In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

  • The Rise of Liberal States in Europe
  • Stanley L. Engerman (bio)
Immanuel Wallerstein. The Modern World-System IV: Centrist Liberalism Triumphant, 1789–1914. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011. xvii + 377 pp. Illustrations, bibliography, notes, and index. $65.00 (cloth); $26.95 (paper).

Centrist Liberalism Triumphant, 1789–1914 , published in 2011, is the fourth volume in Immanuel Wallerstein’s The Modern World-System, with at least two more volumes promised. The first, Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century was published in 1974; the second, Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600–1750, in 1980; and the third, The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy, 1730s–1840s, in 1989. The reason for the increasing gaps between publication of successive volumes is not obvious, but clearly the length of time between the third and fourth volumes is rather extended.

The publication of volume four comes in a set with the reissue of the first three volumes, with only the addition of a ten- to fifteen-page prologue to each. The prologues serve mainly to clarify points or respond to critics. Each volume has the same characteristics that attracted attention in the first—an extended bibliography, a vast quantity of footnotes, and a rather intricate set of arguments. It is probable that the first volume has had the greatest scholarly impact, reflecting the nature of historical scholarship at the time. When first published, fewer works were based on examining the many countries in Europe and linking developments in all. With the recent shift to a more global history, such an approach is less novel.

Wallerstein argues that, “in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century, there came into existence what we may call a European world-economy” linked by economic forces (1:15). Unlike earlier empires such as China, Persia, and Rome, the world-economy functions without “a unified political structure” (1:16). While the focus in volume four is primarily on Western Europe, he points out that volume three details how four zones outside Europe became part of the capitalist world-economy between 1750 and 1850: Russia, the Ottoman Empire, the Indian subcontinent, and West Africa—but not Japan and China, which were able to block, at least for some time, French and British trade expansion (3:129). [End Page 415]

The first volume has probably had the greatest impact on historical scholarship, with the subsequent volumes being seen as less original in approach. There is also some apparent shift in emphasis over time. Earlier volumes focused mainly on economic matters and comparative economic developments; the current volume pays more attention to political ideology and the emergence of academic disciplines in Europe.

The starting point for this volume is the lengthy warfare between the British and French in the eighteenth century in terms of military and economic power as well as ideological dominance. In detailing the political-ideology belief systems of the time, Wallerstein describes three major sets of ideals. “Conservatism,” coming out of the reaction to the French Revolution, was intended to reverse the situation or at the least delay the changes coming with modernity; “Liberalism,” a more left-wing position, aimed at achieving some progress with human effort and intelligence, in opposition to conservatism; and “Socialism/Radicalism” was aimed at achieving the ends of liberalism by struggling harder to achieve its ends. All saw a role for the state in achieving its aims, though the extent and nature of state action would differ; and all believed in “the sovereignty of the people,” although they did define the relevant group of “the people” differently.

Wallerstein is, however, dubious about the value of the terms “Industrial Revolution” and “French Revolution” as usually presented. Industrialization was not new—there had been previous increases in mechanization, and these would, no doubt, occur again. A process in the world-economy that benefited Great Britain, industrialization was part of one of the Kondratieff cycles of fifty to sixty years that dominated the capitalist world-economy. After the Napoleonic War, Great Britain became the world’s hegemonic power (or at least Europe’s), succeeding the Netherlands.

In regard to the French Revolution...

pdf

Share