INDEX

Acheson, Dean, 138, 150; and use of denial mechanism, 182
Afghanistan, and Soviet Union, 15, 196, 197; and U.S. credibility, 142
Agadir (1911), exaggerated threat, 190
Aggression, 183, 211
Agranat Commission, 75, 76, 77, 94, 95
Al-Ahram (newspaper), 38, 43
Alsace-Lorraine, German annexation of, 168
Ambiguous evidence, 75
Analogies, use of, 115
Anaya, Jorge, 110
Anchoring, 45
Angola, civil war in, 140
Anschluss, 115
Appeasement: in 1930s, 9; and motivated bias, 26
Arab Socialist Union, 50
Arabatov, Georgi, 201
Argentina: advisors in El Salvador, 113; and Falklands War, viii–ix, 89–124, 207–8; political weakness of, 215–16
Arms: competition, spiral logic of, 167; races, dynamics of, 166; races and windows of opportunity, 165–66
Arms and Influence, 218
Attrition, 14, 18
Attrition warfare. See war of attrition, a availability, 22–23, 45, 81
Balance of power: shifts in, and brinkmanship, 181; theory of, 13–14
Balkan crisis, 173
Balkan War, First, 173
Banco de Intercambio, 98
Bargaining: range of, 58, 241 n. 29; space, estimates of, 49–51
Bar-Hillel, Maya, 238 n. 28
Baruch Plan, Russian rejection of, 18
Base rate data, 23–24
Begin, Menachem, 192
Belgium, 169
Ben-Zvi, Avi, 245 n. 25
Berlin: and perception of defender’s resolve, 182; Soviet blockade of, 206
Betts, Richard K., 7, 28, 84, 257 n. 28
Between Peace and War, 127, 180, 181
Bezobrazov, Alexander, 184
Bias, viii. See also cognitive bias; motivated bias; unmotivated bias
 Bipolarity, 137
Bismarck, Otto von, 161, 168, 169
Bittel, Deolindo, 114
Blitzkrieg, 42, 44, 48, 159
Bohlen, Charles, 150
Bolstering. See defensive avoidance
Bosnian annexation (1909), and domestic weakness, 181; and perception of defender’s resolve, 182
Brezhnev, Leonid, 195
Brinkmanship, 80, 119–20, 175; challenges of, 211; and domestic impera-
brinkmanship (continued)
tives, 213–14; external causes of, 189;
origins of, 180–99, 212
British Air Ministry, 23
Brodie, Bernard, 131, 162
**Buenos Aires Herald**, 98
Bulow, Bernard von, 190–91
Byrnes, James F., 17

Callaghan, James, government of, 101
Cambodia, 139
Campbell, Donald, 233 n. 6
capability, of defender, 35, 84
Carrington, Lord, 93, 96, 101, 102
Carter, James E., policy of, toward Ar-
gentina, 112; and Presidential Direc-
tive-59 (PD-59), 141; and U.S. credi-
bility and reputation, 142
Cavandoli, Carlos, 96
CGT (General Confederation of Labor),
98, 114
challengers, 127, 204, 217; inner-
directedness of, 229–32; intention of,
79; and military balance, 121–22; mis-
perception by, 87, 88; misperceptions
of, 88
China, 207; conflict of, with India, 209;
Communist triumph in, 150; and Ko-
orean War, 206; U.S. fear of, 150
Chamberlain, Neville, 8–9, 62, 117; and
value trade-off, 33
choice, rational, 55
Churchill, Winston, 16
**Clarín** (newspaper), 92
Clausewitz, Carl von, 256 n. 10
Clay, Lucius, 206
Cleveland, Grover, 222
coercion, 8, 88
cognitive bias, ix, 4, 18, 83, 84; and avail-
ability, 81; and lessons of Munich, 221.
See also cognitive predisposition; un-
motivated bias
cognitive predisposition: of German
leaders prior to World War I, 191;
impact of, 18–22; and preferred op-
tion, 82. See also cognitive bias; un-
motivated bias
cognitive processes, 24–25; error in, 79;
of opponents, 133; of potential attack-
ers, 126
cognitive psychology, viii; and attention
to payoffs, 52, 55

Cohen, Raymond, 14
Cold War, 149; lessons drawn from,
230–31
colonialism, 114
commitments of states, 9; interdepen-
dence of, 130, 132–34, 135; overex-
tended, 32
conflict avoidance: goal of, 184; strategy
of, 205
containment, rigid concept of, 138
cost and benefit, calculation of, 51–56
Cotting, Richard, 25
credibility, 9, 128; and commitment,
127–30; and NSC-68, 137; paradox
of, ix; and reputation, 129–36, 204;
Soviet concern with, 142–43; threats
to, 140; U.S. concern with, 137–43;
U.S. fixation on, 221; and U.S. policy
in Vietnam, 139
Crimean War, 25
Crowe, Sir Eyre: and British-German
balance of power (1907), 15–16; and
strengthening of Entente, 189
cry sheep, 84
cry wolf, 83–85, 107, 251 n. 29
Cuban missile crisis, 10, 139, 181; and
assumptions about adversaries, 230–31;
and John Kennedy, 15; and U.S. stra-
tegic advantage, 189
Czechoslovakia, 137

**Daily Mail**, 117
Davison, W. Phillip, 206
Dayan, Moshe, 65, 72, 246 n. 30, 247 n.
47, 248 n. 49; ambiguity and value
conflict, 75; and miscalculated escal-
ation, 73; and mobilization cycles, 75;
warned of attack, 76–77
deadlock, 156, 166–67, 224, 225
decision makers, 126, 128; affected by
bias, 25; avoiding value trade-offs, 30;
(U.S.) misperceived Japanese image of
U.S., 29–30; predispositions of, 28
decision making, examination of, 8–12
defenders, 87, 229, 231; inner-directed-
ess of, 232; intention of, 79; misper-
ception by, 88
defensive avoidance, 103, 104, 106–7,
213–14
denial, defense mechanism of, 182;
under compulsion, 183
Diego Garcia, 118
Diesing, Paul, vii, 39, 87, 167, 241 n. 30; on signals and feedback, 30
domestic weakness, as cause of aggression. See state's political system, weakness of; leaders, political weakness of dominant strategy, 61, 82
domino theory, Moscow's own, 195
Dulles, John Foster, 150
DYN (Argentine News Agency), 92, 108
Eagleburger, Lawrence S., 251 n. 43
Eastern Europe, Soviet problems in, 194–95
Economist, 91, 102, 105, 117
Edward VII, 190
Egypt, viii, 214, 215, 216; adverse military balance and strategy compensation of, 214–15; flawed calculations of, 213; and leaders' inner-directedness, 212–13; and 1973 War with Israel, 19, 94, 228; use of force by, and Israel, 34–88
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 146; and containment, 138; and U.S. reputation, 148
Eisenhower Doctrine, 150
Elazar, David, 66, 67, 72–78, 84, 248 n. 49
El Salvador, 113
Emerson, Tony, 111
go-to-defense, theory of, 164
error, motivated and unmotivated. See bias; motivated bias; unmotivated bias
escalation, premature, 102. See also miscalculated escalation
faits accomplis, 3, 40, 110, 173
Falkland Islands, 39; Argentina's decision to invade, viii–ix, 215–16; war in, 89–124, 207–8
Fallaci, Oriana, 110, 113
Fashoda crisis, 181; and intra-elite competition, 184–85
Fawzi, Mohammed, 43
Fay, Sidney, 167
finite deterrence theorists, 198
Fischer, Fritz, 167
Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information Center (FOSIC), 91
flexible response, 146, 147
force: alternatives to, 34; and bargaining space, 36; incentives to use, 216–17
Ford, Gerald, 218
France: and European security dilemma (1870–1914), 167–78; and Fashoda crisis, 181; and intra-elite competition, 185; security dilemma (1914) of, 153
Franco-Prussian War, 169, 172
frangibility of states, 181, 187; and Soviet Union, 195
Friedman, Milton, 5
Frow, Brian, 107, 251 n. 29
Gaddis, John L., 137
Gallup Report, 117
Galtieri, Leopoldo, 97, 121; and British control and colonialism, 114; and political weakness, 119; underestimation by, of British response, 110–11, 118; warning from Reagan to, 113
George, Alexander, vii, 20, 42, 127, 235 n. 20, 241 n. 30, 243 n. 45; designing around deterrence, 44; difficulties and complexities of deterrence, 128–29; national interest and credibility, 219
Georgia Island, 92
Germany, 11, 16; and blitzkrieg and offensive dominance, 159–60; and European security dilemma (1870–1914), 167–78; military dilemma of, 168–72; and Russian mobilization, 166; security dilemma of (1914), 153–54; self-image of, 162
Gibraltar, 117
Goa, 115
Golan Heights, Israeli occupation of, 37
Goltz, von der (field marshal), 162
Gomulka, Wladyslaw, 195
Gonen, Shmuel, 77
Great Britain, and biased analysis of German behavior, 16; and estimates of German Air Force, 23; and Falklands War, viii–ix, 8, 9, 89–124; and Fashoda crisis, 181; and German intention (1911), 230; and motivated error and Germany (1930s), 26; and perception of Russia and the Crimean War, 25
Grenada, 141
Groener, Wilhelm, 171
Guatemala, 113
Guyana, 117
Haig, Alexander, 114, 120, 251 n. 43
Hassan, Abdul Qader, 46, 54
Heath, Edward, 96
Heikal, Mohamed, 38, 40, 41, 43, 54
Helsinki Agreements, 31
Herken, Gregg, 206
Herskovits, Melville, 233 n. 6
Herzog, Chaim, 247 n. 48
Heuristics: anchoring, availability, retrievability, 45. See also availability
Hirschman, Albert, 234 n. 8
Hitler, Adolph, 24, 26, 115, 183
Hoffmann, Stanley, 112
Holstein, Friedrich von, 174
Honduras, 113
Hong Kong, and New Territories, 118
House of Commons, 91; Ridley’s report to, 96
House of Lords, 93
Human Rights Commission, of the United Nations, 112
Imperialist’s dilemma, 33, 171–72, 174, 175, 224–26; assumptions and hypothesis of, 156; as cause of World War I, 167; and competition over non-security interest, 165–66
Inaction, cost of, 86, 87
India, 207; and conflict with China, 209
Information processing, 2, 5, 11; and selective attention, 104; and unmotivated bias, 4
Intentions, 121, 135, 190–93; and capability, 82; estimates of, 75, 78–79, 84; insensitivity to others’, 229–31; judging others’, 14
Interest: assessment of, and use of force, 36; distinction between intrinsic and strategic, 39, 130; insensitivity to adversaries’, 229; national, 130, 219; perception of, 40–41; strategic, 40, 41; vital, and nuclear weapons, 132
International history, lessons of, 22
International politics, rules of, 16
Intra-elite competition: as cause of brinkmanship, 181; as source of aggression, 184–85
Israel, viii, 19–20, 102; intelligence failure of (1973), 94, 121–22; and lessons of 1967 War, 22; and perception of Egyptian threat, 21; predispositions of, 19, 20, 22; U.S. support of, 122; and war with Egypt (1967–1973), 34–88
Janis, Irving, defensive avoidance theory of, 103, 104
Japan, and attack on Pearl Harbor, 209; attack on U.S., causes of, 215, 221–22; and motivated bias and perception of U.S., 26, 27, 29–30; and perception of Russian threat (1904), 185; and relations with U.S. (1941) and deadlock, 167; and Russo-Japanese War, 158; and unmotivated bias and perception of U.S. (1941), 29–30
Jervis, Robert, 130, 153, 205, 206, 235 n. 24, 236 n. 3; when offense has the advantage, 157–58; conveying intentions, difficulty of, 190; masking effect, 93
JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff), 137
Johnson, Lyndon B., and dread of U.S. irrationality, 149; and U.S. resolve in Vietnam, 218
Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), 91, 93
Jordan, 63
July Crisis (1914), 176–78, 181, 182
Kahn, Jerome, 189
Katona, George, 234 n. 13
Kaiser Wilhelm: and fear of encirclement, 190–91; use of denial by, 182
Kalicki, Jan, on Sino-U.S. confrontation in Korea, 229
Kaufmann, William W., Requirements of Deterrence, 217
Kaunda, Kenneth, 186
Kennan, George, 131, 132
Kennedy, John F., and concern with credibility, 231; and containment, 139; and Cuban missile crisis, 15, 189; and dread of U.S. irrationality, 149; and flexible response, 147; and meeting with Khruschev, 147; and self-
perception of intentions, 190; and wars of national liberation, 200

Khabir, Ali Abdel, 46

Khruschev, Nikita, 181; and meeting with Kennedy, 147; and Soviet missiles in Cuba, 189

Kiderlen-Wacher, Alfred von, 174

Kissinger, Henry, 20, 50, 67; and Soviet dependence on U.S., 194; and U.S. credibility, 139–40, 149

Korea: crisis of 1903–1904 and domestic weakness of, 181; crisis of 1903–1904 and intra-elite competition among Russians, 184; North, attack on South, 138; North, misjudging U.S. intentions, 116; outbreak of war in (1950), 150; Sino-U.S. confrontation in, 229; South, perception of vulnerability, 182; U.S. intervention in, 116

Laird, Melvin, 140

leaders, political weakness of, 185–87

Lebow, Richard Ned, 2, 39, 127, 143, 228, 243n. 44, 259n. 2; brinkmanship investigation of, 80, 87; challengers resort to force, 40; demonstration of resolve, 251n. 32; motivation for the use of force, 216

Leith Harbour, 99

Libya, 66; U.S. confrontation with, 141

Long, Anne, 189

Luce, Richard, 97, 106

McCarthyism, 144

McKinley, William, 222; and Cuba, 78–79; warning to Spain by, 206–7, 208–9

McNamara, Robert, 149

McNaughton, John, 139

MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction), 145–47

Maital, Shlomo, 234n. 13

Malvinas Islands (Islas Malvinas). See Falkland Islands

Mann, Leon, 105–4

Marshall Plan, 137

masking effect, 93

Mauritius, 118

May, Ernest, 25, 28–29, 206

Mayaguez: U.S. resolve and, 140

Meir, Golda, 247n. 42, 248n. 49; mobilization authorized by, 77; warned of attack, 76

Méndez, Nicanor Costa, 120

Middleton, Drew, 112

military capabilities, estimates of, 41–49

miscalculated escalation, 62–71, 73, 122, 123; British attempts to avoid, 103, 111; and consequences of mobilization, 78; Israeli and British fear of, 100

miscalculation, 45, 52, 203; Falklands War and, 207; prevention of, by opponent, 144

misperception, 41, 58; and accommodative signals, 87; and complexity and uncertainty, 82; impact on deterrence of, 60, 61–62; patterns of, 85; problem of reducing, 84; reciprocal, among defenders and challengers, 88

missile gap, 139

Mitteleuropa, 171

mobilization, 81; cost of repeated cycles of, 70; domestic constraints of, in Israel, 82; Egyptian, 65, 66, 68; partial, 85; and warning, 71–78

Molotov, Vyacheslav, and Four-Power Treaty, 17

Moltke, Helmuth Johannes von (the Younger), 174

Moltke, Helmuth Karl von (the Elder), 161, 162, 168, 169, 172

Monroe Doctrine, 25

Morgan, Patrick M., 10, 241–42n. 30

Moroccan crisis (1904–1905), 173, 181; and German fear of encirclement, 189

Moroccan crisis (1911), 154, 173

Mossad (Central Intelligence Collection Agency), 67

motivated bias, ix, 11, 39, 60, 80, 84, 206–7, 208; affecting threat perception, 24–27; after threat is perceived, 27–33; and anchoring and availability, 43; and brinkmanship challenges, 212; and capability estimates, 58; and Monroe Doctrine, 25. See also cognitive bias; motivated error; unmotivated bias

motivated error, 19, 82; and threat estimates, 26
Munich, analogy of, 151; lesson of, 220; and perception of defender's resolve, 182
MX, 141

Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 38, 49, 100; blockade of Straits of Tiran by, 62–63; and misperception of Egyptian capabilities, 80–81; and 1967 War, 22; and War of Attrition, 37
National Intelligence Service, 54
national interest, 130, 133; and nuclear war, 134
NATO, 130, 144
Nehru, Jawaharlal, 207, 209; avoidance of value trade-off by, 33; and psychological denial, 182
New York Times, 140, 251n. 43
Nicholas II, 62
Nitez, Paul, 147, 148
Nixon, Richard M., 10, 50, 194; on Vietnam and U.S. credibility, 139, 140, 149
Nixon-Brezhnev summit, 55, 67
Nott, John, 102, 117
NSC-68, 137, 138, 146–47, 148, 149, 150
nuclear war, 131; cost of, 10; and flexible response, 146–47; mutual assured destruction (MAD) in, 145–47; and national interest, 134; and Soviet Union, 145, 201; and U.S., 198–99, 201; and vital interest, 132, 133
nuclear weapons: and credibility of commitment, 151–51; and debate over H-bomb, 149; and miscalculation, 203; U.S. monopoly of, 132. See also MX; PD-59; SS-20; Trident
Ocean Surveillance Satellites (OSUS), 91
offensive advantage, 157–60, 165
offensive bias, of the military, 162–64
Operation: Chalk, 70; Dovecote, 70, 77; Rock, 70
operational code, 22
Owen, David, 109
Palestinians, 72
Parliament, 92
PD-59 (Presidential Directive-59), 141, 150
Pearl Harbor, 27, 209
Pentagon Papers, 139
People's Assembly, 49
perception: of defenders' commitment, 133; of hostility, 164–65; of power, 148. See also misperception
perceptual bias, 35, 225
perceptual security dilemma, 155, 161–65, 171, 172, 175, 178, 224, 225
Piao, Lin, 200
Plaza de Mayo, 98, 114
Plehve, Vyacheslav, 187
Poland, 169
policy makers, 215, 216; brinkmanship of, 212; exaggerated concern for credibility of, 196–97; inner-directedness of, 229–39; perception of, 57; value trade-offs of, 103
Port Said, 14, 74
Port Stanley, 90, 92, 96, 99, 109, 111, 119
Posen, Barry, 162, 163
Potsdam Conference, 18
Prensa, La (newspaper), 92, 98
prestige: loss of, 138; and self-image, 162
preventive war, 154
prisoner's dilemma, 179
procrastination. See defensive avoidance
Pym, Francis, 115
Quster, George, 256n. 12
Radicals (Argentine political party), 98
rationality, assumption of, 10, 11, 126, 128
Ravencal, Earl, 135
realism, political, 130
Reagan, Ronald: defense buildup by, 147; on limited nuclear war, 201; and policy change toward Argentina, 112–13; and U.S. reputation, 141; and U.S.-Soviet relationship, 144
representativeness, 22–24
reputation of states, 9, 57; and credibility, 129–36, 138, 148, 204; image of, 147, 148; and resolve, ix, 220, 221, 222. See also resolve
resolve: adversary's discounting of, 216; demonstration of, 251n. 32; and U.S. in Vietnam, 218
Reston, James, 107
Rhineland (1930), 182
Index

Ridley, Nicholas, 96, 97, 99, 105
Riezler, Kurt, 175
Ros, Enrique, 97, 99
Rosen-Nissi Convention, 185
Rostow, Walt, 149
Rowland, Ted, 91
Royal Marines, 109
Royal Navy, 91, 109
Rusk, Dean, 149
Russia (Imperial): and European security dilemma (1870-1914), 167-78; and intra-elite competition and Korea crisis (1903-1904), 184-85; and Russo-Japanese War, 158, 172; and security dilemma (1914), 153-54
Russo-Japanese War, 158, 172
Saar, German defense line on, 169
Sadat, Anwar, 20, 37, 38, 40, 50, 51, 53, 54, 55, 79, 83, 94; and estimates of Egyptian inferiority, 46-47; expelling of Soviet personnel by, 66; peace initiative (1971) of, 49; peace initiative (1975) of, 191, 228; “year of decision” (1971) of, 65
Sadeq, Mohammad Ahmed, 46, 54
Sagan, Scott, 238 n. 35
SALT II, 147
Sanders, Liman von, 174
SASETRU, 98
Schelling, Thomas, 127, 134, 241 n. 30, 248 n. 59; Arms and Influence, 218
Schlesinger, James, 140; perceived equivalence and, 150
Schlieffen, Alfred, Count von, 169, 174
Schlieffen Plan, 170-75, 177, 225
Schmidt, Helmut, 186
SCUD (Soviet missile), 47
security dilemma, 21, 62, 154, 223; defined, 153; European, 167-78; German, 170; types, 224
Segall, Marshall, 233 n. 6
selective attention, 36, 183
Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlavi, 19, 151
Shazli, Sa’dal-Din Muhammad Al-Husayni, 46
Sie te Días (magazine), 93
signaling, 229; barriers to, 204-11
signals, 1; bombing pause as, 205; context of, 206; misleading, 116; ignored, 30; insensitivity to others’, 229-31
Sinai Peninsula, 57, 63, 64, 66; Israeli exercises in, 72; Israeli occupation of, 37
single factor analysis, 85
Sino-Indian crises (1962), 182
Smoke, Richard, 20, 42, 127, 235 n. 20, 241 n. 30, 243 n. 45; designing around deterrence, 44; difficulties and complexities of deterrence, 128-29; national interest and credibility, 219
Snyder, Glenn, 39, 167, 241 n. 30; signals and feedback, 30
Snyder, Jack L., 2, 6, 223-28, 239 n. 42; and imperialist’s dilemma, 33; offensive strategies and motivated biases, 26
South Atlantic, 89, 91, 109, 110, 122
South Georgia, 99, 108, 111
Southern Thule, 101
Soviet Union: advisors from, expelled by Egypt, 74; and Afghanistan, 196, 197; aid to Syria from, 37, 47, 64; attribution and relations with U.S. of, 15-18; concern of, with credibility, 142-43; concern of, with reputation for resolve, 220; conflict of, with China, 196; conflict of, with Poland, 197; U.S. perception of, 15-16
Spain, McKinley’s message to, 206-7; and motivated bias, 28-29, 208-9; and nonresponse to U.S. threat, 30
Spanish-American War (1898-1899), 222
spiral of fear, 6, 21; model of, 153
SS-20, 142, 144
stalemate, 42
Stamp Act (1766), 17
state’s political system, weakness of: as cause of aggression, 186-89; as cause of brinkmanship, 181
status quo, 69, 80; challenges to, 2-3, 58; defenders of, 3
Stein, Janice Gross, 2, 20, 27, 95, 100, 228; inner-directedness of challengers, 212, 214-15; motivation for use of force, 216; standard of rationality, 241 n. 30; a war of attrition, 213; the War of Attrition, 27
Strasbourg, 170
strategic concepts: defense, deterrence, miscalculated escalation, 80
strategic dilemma, 45
structural security dilemma, 155, 157–61, 166, 224
Suez Canal, 19, 67; analogy of, to Falkland Islands, 115; and crisis, 117; war of attrition across, 37
Syria: aid to, from Soviet Union, 37, 47, 55, 64, 72; attack on Israel by, 79
Taiwan, 150
Taiwan Straits, crisis in, 138, 150
Tanber, Raymond, standard of rationality, 241 n. 30
Terry, Fernando Belfauce, 120
Thatcher, Margaret, 91, 93, 97, 101, 105, 107, 111, 117, 123
threat: deterrent as, 2; explicit, 8; and motivated error, 26; perception of, 8, 13; and reassurance, 193; retaliatory, 128–29; and rhetoric, 199–202
Times (London), 115, 117
Tiran, Egyptian blockade in Straits of, 37
Tirpitz, Alfred, 175
totalitarianism, 114
Trident (submarine), 140
Trofimenko, Henry, 201
Truman, Harry S., 137; and Potsdam Conference, 18
Truman Doctrine, 137
Trumpener, Ulrich, 177, 258 n. 44
Tversky, Amos, 238 n. 28
uncertainty, reduction of, 163
United Nations, 120; emergency force, 68–69
unmotivated bias, 4, 5, 11, 25, 39, 43, 58, 60, 80, 238 n. 35; after threat, 27–33; effect of, on threat perception, 18. See also cognitive bias; motivated bias
Uruguay, 92, 93, 109, 110
value conflict, 75
value trade-offs, 103
Vandenberg, Molotov, and Four-Power Treaty, 17–18
Van Evera, Stephen, 163, 257 n. 28
Venezuela, 117
Vienna, 72
Vietminh, 138, 150
Vietnam: failure of U.S. coercion in, 8; French withdrawal from, 138; U.S. blockade of (North), 142; U.S. fear of loss of, 149–50; U.S. intervention in, 139, 218; U.S. resolve toward, 218
Viola, General Roberto, 112
Walters, Vernon, 113, 251 n. 43
Waltz, Kenneth, 5
war of attrition, a, 42, 44, 63, 213
War of Attrition, the, 40, 43, 45, 48, 63
war-fighting theorists, 198
War of 1967, 37, 68
warning, absence of unequivocal, 75–76
Wasel (Egyptian general), 46
Whaley, Barton, 83, 248 n. 61
Whiting, Allen, 206
Wilson government, 96
Witte, Sergei, 185
window of opportunity, 160–61, 165, 168, 171, 178
window of vulnerability, 160
Woodward, John F., 111
worst-case assumptions, 161
Yariv, Aharon, 245 n. 28
Zamir, Zvi, 67
Ze'ira, Elihu, 65, 66, 67, 71, 72
zero-sum (game), 154; and nature of strategic competition, 223