Hellenistic Philosophy (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 223 Hellenistic Philosophy. By A. A. Long. (London: Duckworth, 1974. Pp. 262. s 4.95) The last general appraisal of Hellenistic philosophy was that of R. D. Hicks, which appeared in 1910, three decades after the translation of Zeller's work covering the same period. Long's work is of great interest for two main reasons: (i) much specialized work has been done on Hellenistic philosophy since the publication of Hicks's work, but there has been no general appraisal of the period to help the nonspecialist find his way through it; and (ii) Long contends that the period is both "historically and conceptually fascinating," and he aims, after an introductory historical chapter, to make the reader appreciate the intrinsic philosophical interest of Hellenistic philosophers by giving a critical analysis of their ideas and modes of thought. In his introductory chapter Long gives a brisk treatment of the political background to the intellectual life of the Hellenistic period and surveys the philosophical milieu--Plato, Aristotle , Diogenes the Cynic, and the minor Socratic schools. He remarks upon the popular appeal of the Epicureans and Stoics but stresses that serious philosophical work beyond mere edification was expected of students within the schools. As for the invidious contrast afoot since the publication of Zeller's Die Philosophie der Greichen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung (1844-1852), between the superior philosophical labors of Plato and Aristotle, on the one hand, and the soft-headedness of the Hellenistic philosophers, on the other, Long sketches two lines of defense. One is that Plato and Aristotle would tower over anyone in the history of Western philosophy, for they are philosophical giants; and the second is that we have only fragmentary remains of the writings of Epicurus and the early Stoics. Finally, Long brings out in his historical survey that philosophy becomes more narrow in scope, more rigidified, and more detached from the departmental sciences in the Hellenistic period. Given this separation between philosophy and the special sciences one is made a little suspicious about the possibly fascinating character of Hellenistic conceptual systems, and one is initially inclined to think that Zeller was right after all in thinking that after Aristotle there was a great falling off. One suspects that Long is going to have an uphill task on his hands in the analytical chapters that follow his historical preview. Concerned to set forth critically the theory of Epicureanism, Long lays out his chapter on the subject in an admirable way. After introductory sections on Epicurus's life and works and the scope of his philosophy, Long takes the reader through Epicurus's theory of knowledge, his metaphysics, and his ethics. He holds that Epicurus was a moralist and a philosopher. Epicurus is the advocate of a certain way of life, and he proceeds by the presentation of arguments and evidence in order to displace with true beliefs certain false and anxietyproducing beliefs "about the gods, the destiny of the soul, and the objects in life which are truly valuable" (p. 14). It is the empiricism of Epicurus, according to Long, that holds together his theory of knowledge, metaphysics, and ethics. The immediacy of sensations and feelings gives us our hold on reality, and it is this fundamental doctrine that separates Epicurus most radically from Plato and Aristotle. Long acknowledges that there is no necessary connection between atomism and hedonism (p. 21), except the internal connection provided by empiricism. This unsays slightly the claim he makes on page 13 that "the ethical values of both philosophies [Stoicism and Epicureanism] are related to two fully developed, if divergent, conceptions of the universe ." In his account of Epicurus's empiricism Long raises critical questions, which make his essay all the more interesting philosophically; but there is one problem he overlooks or fails to regard as problematic: sensations are evidence of effulgences. When these sensations are clear, one may assume that no distortion has occurred in the continuous stream of effulgences from a material object to one's sense organs. Clarity of sense impression is, however, only a necessary condition of knowledge. If we are to know what something is, the sense impression produced by the effulgences coming from it...