Minimal Theologies: Critiques of Secular Reason in Adorno and Levinas (review)

De Vries' thesis is that theology, minimally understood, is an unavoidable supplement to critical thought; indeed, secular reason makes claims for which it cannot give an adequate account on its own terms. It depends on the "other of reason," on religious figures of speech that supplement its every claim. Secular reason is parasitic on or in symbiosis with (depending on your view) theological minimalism, that is, with the trace of reason's transcendent other. And to this extent, despite its ontotheological and dogmatic downfall, theology is a necessary supplement to the incompleteness of secular reason. De Vries supports his thesis by exploring the philosophies of Theodor Adorno and Emmanuel Levinas that converge, he argues, on a common, philosophical negativity, the core features of which anticipate, systematize, and formalize what he calls "minimal theologies." The negative of minimal theologies is different from the Hegelian negative: there is no negation of the negation and thus a positive advance, which is a feature of Hegelian negativity that seems to vex so many people. The negative of theological minimalism also differs from the negative of apophatic theologies with which it has some affinities. In this fascinating study, de Vries distinguishes "minimal theologies" from negative theologies while explicating Adorno and Levinas' respective critiques of reason. That he does not call their critiques postsecular reveals both their proximity to and distance from Kant's critique of pure reason. This is an important point and should be understood at the outset: Adorno and Levinas critique the limits of reason, which is tied-up, necessarily, with the absolute, the trace of the "other of reason." The object of de Vries' critique is what he calls "bisected" notions of rationality, that is, reason split by the faith–knowledge distinction. He argues that Habermas' concept of formal (quasi-transcendental) pragmatics is a grand but ultimately failed attempt to overcome bisected reason. He argues, further, that Adorno and Levinas provide resources for overcoming the division. De Vries characterizes their positions, respectively, as "the dialectical critique of dialectics" and "the phenomenological critique of phenomenology," thus signaling their paradoxical character. Indeed, he views their paradoxical and hyperbolic rhetorical style as a methodological virtue. It provides rationality with a breadth and depth that transcendental pragmatics cannot match. In short, Adorno and Levinas revel in the act of performative contradiction, rejecting before the fact, as it were, Habermas' stringent critique of such discursive contradictions in Theory of Communicative Action (1983) and Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (1987).

Part I addresses Habermas' transcendental pragmatics, which provides the criteria for rationality that de Vries presupposes, criticizes, and tries to go beyond. Its length seems excessive, owing no doubt to the genesis of the book during the late 1980s when Habermas was at the center of a huge debate about rationality and communication. Its excessiveness notwithstanding, it is an extremely important book and reading it is well worth the effort. Part II is devoted to Adorno's negative metaphysics, his paradoxical attempt to break free of Hegel's dialectic through a dialectical critique of identity and totality. Part III deals with Levinas' equally paradoxical attempt to escape phenomenology using phenomenological concepts. De Vries acknowledges that Adorno's efforts could be read as a failure, as exhibiting his true status as a negative Hegelian. Nevertheless, Adorno is important to theological minimalism. Even if his contribution is not as clear as Levinas', it converges with Levinas and does the same "negative" work. Their common theological minimalism points simultaneously toward the absolute, the trace of the "other of reason," toward realities that elude conceptualization.

In Part IV, de Vries summarizes and elaborates the notion of minimal theology. He uses a mode of interpretation (hermeneutica sacra sive profana) that is simultaneously sacred and profane, which pursues the sacred through the profane. This hermeneutic is irreconcilable with any positive theology, any theology that affirms what the transcendent (infinite, absolute, or God) is. Indeed, its ascesis is so extreme that it outstrips every negative...