Virtue and Ethics in the Twelfth Century (review)

The essays collected in this fascinating volume on virtue reveal both the increasing debt twelfth-century thinkers owe to Augustinian moral psychology, as well as the extent to which those thinkers integrate classical moral philosophy and its canons of rationality into their medieval Christian worldview. However, the authors also explore the historical, social, economic, and theological genesis of twelfth-century treatments of virtue, and studying these explorations closely will help historians of philosophy to avoid that all-too-common vice of anachronism. By the time readers finish this volume, they will have read encyclopedic treatments of virtue and moral psychology in such greats as Anselm and Maimonides, but also in such lesser-known, but illuminating thinkers as John of Salisbury and the Porretans. Although the collection is marketed as intellectual history, and some of the medieval authors discussed are better described as moralists (or perhaps even moralizers) than moral philosophers, historians of philosophy will find that their interests largely coincide with the contributors'.

The medieval authors studied view ethics as having a wide scope, ranging beyond treatments of justice and honesty to include such topics as the moral value of weeping and easy manners. For instance, Willemien Otten's contribution, "In Conscience's Court," contends that Abelard's ethical thought is not restricted to his analyses and arguments. His works' very expression of his distinctive Christian identity—accomplished largely through the character and texture of his writing—turns his own life into a poetic example in his ethical thought. Like the medievals treated in this collection, Arjo Vanderjagt, in "The Devil and Virtue," himself adopts a broad view of ethics by trying to uncover what other scholars have neglected in Anselm's ethical thought by exploring his sense of life. Despite that welcome move, Vanderjagt assumes without warrant that we can discover Anselm's sense of life best from his "non-scholarly" work, in particular, from his letters. As I read him, Anselm conveys other aspects of his sense of life in his dialogues, which portray the interaction between the very Anselmian Teacher and his Student, and likewise in his highly impersonal Monologion, for the impersonal figures strongly in Anselm's sense of life. Moreover, what Anselm writes in his letters sometimes appears to contradict what he writes in his more theoretical works. The apparent contradictions may sometimes be resolved by arguing that that the letters' primary purpose is pastoral, and what nourishes the flock is not always the same as what nourishes the student of philosophy. For that very reason, relying on the letters as the primary source of Anselm's ethical thought is dangerous.

One theme linking many essays in the volume is the revival of Augustinian internalist ethics: virtuous activity requires not just political or social power, or the mere performance of prescribed acts, but the right internal disposition. Hence, as Björn Weiler points out in "Royal Justice and Royal Virtue," according to William of Malmesbury, Stephen of Blois lacked the qualities to be king because he lacked genuine virtue, despite his good intentions and political power. So did Earl Godwin, according to Walter Map, but that was due to his rustic birth. Many essays focus, in particular, on the moral thesis of intentionalism—the view that only one's intentions or consents are proper candidates for praise or blame. Abelard, Hugh, and perhaps Anselm as well hold that the promptings of vices such as anger or vainglory are not, in themselves, sinful. One sins only when one adds one's volition or consent to vice's promptings.

Intentionalism's most prominent exponent, Abelard figures prominently in several essays, frequently as the object of unsubstantiated criticism. In "The Problem of Natural Virtue," István Bejczy contends that Abelard does not deserve his reputation for promoting natural, as opposed to theological, ethics. His case, however, relies crucially on the claim that virtue, strictly speaking, is what obtains merit with God...