Mastering Soldiers: Conflict, Emotions and the Enemy in an Israeli Military Unit (review)

Book Reviews Book Reviews 127 Mastering Soldiers: Conflict, Emotions and the Enemy in an Israeli Military Unit, by Eyal Ben-Ari. New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1998. 159 pp. $35.00. Soldiers have always constituted a unique category of sociological analysis. In large part, of course, this is because of the singular nature of their occupation, which poses challenges, and carries risks, unequaled in any other field ofhuman conduct. But to this must be added the peculiarity ofthe institutional frameworks within which soldiers live and which bind them together. The ties ofassociation engendered by common service in a single military unit-especially one engaged on combat missions-are altogether sui generis. They foster a sub-culture which pervades the language soldiers use, the symbols to which they relate, and even the emotions they feel. Eyal Ben-Ari's book seeks to further our understanding of that process and its manifestations through the close observation of an Israeli infantry reserve unit over an extended period. The author is exceptionally well qualified to carry out that task. Quite apart from being a highly respected sociologistand anthropologistwith a special interest in military behavior, he is also a reserve officer in the Israel Defense Force (IDF), who himselfserved in the battalion which he employs as the data base for his "field study." This dual background enables Ben-Ari to provide his readers with particularly instructive insights into the minutiae of the vocabulary and concerns of military life. It also permits him to adopt what is-by the standard of most academic studies-an unusual mode ofcomposition. His thematic chapters are interspersed with "Interludes"-the vast majority ofwhich consist ofeither excerpts from the personal journal which the author maintained whilst on service or oftranscripts ofhis conversations with his comrades in arms. The effect is to give the reader two related books within a single set of covers. One is a conventional academic text, replete with all the required paraphernalia. The other is a highly personal record of a formative experience. A basic theme in both parts ofBen-Ari's presentation is the power ofwhat he calls "the military ethos" to dictate the manner in which soldiers both perceive of their missions and carry them out. Images-both of self and of the enemy-are shaped by "cognitive models" (such as the "combat schema"); behavior is expected to conform to the metaphor of the military "machine"; at all but the most senior level of command, profound "reflexivity" about the purposes ofmilitary missions is displaced by a focus on the way in which they are attained. In short, what is important to the men in BenAri 's study (because ofthe composition ofIDF combat units, women are entirely absent from this inquiry) is getting their job done with the proficiency mandated by the "a priori text" of their institutional environment. As Ben-Ari's own extensive bibliographical reference indicate, in itselfthis is not a particularly novel finding. What is surprising is the degree to which Ben-Ari finds 128 SHOFAR Fa112000 Vol. 19, No. I these processes to hold (1) even amongst reserve troops (who, because they are only "part-time" soldiers, might have been expected to be somewhat resistant to the conditioning ofthe "military ethos"), and (2) even under the "gray" conditions ofIDF operations mounted against the intifada (Palestinian uprising, 1987-1993), which, because it was more of a constabulary operation than a conventional military engagemt:nt, raised particularly acute moral dilemmas. Unfortunately, the very briefcompass ofBen-Ari'sbook~oupled, itmustbe said, with the author's occasional preference for a prolix style-does not allow him room to explore all of the various implications of this finding. What, if anything, might it contribute to the ongoing debate about the persistence of"militarism" in Israeli society at large? How might it be reconciled with the phenomenon of conscientious objection which, although still very marginal, nevertheless during the 1980s and 1990s became far more pronounced than was previously thought possible? Above all, what can be inferred from Ben-Ari's study about the benefits and costs to Israel oftransferring to a more "professional" force, in which the current preponderance of reservists will give way to a greater reliance...