Hegel, Freedom, and Modernity (review)

~48 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 32"1 JANUARY 1994 mature consideration of the rational state. The defect of Williams's reading, in other words, may be not that it is too political but that it is not political enough. Nevertheless, Williams's accessible and attractively contemporary presentation of Hegel's thought is both stimulating and invaluable as a counterweight to recent crifcisms of Hegel in the name of "difference"--criticisms that fail to acknowledge their own imperfectly realized Hegelianism. Engiish-speaking readers will also find very helpful Williams's judicious consideration of recent continental scholarship. SUSAN SHELL BostonCollege Merold Westphal. Hegel,Freedom,andModernity.Albany: State University of New York Press, :992. Pp. xviii + 295. Paper, $18.95Hegel 's ability to challenge friends and detractors alike is evident in this lively collection of essays. Westphal organizes it into three sections: the first thinks through contemporary problems with Hegel as iogico-political guide; the second accuses Hegel of a "failure of nerve" in his resting on absolute science laurels; and the third reexamines Hegel's dialectical gifts to philosophers and theologians wresding with the problems of modernity. In each section, Westphal skillfully weaves Hegel's logical, religious and political works into a coherent web. Hegel's theory of freedom (especially in the Philosophyof Right) shares some concerns with but objects to the grounds of liberal democracy. Westphal shows clearly how much Hegel has to offer to contemporary talk about property-based rights and severe poverty. The very poor have no freedom because they have no property, but this is not because freedom is a means to the end of property. Rather, Hegel interprets property as an outward sign of an inward state: the beginning of freedom. He recognizes further that this limited freedom requires a communal context in which to develop, which provides basic needs of housing, food and decent educadon. The radical nature of Hegel's thought on the state and the family is evident in his negative critique of economic models and in his positive description of the community 's potential to fulfill the individual. While the limitations of contract-structured civic and marital relations is increasingly evident, their saturation of our consumer society makes Hegel's vision of a unified family and cultural life seem as remote as a tale of a golden age. In that golden age, men and women had clearly defined roles and duties within which they found true meaning in life. They married, in a "contract to transcend contracts," and lived a life of love. Hegel stresses the recognition and consequent freedom possible within these relations. While we do not want to be defined stricdy as owners or property, there is no turning back to traditional roles. The path to political unity in this multicultural, gender-aware age remains unclear. Thus Westphaljoins Gadamer in a "tension-filled proximity" to Hegel. While they acknowledge his shortcomings, Hegel's insistence upon the historical, perspectival bash of all knowing, including logic and moral thought, grounds their own work. Hegel's claim that the deepest human desire is for mutual recognition, not for stores of meat BOOK REVIEWS t49 and drink, rings true even when human activities indicate otherwise. To work towards a society that values friendship and practices "epistemological non-violence," forsaking knowledge as power, is a task for us. By questioning Hegel and our culture with an openness that puts our selves in question, we realize that freedom is inextricably linked with social praxis. Freedom, logic and praxis are discussed in light of Hegel's views of Hinduism, the Reformation, and the Enlightenment. These historical moments are judged by their rationality, which is reflected in their ability to maximize social and individual freedom. Hegel finds Hinduism limited by the caste system especially, and argues with similar logic that the Lutheran advance lies in the expansion of the priesthood to all believers. Westphal persuasively shows that "providing a religious and moral but nonsectarian foundation for social life, making reality rather than nostalgia or utopia out of Hegel's concept of S/tt//chke/t (ethical life)," is the positive agenda resulting from Hegel's negative critique 063). The last part of the book traces the possibilities...