Forcing the Question of Northern Ireland: The Brooke-Mayhew Talks, 1990-1992

The Mitchell talks, designed to end Ireland's most current "Troubles," ended with apparent success on Good Friday, April 10, 1998. Immediately, the public and private focus shifted to the problems of implementing that agreement, but not before some raised claims as to how and why George Mitchell, the former United States senator, had succeeded where others had failed. In that latter debate, few voices claimed much of a role in Mitchell's accomplishment for the failed Brooke-Mayhew talks--the last previous effort to solve Ireland's "Troubles." An understanding of what happened during those talks, however, may contribute much to our understanding of Mitchell's success: adding two names to the debate about who made the Good Friday Agreement possible helps to explain why the search for a settlement continues still.

That previous effort originated with the appointment of Peter Brooke as secretary of state for Northern Ireland in July, 1989. His predecessor, Tom King, had assumed that responsibility on September 16, 1985, two months before the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement that established the Anglo-Irish Conference --regularly scheduled meetings between the two governments to discuss affairs in Northern Ireland--with a secretariat at Mayfield. Because no Unionists participated in the negotiations that produced that agreement, they believed that the British not only had "imposed" an "Irish dimension" on the affairs of Northern Ireland, but also added "the machinery" to implement it. Considerable, constant, and bitter protest followed--a good bit of which Unionists directed at the Northern Ireland secretary. ¹

In that atmosphere, on September 14, 1987, after two years of considerable effort, King opened what became a series of relatively quiet private talks with Unionist leaders to learn how they could shape an acceptable government structure for Northern Ireland. It took another two years before King could indicate that some progress might emerge from his "talks about talks," but at that point Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher reorganized her cabinet. She used the occasion to appoint Brooke to the Northern Ireland post. ² This new "face" continued to talk with Northern Ireland's politicians, but not with Sinn Féin, the political wing of the Irish Republican Army. Unfortunately, Brooke suddenly chose to test his "get-to-know-you" effort in November, 1989. At the end of a taped television interview, Brooke was asked if "he could see the day when a British government would sit down and talk to Sinn Fein." In his answer, Brooke admitted that he could not envision a military defeat of the IRA; but, if it gave up violence and the local parties regained political power, he would hope the government in power would open negotiations with Sinn Fein." ³

Gerry Adams, Sinn Féin's president, welcomed Mr. Brooke's words. He was prepared to talk "at any time to bring about the conditions for a lasting peace in Ireland." From as early as 1981, when Sinn Féin had endorsed the policy of "a ballot paper in this hand and an armilite in this hand," Adams had campaigned, wherever he could, for the acceptance of his party as a legitimate participant in any discussions on the future of Ireland. ⁴ To add strength to his argument, Adams convinced his party in 1986 to end a sixty-year policy of campaigning for office in the Republic of Ireland, but refusing to take a seat in the Dáil and take part in an "illegitimate government," in orthodox republican thinking. ⁵ No one in authority in Dublin or London, however, accepted Adams's call for his party's participation in political talks. The IRA had refused to end its war policy. Neither he, nor his party, renounced that violence. ⁶

Unionists especially condemned any suggestion of talks with Adams and bitterly rejected Brooke's November comments, especially after an IRA bomb killed three British paratroops...