Strategic Arms After Reagan: The Unfinished Agenda

STRATEGIC ARMS__________ AFTER REAGAN: THE UNFINISHED AGENDA Gary L. Guertner I consider the protection of peace and freedom with these annihilating weapons to be very problematic. The bombs fulfill their purpose only if they never fall. But if everyone knows that they will never fall, they do not fulfill their purpose. German Physicist Carl von Weizaecker .he Reagan administration set the stage for major changes in strategic doctrine, but its legacy is flawed by a lack of coherence among three of its most important strategic programs—arms control, nuclear weapons modernization, and strategic defense. For these programs to merge into a coordinated pursuit of stable deterrence, the Bush administration must first reconcile the contradictory goals that have been declared for each. Enhancing Stability: Arms Control vs. Strategic Defense According to conventional wisdom arms control treaties provide a framework for achieving strategic stability, that ideal posture where neither side has an incentive to initiate a nuclear attack, and minimizing strategic instability, that situation where neither the United States nor the Soviet Union believes that "victory" can be achieved or defeat averted Gary L. Guertner is visiting professor of strategy at the United States Army War College and author of Deterrence and Defense in a Post-Nuclear World (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989). From 1984 to 1985, he served on the START working group of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 87 88 SAIS REVIEW without a preemptive attack.1 Thus the aim of arms control is to create an environment in which both sides feel less compelled to deploy new offensive or defensive weapons. Proponents of strategic defense and preemptive options, by contrast, reject the notion that stability can be based on deterrence by threat of retaliation. This traditional model of deterrence, they argue, is based on revenge, not true defense, and is thus not a credible way of deterring war. Strategic defenses capable of providing protection against ballistic missiles, these critics argue, are needed to overcome the balance of terror. Yet in practice the introduction of strategic defense actually complicates the offensive-defensive relationship by adding a new element of competition. This competition is fueled by the prudent expectation that no weapon is purely defensive. Defensive advantages can be exploited to support offensive threats, which precipitate both offensive countermeasures and efforts to match enemy defenses. Arms control advocates argue that open-ended offensive-defensive arms races will inevitably result from an overreliance on technological solutions to security. Technology , they point out, is neutral, it has no loyalty to offense or defense. Thus, today's defensive solutions can be negated by tomorrow's offensive breakthroughs. And, they add, diplomacy and arms control are also more cost-effective means of maintaining mutual security. Recent experience , however, such as the deadlock in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), has demonstrated the difficulties involved in reaching long-range arms control agreements. Spokesmen for the Reagan administration described mutual deterrence as an intermediate step on the route to a world of "impotent," "obsolete ," or "zero" nuclear missiles. But the attempt to achieve the defensive utopia embodied in the highly controversial Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) will more likely undermine than overcome mutual deterrence— unless the United States and the Soviet Union can agree on specific levels of offensive and defensive weapons. By the same token, arms control solutions will have little long-term value unless they can head off competition generated by the offensive-defensive relationship. The first step to solving this dilemma is to identify the contradictions and the instability created by a defensive doctrine (deterrence) that relies on an offensive military strategy. 1. Important to add, this state of disequilibrium can provide mutual crisis stability, but only if offensive forces are reduced to levels sufficiently low that retaliatory forces can be preserved through unilateral precautions, such as early warning systems, high alert rates, and mobile-basing of weapons. STRATEGIC ARMS AFTER REAGAN 89 Conditions of Stability Stable deterrence requires nuclear forces that can survive a first strike, thus confronting the enemy with assured retaliation. Vulnerable forces tempt preemption in a crisis. These traditional formulations are widely accepted in the arms control community and by those who advocate strategic stability through...