Thailand’s Southern Insurgency

Introduction

The insurgency in southernmost Thailand entered a new phase in 2013 with the 28 February announcement of a peace dialogue between the National Security Council (NSC) and the main militant organization, Barisan Revolusi Nasional Patani Melayu (BRN, Patani-Malay National Revolutionary Front). The dialogue process is Bangkok’s most determined and public effort to peacefully resolve the conflict, which is more than a decade old. It has roots in Malay nationalist resistance to Thai rule that stretch back to Siam’s conquest of Patani¹ and annexation of the region at the start of the twentieth century. Armed resistance to Thai rule took shape in the early 1960s, as a variety of underground separatist fronts formed and fought a low-level guerrilla campaign for an independent Patani state. This struggle had subsided by the 1990s, but the separatist fronts endured in exile and violence never ceased.

In 2001, and intensifying in 2004, a reconfigured militant movement emerged to wage a campaign of unprecedented potency.² Security agencies believe that the Coordinate faction of BRN began quietly preparing for their campaign in the early 1990s, recruiting, indoctrinating and training a new generation of fighters. Today, most rank-and-file insurgents appear to identify themselves simply as “fighters” (juwae) in a national-liberation movement, not as members of BRN or other groups, though the organization has a leadership council in exile in Malaysia.³ The movement casts its cause as self-determination, a struggle to liberate Patani from Thai rule. Recruitment appeals emphasize a history of Siamese conquest and oppression, and most new recruits swear oaths to keep the movement’s secrets on penalty of death.⁴ The cause is couched in religious terms as a jihad, but religious justifications are linked to a local Malay ethnic identity; it remains a local insurgency, not part of a transnational jihadist movement.⁵

Violence had been largely confined to the southernmost provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat, and Yala and four southeastern districts of Songkhla: Chana, Na Thawi, Saba Yoi and Thepa. This region of roughly 13,500 square kilometres is home to almost two million Thai citizens. Close to 80 per cent of the population are Muslims who speak Malay as their first language, the remainder almost all Thai or Sino-Thai Buddhists. More than 5,900 people have been killed and more than 10,200 injured since the beginning of 2004, though common criminality almost certainly accounts for some portion of this total.⁶ Over the past eleven years, Thai authorities have poured tens of thousands of troops and more than US$6 billion into the region in an effort to counter the insurgency, but have not reformed administration in ways that might alter the relationship between state and society.⁷

The first part of the chapter examines the patterns of militant violence in 2013, which demonstrated the insurgents’ adaptability and capacity to stage damaging, coordinated attacks across — and beyond — the conflict zone. The second section examines government policy, with a focus on the peace dialogue process. Although it faltered after only three plenary meetings, it introduced a new dynamic that altered calculations by various actors.

Insurgent Violence

The militant movement’s armed wing exhibits both hierarchical and decentralized characteristics. Local units appear to have a degree of autonomy in selecting targets and planning attacks, but there is strong evidence that militants across the region are periodically responsive to orders from a centralized command. Command-and-control at an operational level is strong enough to sustain the most damaging insurgency in Thailand’s history. The violence of the past decade is unlikely to be the product of ad hoc actions by isolated cells of disaffected young men. The logistical, intelligence, and personnel requirements necessary to carry out this struggle are evidence of a well organized and disciplined movement, embedded in the communities from which it emerged. There are divisions within the broader separatist movement, and the organization evident in the operational arena does not necessarily extend to a unified political stance. Many fighters within Thailand oppose dialogue with the Thai state and reject any compromise such as autonomy under the Thai constitution. [End...