The Military in Greek Politics: From Independence to Democracy (review)

Thanos Veremis’s The Military in Greek Politics: From Independence to Democracy is an extremely well-researched historical account of the Greek military’s politicization and one of the most comprehensive English-language sources on the topic. Using a plethora of sources, including public and private archives, memoirs, biographies, and personal interviews, Professor Veremis provides rich documentation for his central thesis that “the single most obvious distinguishing feature of the Greek army in the twentieth century is its political activism” (189). Specifically, he argues that politicization of the military is a relative latecomer to modern Greek history, beginning during the interwar period. He enumerates many of the causes of this interventionism, including the growth of patronage within the armed forces, the meddling of civilian elites in military affairs, and periodic, politically motivated dismissals and reinstatements. All three practices, argues Veremis, contributed to military factionalism, division, and politicization.

Particularly interesting is Veremis’s argument that increased politicization had much to do with the democratization of the armed forces after the Balkan Wars (1912 and 1913). As the social structure of the officer corps changed—that is, as reserve officers were granted regular commissions and as military cadets became socially diverse—the sons of the less affluent began to rise to officer rank. This new type of military officer, argues Veremis, depended on political and military patrons for promotions and survival and was more susceptible to political manipulation than his colleagues of upper middle-class background. The professionalism of the officer corps was disrupted; officers became politicized.

The national division, or schism further disrupted the professionalism of the Greek officer corps as it led to outright intervention on the part of civilians in military matters. As a result of the schism, officers became arbiters in the struggle between the Liberals and royalists as politicians (including the king) manipulated them to promote their own goals. Particularly interesting is Veremis’s thoroughgoing narrative of Venizelos’s complicity. Using extensive archival and interview data, he illustrates how Venizelos involved the military in political disputes and how he was instrumental in instigating the failed 1916 and 1935 military revolts. Venizelos was particularly adept at giving junior officers the impression that he opposed revolutionary activities while all the while secretly planning to engage the military in politics. Junior officers were simply led to believe that Venizelos was bowing to their will when the revolts occurred. In this way, he avoided soiling his hands and guarded his reputation as the champion of normal parliamentary government.

Politically motivated retirements, dismissals, and reappointments also politicized the military at this time, and Veremis gives detailed accounts of each. He illustrates how, upon Venizelos’s return to Athens from Thessaloniki in July 1917 to take over the government, he engaged in such activities. Supporters of King Constantine were purged from the civil service and the army, senior Germanophile officers were removed from their commands, and many royalist politicians were exiled. Officers supportive of the Venizelist revolt were the beneficiaries; they were rewarded with premature promotions. Later, it would be the turn of others—anti-Venizelists, General Metaxas, the colonels, PASOK and Néa Dhimokratía—to dismiss, remove, and reinstate officers each in its own turn. Settling political disputes by dismissal had become a common practice in the Greek armed forces.

Leaving the interwar period and approaching the present, Veremis illustrates how many of these unhealthy practices persist to varying degrees today. The gradual involvement of party politics in promotions, retirements, appointments, and reappointments in the 1980s and 1990s as well as the appointment of retired officers to head national ministries has contributed, according to Veremis, to a repoliticization of the armed forces. Giving detailed accounts of both Papandreou’s actions in this regard and Néa Dhimokratía’s recriminations, Veremis observes that if this rivalry between the two does not cease, it could again turn the military “into an apple of political discord” (179).

Nonetheless, despite such politicization as well as a...