The Future of American Strategy (review)

238 SAIS REVIEW and ideological roots of the pacifist unilateralism represented by the Greens and different parts of the peace movement. Gress takes a very critical tone regarding these developments from the beginning—great parts of this book are dedicated to the author's confessions of supporting a "conservative" Western defense and deterrence policy. In his preface Gress labels himself a traditionalist — placing his view in a great community with such well-respected men as Raymond Aron, Pierre Hassner, Samuel Huntington, and Hans-Peter Schwarz. Unfortunately, Gress does not always reach their level of sophistication, especially when he disagrees by adopting the reprehensible tradition of linking critical intellectuals like Bertolt Brecht and Heinrich Boll to totalitarianism or even terrorism. The strengths of the book are undoubtedly in its historical parts. David Gress is knowledgeable about the German political and philosophical history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The reader also gets a good overview of the unique national and intellectual situation of the divided nation. Specifically, the author points out the reasons for an increasing interest in history and the "renaissance" of the Heimatgefühl. He is correct — both trends signal important changes in the political culture of the Federal Republic. But the reader also gets the impression that Gress tries to dig out the roots of a phenomenon that he fails to analyze adequately. The main shortcoming of this study is that the author does not bother to differentiate among the current trends within the SPD, the Greens, or the peace movement. In view of the numerous publications and positions on the subject, this would not be an easy goal, but it is absolutely necessary to get an idea of what is happening within these groups. Instead, Gress adopts the ideas and often the clichés of critics of the peace movement in Western Europe and the United States. Gress's exclusive use of secondary literature is not at any time representative and accentuates the bias of his analysis. David Gress surely tells a specific group of his American readers what they want to hear: that many West Germans are anti-American and neutralistic and favor appeasement toward the Soviet Union. All that other readers will gain from this book is a good example of a conservative view of the security debate within the Federal Republic, without discovering what is happening in Germany. The Future of American Strategy. By David C. Hendrickson. New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1987. 210 pp. $34.95/cloth, $16.95/paper. Reviewed by David K. Boren, M.A. candidate, SAIS. Evaluating America's position in the world during the last decades of the twentieth century, David C. Hendrickson sees cause for significant changes in U.S. strategy. Drawing on insights of some of the most noted scholars and strategists of our day, Hendrickson argues in The Future ofAmerican Strategy that the United States must realign its commitments with its resources rather than BOOK REVIEWS 239 exaggerate its responsibilities and run the risk of unduly jeopardizing otherwise secure vital interests. Despite Hendrickson's admonishment that the United States restrain its tendency for seeing all interests as vital, he does not recommend that the country retreat from playing the role of a global power. Far from it, Hendrickson embraces the conventional wisdom that the United States is the keystone in the postwar balance of power. Hendrickson's central point is that U.S. strategy must pay more attention to the "core" of the international system and less attention to the "periphery." Only in this way, argues Hendrickson, can the United States cope with military competition with the Soviet Union and simultaneous economic competition with Japan. The area of the periphery to which Hendrickson devotes the most space is the Persian Gulf, which he believes has lost much of its strategic importance as a result of declining U.S. dependence on Persian Gulf oil. Assuming that this trend will continue, Hendrickson argues that increased reliance on air and naval power would serve both strategic and economic interests. Such a policy would enable the United States to channel more resources toward the core of Western security, Europe. As Hendrickson sees it, proposals to cope with the...