Egypt: Stable, but for How Long?

The regime of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak seems to have escaped from the challenges of the 1990s with a steadier political configuration. Mubarak appears poised to rule for at least another decade; even if he were to leave office during that time, political succession would almost certainly be smooth and orderly and would preserve the status quo. The trade-off for stability, however, has been that the regime now relies on a narrower base of support than was the case just ten years ago. For the first time since the 1952 revolution, the Egyptian government has abandoned any pretense of populism; it has opted for elite support and back-room deals rather than broad public support or a vibrant political life. In the longer term, the challenge for the system as it was reconstituted in the 1990s will be whether it has the durability to survive an economic downturn, social unrest, or both.

Egypt on the Brink

Barely a decade ago, the Egyptian government appeared to be tottering. As economic growth turned negative in the late 1980s, Egypt's debt to gross national product (GNP) ratio was among the highest in the world, wages were plummeting, and unemployment was skyrocketing. On top of the economic morass, militants using the slogans and symbols of Islam were waging war on the government, which was responding with repression.

Forty years after the Free Officers' Movement deposed King Faruq, there was a widespread feeling that political and economic life in Egypt had again become sclerotic and corrupt and that the system needed a jolt. Many Egyptians perceived their government to be venal, inept, and inefficient. Islam-inspired organizations, on the other hand, had a proven track record of providing services more efficiently than the government. They seemed honest, and they had a clear message. Furthermore, the militants were the only force in society willing to express their opposition to the status quo, and by virtue of that fact alone they garnered public support.

After more than a year of disturbances in Upper Egypt, homemade bombs exploded in the heart of downtown Cairo in early 1993. In the subsequent months, reports of attacks on tourists, on Copts, and on government troops were rife, with rumors of incipient attacks even more common. The government seemed out of touch and determined to respond with toughness against an enemy it all too often could not even see.

Conditions in Egypt provoked concern not only among the elites in that country but also in the United States. According to the London Sunday Times, U.S. intelligence analysts had concluded in February 1994 that Mubarak was "in grave danger of being overthrown by Islamic fundamentalists, with catastrophic consequences for Western interests in the Middle East." Based on an apparently leaked National Intelligence Estimate that was then being drafted, the analysts reportedly concluded that "Mubarak is likely to fall and his country slide into economic chaos and civil war if present trends continue." ¹

By the autumn, the mood darkened further. One afternoon in October 1994, 82-year-old Nobel Laureate Naguib Mahfouz slowly shuffled out of his apartment building and into a car to attend a discussion of the week's events with some 50 friends and intellectuals, as he did every Friday. As Mahfouz settled into his seat, young toughs reached through the car window and stuck a cheap kitchen knife into his neck, almost killing him.

According to contemporary reports, the assault was retribution for a book the attackers had certainly not read, Awlad Haratina (available in an English translation by Paul Theroux as Children of the Alley), which had been published more than 30 years earlier. Years before the attack, Muslim religious authorities had denounced the books as blasphemous for featuring characters that resembled historical religious figures. But at the time of the assassination attempt, the book was not available for purchase in Egypt and had not been the subject of public discussion.

The Mahfouz attack captured much of...