiang Kai-shek.

3. Wells, Political Thought of Sun Yat-sen; Chang and Gordon, All under Heaven; and Fung, In Search of Chinese Democracy, discuss Sun’s place in contemporary discussions of democracy, but they do not explore their political content.

4. Chang and Holt, “Naming China,” have used these sources to trace the various ways in which ROC leaders have been referred to on the mainland since 1949 but do not explore their political content.

5. See, for example, Fung, In Search of Chinese Democracy; Nathan, Chinese Democracy; and Guang, “Elusive Democracy.”
6. For recent work, see Wells, *Political Thought of Sun-Yat-sen*; Chang and Gordon, *All under Heaven*; and Fung, *In Search of Chinese Democracy*.

7. Among those arguing that the transition to democracy has been driven by the Cold War are Tien, “Taiwan’s Transformation”; Hansson, “Chiang Ching-kuo: A Motive Analysis,” Ko, “Cold War Triumph?”; and C. Hu, “Taiwan’s Geopolitics.”

8. For examples of the general identification of Taiwan’s transition with the Third Wave, see Tien, *Taiwan’s Electoral Politics*; Diamond et al., *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies*; and Rigger, “Taiwan’s Best-Case Democratization.”


10. O’Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*. For one overview of various explanations of Taiwan’s democratization process, see Tien, “Dynamics of Taiwan’s Democratic Transition.”

11. Halbeisen, “In Search of a New Political Order?”


13. Tien, “Taiwan’s Transformation.”


16. Hood, *Kuomintang and the Democratization of Taiwan*.


19. Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy,” 71. For an example of an empirical study that explicitly uses this definition, see Vanhanen, “New Dataset for Measuring Democracy.”


22. For a discussion of electoral regimes that fall short of democracy in the understanding of many theorists, see Diamond, *Developing Democracy*, 15–16.


24. See ibid., chap. 2.

25. Diamond argues that this type of system represents a minimal model of democracy. *Developing Democracy*, 9–10. For a full discussion, see Held, *Models of Democracy*, chap. 5.

26. For representative and generally accepted descriptions of liberal democracy, see Held, *Models of Democracy*, chap. 3; and Diamond, *Developing Democracy*, 11–12.

27. See Lee, “Culture Is Destiny.” See also the descriptions of pro-Asian democracy elites in Hong Kong in Beatty, *Democracy, Asian Values, and Hong Kong*, 52–57. For a useful overview of the Asian democracy debate, see Mauzy, “The Challenge to Democracy.”

28. See Reilly, “Democratization and Electoral Reform.”


30. Mauzy, “The Challenge to Democracy.” See also the views of the Hong Kong elite who are skeptical of Asian democracy; in Beatty, *Democracy, Asian Values, and Hong Kong*, esp. 48–52.
31. Mukherjee, “Is There a Distinct Style of Asian Democracy?”
34. Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “Building of Political Democracy in China.” A more recent example can be found in Dong, “China Fully Committed to Democracy.” For a Western view of a possible Chinese version of democracy, see Bell, “Democracy with Chinese Characteristics.”
38. See, for example, Peng, “Democracy and Chinese Political Discourses”; Guang, “Elusive Democracy”; and Wei, “Understanding Democracy.”
39. Peng, “Democracy and Chinese Political Discourses.” While one could make the argument that Chiang Kai-shek’s conception fits this description, I argue for a different understanding.
41. Fukuyama, “Historical Pattern.”
42. For several examples of the many early justifications in this vein, see Price, “Revolution of 1911,” 224; see also Fung, *In Search of Chinese Democracy*, 10–12; and Hunt, *The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy*, chap. 2.
43. For this distinction, see Norris, “Does Democratic Satisfaction Reflect?” For the concept of *jiùwáng*, see Fung, *In Search of Chinese Democracy*.
44. For an overview of different understandings of the compatibility of such values with democracy in general and liberal democracy in particular, see Spina, Shin, and Cha, “Confucianism and Democracy”; and A. Chen, “Is Confucianism Compatible?”
47. Some scholars hold that the attribution of this feature to democracy stood in contrast intellectually with the early twentieth-century Chinese republican (gongzhe, 共和) understandings of democracy (in which virtue, structure, constitutionalism, and the separation of the public from the private featured) that were espoused by some participants in the May Fourth and New Culture Movements. See Jin, Liu, and Lam, “From ‘Republicanism’ to ‘Democracy.’” The identification of an objective common will and common good has been associated with some of the leaders of the democracy movement in the 1980s. See Guang, “Elusive Democracy,” 428–29.
49. Chao and Ho, “Philosophical Background of the Chinese Revolution,” 306–12.
51. Linebarger, *Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen*.
53. For example, Zhao, “A Tragedy of History”; and Fung, In Search of Chinese Democracy.

54. Wells, Political Thought of Sun Yat-sen.

55. For an early view that paints Sun in liberal terms, see S. Chung, “Sun Yat-sen’s Revolutionary Principles.” For later discussions, see Chaung, “Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s Social Development Concept”; C. Chung, Sun’s Thought and Political Guidelines; and Y. Cheng, Chiang Kai-shek’s Thought.

56. Y. Hu, Sunology and Its Origins; Y. Cheng, Chiang Kai-shek’s Thought, 2, notes both minbēn and modern democratic influences.

57. See Shang, “Studies on Sun Yat-sen”; and Wells, Political Thought of Sun Yat-sen for overviews of the literature on Sun in the PRC. Both note the different ways in which scholars sought to explicate Sun’s thought in the context of prevailing ideological views from the 1950s through the 1970s. For examples of expository studies on Taiwan, see Y. Hu, Sunology and Its Origin; and Huang C., “Chinese Intellectuals’ Attitudes toward Socialism.”


59. For example, Fenby, Chiang Kai-shek.

60. Sympathetic treatments of Chiang include Lokuang, Chiang Kai-shek’s Interpretation; Tsui, Explication of Chiang Kai-shek’s Philosophical Thinking; and Chien, Chiang Kai-shek. On Chiang’s commitment to constitutional democracy, see Tsao and Tang, Chiang Kai-shek; and Lei, Chiang Kai-shek’s Democratic Thought.

61. Y. Cheng, Chiang Kai-shek’s Thought; Ho, Political Philosophy of Chiang Kai-shek; Lei, Chiang Kai-shek’s Democratic Thought; Tsao and Tan, Chiang Kai-shek.


66. Heng, “Former President Jiang’s Deeds.”


69. For a discussion of moral education on Taiwan, see Meyer, “Teaching Morality”; and Lin, “Political Indoctrination,” 134–38. For an example of the use of the Sān Mín Chū Yì lectures in military training, see Zhu, “Constitution of the Republic of China” [中華民國憲法與孫中山思想].

70. Interview with Vance Chang, director of the Department of Compilation and Translation, GIO, and Virginia Sheng, editor, Taiwan Journal, March 2008.
71. See Breslauer, *Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders*; and Brown and Shevtsova, *Gorbachev, Yeltsin, Putin*.


75. For an overview and empirical test of various types of learning and socialization theory associated with posttransition politics, see Mishler and Rose, “Generation, Age, and Time.”


77. See Fenby, *Chiang Kai-shek*.

78. The issue of translations is also important. All material comes from the official government translations, whether the source is a book or a government publication such as the *Free China Review*. As it was explained to me, the process for translating official speeches and messages starts with local staff initiating the translation after conferring with other government bodies regarding important concepts and terms. The copy is then sent to the foreign editors (GIO editors who are native speakers of non-Chinese languages) for polishing. There is an emphasis throughout the entire process on the creation of consistent translations for important terms. During the KMT era, the approach was even more literal and rigid, with little leeway for loose or free translations. Interview with Vance Chang and Virginia Sheng, March 2008. I also reviewed important portions of the original Chinese text with native speakers to check the GIO translations, including Vance Chang, who has been involved with the GIO translation process for many years.


**CHAPTER 2: Sun Yat-sen**


2. For a useful discussion of the larger conversation on the need to tie the population to the state during the late Ch’ing era, see ibid., 56–60.

3. Biggerstaff, review of *The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen*, 188–89.

4. See Wilbur, *Sun Yat-sen*.


7. Linebarger, *Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen*.


13. See, for example, The Book of Lord Shang.

14. Chang and Gordon attribute this development to Sun’s increasing political estrangement from the West, his negative perceptions of the May Fourth Movement, and his general disappointment at the lack of progress since 1911. However, they also argue that his theoretical understanding of democracy incorporates a Montesquieu-like conception of the separation of powers. All under Heaven, 57–63, 107–13.


17. Ibid., Dem. Lect. 1, 61.

18. Sun explicitly emphasizes this orientation by referring to the epistemological primacy of the “evolution of history.” Ibid., 61–62.

19. Ibid., 62.

20. Ibid., 57–58.


22. Ibid., 52.

23. For a fuller discussion of natural cooperation and human nature in Sun’s thought, see Jiang, Sun Yat-sen’s Philosophy, chap. 7.


25. Ibid., 63.

26. Ibid., 64–65.

27. See Smith, Civic Ideals, epilogue.


30. Ibid., 53.

31. Ibid., 56–57.

32. Ibid., 57–58.

33. See Lei, Chiang Kai-shek’s Democratic Thought, 12.

34. This point is emphasized by Fung, In Search of Chinese Democracy, 37. See also Chang and Gordon, All under Heaven, 109–11.

35. Y. Cheng, Chiang Kai-shek’s Thought, goes further to argue that Sun’s overall understanding of democratic conception was influenced by traditional “people-oriented” thought.


37. Ibid., 59.

38. Peng, “Democracy and Chinese Political Discourses”; Fung, In Search of Chinese Democracy, 22. In this judgment, Sun is close to contemporary scholars who argue that Confucian and minbên values are compatible with democracy. See Spina, Shin, and Cha, “Confucianism and Democracy.”

40. Ibid., 58. This discussion may in part be a response to the work of Frank Goodnow, an aide to Yuan Shih-kai, who argued that China was not suited for democracy. See Chang and Gordon, All under Heaven, 55–56.


42. Ibid.

43. Ibid., 118.

44. Ibid., 119.

45. Sun, Sān Mín Chǔ Yì, Nationalism Lect. 6, 37–38.

46. Ibid., 41–42, 43–44.

47. Sun’s embrace of traditional Chinese values is heavily emphasized in Wang S., The Thought of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, 43.


49. Ibid., Dem. Lect. 4, 99–100.

50. Ibid., 100–101.

51. Ibid., 100–101.

52. Ibid., 107.

53. Ibid., 105.

54. Ibid., Dem. Lect. 5, 106–7, 110.

55. Ibid., 111.

56. Ibid., 110.

57. Ibid., Dem. Lect. 4, 106.


59. Ibid., 126.

60. Ibid., Dem. Lect. 1, 51. This is one of several places where Sun appears to echo Rousseau despite Sun’s rejection of the anthropological basis of Rousseau’s understanding and his probable rejection of the parallel as a whole.

61. In this, Sun’s insistence on both the necessity of unity and its absence is possibly a manifestation of what Lucian Pye argues was a contemporary Chinese legitimacy crisis. See Spirit of Chinese Politics, 7–10.

62. In Dem. Lect. 6, 133–34, Sun confuses this point by using the metaphor of a train and its conductor.

63. Sun, Sān Mín Chǔ Yì, Dem. Lect. 5, 118; Dem. Lect. 1, 52.

64. Ibid., Dem. Lect. 5, 115–17.


66. Ibid., Dem. Lect. 3, 81, quotation on 82.

67. Chang and Gordon take the position that it is a reference to equal opportunity. All under Heaven, 110.

68. Sun, Sān Mín Chǔ Yì, Dem. Lect. 4, 93.


70. Lei differs here, arguing that Sun, unlike Chiang Kai-shek, embraced a model of direct democracy. See Chiang Kai-shek’s Democratic Thought, 20.

71. Wang S., Thought of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, 238–44, puts a somewhat different spin on this, holding that Sun’s contextualism would lead him to different, more liberal understandings in different circumstances. For a harsher view, see Fung, In Search of Chinese Democracy, 34–38.
72. For a survey of these difficulties, see Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics*, chap. 20.
73. Ibid., 283–89.
74. Held subjects Weber’s similar proposition to the same criticism. See *Models of Democracy*, 175.
76. Ibid., Dem. Lect. 4, 107. Thus he also approves of the saying “The skillful the slaves of the stupid.” Ibid., Dem. Lect. 3, 90.
77. Ibid., Dem. Lect. 6, 134.
79. See Fung, *In Search of Chinese Democracy*, for a similar analysis. Chang and Gordon cite Sun’s criticisms of the British style “parliamentary dictatorship” that appear to make such an understanding unlikely. Yet Sun’s theoretical understandings were often at odds with his practical discussions. See *All under Heaven*, 112.
81. Ibid., 116.
82. Ibid., 124–25.
83. Ibid., 126.
84. Even though Sun would again probably reject the comparison, this judgment parallels Rousseau’s understanding that the population’s conception of the general will (as opposed to the general will itself) is inerrant.
88. Ibid., Dem. Lect. 5, 111.
89. Lei, *Chiang Kai-shek’s Democratic Thought*, 20.
91. Ibid., 113–14.
92. Wells, *Political Thought of Sun Yat-sen*, argues that Sun would see his democratic state as embracing at least a two-party system, as does Lee Y., “Sun Yat-sen’s Democratic Thought.”
95. See, for example, Lei, *Chiang Kai-shek’s Democratic Thought*; and Y. Cheng, *Chiang Kai-shek’s Thought*.
96. On this point see Tan, *Chinese Political Thought*, 126.
98. Ibid., 79–80.
99. See, for example, Wells, *Political Thought of Sun Yat-sen*, 82–83; and Chang and Gordon, *All under Heaven*, 111–12.
100. Sun, *Sān Mín Chū Yì*, Dem. Lect. 6, 147–49. For this interpretation, see Ling, “Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s Doctrine,” 6.
102. Ibid., 124–25.
103. Ibid., 126–28.
104. Ibid., 6, 133–34. While Sun speaks of the demos controlling government, some recent discussions read liberal tenets into his understanding. See, for example, Y. Hu, *Sunology and Its Origins*, a college-level Taiwanese textbook published in 2003; and Wells, *Political Thought of Sun Yat-sen*, 83.


106. Ibid., 70. As noted above, some commentators, drawing upon materials previous to the *Sān Mín Chū Yì* lectures, argue that Sun was interested in individual rights. See C. Chung, *Sun’s Thoughts and Political Guidelines*; for an earlier discussion in a government publication, see S. Chung, “Sun Yat-sen’s Revolutionary Principles.”


108. Ibid., Dem. Lect. 2, 72–73.

109. Ibid., Dem. Lect. 3, 89.

110. Ibid., Dem. Lect. 2, 76; ibid., Dem. Lect. 3, 84, 88–89.

111. Lei, *Chiang Kai-shek’s Democratic Thought*, 12. Chang and Gordon, *All under Heaven*, also take this line while arguing that Sun adopted a generally liberal structure of government. For an opposing view, see Bergère, *Sun Yat-sen*, 353.


113. Ibid., 76. Chang and Gordon, *All under Heaven*, argue that this position represented a shift from Sun’s earlier conception and was a reaction to the May Fourth Movement.


115. Ibid., 98–99.

116. Ibid., 97.


118. Chung, *Sun’s Thoughts and Political Guidelines*, differs in holding that Sun does emphasize the rule of law.


120. In employing this intellectual strategy, Sun participated in what Yu argues was at the time one of two often-used intellectual strategies for incorporating Western ideas into the Chinese context. See Y. Yu, “Radicalization of China.”

121. This assertion appears to have also been important to Chiang’s government on Taiwan, as it appears in at least one article in the government-sponsored *Free China Review*. See S. Chung, “Sun Yat-sen’s Revolutionary Principles.”

**Chapter 3: Chiang Kai-shek**


1. Official sources in the PRC praise Chiang for his leadership in the war against Japan and in his efforts to tamp down Taiwanese independence groups. See, for example, Segura, “Cross-Straits Tourists See Double.”

2. For a useful and informative discussion of the democratic shortcomings of the early Nationalist regime, see Fung, *In Search of Chinese Democracy*.

3. See Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 68–69, 192–93. Gaddis documents Dulles’s reasoning that supporting the Nationalists on Taiwan would lead the PRC to make demands
on the USSR that could not be met, thus straining relations between the two Communist regimes.

4. Sun’s influences on Chiang’s democratic conceptions are emphasized, for example, in Y. Cheng, *Chiang Kai-shek’s Thought*, 4; Tsu, *Influence of Wang Yang-ming’s Philosophy*, 1; Chien, *Chiang Kai-shek*; and Tsui, *Explication of Chiang Kai-shek’s Philosophical Thinking*.

5. Even Cheng, who argues that Chiang was influenced by Rousseau and Montesquieu, holds that Chiang refused to blindly follow Western democratic models. See *Chiang Kai-shek’s Thought*, 4. Ho also argues that Chiang departed fundamentally from the West’s “Machiavellian effort” to separate power from morality. *Political Philosophy of Chiang Kai-shek*, 19.

6. See Lipset, “Some Social Requisites for Democracy,” for a general discussion of this topic and Soong, “Explaining Taiwan’s Transition” for Taiwan’s case.

7. See in particular Chang, “‘Fascism’ and Modern China,” 553–67; and Wakeman, “A Revisionist View,” 395–432.


9. For example, Dickson, *Democratization in China and Taiwan*; and Wakeman, “Revolutionary Rites.”

10. Wright, “From Revolution to Restoration.”


14. In addition to Lei and Cheng, see also Tsao and Tang, *Chiang Kai-shek*; and Ho, *Political Philosophy of Chiang Kai-shek*.


19. For Chiang’s religious practices while on Taiwan, see Taylor, *The Generalissimo*, 390, 432. Also see “Testimony on Good Friday,” Mar. 27, 1959, SAM 1959, 23–25, in which he argues that freedom comes only through God’s truth and Christ.


26. Ibid.
28. Interestingly, the Free China Review in the late 1950s published an essay that connected natural law with democracy in a way that moved away from Western understandings. See Wu, “Natural Law and Democracy.” See also Pan, “Role of Confucianism,” in which Pan also identifies elements of natural law and democracy in Confucianism, particularly in the concept of rén (人人).
29. See specifically Locke, Second Treatise on Government.
30. This position is laid out most explicitly in Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.
31. Tsui, Explication of Chiang Kai-shek’s Philosophical Thinking; Lokuang, Chiang Kai-shek’s Interpretation.
32. Lokuang, Chiang Kai-shek’s Interpretation, 5.
34. He did elsewhere document his struggle to resolve the differences between Sun’s and Wang’s epistemological positions. For one account, see Tsu, Influence of Wang Yang-ming.

41. Note that Chiang did not go quite as far as those quoted in Stepan, “Religion, Democracy,” 1, 3, 34. Stepan interprets Confucian texts as explicitly supporting democratic principles. A contrary view is held by Chaibong, “Ironies of Confucianism.”

42. Ho, Political Philosophy of Chiang Kai-shek, 12, emphasizes Chiang’s argument that “public opinion and public sentiment are the basis of the government’s policy-making.”


47. “New Year’s Message,” FCR, Jan. 1956, 47; Y. Cheng, Chiang Kai-shek’s Thought, emphasizes this point.

48. Y. Cheng, Chiang Kai-shek’s Thought; Lei, Chiang Kai-shek’s Democratic Thought; Tsao and Tang, Chiang Kai-shek.


51. Y. Cheng, Chiang Kai-shek’s Thought, 1–12.

52. Halbeisen, “In Search of a New Political Order?”


58. Note that Chiang was quick to have the constitution changed to permit him to seek a third, fourth, and ultimately fifth term as president.


65. Lei, Chiang Kai-shek’s Democratic Thought; Tsao and Tang, Chiang Kai-shek; Y. Cheng, Chiang Kai-shek’s Thought.


67. Ibid., 80.

68. Ibid.


74. Fukuyama, “Historical Pattern.”

75. See Taylor, The Generalissimo.


78. Bai, however, might label Chiang’s use of Confucian ethics, as well as his understanding of moral accountability, as compatible with a “thin” liberal conception of democracy. See “Mencian Version of Limited Democracy.”


80. Chiang shared this view with some Western thinkers whom we regard as democrats. See for example Jefferson, “Letter to the Abbé Arnaux, July 1789.”


88. Chiang rejected the description of Taiwan as a one-party state, asserting that the two other small constitutional parties were important and stressing that independent candidates could run for office.


92. For a discussion of the restrictions on candidates’ speech and policy positions during this time, see Jacobs, “Recent Leadership,” esp. 152.
101. Chin, Preliminary Commentary, emphasizes Chiang’s arguments that national goals require the limitation of freedoms, resulting in a situation in which citizens possess “disciplined freedoms” and government officials enjoy “functional powers.”
107. This quite typical justification was provided by a government publication after the transition. See Ger, The Story of Taiwan: Politics, 7.

Chapter 4: Chiang Ching-kuo

1. See, for example, “Address to the Fifth Journalists’ Conference, November 18, 1978,” Perspectives, 10; and “Address to the Annual Constitution Day Meeting of the National Assembly, November 25, 1978,” Perspectives, 16.
2. For a full discussion of the political contexts, see Nathan and Ho, “Chiang Ching-kuo’s Decisions.”
3. Ge, “Chiang’s Transitional Leadership Style”; Hui, “Chiang’s Contribution.”
5. “Remembering Chiang Ching-kuo.”
11. Winkler, “Institutionalization and Participation on Taiwan,” 481–99. See also Nathan and Ho, “Chiang Ching-kuo’s Decisions for Political Reform.”
14. Taylor, *The Generalissimo’s Son*. For Ching-kuo’s ambivalence regarding liberal democracy, see Taylor’s description of his reaction to US culture and comparison of it to Taiwan, 221, 224.
17. On the function and rhetorical power of references to founders, see Lorenzo, *Tradition and the Rhetoric of Right*, chap. 3.
20. For a discussion of this feature of discourse communities, see Lorenzo, *Tradition and the Rhetoric of Right*, chap. 3.
21. Indeed, many of the government officials and academics on Taiwan with whom I have spoken, in both parties, see Sun and his ideas as old and of only historical interest.
22. The “2/28 Incident” refers to the events surrounding the ROC’s takeover of Taiwan from Japan at the end of World War II, which resulted in riots and the use of military force against protestors who demonstrated in response to a long list of grievances, including official corruption and the importation of mainland officials.
41. “Address to the 1984 Constitution Day Ceremony of the National Assembly,” SAM 1984, 32.
44. This resembles the understanding of a Confucian, mínbêngovernance continues to cast the people as objects of elite rule,” “Confucianism with a Liberal Face,” 62.
52. Taylor argues that Chiang was deeply committed to creating a multiparty system at this time and that the small reform groups he formed had this as their agenda. See The Generalissimo’s Son, chap. 25.
53. In response to a question about new parties Chiang concluded, “In the future, leaving in mind the due balance between national security and constitutional democracy, we will carefully and actually study the issues relating to the formation of new parties and the termination of Chieh-yen.” “Answers to Questions Raised by a Visiting Group From the Washington Post, Oct. 7, 1986,” SAM 1986, 27.
55. “Answers to Questions asked by William Lawrence Rother, Regional Editor and Peking Hong Kong Bureau Chief of Newsweek, November 1, 1982,” Perspectives, 216.
60. “Unity for a Bright Future, June 2, 1982,” Perspectives, 120.
65. Ibid., 92.
74. “Address to the Constitution Day Rally of the National Assembly, December 25, 1979,” Perspectives, 27.
76. Chiang’s emphasis on the responsibilities of government to ordinary citizens in this regard may have sprung from his experiences in Kiangsi Province during World War II. See Hsu, “Historical Setting,” 6.

79. In 1979, demonstrations in favor of human rights and democracy led to government arrests and sentencing of major opposition leaders.


CHAPTER 5: Taiwanese or Mainland Chinese Democratic Thought?


1. Thus one columnist on Taiwan argues that “China’s leaders should realize that without democracy, the country cannot be culturally advanced; without democracy, it cannot really be modern, and without democracy, the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation will be incomplete.” Ching, “Beijing’s Democratic Vision Falls Short.”

2. “DPP Will Not Make Pro-China Policies.”


5. The press has also echoed this view. One editorial in a paper generally favorable to the KMT condemned that party for not fully disclosing its policy positions in the 2012 presidential campaign. All parties, the article argues, sidestep unpopular yet essential policy issues and instead use electoral tactics “focused mainly on mudslinging and party ideology” rather than issues. “Unhealthy Democracy.”

6. For a defense of the DPP’s use of mobilizational tactics as a routine matter in the face of perceived KMT domination of state institutions, see P. Lin, “Hong Kong Leading the Resistance.”

7. This theme was repeated, though in more muted form, by Tsai campaign’s emphasis on the significance of the spontaneous “piggy bank” phenomenon that occurred during the 2012 campaign. A video on the phenomenon at the International Press Conference played the same role as did the “March against the Wind” video during the 2008 press conference.


9. Fukuyama, “Confucianism and Democracy,” points to the importance of national unity for this aspect of Chinese political thought. Ling and Shih, in contrast, argue that references to harmony and unity are more rhetorical than substantive. See “Confucianism with a Liberal Face,” 79.
10. “Questions and Answers about Taiwan’s Referendum,” GIO 2004. For similar statements from both Green and Blue camps, see also “Ma must Affirm Taiwan’s Sovereignty, Says DPP’s Tsai,” 2; and “Taiwan’s Opposition’s Anti-Chen Drive Gathers Steam,” Asian Political News.


12. This reading is also consistent with interpretations that argue that Chen used referenda in part to bypass the deadlocked Legislative Yuan as well as to demonstrate a consensus on Taiwan’s status. See Kao, “Referendum Phenomenon in Taiwan.”

13. For more examples, see “No Casinos Allowed before Consensus Reached”; “Chen Seeks Consensus on Future Amendments”; “Consensus Called For on Economics”; “DPP Urges Consensus before CECA Is Signed”; “Ma Restores 2/28 Foundation Budget”; “DPP Resolution on Taiwan’s Future”; The Significance of Taiwan’s Constitutional Reforms, 1; Hsieh, Cooperation and Symbiosis; Lin, “Taiwanese Must Find Common Interests,” 8; “Preserving Harmony as Important as Democracy”; “President Chen Shui-bian’s Remarks to the Opening Ceremony”; and “Shih Confident in Taiwan’s Democracy.”

14. For contemporary emphases on consensus alongside pluralism, see “DPP Resolution on Taiwan’s Future”; The Significance of Taiwan’s Constitutional Reforms, 1; Hsieh, Cooperation and Symbiosis; Lin, “Taiwanese Must Find Common Interests,” 8; “Preserving Harmony as Important as Democracy”; “President Chen Shui-bian’s Remarks to the Opening Ceremony”; “Shih Confident in Taiwan’s Democracy”; Mainland Affairs Council, “Public Opinion in Taiwan”; and Chen S., “President Chen Shui-bian’s Speech,” 4.

15. For example, some members of the KMT argue that ethnic differences would not be important were it not for the politicization of those differences by elites seeking political office.


22. I describe alternative explanations for this consensus rhetoric in Lorenzo, “Democracy and the Roots.”


28. Liu K., “Reform of Legislative Yuan.”
31. It is important to note, however, that Rawls sees the achievement of such consensus as important for such fundamental political principles as toleration rather than as a routine political activity concerning policy matters.
32. Zhao, “A Tragedy of History,” argues that advocates of dictatorship in the 1930s used the same jiùwáng justification. See also Fung, In Search of Chinese Democracy, 16, as well as his discussion of Zhang Zunmai, Luo Longji, and Hu Shi, 138–40.
33. One example is the group of liberal democracy advocates whom Fung documents as arguing that a democracy marked by significant rights and freedoms was necessary for the successful prosecution of the war against Japan. Fung, In Search of Chinese Democracy, 195–97. See also his discussion of Ip Hung-yok’s argument regarding the ability of Chinese intellectuals to justify democracy on instrumental and other grounds, 213–18.
34. For example, Guang, “Elusive Democracy,” 426; Goldman, Sowing the Seeds of Democracy, 41; and Wen zhi bu bin’s (文質彬彬) response to Charter 08 in “Either Democratize or Don’t.”
38. “Du Daozheng: I’m Optimistic about the China’s Prospects.”
40. See Cao, Jiang Jingguo.
42. Ibid., passim.
43. Guang, “Elusive Democracy.” For a contemporary discussion that emphasizes harmony and unity, see Peng, Ma, and Xu, “Cooperative-Harmonious Democracy.”
44. Peng, “Democracy and Chinese Political Discourses.”
45. For one such appeal in Wuxue City, Hubei Province, see www.wxycz.cn/Board_news.asp?ID=20.

46. Hu W., “Understanding Democracy in China.”


50. Hu W., “Understanding Democracy in China”; Nathan, *Chinese Democracy*; Guang, “Elusive Democracy.” For various discussions of deliberative democracy in China, see Lieb and He, *Search for Deliberative Democracy in China*. For an explicit rejection of the notion of the elitist “good” official or emperor model that also criticizes other democracy activists’ infatuation with Zhou Enlai as the embodiment of consultation, see “The Awakening of People’s Consciousness Is a Prerequisite for Democracy,” in Minchu, *Cries for Democracy*.

51. See, for example, the summary issued by the PRC Information Office, “China Issues 1st White Paper on Democracy,” Oct. 19, 2005.

52. Pan, “Chinese Model of Development.”

53. Peng, Ma, and Xu, “Cooperative-Harmonious Democracy.”

54. See, for example, Zhang M., “Zhang Musheng Discusses New Democracy.” For a general discussion of the concept, see Cheng L., “Intra-Party Democracy in China.”


56. This conception and the claim that it has been successfully implemented have both been echoed in recent official statements that contrast the events of the Arab Spring with China’s situation. See, for example, Lai, “China’s Political and Social Stability.”


64. Qian, “How the Next Ten Years.”


66. Yang J. “How I See the ‘China Model.’ ”


68. A translation of Charter 08 by Perry Link can be found at www.chartero8.eu/2.html.

70. For discussions that reject Wen as a serious reformer, see Qian, “How the Next Ten Years”; and Zhai, “You Have Failed Us, Mr. Wen.”


72. Wen also mentions transparency and oversight of officials by the public in his interview with Zakaria (see preceding note).


74. For a discussion of Yu's conception, see C. Li, introduction to Democracy Is a Good Thing, xxi.

75. Yu K., Democracy Is a Good Thing, 79.

76. Liu X., “Can It Be?”


78. See “Chinese Politics and China’s Modern Intellectuals,” “Ba Jin,” “The Erotic Carnival in Recent Chinese History,” and “Political Humor in a Post-Totalitarian Wasteland” in No Enemies.


80. Wén, “Either Democratize or Don’t.”


82. See Zheng, “China Long Ago Entered.”


84. For example, see Zhao [趙強], “Seeking Truth” [求是].

85. For an overview of this argument, see Tsai, Capitalism without Democracy, chap. 1.

86. For one such discussion, see Friedberg, “US-China Relations,” 30–33.