A Matter of Time: Taiwan's Eroding Military Advantage

Taiwan will continue to hold a number of significant qualitative military advantages against its potential adversary in mainland China for most of the next decade. During this period, the island's security will be insured not so much by Taiwan's adequate defenses as by China's shortfalls in offensive capabilities. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has one big trump card, its growing ballistic missile force, but its other conventional capabilities remain far from adequate to pursue a decisive range of offensive operations against Taiwan.

This article describes Taiwan's defensive strengths and China's offensive weaknesses. It argues that China is closing the gap in several key areas and Taiwan's "window of invulnerability" is gradually closing. If current trends continue, sometime in the second half of this decade the conventional force balance between the two will tip in China's favor--unless the United States transfers massive amounts of high-tech weaponry to the island's armed forces. Even if Washington did so, Taiwan's military would likely suffer even greater problems absorbing and utilizing the equipment than it suffers today. Finally, the article describes likely conflict scenarios if push came to shove between China and Taiwan.

Despite Beijing's steadfast refusal to renounce the use of force, its occasional saber rattling in recent years, and regular reports in the Hong Kong media that the PLA is anxious to be unleashed to "teach Taiwan a lesson" or force it back into the fold of the People's Republic of China (PRC), it is very doubtful that Beijing has much realistic incentive to use force against the island. The costs of failure would be enormous--quite likely enough to bring down an already fragile regime. While the costs of "success" would be equally devastating to China's international image, trade and investment, and diplomatic ties. The use of force by Beijing is a lose-lose option. Yet, China has warned that it would have "no choice" if Taiwan formally asserted its independence, came under the military protection of another nation, or if "chaos" erupted on the island. Outgoing President Lee Teng-hui's July 1999 call for "special state-to-state" relations with Beijing came dangerously close to such a declaration of independence, and some analysts believe that enshrining this terminology in Taiwan's constitution would be seen by Beijing as tantamount to a formal break from the sacred sovereign principle of "One China." Semantic and substantive moves by Lee and Taiwanese authorities in recent years, such as dismantling the island's provincial administration, while leaving only its "national" bureaucracy, have set Beijing on a hair trigger. China is also hypersensitive about its second precondition--as it watches the Pentagon not only load Taipei with materiel, but also upgrade its training, logistical support, and other contacts with Taiwan's armed forces. Many experts believe--and China has warned--that the extension of theater missile defense (TMD) to Taiwan would necessarily bring with it a "denseness" of bilateral military and intelligence ties (as well as U.S. forces on the ground) that would de facto reconstitute the defense treaty terminated in 1979.

Precisely because the military balance between China and Taiwan is gradually shifting in China's favor (combined with the growing weapons absorption problem and the nascent arms race) more than ever the "Taiwan problem" cries out for a political solution. Taiwan's negotiating leverage with Beijing is not all that great now, but it will continue to deteriorate as its defenses and deterrent do. By the end of this decade, Taipei may well find itself trying to negotiate its future at a distinct disadvantage.

The Order of Battle

Most military experts do not consider the total balance of forces and order-of-battle (OB) between the PLA and Taiwan's armed forces to be a very useful measure. Terrain, as will be discussed below, is a key factor that obscures...