Squatter settlements -- Political aspects -- Brazil -- Rio de Janeiro.
Social networks -- Political aspects -- Brazil -- Rio de Janeiro.
Drug traffic -- Political aspects -- Brazil -- Rio de Janeiro.
Santa Ana (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil)
Vigário Geral (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil)
Tubarão (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil)
Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) -- Politics and government.
After nearly 20 years of democratization, residents of Rio's favelas
suffer high levels of civil and human rights abuse at the hands of
both police and drug traffickers. The government is generally unable to
guarantee the political order necessary to protect the rights of residents
in these communities. Existing theories of democratization and advocacy
networks offer little to explain how the types of endemic violence
that affect poor neighborhoods in the developing world can be brought
under control. Based on more than two years of participant observation
and interviews in Rio de Janeiro, this article examines how democratic
order can be extended to favelas. It argues that networks can link favela
residents to organizations in civil society, and state actors can play
a critical role in reducing violence and establishing democratic order.
This article examines the World Bank's role in the market policy reform
experiences of Mexico and Argentina. It argues that while reform was
driven by domestic elites, the bank played an important role, providing
technical advice and financial support and helping to spread market
reform ideas. The nature of the bank's involvement, however, differed
substantially in the two countries because of their distinct political
arrangements, histories, and geopolitical positions in regard to the
United States. In the recent era of second-generation reforms, the World
Bank's involvement in compensatory policy development has become more
focused, although still more intense in Argentina than in Mexico. This
involvement has important implications for the quality of democracy,
insofar as the 1990s market reforms were formulated by insulated
international policy networks unaccountable to the public. Recently,
the bank has declared its commitment to involve civil society in its
lending policies, a move that may have important implications for
Venezuela -- Politics and government -- 1974-1999.
Venezuelan Evangelicals' responses to candidates in that country's 1998
presidential election seem to confirm the view that their political
culture is inconsistent, contradictory, and paradoxical. Not only
were they just as likely to support nationalist ex-coup leader Hugo
Chávez as was the larger population, they also rejected Venezuela's
one Evangelical party when it made a clientelist pact with the infamous
candidate of Venezuela's discredited Social Democratic party. This
article uses concepts from recent cultural theory to analyze qualitative
data from these two cases and make sense of the contradictory nature of
This study aims to explain the victory of Hugo Chávez and his
party in the 2000 Venezuelan elections, to analyze the factors that
made this victory possible, and to examine the consequences for future
developments in the Venezuelan political system. The decay of traditional
party loyalties without the emergence of new parties deeply rooted in
society (dealignment without realignment); underdevelopment; and an
institutional setting dominated by a president elected by a plurality
electoral system have opened the door to personality-centered politics
and weak parties, which are the main features of the current political
situation. Compared to the 1993 and 1998 elections, the 2000 elections
once again confirm an increase in personality politics and the decay
of parties as instruments for articulating interests, representation,
and governance. As a consequence, this article argues, instability is
likely to remain a feature of Venezuela's party system for some time.
Economic stabilization -- Political aspects -- Latin America.
Structural adjustment (Economic policy) -- Political aspects -- Latin America.
Latin America -- Politics and government.
This essay argues that neoliberalism has strengthened the sustainability
of democracy in Latin America but limited its quality. Drastic market
reform seems to have abetted the survival of competitive civilian rule
through its external and internal repercussions. By opening up Latin
American countries to the world economy, neoliberalism has exposed
them to more of the international pressures for preserving democracy
that intensified with the end of the Cold War. At the same time, the
move to market economics has weakened leftist parties, trade unions,
and other proponents of radical socioeconomic reform, reassuring elites
and preventing them from undermining democracy. But tighter external
economic constraints limit governments' latitude and thereby restrict the
effective range of democratic choice; and the weakening of parties and
interest associations has depressed political participation and eroded
government accountability. The available evidence therefore suggests that
neoliberalism has been a mixed blessing for Latin American democracies.