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Democracy and Liberty in Mill's Theory of Government RICHARD J. ARNESON JOHN STUARTMILL'S theory of government is of a piece with the rest of his philosophy: intelligent, eclectic, carefully modulated, somewhat recalcitrant to systematization. Seizing on this last feature, critics of Mill allege that his philosophical views are riddled with inconsistency. Perhaps the most notable and frequent charge is that the central doctrines of Utilitarianism conflict with those asserted in On Liberty. In this paper I claim to discern an incompatibility of another sort. Most simply put, the position to be argued is that Mill's qualified intolerance of straight majority rule in Considerations on Representative Government, asserted on paternalistic grounds, is inconsistent ~vith the antipaternalism of On Liberty.' To expose this tension in Mill's theory is to throw fresh light on its character; whereas Mill's social philosophy is often accused of being too individualistic, I shall suggest that Mill failed to follow through the implications of his own best individualistic insights. I To see clearly the inconsistency of which I believe Mill to be guilty, it will be helpful to brush aside some inconsistencies that are, at most, merely apparent . The first point to notice is that in both works Mill is careful to set down historical boundaries that fence in his theses. Mill holds in the one work that under certain conditions it is wrong to deprive an individual of liberty for his own good, and in the other work that under certain conditions a type of ' Considerations on Representative Government (1861; reprinted in Collected Works, ed. J. M. Robson [Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1977], vol. 19); On Liberty (1859; reprinted in Collected Works, vol. 18). Further references to page numbers from these works are given in parentheses in the text. [43] 44 HISTORY OF PnlLOSOPHY representative democracy is the best form of government, but in neither work does he maintain that the stipulated conditions invariably obtain. Representative Government urges that it is only after a people has reached a minimum level of development that representative institutions are suitable for it (chap. 4). In On Liber(~ Mill says that his principle of liberty is meant to apply only to persons "in tile maturity of their faculties" (p. 2'~4), and he proceeds to note that in rude and barbarous times most persons may in effect fail to reach maturity. No discrepancy between the two works arises from the one's voicing timeless abstractions while the other limits its recommendations to a historical era, for both works are historically attentive in this way. Secondly, there is no inconsistency stemming from Mill's upholding unlimited scope for majority rule in Repre,sentativeGovernment and limited scope for any form of government in On Liberty. This is so because Mill nowhere asserts that majority rule ought to operate with unlimited scope, with no limits to its proper authority. Referring the reader to On Liber(v and Principles of Political Economy for a statement of his views on this matter, Mill states explicitly that Representative Government assumes a prior delimitation of the proper scope of government authority (p. 534). Given that it has been settled what the powers of government should be, what decisions should fall within the purview of governments, the issue Representative Government addresses is how or by what agency this power should be exercised. On Liberty, linfits the legitimate authority of government to the regulation of other-regarding actions , actions that affect persons other than the agent without their consent; Representative Government answers the question on whose shoulders this legitimate authority should repose. In this regard the two writings lit together amicably. I1 The thesis of On Libertv I wish to single out and juxtapose to a contrary tendency in Representative Government is antipaternalism: the doctrine that in a civilized society it is always wrong to deprive a sane, nonfeebleminded adult of liberty against his will, for his own good--with the exception of" a single class of cases of "contracts in perpetuity" in which persons attempt to commit themselves irrevocably for the distant future. ~ The phrase "against his will" requires a careful gloss, but for present purposes it will suffice to note...

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