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CORRESPONDENCE Margaret E. Clark and David Ray, editors Human Rights Policy as Principle To the Editor: Stephen Wrage's "Another Look at Human Rights" (sais review 3, WinterSpring 1983), offers yet another critique of the Carter human rights policy. Without abandoning the principle, Wrage argues that with some major adjustments, the policies could be made to work effectively. In his view, Carter frittered away his advantage by setting his sights too high, succumbing to flamboyant crusading rhetoric, and stubbornly trying to "raise global consciousness " on human rights. Mr. Wrage eschews Carter's ambitious design and opts for a more modest approach. The approach for success would include (1) a specific objective; (2) an array of pressures concentrated into a comprehensive program ; and (3) a notion by the accused that some benefit will accrue through compliance with the demands. Only the combination of these ingredients guarantees success . Three salient examples from the Carter years were highlighted as proof that when all the conditions are met, success is inevitable. Apart from these exceptions, according to Mr. Wrage, the Carter record was a dismal failure. In Mr. Wrage's haste to prove his thesis, he misreads a number of factors, misinterprets the consequences of the Carter campaign , and ultimately gives us a prescription more oriented toward accomplishing specific casework than setting out the broad principles that should help guide U.S. foreign policy. The criticism most often leveled at the Carter policy was that it was unevenly applied . While he castigated the Argentine government for killing and making thousands of its own citizens disappear, he toasted the shah's government at a New Year's Eve celebration in Tehran. Where the Carter policy was applied most vigorously—in Latin America—the results have been notable. In addition to saving many lives, the United States began to recover a measure of goodwill among the Latin American peoples. In the developing world, the United States is regrettably not viewed very sympathetically. Strident anticommunism combined with material abundance do not provide an adequate basis upon which to build a national image. The United States needs to be able to clearly articulate before a global audience the human rights values that are embedded deep within the spiritual fabric of this society. I therefore take sharp exception to Mr. Wrage's obvious displeasure over the cosmic vision of the Carter advocates . Whereas I would not quarrel with Mr. Wrage's recipe for effective human rights work, I would hasten to point out a couple of pitfalls if immediate success is the only criterion. First, human rights practices are seldom reversed overnight but require a long incubation. Therefore, steady, longterm pressure may ultimately be the best 239 240 SAIS REVIEW antidote to entrenched, repressive regimes. Second, if an administration is required to forgo action until all the components in Mr. Wrage's formula are present, precious few human rights actions would ever be taken. The U.S. government should not be reduced to doing only casework. However, when opportunities for immediate and forceful action arise, certainly there should be no hesitation. As Mr. Wrage points out, private groups specialize in the effective deployment of the tactics he prescribes for the U.S. government. While applauding the work of these private and intergovernmental groups (Amnesty International, the OAS's Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, etc.), he neglects to mention that the work of these groups was enormously strengthened by President Carter's "noisy" human rights diplomacy. Finally, I must take issue with Mr. Wrage's interpretation of the facts. At one point he said that when the Carter administration threatened to cut arms to Argentina and Uruguay (actually the State Department was only attempting to faithfully comply with the human rights legislation), other countries including Guatemala, Brazil , and El Salvador repudiated military aid. Mr. Wrage maintains that "nothing was gained and leverage was lost." It would be more accurate to say that these strange human rights notions emanating from Washington both irritated and jarred a number of Latin America militaries. Human rights leverage was increased and improvements did occur over time in some of the countries that suffered this reproach. Mr. Wrage despairs of the Carter idealism . In foreign...

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