John Dewey and Moral Imagination: Pragmatism in Ethics (review)

John Dewey and Moral Imagination focuses on three aspects of Dewey's ethical thought: social habits, moral imagination, and the metaphor of morality as art. In his first chapter, Fesmire describes how social institutions shape and constitute our character habits. He illustrates this point using James Farrell's Studs Lonigan novels, which were inspired by Dewey's moral psychology. The main character, Studs, lives in an impoverished, racist, and gang oriented social world, and meanings drawn from this world constitute his habitual character. These social habits that Studs acquires are not simply routines nor are they formed by biological drives. Rather the social meanings that they contain "organize a horizon of possibilities" (16) that comprise his will. As a result, character building is not simply a matter of strengthening an isolated personal will, but instead requires the reconstruction of social institutions and their embedded meanings.

In chapters four and five, Fesmire discusses moral deliberation as a process of imaginative and dramatic rehearsal, teasing out two senses of moral imagination. Empathetic projection enables us to take the attitude of others and is critical for proper moral decision making. But imagination also includes "the capacity to concretely perceive what is before us in light of what could be" (65). This ability to see possibilities in current circumstances involves the emotional generation of new ideals and ends. Imagination thus transcends the rational and evaluative constraints of much moral theory. Imagination is neither a handmaiden to rational evaluation, nor does it consist in undisciplined flights of fancy. Imaginative moral deliberation is constrained by the context of larger life narratives and social institutions; it alone determines how we act and the meaning of those actions.

Using recent cognitive psychology, Fesmire describes how imaginative deliberation is permeated with metaphor and is therefore embodied in a social and cultural context. This means that "conceptual structures ride piggyback on and evolved from sensory and motor systems" (83). Metaphors transmit meaning and are embedded in social institutions. So, it becomes critically important to choose appropriate metaphors for moral action. Fesmire shows that current metaphors for morality are drawn from the areas of commerce and business. In the book's last two chapters, he argues that we should replace these metaphors with those drawn from the realm of art. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle compared ethical conduct to art, arguing that in order to hit the mark in each one could neither add nor subtract any element of conduct. Fesmire dwells upon these aesthetic metaphors for morality, extending them to jazz, sculpture and narrative composition in illuminating ways.

Fesmire is careful to acknowledge both the strengths and distortions of artistic metaphors to illuminate morality. Creative artists and moral agents both possess a carefully attuned perception that includes appropriate emotional responses. Both also possess a productive means of creative expressiveness. Fesmire is committed to a model of art and morality that is ultimately based on harmonizing or integrating interests. He acknowledges that moral actions can be wrenching and difficult and that moral decisions "may lead to dissatisfying employment, ruptured friendships, harassment, political imprisonment" (121). Despite these acknowledgements, Fesmire argues that "Discovering an integrative value is an ideal for which to strive" (122).

The aesthetic harmonization and integration ideal for moral action may break down in areas where there are substantial and deeply held conflicting values. Fesmire's discussion could benefit from a careful analysis of how these metaphors might help navigate through current moral dilemmas, such as abortion, euthanasia, or environmental issues. More fundamentally, there may be moral benefit from disharmony and irreducible pluralism that cannot be integrated into a greater whole. For example, Leni Riefenstahl's film Triumph of the Will expresses the social integration of Nazi Germany in beautifully aesthetic terms. This suggests that there may be moral dangers to relying exclusively on aesthetic harmonization and integration to characterize our moral ideals. This suggestion does nothing...