Weapons Don't Make War (review)

148 SAIS REVIEW Weapons Don't Make War. By Colin Gray. Kansas: University Press ofKansas, 1993. 236 pp. $29.95/Hardback. Reviewed by Keith B. Bickel, PhJ). Candidate, SAIS When an author sets up a straw man for a thesis, one might be tempted to hope for two things: first, that the process is subtle, and second, that the straw man has notbeen belabored in previous arguments. Regrettably, in bis latest work, Weapons Don't Make War, Colin Gray accomplishes neither. Being that this is his third scholarly book in two years, one might give Gray some credit were the presentation smooth and new arguments presented. Instead, Weapons Don't Make War reads like an eclectic collection of ideas in search of a unifying theme. The unifying theme is ostensibly, as the title suggests, that weapons technology is subordinate to the cause ofpolicy and strategy in the pursuit ofinternational power. As Gray himself puts it throughout, arms races themselves do not cause war. This is the "straw man" thesis. In a baroque style and argumentation that makes the book more difficult to read than it need be, Gray argues that Americans have an excessively machineminded view ofstrategy that causes its leadership—military as well as political— to confuse strategic weapons capabilities with strategy. The former tends to drive the latter, instead of vice versa. To counter this tendency, the author develops a series ofarguments in seven chapters that are designed to show America the error of its ways. The first chapter argues that on all levels of war —tactical, operational, and strategic—there is no real meaning to the terms offense and defense. Instead, "whether a policy isjudged offensive or defensive is very much a matter ofpolitical perspective." This theme is carried into the second chapter where the author draws the logical conclusion that weapons are neither inherently offensive or defensive. Rather, rifles, tanks, and nuclear weapons can be made to serve whatever purpose policy or military exigencies dictate. The third chapter discusses the rise of the arms race metaphor and contributes to arguments debunkingthatmetaphor. Chapters four and five shift to a discussion of the proper relationship between policy and weapons acquisition and how the latter is accomplished under circumstances of international uncertainty. These two chapters are followed by a shift back to the arms control thesis, with an historical treatment of the arms control process and an enumeration ofsome lessons and "mislessons" to be learnt from thatprocess. The double transition between chapters does not make sense until the real thesis of the book is taken into account. At its core level, this book is long series of arguments in favor of deploying the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Gray metaphorically establishes this thesis early with the following: ". . .an enemy swordsman will find his job much more difficult and dangerous ifhe is obliged not only to find a way ofpenetrating his opponent's protective armor, but also to avoid painful and weakening (if not fatal) strikes by his opponent's sword." Gray gets more specific when he writes: ". . .but what ifsome newly great power should prove to be beyond deterrence? Future strategic historians would identify the dilatory pace of the SDI as the source ofdire consequences." Later, as one ofthe lessons to be learned from nuclear history, Gray asserts: "In the same way that tactical BOOK REVIEWS 149 offense and defense complement each other in land warfare, so strategic offense and defense synergistically should produce a more formidable deterrent." Unfortunately, with respect to argumentation supporting both the arms race metaphor and strategic defense theses of the book, Gray produces nothing new. Ten years ago the arguments he makes in favor ofSDI could have made an impact on strategic thinking. Today they are a tired re-hash, albeit in different guise, that do not serve the serious scholar of strategic affairs. Worse, omissions and contradictions mar the quality of the author's arguments. To begin, Weapons is ostensibly a treatise on strategic weapons. Indeed, Gray excoriates Americans for a reductionist mindsetthatequates nuclearweapons with strategic weapons in toto. What becomes immediately evident, however, is that the author's background causes him to commit the same fallacy throughout the book. Given that America is...