Aristotle's Forbidden Sweets

Aristotle's Forbidden Sweets JAMES BOGEN JULIUS MORAVCSIK I To ACT INCONTINENTLYis to do what one knows or strongly believes is not to be done (NE 1146b25-31).' Is incontinence possible? It is clear that one can do what one knows or believes is not to be done if one does it unintentionally or unknowingly. A man's conviction that champagne should not be spilled on the dress of the wife of his college's president will not prevent him from spilling it on her if he is tripped or if he mistakes her for someone else on whom champagne should be spilled. But Aristotle's question is whether a man can freely and intentionally do what he knows or believes he should not do when he realizes what it is that he is doing. Speaking very generally, Aristotle's answer is that a man may have knowledge or beliefs that have no influence on what he does on a particular occasion. For example, a man who is gripped by uncontrollable anger may fail to recall or consider something he knows or believes and so may act against that belief or bit of knowledge (1146b32ff.). In cases in which a belief or bit of knowledge plays no part in, determining an agent's behavior, incontinence is possible. It is only in cases where the belief or knowledge plays a fully active role in the determination of a man's action that incontinence is impossible (1146b35). Unfortunately, the details of Aristotle's view are less clear than its outline. How can we be said to retain a belief or bit of knowledge when it does not The authors constitute The West Coast Ancient Philosophy Collective. The general lines of this interpretation come from a meeting of the Northern California Aristotle reading group attended by the authors and Alan Code, David Glidden, Richard McKirahan, and Henry Mendell . Details of the interpretation came from comments from J. O. Urmson and extensive discussion with Charles Young, who made so many valuable and helpful suggestions that we offered him honorary membership in the collective, which he declined, saying that he preferred to appear in a footnote. 1 Unless otherwise noted, all references are to passages in the Nicomachaean Ethics (NE). [11:1 112 HISTORY or PHILOSOPHY determine our behavior? Which sorts of belief or knowledge are inactive in the incontinent man? In the Nicomachaean Ethics the most detailed discussion of a case of incontinence and the best place to look for the specifics of Aristotle's account is the following difficult and often discussed passage. [l] Again, we may also look to the cause of incontinence scientifically [physikos] in this way: On the one hand there is a universal belief, while the other belief is concerned with particular things over which perception is immediately authoritative [KvQi(~]. When one belief arises out of these it is necessary [&v~yKTI]in one case for the mind to affirm the conclusion, and with beliefs concerned with conduct [~v 8~ ~(~g z~QCtK~tKCffg] ~ one must act straightway. [1147a~4-28 ] [2] For example, if one should taste everything sweet, and this thing is sweet, being one of those particular things, then a man who is able and not being prevented must of necessity do this immediately. [ x147a28- 31 ] [3] And so, when there is in the mind one universal belief which forbids tasting, and another belief that every sweet thing is pleasant, and this is sweet (and this belief is active), then when desire happens to be present, the one belief tells us to avoid this, but desire leads us to it (for it can move each of the parts). 3 l1147a3t-35] [4] And so it turns out that one acts incontinently in some way under a principle or belief which is not in itself but is only incidentally opposed to the right belief [~ 8Q00~ L6y~] (for it is the desire and not the belief which is opposed). 4 [1147a35 lt47b2 ] [5] That is why animals are not incontinent; they do not have a grasp of universals, but they have only mental images and memories of particular things. [~47b~ I47b5 ] [6] How does the ignorance dissolve, and how does...