Jacobi de Viterbio O. E. S. A. Disputatio prima de quolibet, and: Jacobi de Viterbio O. E. S. A. Disputatio secunda de quolibet (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 257 moment Anselm wishes to conciliate two demands: (1) an ordering which permits one to put 'greater than' to work, and (2) the clear and intended sense of the formula to remove what it expresses from the order itself. Vuillemin characterizes these twin exigencies as (1) resemblance and (2) transcendence. He identifies them by noting carefully how Anselm himself uses his touted formula; hence they characterize the proof as Ansekn himself executes it, and clarifies that execution in meeting Gaunilon's objections. This careful presentation is certainly the distinguishing feature of this work. Vuillemin carries it out initially without explicit recourse to set theoretic notions, so that his later use of these conceptual tools can be judged to sharpen Anselm's original intent rather than impose alien concerns. Both Vuillemin's original reading and his subsequent analysis are guided by a keen sense for Anselm's dialectical preoccupations, as may be testified by his refusing to bring what Anselm is doing under the harmonizing rubric of "ontological proof." Vuillemin is able to appreciate how precisely the proof of the Proslogion appears to be adapted to its object by the way in which the original formula displays the transcendent character of God. He is also able to show that the price of so perfect a fit are the antinomies which that same formula generates as it is put to work. Yet in the process we are schooled that much more in learning how to exercise our reason at her limits. And if Anselm's desire to conclude to divinity remains blocked by apparently inescapable antinomies, his original intent of using the formula he had stumbled upon to exercise our reason in a manner calculated to put down foolish and fiat denials finds fresh vindication in Vuillemin's clear yet creative analysis. DAVIDBURRELL,C.S.C. University o[ Notre Dame Jacobi de Viterbio O. E. S. A. Disputatio prima de quolibet. Edited by Eelcko Ypma, O. E. S. A. (Wiirzburg: Augustinus-Verlag, 1968) Jacobi de Viterbio O. E. S. A. Disputatio secunda de quolibet. Edited by E. Ypma, O. E. S. A. (Wtirzburg; Augustinus-Verlag, 1969) James of Viterbo (ca. 1272--1308), a member of the Order of Augustinian Hermits, succeeded Giles of Rome as magister regens of the order at Paris no later than 1293 and held that post until 1299 or 1300 when he left to assume a similar position in the order's studium generale at Naples. He is probably best known for his markedly papalist treatise, De regimine christiano (1301-1302), of which there exists a modern edition by H. X. Arquillibre. Since James not only taught at Paris but had also studied there from 1275 to 1281 or 1282 and again from 1285 to 1293, his writings represent an important and interesting source of information on philosophical ideas and debates current in Paris during the last quarter of the thirteenth century. According to P. Glorieux, the first series of James's quodlibetal disputations was held in 1293-1294 and the second in 1294-1295. While there may be some question as to these datings, 1 it is certain that the first two quodlibets had a wide circulation at Paris and that various masters, such as Godfrey of Fontaines, owned copies of them. Of special note among the twenty-two questions which comprise the first quodlibet are the fourth, which raises the problem of whether essence and esse are really distinct in creatures and presents James's own interesting viewpoint; the fifth, which concerns the divine knowledge of the "possibles"; the seventh, which contains an interesting discussion of the will and its relation to the intellect; and the twelfth, which contains not only a full and well-informed presentation of various positions on the nature of the 1 For a reexamination of the dating of James's first quodlibet, see John F. Wippel, "The Dating of James of Viterbo's Quodlibet 1 and Godfrey of Fontaines' Quodlibet 8," Augustiniana 24 (1974). 258 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY agent intellect (based in great part on Philoponus and Themistius), but also some of James's own basic ideas on the nature of intellectual cognition and its relation to sense knowledge...