La théorie platonicienne de la Doxa (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 393 treatment (two pages in all) of the four basic kinds in the Philebus is particularly frustrating, given the attention these factors have received in recent commentary. A distinct virtue of this study is the author's attempt to remain faithful to the "primary evidence," which "in Platonic studies.., is the text" (~71). Moreover, he recognizes that the "context in which an interlocutor says something, and the dramatic characters who speak, are relevant to the philosophical content" 07). These interpretive principles deserve applause. KENNETH M. SAYRE University of Notre Dame Yvon Lafrance. La th~orieplatonicienne de la Doxa. Collection No,sis. Montreal: Editions Bellarmin, 1981. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1981. Pp. 475- $3~ The distinction between knowledge and opinion being undeniably central to Plato's thought, a study showing that Plato developed a complete theory of opinion, rather than casually contrasting it to knowledge, would obviously be significant. This is the task Yvon Lafrance undertakes, and which he executes most commendably. Since nothing properly identifiable as a theory of i56~a is completely worked out in any single dialogue, such a theory is necessarily reconstructed from several dialogues on the basis of assumptions about their interrelationship. Our author assumes that Plato's thought on this topic evolves, and therefore his inquiry is chronologically ordered, tracing the evolution of this problematic from earlier to later dialogues. He treats only those dialogues in which 66~a occurs in a philosophically significant way and discusses only those passages which bear on that topic. Thus there are chapters on the concept of 66~ct in the Socratic dialogues (emphasizing the Euthyphro), followed by chapters on the Meno, Republic, Theatetus, and Sophist. These are preceded by a brief introduction and a survey of the various meanings of ~5~a in the dialogues and are followed by a concluding resum6. The commentaries on each dialogue first review the better-known interpretations found in the recent literature, then propose a reading which justifies its departures from them by judicious exegesis. The views of other scholars are fairly presented. For example, the Jackson-Ferguson bipartite interpretation of the Divided Line is so persuasively stated that one is a bit surprised to find it being rejected for a more traditional quadripartite reading. Accounts of the various positions and their supporting arguments are stated so clearly and sufficiently completely that they would probably be intelligible to readers unfamiliar with the original articles. This is an excellent place to begin a study of the Platonic doctrine on opinion, as the range of generally recognized interpretative possibilities is summarized and documented. Looking at some specific readings should provide some idea of the work's orientation . The a~x~ag ~.oyto~t60of Meno 98A is identified as the factor which transforms opinion into knowledge and is understood as a process of deductive inference which does not invoke Forms. The object of knowledge is propositional and is the same as the object of opinion, only with its necessitating premises made explicit. Yet the 394 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Republic is interpretated as taking 66~ct and ~twvt]g~q to be apprehensive powers, analogous to sight and hearing, each having its own proper objects. Lafrance argues that there is no real conflict here because these are powers both to represent objects and to make judgments about them. The Meno provides "une ~pistOmologie de la dianoia " and the Republic one "de la no,sis," which merely adds to the earlier theory. It is nevertheless emphasized that "true opinion," a concept generated by the judgmental analysis of the Meno, is not found in the Republic and that only the later dialogue takes knowledge to be a kind of direct acquaintance like that of the senses. Plato is faulted for this "typiquement parm~nidienne" emphasis on "l'omnipr~sence de l'objet," and for having forgotten that "'les ex~gencessubjectives de la science" are more important than its objective requirements. Although ultimately dependent on the relative emphasis given to ct~x(ct or to koyfo~og, it is doubtful that even the author of the Meno would have subscribed to that proposition. Refusal to mix discursive and intuitive models of knowledge determines much of Lafrance's...