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Civil War History 47.4 (2001) 356-357



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Book Review

Training, Tactics, and Leadership in the Confederate Army of Tennessee


Training, Tactics, and Leadership in the Confederate Army of Tennessee. By Andrew Haughton. (Portland, Ore.: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000. Pp. x, 261. $59.50 cloth; $26.50 paper.)

The training of soldiers "who saw the sharp end of Civil War combat" (10) has been a neglected subject in the historiography of the war. In Training, Tactics, and Leadership in the Confederate Army of Tennessee, Andrew Haughton has produced a genuinely original study on the format and content of training and doctrine for one of the least successful armies in modern history--the Confederate Army of Tennessee. He analyzes every aspect of an army from volunteer to general officers, explains the process Confederate soldiers experienced as they adapted to military life, and seeks to interpret the mechanics of battle, or the process by which army commanders shaped the combat effectiveness of their soldiers and fought battles.

Despite a record of failure, the citizen soldiers of this western Confederate army continue to be regarded as brave and highly skilled warriors. Historians traditionally attribute blame for their defeats to incompetent leadership, lack of numbers and missed tactical opportunities. Haughton, however, discovers a paradox in this stereotype of the western Confederate, and argues that soldier competency develops from training, and there is evidence that Southern volunteers were ill disciplined and difficult--often reluctant--to train. He considers the views and leadership performance of middle-ranking officers to be key factors in understanding the flawed training and tactical doctrine that plagued the army. The structure of the Confederate army, according to convention and doctrine, permitted brigade and [End Page 356] regimental commanders to enjoy a great deal of power over their units, "particularly concerning training" and discipline. In spite of the fact that all officers used the same tactical manual, the high degree of autonomy field commanders exercised in carrying out instruction and maintaining order meant "the proficiency of different units in tactical exercises, musketry and general discipline varied enormously" (80).

The argument presented is that there was little development in training and doctrine within the army between its first major combat, at Shiloh in April 1862, and the virtual collapse of the organization in December 1864, in the aftermath of its decisive defeat at Nashville. The failure to learn lessons from early combat experiences left the western Confederates ill-equipped to perform in later battles and contributed to the series of defeats suffered by the army. Haughton believes that flaws within the army "lay not with the commitment" or motivation of the soldiers or their leaders "but in their ability to adapt training to circumstance, to evolve tactically . . . and to appreciate that there were alternatives to the [outdated] doctrine of 1861" (181). Army leaders could have done more to improve the combat potential of their soldiers by adopting a flexible attitude towards tactical thinking. They could have openly debated alternative doctrines, experimented with their men on the drill field, examined their battlefield and organizational tactics and asked probing questions about their methods. This failure to carry out a structured reexamination of tactical doctrine clearly rested with army leadership. "Without direction from above, the training and tactics were allowed to drift and stagnate in a war which was constantly evolving"(185).

The reader will find this book provocative and may agree with the author that his assessment of the Army of Tennessee is "undoubtedly harsh," and that it is gross speculation to infer that any improvement in training and doctrine might have turned the history of the Army of Tennessee from one of failure to one of success (182-83). The author agrees that training and doctrine were not the only factors that bore on combat effectiveness. "Food supply, equipment, morale and a plethora of other incidences" all had impact, and ultimately a culmination and combination of numerous strengths and weaknesses led to the eventual defeat of the Confederacy. It is reasonable, however, to question why there was no improvement in the...

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