Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference: Its Origins and Scope (review)

310 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 35:~ APRIL ~997 Not every reader will accept this provocative conclusion, nor will everyone share di Giovanni's impatience with alternative (and, in his view, untenable and superseded) conceptions of rationality or his animus against transcendental idealism in general and against Fichte in particular; but none will fail to be stimulated and enlightened by di Giovanni's sensitive and shrewd analysis of Jacobi's theoretical struggles. The scholarship displayed in the introduction and notes is of a very high and consistent quality. (A rare exception is the confusion, on p. 3o, of the AUgemeine Literatur Zeitung with the Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek. It was the latter, not the former, which was edited by Nicolai as the voice of the Berlin Aufkliirung.) This volume is, in short, a signal achievement and a major contribution to its field. Both the editor/translator and the publisher are to be congratulated for making such a generous selection of this important material available in such an accessible form. Anglophone readers have had to wait a very long time for an adequate presentation of Jacobi's writings and for a full and informed account of his place in the history of philosophy. Presented with a volume of this scope and quality, however, one might almost conclude that it was worth the wait. DANIEL BREAZEALE University of Kentucky Wolfgang Carl. Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference: Its Origins and Scope. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Pp. viii + ~o. Cloth, $49-95. Paper, $17.95. The aim of this book is to place Frege's theory of sense and reference in the context of his general philosophical framework and to "support the general view that Frege's theory of sense and reference belongs to the epistemological tradition of modern philosophy that stems from Kant" (vii). Carl's emphasis upon an epistemological interpretation is intended to replace and refute ontological interpretations, especially those that place Frege in the tradition of Platonic logical realism. According to Carl, Frege's philosophical project was not motivated by an interest in language as such but was intended, in Frege's words, "to break the power of words over the human mind" (1o) so that we might more perspicuously express our knowledge claims and their justifications. Since, according to Frege, human beings can think only by using sentences, language enters the picture to explain the relation between thinking and the pursuit of truth. Throughout this book, Carl stays close to Frege's text and provides rigorous, meticulous , and detailed analyses of Frege's arguments that give weight and plausibility to the main lines of his interpretation. He provides interesting criticisms of the views of other interpreters. For example, against Dummett's view that Frege is a philosophical realist, that our discourse aims to speak of a world that exists independently of us, Carl claims that the fact that we intend to speak of the entities to which our words refer does not have "to be understood in a 'realistic' way in the sense of Dummett--that is, a world conceived quite independently of our thought and knowledge--and the claim does not BOOK REVIEWS 311 imply the opposite either. In other words, Frege's claim has nothing to do with metaphysical positions like idealism or realism" (12 7)Carl 's book is the most recent contribution to an interpretive stance that aims at deemphasizing Frege's ontology. But why should one want to do this? Perhaps the answer is that if we take Frege's ontology at face value, he believes in the reality of abstract objects such as numbers, propositions, concepts, functions, and truth values. Some philosophers, and I think Carl is one of them, are impressed and persuaded by Frege's criticisms of psychologism and formalism, but are also uncomfortable with abstract objects whose reality seems to be implied by these criticisms. They would like a Frege that they would be proud to introduce to mother, but abstract objects stand in the way. Interpreting Frege as a Kantian epistemologist is one strategy to "demythologize " his system and make it acceptable to those skeptical about the reality of abstract objects. Thus, according to Carl, Frege...