France and the Polish Crisis

FRANCE AND THE POLISH CRISIS Dominique Moni A he Polish question has always been—since the first partition of Poland in 1772—a mirror revealing the West's political and moral stances. The present crisis in Poland is no exception to the general rule. In their reaction to the events that have unfolded in Poland since December 13, 1981, the various European countries are revealing how they view themselves, how theyjudge their ability to influence developments in Poland, and what they hope and fear from the East-West competition. This scheme applies particularly to France. France has always been the traditional ally of Poland. For a mixture of realpolitik and emotional ties, France used to engage in a formal alliance with Poland when it was a state, and professed indignation and commiseration when the Polish nation was stateless. History and religion—for France and Poland are the two daughters of the Catholic church—as well as the influential support of the French trade unions, combined to make Poland the perfect test for Socialist France's new realism and strength vis-á-vis the Soviet Union. I have described elsewhere1 the reasons behind France's firm posture, its strong condemnation of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, and its clear support for Chancellor Schmidt in the Euromissile quarrel. Was Poland to confirm or deny this new realism? It is too early to say whether France has passed the test successfully. As of March 1982, three months after the coming to power by force of 1. Dominique Moisi, "Mitterrand's Foreign Policy: The Limits of Continuity," Foreign Affairs 60 (Winter 1981-82), pp. 347-57. Dominique Moisi is Associate Professor at the University ofParis X, and Assistant Director of the Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI), Paris. 99 100 SAIS REVIEW General Jaruzelski, the general feeling is one of relative disappointment. Consistency between speeches and actions, and even among the various speeches, has not always been evident. But, before passing judgment on France, one must keep in mind two important factors: France's limited maneuvering room and ability to influence events in Poland, and the general attitude of the West toward the Polish crisis. We have made a more fundamental analysis than the Americans have of the Polish situation. We believe it is a further demonstration of the logic of the totalitarian system which simply cannot accept free expression. That system was forced by its nature to crush liberty and muffle the church. Minor measures like increasing interest rates on loans to the Soviet Union won't have the slightest influence on the unfolding of the drama. Secondly, we are more dependent on the Soviet Union for trade. Above all, since we are not as strong as the United States, and since our national defense depends on our credibility, we simply cannot afford to make a threat that is not realized—as happened with the American embargo on grain after Afghanistan.2 In the interview he gave to Newsweek, Claude Cheysson summarized perfectly for an American audience the tenets of France's attitude toward the Polish crisis: severity and a realistic assessment of the nature of the crisis, but also a refusal to take steps that would lead nowhere. While this position is not inconsistent with past policies—in terms of perception, if not in action—France's attitude toward the Polish situation fluctuates like variations on a theme. If in December 1981 a line were drawn between firmness and softness, from the United States to the Federal Republic of Germany, France was clearly closer to the United States. From December 1981 to March 1982, as the Jaruzelski regime seemed to consolidate itselfwhile emotions faded as verbal denunciations gave way to concrete measures, France began moving in the other direction, toward the Federal Republic. It was as though France were returning to the original assessment of Cheysson's first reaction: "It is a Polish affair that must be solved among the Poles. We do not see for the moment any trace of a threat of foreign intervention. . . . Of course, we are not going to react." If one switches the focus from the government response to the reactions of individuals, the Germans, though they...