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GRAIN EMBARGO AS DIPLOMATIC LEVER: FULCRUM OR FOLLY? John C. Roney Xoland provides the setting for a potentially major confrontation between the Atlantic Alliance and the Soviet Union. Indeed, the situation in Poland has already sparked serious dispute not only between the United States and the Soviet Union, but between the United States and its West European allies as they consider responses to the apparent Soviet influence over Polish affairs . Among the most frequently mentioned possible measures that the United States and its allies might take against the Soviet Union to protest its involvement in Poland is a reinstatement of the grain embargo of 1980—81. Is another grain embargo ofthe Soviet Union likely? Is a grain embargo, in fact, a potent tool of foreign policy? Based on the lessons of the 1980-81 experience, could another grain embargo have a significant economic and political impact on the Soviets? This paper attempts to answer these questions by examining the decision -making process that led to the 1980-81 embargo, assessing the effects of the embargo—on the United States as well as on the U.S.S.R.—and, from that examination, drawing conclusions about the effectiveness of the grain embargo as a foreign policy tool. Because of the dearth of literature on the embargo decision-making process, the author interviewed many of those involved in the decision, including National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, Defense Secretary Harold Brown, Agriculture Secretary Bob Bergland, a number of sub-CabJohn C. Roney is a candidate for the M.I.P.P. (Master in International Public Policy) degree at SAIS. He is on leave from his position as Information Director of the U.S. Department ofAgriculture's World Agricultural Outlook Board. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Department of Agriculture or of the United States government. 189 190 SAIS REVIEW inet government officials, and members of the intelligence community who preferred not to be named. Though the United States accounts for less than a fifth of the world's annual grain production, it generally provides more than half the grain traded internationally each year. Despite its domination of grain trade, the United States had never, until 1980, overtly singled out its agricultural exports to use as a punitive foreign policy tool. Possible exceptions might be the United States' strategic use of food aid over the years: the 1973 soybean embargo, the suspension of grain shipments to the Soviet Union in 1974, and a similar suspension in 1975 that included Poland as well as the U.S.S.R. Each of these actions differ substantially, however, from the 1980 embargo. The United States has always used food aid more as a carrot than as a stick— for rewarding countries in U.S. favor rather than for punishing transgressors. The 1973 and 1974 actions were taken for economic rather than political reasons. In both cases, the export halts appeased consumer groups that were railing against escalating food prices, but they infuriated farm interests. Farm interests objected vehemently to the subsequent drops in commodity prices, the lack of compensation for canceled export contracts, and the erosion of the United States' reputation as a reliable supplier.1 The 1975 suspension was depicted at the time, like the 1973 and 1974 actions, as being taken for purely economic reasons. It was also, however, a largely unsuccessful attempt by the Ford administration to exert some political pressure on the Soviet Union. According to one account, President Ford made the suspension decision based on Secretary of State Kissinger's argument that it would give the United States a lever that "could conceivably calm Soviet behavior in the Middle East and elsewhere."2 In negotiations with the Soviets to end the suspension, State Department officials attempted to arrange a long-term agreement that would link U.S. grain, which would be sold at above-market prices, to Soviet oil, which would be bought at below-market prices. The Soviets, however, flatly refused to make any linkage with oil. A grain-only agreement did end the suspension and, to some extent, the extreme volatility that had characterized U.S.-Soviet grain trade...

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