Russia and Iran: A Tactical Alliance

With the breakup of the Soviet Union, the newly independent states of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus became a central focus for Russian foreign policymakers. Given these states’ ties to the Middle East, Moscow now tends to view its policy toward Iran through the lens of Tehran’s policies toward Central Asia and the Transcaucasus. Of all the states in the Middle East, perhaps none is more important to Russia than Iran. Not only is Iran a major player in the region, it is also an important trading partner and occupies a strategic position on the Persian Gulf.

The Yeltsin regime sees in its relations with Iran three geopolitical opportunities. First, Iran is an important market for Russian arms and nuclear technology and is therefore a source of foreign exchange. Second, sound relations with Tehran give Moscow the opportunity to demonstrate its diplomatic independence from the United States. Third, Iran looks to be an ally in Moscow’s efforts to contain and control Azerbaijan and the Taliban, and checking Turkish influence. These factors are valued in Moscow despite concerns about the spread of political Islam and the possibility that Iran will make good on its offer to provide alternative transportation links to Central Asia and the Transcaucasus. For its part, Iran regards Russia not only as a source of arms, but also as an important diplomatic link in its efforts to counter US attempts to isolate it. In addition, the Rafsanjani regime and Moscow have common policy goals in both Azerbaijan and Afghanistan.

Russia’s Foreign Policymaking Processes and Priorities

In most democratic countries, domestic politics play a significant role in foreign policy. In Russia, a country that only became democratic at the end of 1991, domestic politics have also become central to Russian foreign policymaking. The impact of domestic politics on Russian policy toward the Middle East is clearly illustrated by the shift from a strong pro-western stance in 1992 to a more nationalist one in 1997, a process punctuated by the January 1996 replacement of Andrei Kozyrev by Yevgenii Primakov as Foreign Minister. Throughout this period, Yeltsin’s foreign policy has reflected the demands of Russian domestic politics. Particularly after the December 1993 elections, instead of openly confronting the Duma, Yeltsin chose to adapt to its highly nationalistic foreign policy agenda, a pattern of behavior he was to repeat after the December 1995 Duma elections. This strategy, in part, helped him to be re-elected in 1996.

Stage One: A Pro-American Approach

During most of 1992, Russian foreign policy was clearly oriented in a pro-American direction. Russia joined in enforcing sanctions against Iraq by dispatching two warships to the Persian Gulf, backed sanctions against Libya, and enthusiastically supported the Arab-Israeli peace process. In addition, Kozyrev took the lead in calling for normal diplomatic relations with the newly independent states, where 25 million Russians now live. Only in the case of arms sales to Iran did Russia take a position markedly different from that of the United States.

By December 1992, however, Yeltsin’s control over foreign policy was being challenged in the Duma, where three main groups vied for power. On the left was a group of legislators who supported Yeltsin’s economic reforms. In particular, this group favored strengthening ties with Israel, supporting sanctions against Iraq, and cooperating with the countries of the “near abroad.” In the center was a group of legislators who advocated the so-called “Eurasian” approach to foreign policy. They believed Russia should not focus exclusively on the United States and Europe, but called for good ties with all of the Middle East and China. While this group also wanted much closer ties with the “near abroad,” it wanted Russia to rank first among equals. On domestic policy, although still in favor of economic reform, the Eurasianists advocated a far slower privatization process. Finally, on the right was an alliance of ultranationalists and old-guard communists. Though differing on economic policy, they all wanted a powerful, highly centralized Russia that would actively protect Russians living in the “near abroad,” act like a major...