Austrian Philosophy: The Legacy of Brentano (review)

3~4 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 35:2 APRIL 199 7 Barry Smith. Austrian Philosophy: The Legacy of Brentano. Chicago: Open Court, 1994. Pp. xii + 381. Cloth, $36.95 . This book is a collection of essays which are for the most part revisions of previous publications. Together they are meant to constitute "a survey of the most important developments in Austrian philosophy in its classical period from the 187os to the Anschluss in 1938" (xi). As the subtitle indicates, a central thesis is that Franz Brentano was a decisive influence on Austrian philosophy in this period. If we have doubts about a peculiarly Austrian style of philosophy, this book can nonetheless be appreciated as an attempt to show that Brentano is by no means a minor figure. This becomes particularly clear in the essays on four outstanding pupils of Brentano: Anton Marty (83-1 ~4), Alexius Meinong (x~5-54), Kasimir Twardowski (155-92), and Christian von Ehrenfels (e8 a-98). The most prominent pupil of Brentano is of course Edmund Husserl. Though an essay on him would have been welcome in such a book, the author to some extent compensates by giving him attention in crucial places. The first essay concerns the link between Austrian philosophy and the Brentano School. An obvious way of beginning a discussion of Austrian philosophy is by considering the Vienna Circle. Smith takes this route and herein finds the connection with the Brentano School. While many of the outstanding German philosophers are known as great system-builders, without any concern for detailed analysis, the members of the Vienna Circle were for the most part engaged in such analysis. In this regard, according to Smith, the legacy of Franz Brentano, who had been lecturing in Vienna from 1874 to 1895, is to be seen. Brentano's pursuit of scientific philosophy, together with an unyielding contempt for German idealism, was transmitted to his pupils and thereby created the climate in which the Vienna Circle could thrive. The notion of Austrian philosophy put forward by Smith is accordingly to be understood by means of a contrast with German philosophy. We should take this contrast with a grain of salt, since there have been many German philosophers, most notably of course Frege, who have been engaged in the project of scientific philosophy. The author replies to such counterexamples that these philosophers "were, however, on the fringes of Germany philosophy," as opposed to "the mainstream German tradition--for example that of Natorp and the lesser Neo-Kantians" (9n.). But as far as the time period under consideration is concerned, it is rather dubious to speak of such a mainstream tradition in Germany. Even Brentano, after all, had lectured quite successfully in Wiirzburg (Germany), where both Anton Marty and Carl Stumpf came under his influence, before he was called to Vienna. He left Wiarzburg, not because he did not fit in with mainstream German philosophy, but because it was too difficult to keep his chair in view of his controversial decision to leave the priesthood and the Catholic church altogether. The opposition between Austrian and German philosophy therefore seems rather questionable, though it should be kept in mind that contrasts used by historians of philosophy are for the most part hardly more than heuristic devices. Under the heading "Austrian philosophy" we can bring into prominence a good deal of philosophy which would otherwise be overshadowed by the likes of Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche. BOOR REVIEWS 315 There are two essays on Brentano in this work; the first of them (35-6o) is far more important in connection with his legacy. This essay is an overview of the philosophical orientation that Brantano conveyed to his pupils. This orientation is of course psychological in character. The psychology in question is, moreover, one in which "intentionality" becomes the central theme. It is well known that, according to Brentano's early formulation of this notion, the object exists in the act, though there is some dispute about how this is meant. Smith insists that it is "to be taken literally" (42). While it is uncertain how a literal reading could here be contrasted with a metaphorical one, it should be kept in...