A Culture of Secrecy: The Government Versus the People's Right to Know (review)

Book Reviews 361 persistence of conservative thought, even though it is grounded in many of the same philosophical commitments as is the liberalism it purports to oppose (282). Taken as a whole, these essays illustrate how ideas in American politics are less the result of a priori ideology than of pragmatic application to practical realities. The course of liberalism over the past sixty years, as Brinkley has represented it, illustrates well how the conduct of public affairs is bound inextricably to rhetorical forces. The way we think and talk about the world has much to do with the way we act in and upon it. David Zarefsky Northwestern University A Culture of Secrecy: The Government Versus the People's Right to Know. Edited by Äthan G. Theoharis. Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 1998; pp. vii + 245. $29.95. Veteran investigators of U.S. intelligence agencies, the contributors of A Culture of Secrecy testify to the ways in which the foundations of democracy are threatened and sometimes disregarded by government officials. Editor Äthan G. Theoharis, a professor of history at Marquette University, characterizes the work of the authors as "efforts to breach the 'wall of secrecy' restricting research into the records" of U.S. government offices and intelligence agencies (vii). These efforts narrated by the contributors are often laden with frustration and rarely result in triumph over a bureaucracy that serves to keep hidden covert interactions and operations. Hence, a degree of optimism is required of the reader to recognize this anthology as a tale of hope and perseverance, and as a map to investigate the U.S. government. Tracing the history of the "culture of secrecy" to a power shift that occurred during the Cold War era, Theoharis provides an introduction to the anthology. He explains that as the United States became increasingly involved in international crises, Congress became less involved in determining foreign policy and relations, and "the presidents's role became more determinative" (2). Theoharis presents Presidents Truman, Kennedy, and Nixon as pioneers in unilateral decision making, ordering intelligence agencies to conduct foreign and domestic investigations of perceived threats to national security. As the book's following nine essays are variously interested in the historical and present evasiveness of U.S. intelligence agencies , Theoharis summarizes the birth and function of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the National Security Agency (NSA). Perhaps the reader will not be shocked by Theoharis's description of the late 1940s illegal surveillance of reporters, actors, and trade unionists by U.S. intelligence agencies. The researcher will appreciate, however, Theoharis's frank discussion of the trials (both legal and emotional) to be endured when investigating the U.S. government. 362 Rhetoric & Public Affairs In nearly every chapter, we are provided with (sometimes repetitive) details of the ways in which the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) has helped and hindered the historical researcher. In theory, the FOIA is a key to agency treasure chests, capable of unlocking the secrets which have eluded the general public for decades. Unfortunately for the researcher, the FOIA is made of malleable material: language. That is, its terms are subject to interpretation. For example, the original FOIA of 1966 excluded any information that, if revealed, would constitute a threat to national security. James X. Dempsey's "The CIA and Secrecy" explores how intelligence agencies have broadly interpreted (to their advantage) the grounds for this exclusion (40). Even with the 1974 FOIA amendment, dictating that agencies had to prove that disclosure would harm national security, researchers continue to have limited success in gaining access to intelligence reports. Furthermore, as Joan Hoff notes in "The Endless Saga of the Nixon Tapes," most of the information that is released is piecemeal and must be interpreted by the researcher (131). Hence, one must wonder how historians go about doing their jobs. Theoharis suggests that, in an attempt to understand the U.S. past, historians would benefit from turning to the government documents of the former Soviet Union (13). Although not all of the contributors are historians by trade (several are attorneys ), it is clear from the book title alone that all share a common interest in...