John Grote: A Critical Estimate of His Writings (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 217 Kant that the thesis of the antinomy represents the Newtouian point of view and its antithesis the Leibnizian. Though not convincing, the argument is carefully detailed. Kant's Theory of Time creates more puzzles than it solves. This may well be a virtue, for Kant interpretation often thrives on such puzzles--in fact, some might say is only accurate in so far it reflects them. But there are puzzles and there are puzJles. Often AI-Azm seems to have distorted rather than to have clarified them. For those concerned with Kant's conception of time, however, the book deserves careful reading. STEPHEN A. ERICKSON Pomona College John Grote: A Critical Estimate of His Writings. By Lauchlin D. MacDonald. /The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966. N.p.) I might as well start with a confession and an apology. My confession is that, much as I may be in sympathy with Personalism as a philosophical position, I doubt that I am the best reviewer for this book. My apology is that, nevertheless, I venture to write this review because I believe that it must be written. Difficulties arise, however, from the fact that I find large parts of the book so confused in presentation and argument that I do not know exactly what to say about it. There is practically no page in my copy without question marks or queries on the margins. A few samples may suffice. On page 11 Lauehlin D. MacDonald writes that "Kant had a profound influence on Grote's philosophy"; to substantiate this claim he discusses "'noumenon,' 'phenomenon,' and 'thing in itself,' as used by Kant." But instead of using Kantian texts to make his point, he quotes Erdmarm to the effect that Kant "called . . . duties things-in-themselves " and regarded the noumenon as "an eternal ought." On page 15 Grote is quoted as saying that "phenomenal reality.., is what it is quite independently of the manner in which anyone knows it, and even independently of its being known at all by anybody." Though not at all Kantian in spirit or in fact, a proper interpretation of "phenomenal reality" might justify the statement were it not for the author's statement (13) that "the term 'phenomena' . . . is a looking . . . at the 'objects' of physical science" and (15) that "the existence of consciousness has nothing to do with it." On page 17 we read that "phenomenal reality cannot comprehend what life is"---one wonders why it should, since (according to page 18) it is something that "responds to the senses." On page 20 we are told that Grote "'is a Kantian" inasmuch as he holds that "the pure concepts of the understanding.., are [or "should" be] abstractions from reality." Poor Kant! Space does not permit going through this book page by page. But let us turn briefly to Chapter IX, "Personalism in Grote's Writings." Here we are reminded of the fact that in Chapter viii Grote was classified as "'an epistemological personalist." Now the theme is that he is "a metaphysical personalist" also. We are told that "by metaphysical personalism is meant the personal nature of reality" (188). At this point, however, an ambiguity creeps into the argument: "Ideas and purposes," MacDonald points out, "are properly regarded as belonging to persons and are therefore . . . personaL " and since "there is no reality . . . that is not a . . . reality-for-us," there is "always a personal nature to reality." But on page 191 we are told that the God who "originated the universe" is "possessed of a mind and a personal existence." Moreover, "the reality of the universe is . . . characterized by divine personality." I can discover no logically compelling transition from the initial statement to the conclusion. My difficulties increase on pages 192-194 where we are told that "Grote is an epistemological 218 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY monist and a metaphysical pluralist.'" The epistemological monism, presumably, lies in Grote's "identifying idea and object," even though we "cannot deny the existence of the phenomena" (193) which are "matter and movement" (17), and "they are phenomena not phenomenon" (193). Moreover--and this is Grote's metaphysical pluralism-- "'reality is as pluralistic as the many selves that view it," and...