Secrecy and Democracy (review)

254 SAIS REVIEW generations after V-E Day attests to the enduring ambiguities and conflicting perceptions that will test the cohesiveness of the nato Alliance in the years ahead. Secrecy and Democracy. By Stansfield Turner. Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Co., 1985. pp. 304. Reviewed by David Colton, M.A. candidate, SAIS. America's liberal democratic values and the processes peculiar to intelligence gathering have never been fully reconciled. The United States has historically oscillated between reluctant acceptance of intelligence activities and abhorrent rejection—often with disastrous results. Despite America's superpower status, the uncertainty about the role of intelligence in a democracy continues. Can intelligence and democracy be integrated without compromising the effectiveness of the former and the legitimacy of the latter? The old school, which holds that the nation must take it on faith that intelligence officers are honorable men, urges heightened secrecy and autonomy for the intelligence community. Others, less trusting, desire congressional oversight. Former director of central intelligence Admiral Stansfield Turner is clearly of the latter breed, and his Secrecy and Democracy presents their case with verve. An intelligence community outsider prior to his posting, Turner approaches questions such as covert action, counter-intelligence, and community management with the distrust ofentrenched independent authority and foreign intervention that marked the Carter administration. He suggests that democracy and secrecy can best be reconciled through congressional oversight and increased use of technological espionage. Turner argues that congressional oversight precludes further intelligence abuses through the application of a "just war" analysis to U.S. intelligence operations: Are the objectives just? Are the means employed appropriate and just? Will justice be enhanced if the action succeeds? This process preserves democratic ideals, while allowing the public to become familiar with the mission of U.S. intelligence. Concern for democracy is not the only factor animating Turner's analysis. Increased reliance on technology over traditional clandestine services facilitates both bureaucratic and operational control. Technology is eminently suited for "management by objectives" and other "rational" schemes that assist in the penetration ofan organization by the planning agent. Emphasis on technological collection also reduces the need for human collection and provides greater specificity in targeting. Turner does outline instances when human intelligence may be more useful than that retrievable by high technology, yet these instances are few and do not alter the subservient status he allots it. The threats that confront the nation today, however, are often in areas best suited for human intelligence, such as in penetration of terrorist organizations and narcotics cartels. One is further puzzled by Turner's claim that a technological revolution justified the change in organizational emphasis. In the two chapters allotted to technology and spying, the agency's past exploits are barely mentioned. Yet since the 1950s U.S. intelligence has consistently been a major innovator in technology ; the development of the U—2 and the reconnaissance satellite revolutionized BOOK REVIEWS 255 the intelligence process. In fact, the history of U.S. intelligence has been one of technological accomplishment. Turner's stress on congressional oversight and use of technology is often cited as the most important difference between him and the old school. This may be misleading. Turner distinguishes himself most by his focus on the domestic tension between democracy and intelligence. While acknowledging a threat to free institutions from totalitarian forces, he seems more concerned to protect democracy from its own supposed guardians. The proposals for reform at the end of the book are, with one major exception, not novel. Calls to write a new charter, increase the director's authority, and guarantee his political independence have all been heard before, although Turner's former position lends them added weight. Some suggestions, such as merging the analytical and espionage branches of the cia, reflect a penchant for organizational neatness that may have questionable results. Turner goes beyond the pale, however, when he puts forth a rather bizarre scheme to transform U.S. intelligence into a supranational "Open Skies Agency"—a conception so Utopian that its inclusion will merely serve to frighten wary bureaucrats. Africa: The People and Politics of an Emerging Continent. (Third Edition.) By Sanford J. Ungar. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985. pp. 527. The Africans. By...