Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit (review)

494 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY heavdy upon the spoken word. There is a distinctionbetween what one would say and what is true. For example, whde it may be true that the Dean has a wart on his nose, it would be improper for the untenured instructorto say this at a faculty meeting. What we should or should not say is a better guide to the proprieties implied in certain speech and social contexts than ii is to what is true. Graham applies these general criticisms to the ways that Austin approaches particular philosophical topics. For example, he argues against Austin that one cannot refute skepticism of the senses merely by pointing out that the way we ordinarily speak of our perceptual experiences conHtcts with that of the sense-datum theorist (p. 183). Instead, one must examine in detail the skeptic's arguments to determine where they go wrong. Again, the problem of other minds arises "'from the consequences of a particular philosophical picture of the nature of human beings, viz. that deriving from Descartes. But the way to settle the problem is to show what is wrong with that phdosophical picture, not to refer to existing linguistic idiom" (p. 136). Not only does Graham develop a general line of criticism of Austin as an ordinary-language philosopher, on each topic that he discusses he takes up in detail the particulars of various issues and develops his own account of them. For example, he tries to save the theory of performatives against Austin's own criticisms by interpreting them as a type of self-verifying statement (Chapter 3). He provides his own account of illocutionary force (Chapter 4). He argues for a capacity concept of knowledge against Austin's performative account (Chapter 5). He provides an alternative interpretation of the nature of ability (Chapter 8). Throughout, Graham writes clearly, forcefully, and accurately . I recommend this book to those who want a reliable account of Austin's philosophy in particular and a critical grasp of ordinary-language philosophy in general. The only important fault in Graham's account is that it insufficiently appreciates the fact that Austin stimulated a great deal of interesting and fruitful discussion about most of the issues that he tackled. Even if his own views cannot stand up to criticism, his errors were of that interesting kind that are a mark of philosophical importance. CHARLES LANDESMAN Hunter College, CUNY Martin Heidegger, Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit. Edited by Waiter Biemel. Volume 21 of Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976. Pp. 415. Although not as well organized and clear as Die Grundprobleme der Phiinomenologie (the first published volume of Heidegger' s Gesamtausgabe),these lectures (given at the Universityof Marburg in the winter semester, 1925-26) are nevertheless important not only for understanding the development of Heidegger's thinking, but also for gaining insight into the philosophical squabbles of early twentieth-centuryphilosophy, squabbles which Heidegger viewed as indicative of modem man's lack of understanding of the philosophical issue: the question of Being. It is difficult to review these lectures, because they attempt too much. Besides an introduction, there are three major divis)ons: "A. Preliminary observation: The present situation of philosophical togic. Psychologism and the question of truth." "'B. First major part. The problem of truth in the decisive beginningof phdosophical [philosophierenden]logic and the roots of traditional logic." "C. Second major part. The radicalized question: What is truth? Repetition of the analysis of falsehood from its temporality." Division A is a lengthy treatment of Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen as an attempt to overcome the "psychologism" so important in logical theory in the early twentieth century. But Heldegger is also critical of Husserl's failure to ask penetrating questions about Husserl's notion that truth is the "'identity" between meaning and what is "given'~'in intuition. Division B involves the analysis of Aristotle's theory of the proposition as the ground of truth. Heidegger shows that the proposition is itself founded m a more primordial form of activity of Dasein, in which Dasein revealsthe thing about which a proposition can then be formulated. A major problem for the Aristotelean concept of truth, namely, the possibilityof falsehood...