The Ambiguity of the Categorical Imperative

The Ambiguity of the Categorical Imperative PAUL BAMFORD A SEr~NC~. IS SAIDTO BE AMBIGUOUSwhen it can have two (or more) meanings. A philosophical position would be ambiguous, then, if it could have two or more interpretations ; that is, if it could be taken to be holding two or more distinct views on a particular issue, or providing two or more distinct answers to a particular question. Such an ambiguity will infect a philosopher's theory if he fails to appreciate an important distinction and so uses two or more distinct phrases or words as if they were equivalent.. For in such a case it will be impossible to tell whether the philosopher is advocating the view one of the phrases implies or the (alternative) view implied by the distinct phrase that he (mistakenly) believes to be equivalent. It is not generally recognized that such an ambiguity infects Kant's ethical position , specifically his categorical imperative. I shall stiow that it does. I shall first draw the distinction I believe he has failed to appreciate; I will then present evidence from his writings in moral philosophy to show that failure. L The distinction at issue is that between what I shall call the logical status of a universalizable practical principle and the logical status of an objectively valid practical principle. As a preliminary characterization, we may say that a principle of action is universalizable if and only if it is possible for at least one agent to will that everyone act in accordance with it in the appropriate circumstances. A principle is objectively valid if and only if it would be willed by any rational being who was judging rationally (i.e., without prejudice or emotion). That is, given some set of circumstances and some proposed course of action in that set, and assuming there to be a principle describing the relevant features of the circumstances and the proposed act, this principle will be univ'ersalizable if there is (or could be) an agent who would choose to have everyone act in accordance with it; that is, would have everyone who found himself in relevantly similar circumstances undertake the relevantly similar course of action. The principle is objectively valid, however, only if every rational agent would so choose (were he considering the situation rationally). As defined, all objectively valid principles are universalizable. An early version of this paper was presented at DukeUniversity, and 1am indebted to W. D. Falk, Stephen L. Darwall,and Arthur Kuflik(of the Universityof North Carolina), and to Martin L. Golding, Edward P. Mahoneyand Paul Welsh(of DukeUniversity),for their helpfulcommentsand suggestions. [~351 136 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY But not all universalizable principles are objectively ~,alid. There are some technical difficulties with universalizability that make this so,' but the philosophically interesting reason that it is so is what g. M. Hare called the problem of the fanatic. ~ A "fanatic" is a person who is prepared to universalize a clearly wrong principle; for example, that slavery or apartheid is acceptable, or that Jews should be exterminated . That there actually are or have been such people may not be obvious, especially in such extreme cases, but that there can be such people is clear. In fact, there are probably lots of them, for, given the definition of fanatic, the father of a teenaged girl who believes that rapists should be put to death--and who is quite ready to "universalize" this (would say, e.g., that he or his son should be put to death should either of them turn to rape)-counts as a "fanatic." So do people with strong views about communists, draft-dodgers, policemen, and bourgeois revisionists. It might be objected that this argument is only as good as the judgment that the father's principle is indeed "clearly wrong." This is correct but not yet an objection until bolstered by considerations in favor of his principle. But even if it should turn out that "death to rapists" is objectively valid, and so cannot stand as an example of a universalizable but nonobjective principle, its competitors can fill its place. Consider , that is, the person who believes that rapists should be removed from society until rehabilitated...