Kant's System of Rights (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 297 and at the same time understand that philosophy will fit others differently" 093). Ultimately, what these quotations reveal is a lack of philosophical sophistication which does get in the way of the arguments that Siebert presents. There are, I believe, more significant difficulties. First, informing the whole book is the idea that Hume shapes his history for didactic purposes. What seemingly never enters Siebert's mind is that in his H/story, Hume is interested in getting at the truth of historical matters 059 is a possible exception). Second, outside of the first two chapters, Siebert does little to connect the arguments of the book together, leaving readers with an impressionistic mosaic that they have to piece together. Third, Siebert never discusses the tension between the central claim of the first chapter, that the purpose of the H/story is moral instruction, and the claim of the fourth chapter that moral philosophy is impotent. Finally, in several places, Siebert severs Hume the philosopher from Hume the historian . I would like to suggest that this leads to a distortion of both Hume's philosophy and his history. STUART D. WARNER Roosevelt University Leslie A. Mulholland. Kant's System of Rights. New York: Columbia University Press, 199o. Pp. xvii + 434. Cloth, $49.00. With this book, Professor Mulholland has made a significant contribution to the burgeoning literature on Kant's political philosophy by offering us an interpretation of Kant as a natural-law theorist. His goal is to demonstrate that Kant's theory of rights is grounded in a system of natural law. Professor Mulholland contrasts his reconstruction with what he considers to be the more prevalent consent or contractualist interpretations. The first four chapters explore the moral basis for Kant's political theory. Mulholland begins with an examination of Kant's rejection of teleological ethics, which he locates in Kant's conviction that morality must ultimately be grounded on a selfreferential law prescribing obedience to law as such. He then proceeds to the analysis and derivation of the categorical imperative and its relationship to moral goodness. Mulholland holds that the account developed by Kant in the first section of the Foundat /ore suggests the distinction between persons and things and presents "the conception that principles governing human action must be compatible with reason as the power determining action having moral worth" (69). From this starting point, he considers Kant's law of nature formula as a principle regulating human conduct. Mulholland construes this principle as mandating rational consistency in willing as applied to human nature in both its causal and teleological aspects. In determining whether a maxim can be a law of nature, one must consider"how the moral, rational features of the individual person can cohere in a unified whole with the natural desires and inclinations and the undeveloped talents and abilities" (99)- The author concludes his exposition of the moral underpinnings of Kant's theory by examining the idea of humanity as possessing intrinsic value. Mulholland claims that Kant's formulation of humans as ends in them- ~98 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 31:2 APRIL 1993 selves is fundamentally misleading due to its highly original character. According to the author, Kant's concern here is not with moral value but with the theoretical relation of rational beings to moral values. With this second formulation, Kant introduces an entirely new element, freedom. From the connection of rational agency with freedom, Kant derives what Mulholland calls the deed principle: a rational being can only acquire an obligation through some act he or she has performed. The opposition between the law of nature principle and the principle of humanity as an end in itself is central to Mulholland's reconstruction of Kant's political philosophy . Mulholland argues that the two principles are not entirely compatible with each other and that this leads to tension and ambiguity in Kant's political thought. It is the deed principle that makes Kant's theory appear to rely heavily on consent. However, as a result of the inadequacy of the deed principle as a basis of rights and political obligation, Kant is ultimately forced to fall back on the law of...