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BOOK REVIEWS 227 Now that the USSR has a reformer at the helm, Colton asks where Gorbachev is likely to steer the country. It is clear that the stagnant economy is the main problem to be tackled because, as Andropov said, the USSR's "main influence on the world revolutionary process is through our economic policies." The question remains, however, what the new general secretary intends to do. Russian pride and the large size of the Soviet Union prevent the imitation of the success of Hungary or even China, so the Kremlin must come up with its own reforms. Gorbachev is fortunate to have the advantage of youth on his side, but if he does not act fast, youth will disappear and the same yearning for security that befell Brezhnev's Politburo might befall Gorbachev's. The two most likely outcomes of the Gorbachev years, according to Colton , are either moderate reform or conservatism —not an earthshaking pronouncement ; with the exception of Lenin and Stalin, the latter has been avoided consistently by Soviet leaders. Revolution is not likely because of the strength of the Soviet military and the Soviet people's approval of a governmental system that has kept them secure and has greatly improved domestic conditions since 1917. The last of the book's five chapters deals with the influence Gorbachev's reforms might have on the USSR's relations with the outside world. Since 1953 the Soviet Union has opened considerably to outside scrutiny, leading to a greater connection between domestic and foreign policies. Still, the question of emigration and human rights bears heavily on the Soviet's bargaining power with the West. In conclusion, Professor Colton warns U.S. leaders not to think that because a Russian bear has a limp, it is harmless. If it is prodded too far, its teeth are still quite sharp. It is important for the United States to be receptive to Soviet overtures toward maintaining peace and not to regard them as pleas from a weak state. One of the most important areas that the United States should endeavor to develop is a more meaningful integration of the Soviet Union into the world economy. If the Soviets were more economically integrated with the West, then military threats would be less likely or less severe. East Asian Security and the Trilateral Countries. By Masashi Nishihara. New York: New York University Press, 1985. 109 pp. $25.00/cloth. Reviewed by Angela Lykos, M.A. candidate, SAIS. The fall of the regime of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines and the U.S. trade deficit with Japan have placed East Asia back in the limelight as an area of concern for U.S. strategic interests. In East Asian Security and the Trilateral Countries Masashi Nishihara addresses the timely issues of Asian political instability , increased Soviet military power in the region, and the effects ofJapan's continued economic growth on its bilateral relations with the United States. He analyzes how the current interests of the trilateral nations— the United States, Western Europe, Canada, and Japan — pertain to the security of East Asia. Finally, Nishihara outlines the policy implications for the trilateral nations. 228 SAIS REVIEW Nishihara, a professor of international relations at the National Defense Academy of Japan, begins with a brief survey of the current strategic and economic situation in the region. He argues that the regional balance of power does not favor communist countries because the People's Republic of China now has a better relationship with the United States than with the Soviet Union and because communist insurgency is a threat only in the Philippines. Nevertheless , Soviet deployment of nuclear and conventional forces in the area means that East Asia remains a concern for trilateral nations. Another source of tension is the sustained economic prosperity of some noncommunist Asian countries. Although economic growth benefits Western security by making communism a less attractive alternative, Japan's trade surplus concerns a deficit-ridden United States. Nishihara explains how trilateral interests in East Asia have changed since World War II, contending that the United States, Europe, andJapan possessed different objectives until the 1970s. One example cited is the European nations' recognition of the PRC long before...

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