The Dilemma of Reform in the Soviet Union (review)

226 SAIS REVIEW Yaniv conludes by addressing the possibility of the introduction of nuclear weapons into the Middle Eastern equation. Although it is not inevitable, he argues that it is likely that they will be introduced unless both sides take actions to defuse the situation. Israel's responsibility is to return the territories captured in 1967 from the Arab states, under the condition that they are strictly demilitarized. Not only will this remove the immediate cause of Arab belligerency ; the author claims that it also will make strategic sense for Israel. Yaniv's proposals are provocative, but as they come at the end of a comprehensive , insightful investigation of Israel's strategic history, they merit serious consideration. One hopes that they will find currency in Israel's domesdc political debate. The Dilemma of Reform in the Soviet Union. By Timothy J. Colton. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1986. 274 pp. $19.95/cloth, $9.95/paper. Reviewed byJames Lloyd Glucksman, M.A. candidate, SAIS. The advent of a youthful Soviet leader with new ideas has led many to speculate about which direction the Soviet Union will now take. General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's pronouncements of the importance of "glasnost," or openness, has fostered hopes that there will be an era of reform and change of the long-static Soviet system. Still, the questions remain: are the reforms merely for show, a "Potemkin village" designed to improve the Soviet Union's image as a response to Ronald Reagan's successful histrionics, or are the reforms here to stay? This revised edition of Timothy Colton's The Dilemma ofReform in the Soviet Union expands the author's original 1985 version to cover the dynamic Gorbachev years, a period in which many of the USSR's perennial problems are beginning to be remedied. It is a thorough account of the current situation in the Soviet Union that is well worth reading. The Brezhnev succession, like all post-Stalin leadership transfers, can be characterized as a repudiation of the previous leader's policies. Just as Khrushchev was the architect of de-Stalinization and Brezhnev did away with Khrushchev's "harebrained schemes," so Gorbachev is undoing Brezhnev's legacy— a legacy Colton refers to as lethargy. According to Professor Colton, Brezhnev was chosen to counteract high-risk policy decisions that had run rampant under Khrushchev, who used such policies to extend widely the USSR's influence, but at great cost. The result of Khrushchev's rule was idleness in both the Kremlin and the workplace, leading to the economic malaise that has plagued the Soviet Union since the 1970s. By the end of Brezhnev's rule the Soviet leadership had upended most of the achievements made under Khrushchev: for example, the life span of the average citizen, which had been on the rise, began to recede under Brezhnev; the number of new available apartments no longer matched increased demand. Neither Andropov nor Chernenko was in power long enough to effect changes, but Colton points out that many of Gorbachev's statements are built upon those of Andropov, who was also very reform-minded. BOOK REVIEWS 227 Now that the USSR has a reformer at the helm, Colton asks where Gorbachev is likely to steer the country. It is clear that the stagnant economy is the main problem to be tackled because, as Andropov said, the USSR's "main influence on the world revolutionary process is through our economic policies." The question remains, however, what the new general secretary intends to do. Russian pride and the large size of the Soviet Union prevent the imitation of the success of Hungary or even China, so the Kremlin must come up with its own reforms. Gorbachev is fortunate to have the advantage of youth on his side, but if he does not act fast, youth will disappear and the same yearning for security that befell Brezhnev's Politburo might befall Gorbachev's. The two most likely outcomes of the Gorbachev years, according to Colton , are either moderate reform or conservatism —not an earthshaking pronouncement ; with the exception of Lenin and Stalin, the latter has been avoided consistently by Soviet leaders. Revolution is not likely because of the...