The Rhetoric of Conspiracy in Ancient Athens (review)

The present study had its origin in researches the author undertook for his recent book, The Rhetoric of Manhood: Masculinity in the Attic Orators (Berkeley 2005). In the process he became aware that the speeches of the orators are rife with allegations of plots and conspiracies, indicating the prevalence of what Roisman terms a “conspiratorial mind-set” (xi). It is this mind-set he aims to study through the rhetoric that articulated it. Roisman’s larger purpose is to shed light on the Athenians and their world-view—their values, thought-patterns, and fears.

In his introduction, Roisman outlines a “rich lexicon of conspiracy” (3) drawn upon by speakers in charging their opponents with plotting, collusion, or behind-the-scenes machinations. He also offers a capacious definition of conspiracy, extending it to plots that are the work of one person rather than two or more and that are not criminal in character.

Some might quarrel with this definition and suggest that the word “plot” may in many instances be more appropriate than conspiracy. It seems far-fetched, for example, to apply the term conspirator, as Roisman does (11–13), to the step-mother in Ant. 1 accused of poisoning her husband with the aid of an unwitting slave. Also in the introduction Roisman sets out his programme: to reveal “how and why speakers allege conspiracy” and, wherever possible, to “test the validity of their allegations” (7). To that end, he divides the latter into a number of categories: homicide (ch. 1), property (ch. 2), legal plots (ch. 3), political plots within the polis (chs. 4 and 5), and international conspiracies (chs. 6 and 7).

The first three chapters are a unity, analyzing cases that are purely private in nature. In each instance, Roisman summarizes the relevant speech, laying bare the allegations of conspiracy or, in some cases, the response to such allegations. The suits considered include Ant. 1 and 5 and Lysias 1 (homicide), Isaeus 6 and 8, Dem. 30–31, Hyp. 3, Dem. 55, and a number of maritime cases (property), and Dem. 28, Ant. 6, Dem. 39–40, 59, and 53 (legal plots). The plots alleged are diverse in character, often presenting a challenge to the modern reader’s credulity. Nonetheless, Roisman believes, they appealed to the conspiratorial world-view of the listeners, who took such schemes for granted, especially when members of the élite were involved. Throughout the discussion, Roisman highlights the negative attributes of plotters: they are shameless, tricky, lying, dishonest, greedy, and/or sycophantic. It is the speaker’s task to uncover and frustrate their schemes and, if the public interest is involved, as it is in later chapters, to win gratitude and praise for uncovering a threat to the polis.

As part of his purpose in these first three chapters, Roisman undertakes to validate some of the allegations made by the speakers. For example, he attempts to undermine Demosthenes’ “self-centered” explanation of the actions of his opponents, Onetor and Aphobus, in Dem. 30 by separating what he deems “attested facts” from dubious forms of argumentation (23). Apart from the inconclusiveness (and perhaps even futility) of trying to decide in these one-sided rhetorical exercises who has “truth” on his side, it seems to me that this concern for validation leads to a serious bifurcation of purpose. Is this work a study of rhetoric as a form of discourse with its own modes and implications, offering, as its author claims, an insight into Athenian social relations and values, or is it an attempt to set the record straight by seeking the truth behind the rhetoric?

The second part of the work, dealing with political conspiracies, holds the answer: it is the truth behind the rhetoric that increasingly interests Roisman. Chapter 4 begins with plots in Aristophanes and Thucydides, concentrating on Cleon, who is presented in both as “a plot detector and a manipulator of conspiratorial suspicions” (67). Roisman believes that...