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BOOK REVIEWS 107 of his religious belief (pp. 43-46). He points out that Cudworth distinguished Hobbesian from Calvinistic determinism (p. 127), and that some Calvinists refused to connect Hobbes's view with theirs (p. 127); unfortunately, he makes no note of the fact that Warrender and Herbert W. Schneider (see his Introduction to the edition of Leviathan, published by Liberal Arts Press [1958], p. ix) have suggested that Hobbes may be interpreted as a Calvinist, at least in religious thought; and that Calvinism with its many ramifications would seem to include both forms of determinism that Cudworth distinguished . This is not the place for an exigesis of Hobbes, but surely he can be looked upon as one who, in an age of scepticism, saw the impossibility of reconciling matters of fact and reason with faith. Fideism has never been a popular view nor does it appeal to many divines and churchmen, but it is certainly within the Christian tradition, Catholic and Protestant. It is true that he identifies body with substance, and for the most part defines "spirit" as "air, wind or a disposition of the mind." He states, however, "Other significations of Spirit I find no where any; and where none of these can satisfie the sense of that word in Scripture, the place falleth not under humane Understanding: and our Faith therein consisteth not in our Opinion, but in our Submission; . . For the nature of God is incomprehensible; that is to say, we understand nothing of what he is, but only that he is . . ." (p. 304, Hobbes Leviathan, with an essay by the late W. G. Pogson Smith; Oxford, 1947). To argue that God's nature is incomprehensible, that we cannot describe Him, only honor Him; to warn that all else is vain philosophy is certainly not alien to Christian orthodoxy even if many professing Christians have denounced it. In beginning this review I noted that the main purpose of Professor Mintz in this book was a significant one. It is also the case, however, that knowing the historical background of Hobbes is only an aid to interpreting him. The student of philosophy has to know Hobbes too; and if the historical material presented is an interpretation, then, qua interpretation, it loses its historical character and becomes timeless. In this sense the student who reads and tries to interpret Hobbes three hundred years after the publication of Leviathan is as contemporary as those who tried to do so while the sage of Malmesbury yet lived. He, the student, may read Hobbes and his critics and disagree with them; he may read Hobbes and Warrender and agree with Warrender. It is perhaps fitting to 9 conclude this review of a stimulating, if brief, study with a word from Hobbes: From whence we may inferre, that when we believe any saying whatsoever it be, to be true, from arguments taken, not from the thing itselfe, or from the principles of naturall Reason, but from the Authority, and good opinion we have of him that hath sayd it; then is the speaker, 'or person we believe in, or trust in, and whose word we take, the object of our Faith; and the Honour done in Believing, is done him onely (p. 51, op. cir.). THEODOREWALDMAN Harvey Mudd College Studi sull'Ontologia di Spinoza. Parte I. da Piero Di Vona. (Firenze: La Nuova Italia, 1960. Pp. vii + 275. = Pubblieazioni dell'Istituto di Storia della Filosofia dell'Universith degli Studi di Milano. 4. L. 2000.) This is a detailed analysis of the wider (or narrower, more traditional) context of Spinoza's conception of God as the order of nature. It has three long chapters: 1. The concept and order of the philosophical sciences; 2. Reason and metaphysical knowledge; 3. The concepts of res and ens. 108 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY The author first explores the significance of the relatively early Cogitata Metaphysics. Metaphysics is divided by Spinoza into General (concerning Being and its essential affections) and Special (concerning God and his attributes). This is developed into the distinction between God's "essential attributes" as Being and his "natural properties" as the order of nature; between the infinitude of essential being and the two...

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