The Origins of the Second Arab-Israeli War: Egypt, Israel and the Great Powers, 1952-56 (review)

140 SHOFAR Winter 1994 Vol. 12, No.2 Mason concludes laconically, "One is probably entitled to cite him as independent evidence that Jesus actually lived ..." (p. 174). Many scholars have found "generic parallels" between Josephus's writings and Luke-Acts. These parallels have to do with both writers: producing sequels, having patrons, creating speeches as Thucydides did for key players in the drama, providing exciting episodes, and dealing with principal political themes of the day. Beyond these "generic parallels" there are a striking number of incidents both sources report. This comparison is the subject of chapter six.· To me, the most interesting insight here is Mason's view that the author of Luke-Acts presented Christianity as a "philosophical school within the Jewish orbit" (p. 216), as Josephus described the Pharisees as "a sect (hairesis) having points of resemblance to that which the Greeks call the Stoic school" (Life 12). Mason proposes that Luke knew something ofJosephus's work, which explains the points of agreement between the two writers. I commendJosephus and the New Testament as an interesting, wellpaced , judicious study of exactly what the title proposes. Louis Feldman's remark is apropos: "As one reads it, one senses that a master teacher is talking directly to one in a most delightful, even breezy, style so easy to understand." Mason acknowledges that he has not discussed a number of matters pertaining to his theme, such as "the versions of the Bible used by Josephus, Josephus' historical geography, the temple and its service, etc." (pp. 230-231). But these themes have been dealt with amply elsewhere, and Mason points the reader to many of these additional sources. The charts and maps included along the way are very helpful. I have rarely read a book as free from printing errors as this. Stuart D. Robertson History and Jewish Studies Purdue University The Origins of the Second Arab-Israeli War: Egypt, Israel and the Great Powers, 1952-56, by Michael B. Oren. London: Frank Cass and Company Ltd., 1992. 199 pp. $40.00. This book by Michael B. Oren, a Fellow at the Ben-Gurion Research Center and a lecturer in Modern Middle East History at Ben-Gurion University in Israel, is a systematic and specialized study of the developments leading to the outbreak of the 1956 Suez-Sinai campaign. It is an Book Reviews 141 objective, scholarly, and carefully researched work based upon archival and documentary sources, and also books and periodicals, some Egyptian newspapers and journals, and an Israeli newspaper, along with a number ofdoctoral dissertations. Oren's book is probably the first scholarly volume on this important topic and includes much new and significant material. The methodology employed by Oren is not strictly chronological but thematic. Themes include the Egyptian-Israeli border as set out in the armistice agreement of 1949, the Arab boycott and Egyptian blockade of the Gulf ofAqaba and passage of the Suez Canal, the struggle over regional defense in the Middle East with an emphasis on the intricate maneuvering of the great powers, the destabilizing effect of the Egyptian-Israeli arms race during that period, secret efforts for peace, and the ultimate descent to war. Oren's treatment of these topics reveals in a dispassionate way without seeming to be case-making or card-stacking a rather consistent British and u.S. bias against Israel, and for Egypt and Nasser until after the latter's nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956. An important example in both content and actual procedural approach was a major initiative code-named Alpha in 1954-55 concerning Anglo-American planning for Arab-Israeli peace. The central feature was Israeli territorial concessions, which would have included ceding a large part of the Negev. Israel would have received neither membership in the proposed Western defense organization that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and the British were so determined on, nor any economic aid, although it would have secured termination of the secondary Arab boycott and blacklisting and maritime blockade. The strategy for achieving Alpha involved first an approach to Nasser while keeping Israel in the dark to prevent it from accepting the plan "prematurely." British Foreign Minister Harold Macmillan and...